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SYNOPSIS 
 
This thesis proposes that the modern Western legal system contains secularised or otherwise 
distorted Christian theology as an integral part of its conceptual foundation.  It argues that 
this secularisation has led to legal violence in the form of antagonism between the members 
of the legal community, and alienation of the individuals in the community from each other 
and the state.  In order to establish a peaceful system of law and mitigate this violence, the 
thesis contends that these distorted concepts ought to be identified and returned to their 
‘orthodox’ understandings.  In particular, the Christian ideas of truth, faith and reason require 
analysis in a jurisprudential context.  To this end, the thesis engages the work of John 
Milbank and attempts to articulate a particular conception of the relationship between truth, 
faith and reason – one which will be conducive to the construction of a legal community 
characterised by peace rather than violence. 
 
The introductory chapter summarises the thesis and its methodology, and positions the thesis 
in its relevant jurisprudential, philosophical and theological context.  The first chapter of the 
thesis more specifically structures the content by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s 
work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason.  Having 
proposed these, chapter two examines and extends Milbank’s theological critique of science, 
exposing the secularisation of ‘scientific’ reason and its divorce from ‘Christian’ faith which 
forms the foundation for ‘modern’ (secular) thinking.  With an analysis of Jacques Derrida in 
chapter three, the thesis proceeds to explain how faith and reason are reconciled in Christian 
theology, allowing the development of a ‘post-modern’ theology with the view of producing 
peace rather than violence. 
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Chapter four adopts this postmodern theology, tracing the genealogy of secularisation and 
violence in the development of law and the modern legal community.  This shows the 
contingent nature of the secular legal system and creates a space for it to be redeemed and 
made peaceful.  Chapter five commences the process of articulating this Christian idea of a 
peaceful legal community through the revelation of theological truth by reading law and truth 
in the trial of Christ, arguing for a system which embraces a loving mutual trust rather than a 
calculating drive for decision or finality.  Chapter six contends that trust in the face of the 
mysterious divine is in fact the desirable Christian legacy, one which is nevertheless 
materialised and accessible through Christ’s resurrection, and makes possible eternal life 
beyond the constraints of violence.  The resurrection instantiates the Pauline law to love your 
neighbour as yourself, and chapter seven explores the nature of this theological truth, and 
argues that its application to the modern legal system will allow a love beyond law which 
produces a peaceful community. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
I A TALE OF TWO CITIES 
 
The great Christian theologian and church father, Saint Augustine of Hippo, once identified a 
fundamental distinction between the violence of the ancient pagans and the peace of the early 
Christians.  In his magnum opus, The City of God, Augustine contrasted the ontological 
presupposition of Roman and Greek culture (the pagan or ‘earthly’ city) – a focus on an 
antagonism and chaos which needed to be controlled or suppressed – with the City of God, a 
Christian theology that took as its starting point a harmonious communion with God.1  This 
dynamic tension between peace and violence also exists in law today.  As will be explained, 
the modern legal system is fundamentally concerned with the regulation of individual 
relationships through various forms of violence in the pursuit of peace.  However, just as the 
ancient Roman peace confronted by Augustine was really just a false peace of violently 
controlled violence, so the peace arrived at through the modern legal process is not a real 
peace.  In order to identify the fundamental agonistic tension between peace and violence 
within modern jurisprudence, just as Augustine did with ancient society, I will utilise the 
work of contemporary theologian John Milbank, and open the possibility for re-thinking law 
in relation to a community of true peace. 
 
 
                                                            
1 Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans (Penguin, 2008).  Specific references to the text 
will follow at the appropriate points. 
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A A Crisis of Modern Jurisprudence? 
 
‘A crisis in human law is the occasion for the discovery of jurisprudence’, and it can often be 
the case that this ‘crisis’ is the perceived existence or threat of violence, and the way to avert 
the crisis is through the existence or threat of violence.2  Indeed, as one superficially 
examines the canon of modern jurisprudence, such a theme appears to emerge.  For example, 
recently Giorgio Agamben has disturbingly contended that his notion of the concentration 
camp ‘signals the political space of modernity itself’ – in other words, the concentration 
camp is our modern world.3  In this space where law is permanently suspended, ‘its 
inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life’, such that 
‘the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realised, in which 
power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation’.4  Here Agamben sought to 
extend the notion of Carl Schmitt’s state of exception as the ‘temporary suspension of the 
rule of law on the basis of a factual state of danger’ to a ‘permanent special arrangement, 
which as such nevertheless remains outside the normal order’ through the concept of 
exclusion in the camp.5   
 
 
                                                            
2 S Buchanan, So Reason Can Rule: Reflections on Law and Politics (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1982) 267. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University, 1998) 177.  Jacques 
Derrida similarly argues that the very foundation of law and justice itself implies a performative force, or 
violence (Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: ‘The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ (Paper presented on 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Cardozo Law School, 1989) 13).  Some of the mentioned 
theorists, as well as others, are examined in much more detail in further chapters in an attempt to catalogue the 
intrinsic violence of this ‘modern’ law.  It could perhaps be objected that the represented ‘canon’ is rather 
selective, excluding more arguably peaceful frameworks of modern law such as that of John Locke ((Two 
Treatises of Government (Cambridge, 1967)) or John Rawls ((A Theory of Justice (Oxford, 1972)).  As will 
become apparent over the thesis, even these more ostensibly ‘peaceful’ frameworks are couched in terms of the 
violence of the purely rational self-interested liberal subject, and so are not excluded from this broad brush. 
4 Agamben, Homo Sacer, above n 3, 174. 
5 Ibid 167. 
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In the twentieth century, Schmitt articulated a view of law and sovereignty based on the 
ability to ‘decid[e] on the exception’, where the exception ‘can at best be characterised as a 
case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state’.6  As such, on the basis of a 
perceived threat of violence to the state, the sovereign can decide to suspend the operation of 
law in order to (potentially violently) eliminate the threat.7  This notion of absolute state 
sovereignty can be found in seventeenth century political theorist Thomas Hobbes.  
According to Hobbes, the end or purpose of the commonwealth, or legal system, is security.8  
Hobbes argues that we ‘would not observe the Laws of Nature… without the terror of some 
power’, and through creating the Leviathan as legal sovereign we escape ‘from the miserable 
condition of war, which is a necessary consequence… of the natural passions of men when 
there is no visible power to keep them in awe and tie them by fear of punishment to the 
performance of their covenants…’ – for the Leviathan destroys all those parts of society 
which threaten the society itself.9   
 
From this brief overview, the crisis in human law which is the occasion for jurisprudence 
could then be viewed in the sense that it seeks to alleviate the threat or existence of violence, 
whether fictitious as in Hobbes’ hypothetical state of nature, or actual in the sense of 
Schmitt’s state of exception.  However, the notion of crisis may also be taken in a slightly 
different sense – that, as has been sketched, the existence of law and jurisprudence apparently 
seems to assume a foundation of violence.  This, in fact, is what I see as the salient crisis of 
law – the claim that law is ontologically based in a foundation of violence, rather than peace 
– which suggests the need for a new jurisprudential approach.  
                                                            
6 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (University of Chicago, 2005) 
5-6. 
7 Ibid 9-10. 
8 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Longman, 2008) 113. 
9 Ibid. 
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II THE NATURE OF VIOLENCE 
 
A Violence as Antagonism 
 
Before proceeding, it is worthwhile investigating what is meant by the term ‘violence’.  This 
initially requires an understanding of violence generally, followed by a consideration of how 
the notion of violence is specifically understood in its legal context.  The late Grace Jantzen, 
in Foundations of Violence, does not explicitly define the term ‘violence’, but we are able to 
derive an idea of it from what she expresses.10  She views violence in terms of ‘aggression’, 
including ‘warfare’ and ‘hostility’, and extends this by including ‘violent crimes such as rape 
or murder’.11  Put negatively, violence is the denial and disruption of a flourishing ‘web of 
relationships’, the pursuit of ‘atomistic individualism’.12  The pursuit of atomistic 
individualism can be seen as violent because the intrinsic difference between individuals 
implies there will be friction between them as they interact.  With no uniting communal 
factor that provides a basis or motivation for relational harmony, people attempt to pursue 
their individual interests at the expense of other individuals.13  From the perspective of 
violence, ‘death is constitutive of life’ and an ‘obsession’ – ‘violence and mastery’ become a 
‘way of life’.14  Violence in the sense of ‘battle’ or ‘war’ is ‘graphic’ and ‘bloody’, bringing 
‘devastation’ and ‘cruelty’.15  The ‘lust for power and wealth’ which could be the motivation 
for such warfare is an expression of this ‘self-interest’.16  Ultimately violence, in this sense of 
                                                            
10 Grace Jantzen, Foundations of Violence (Routledge, 2004). 
11 Ibid 16, 27. 
12 Ibid 37-38. 
13 One might think of this in terms of a ‘state of nature’. 
14 Jantzen, above n 10, 90. 
15 Ibid 99. 
16 Ibid 111. 
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pursuing ‘civil peace at the expense of foreign war’, actually ‘destroys the very structures of 
the society that it was undertaken to preserve’.17    
 
It is not a pretty picture.  Jantzen goes on to conclude that ‘this present life is constituted by 
death and violence, the warring absence of harmony’, and that ‘war, violence, cruelty and 
hypocrisy’ are the ‘real sources of human suffering’.18  She reduces all human suffering to the 
propagation and permanent presence of this sort of violence.  As an initial working definition 
from Jantzen then, we can understand violence fundamentally as antagonism, the warring 
absence of harmony between individuals and society which disrupts the mutual human 
flourishing that comes through the harmony of life-giving relationship.  This violence can be 
manifested variously through warfare, aggression, dominance, power, cruelty and hypocrisy.  
Furthermore, according to this understanding of violence, there is a direct connection 
between ontological peace/violence and political peace/violence; the disruption of ontological 
harmony requires the exertion of political power to regulate the community. 
 
From a slightly different angle, we can observe this notion of violence as antagonism as the 
return of the question of reconciling the one and the many, which may also be understood as 
the particular and the universal, or the individual and the community.  The resolution of the 
one and the many is, in one sense, the very beginning of philosophy and theology.  Its 
contribution is most clearly set forth in the famed disagreement between Heraclitus and 
Parmenides.  Heraclitus is the philosopher of plurality and motion – everything is becoming, 
the many are prior to the one, and there is no stability in nature.19  By contrast, Parmenides 
                                                            
17 Ibid 117. 
18 Ibid 199, 235. 
19 Heraclitus, cited in Jantzen, above n 10, 156. 
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argued that nature is uniform and unchanging, pure being with no becoming – the many do 
not really exist, but everything is the One.20   
 
Aristotle joined the dialogue between these positions, and using a medical analogy, 
articulated why this is a ‘problem’ which requires some form of resolution or reconciliation: 
‘… the general universal statement is inadequate insofar as it is indeterminate with respect to 
particular situations, while the more specific universal statement, though more determinate, is 
nevertheless liable to mislead’.21  In other words, the universal fails to take account of the 
specific situation due to its ambiguous universality, while the more specified or particularised 
universal (or the ‘particular’) cannot be applied universally.  Hence, the problem of the one 
and the many conceived as a problem of violence: the universal alienates the particular, and 
the particular castrates the universal.  There is a gap or alienation between the one and the 
many which produces an antagonistic violence.22 
 
B Violence as Alienation 
 
This reveals the second aspect of violence, as that which alienates subjects from mutually 
beneficial, charitable relationships.  As the thesis proceeds, it will argue that both these 
aspects of violence are present in and even foundational to the modern Western legal system, 
especially common law legal systems (e.g. that of the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, New Zealand and so on).  This kind of legal system lies at the heart of society, 
                                                            
20 Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many (Cambridge University Press, 1992) 17-18; c.f. Jantzen, 
above n 10, 155-158. 
21 David Devereux, ‘Particular and Universal in Aristotle’s Conception of Practical Knowledge’ (1986) 39 The 
Review of Metaphysics 483, 496. 
22 C.f. the problem Aristotle identifies with law in this context, Ibid 500-502. 
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protecting rights, imposing duties, and establishing a framework for the conduct of any 
social, political or economic activity.  This includes punishing offenders, compensating the 
injured, and enforcing agreements, and is consequently a type of contractual, codified or 
‘legalistic’ view of law.  Such law exists with the aim of achieving justice, promoting 
freedom, upholding the rule of law and protecting security.23  However, Jeffrey Bloechl 
submits that this modernist conception is undesirable, for there is a focus on totalisation, 
where one is submitted to a general principle which forms one’s identity and subsumes 
difference.  This principle is governed by what is viewed as a pure, universal reason, and as 
such it is indifferent to the individual.  This is particularly so in regard to upholding 
something like the ‘rule of law’, which claims that the law is objective, applies equally to 
everyone, and is the authority for and subjectivates society.  This arguably leads to alienation 
where personal subjectivity is irrelevant.24   
 
Martha Minow appears to articulate a similar position, arguing that legal rules ‘tend to 
establish categories’, and have ‘drawn a boundary’ between people.25  This has occurred 
specifically in terms of people’s obligations to others – for example, with the duty to rescue.26  
‘Law’s usual boundaries distinguish self from others’ and have ‘helped implement norms 
which curb responsibility’.27  Consequently, ‘legal rules often falter when conflicts arise 
within ongoing relationships’.28  Fundamentally, ‘law has tended to deny the mutual 
dependence of all people while accepting and accentuating the dependence of people who are 
                                                            
23 Raymond Wacks, Law: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2008) 1. 
24 Jeffrey Bloechl, ‘Between Law and Love: Paul and Philosophy’ (Paper presented at the Annual Simone Weil 
Lecture on Human Value, Australian Catholic University, June 2013). 
25 Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Cornell University, 
1990) 8. 
26 Ibid.  This particular issue is highlighted in the final chapter in relation to Christ’s Parable of the Good 
Samaritan. 
27 Ibid 9. 
28 Ibid. 
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“different”’.29  Overall, Minow seems to advocate a legal system based in relationships 
between people rather than boundaries distinguishing them, and a legal system which treats 
everyone as different in this context.30   
 
From these considerations we can map our general definition of violence as antagonism and 
alienation onto a specifically jurisprudential space.  I propose that legal violence exists in the 
sense that it establishes categories and draws boundaries between people (alienation) under 
the assumption of purely rational self-interest and atomistic individuality (antagonism).  
These boundaries and categories separate and exclude persons from mutually harmonious 
relationship, disrupting communal flourishing.  This is particularly displayed in law’s attempt 
to balance the individual and the community.  Focusing on the atomistic individual 
differentiates and excludes an interdependent web of flourishing human relationships, while 
focusing on the community as universal posited sovereignty denies differences between 
individuals.  As will be explained, this legal violence may be manifested in the sense of pure 
violence as defined above, but it often also seems to be engaged more subtly within the 
institutional level of law. 
 
C ‘Pagan’ Violence and the Augustinian Response 
 
Jantzen traces the foundations of violence to the ancient Greeks and Romans, or the ‘pagans’.  
The intrinsically pagan nature of violence is found in the fact that for the ancient Greeks, 
‘beauty is identified with death’ – it is beautiful to engage in war and violence and to die in 
                                                            
29 Ibid 10. 
30 Ibid 15-16. 
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so doing.31  For example, the Greek hero Achilles (notably, a supreme warrior or perpetrator 
of violence) is glorified and exalted for the fact that he died in battle.  ‘The type of heroic 
deed that qualifies above all for imperishable glory is violence and killing’, as well as being 
killed.32  It is a ‘glory of violence and slaughter’, ‘saturated in blood’ – and incomparably 
venerated.33  ‘Glory is achieved, ultimately, by heroic death… immortality is gained through 
dying, eternity through violence; and both are more excellent than a peaceable life’.34  In this 
pagan sense, ‘violence, rather than being represented as destructive and brutal, is portrayed 
ultimately as glorious: it confers beauty and immortality upon its perpetrators and 
victims…’35  Heroic excellence may also be construed in terms of victory not just in warfare, 
but also in cunning and mastery.36  Indeed, the Greek intellectuals were often ‘invested in the 
role of warfare in the state and the necessity for men to engage in violence’.37   
 
The city of Rome was also ‘premised on violence’, grew up under Mars, the God of War, and 
valorises the willingness to fight and die violently for the empire.38  The peace of Rome, 
‘while representing itself as a golden age, was built on violence… its monuments exalt 
violence’.39  In this sense, virtue’s ‘chief characteristic’ was viewed to be ‘active control or 
power’.40  For both Greeks and Romans, violence was the way through which beauty was 
depicted, and death in battle is ‘sweet and honourable’ – ultimately glorious, whether for self 
(the Greeks) or the city (the Romans).41  ‘Beauty itself was bent to the service of power, and 
                                                            
31 Jantzen, above n 10, 39. 
32 Ibid 54. 
33 Ibid 55. 
34 Ibid 56. 
35 Ibid 62. 
36 Ibid 76-77. 
37 Ibid 176. 
38 Ibid 251. 
39 Ibid 253. 
40 Ibid 268. 
41 Ibid 291-292. 
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made to give a glorious face to violence and death’.42  Jantzen concludes by asking a 
pertinent question: ‘How can dissent be expressed in a world where there is a single 
superpower insisting on its global hegemony and masking its violence in a rhetoric of 
peace?’43 
 
This is expressed in the specific context of the Roman peace, but Jantzen acknowledges that 
the treatment of warfare and the rhetorical legitimation of violence in Ancient Greek and 
Roman times is also applicable to the contemporary west.44  In other words, as we 
countenance this claimed violence of law masquerading as peace, the question is equally 
important to us today – if indeed law is as violent as has been claimed, how can we articulate 
an alternative basis for law: one where peace is the foundation rather than violence?  This 
thesis argues that just as Augustine dissented from the pagan violence of his day through 
orthodox Christian theology, so we may dissent today through Christian theology.  For John 
Milbank, it is Augustine in The City of God who most properly articulates the meaning of an 
ontology of peace in Christian theology, in contrast to pagan violence.  Augustine argues that 
the heavenly peace is unique in that it 
 …is so truly peaceful that it should be regarded as the only peace deserving the name, at least 
in respect of the rational creation; for this peace is the perfectly ordered and completely 
harmonious fellowship in the enjoyment of God, and each other in God.  When we arrive at 
that state of peace, there will be no longer a life that ends in death, but a life that is life in sure 
and sober truth.45   
 
The key here is ‘perfectly ordered and completely harmonious fellowship’ in the enjoyment 
of God and each other, which leads not to death or violence, but rather to peace and the good.  
                                                            
42 Ibid 295. 
43 Ibid 299. 
44 Ibid 103-104. 
45 Augustine, above n 1, 878. 
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This problem of whether there can be a harmonious human order is central – whether one can 
assign to their respective tasks and places many different activities, desires, and social 
formations.  If this is not possible, then ‘only an “effective” peace is possible, a “secular” 
peace of temporarily suspended violence or regulated competition’.46  
 
In the City of God, Augustine retraces the story of the pagan virtues, and, as Milbank argues 
with regard to the secular, these ‘virtues’ were hopelessly contaminated by a celebration of 
violence.47  The earthly city is marked by the ‘denial of love for God and others’, and the 
‘enjoyment of arbitrary and violent power’ over others.48  Augustine argues that the ‘peace’ 
of the pagans is limited and apparent, where dominion is pursued as an end in itself and the 
‘peace’ is a result of the victory of a dominant force over other forces.  In other words, it is an 
‘arbitrary limitation of a preceding state of anarchic conflict’.49  Indeed, the pagan notion of 
virtue reduces to the pursuit of glory and pre-eminence which comes from defeating 
something, or a conquest of less desirable forces supplementary to supporting a right desire.50  
The very foundation of the pagan city enshrines violence, and ‘mythical beginnings of legal 
order are therefore traced back to the arbitrary limitation of violence by violence, to victory 
over rivals, and to the usurpation of fathers by sons’.51   
 
Augustine’s critique of pagan religion extends to its many gods and the rituals associated 
with worshiping those gods.  The diversity of gods controlling various areas of life implies 
                                                            
46 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Blackwell, 1990) 336.  This notion of 
the so-called ‘secular peace’ will be unpacked over the thesis. 
47 Ibid 289. 
48 Ibid 392. 
49 Ibid 393. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid 393-394.  Consider, for example, the violent foundation of Rome based on the account of Romulus and 
Remus.  See Augustine, above n 1, 600-601. 
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those areas are in fundamental conflict, and the honour due to the diverse gods is really a 
function of their self-assertion of power.  In this sense, the reason of the greater paganism is 
concerned with the ability to adapt cunningly to circumstances and so retain the upper hand 
through moral tricks, and the gods delight in being spectators and promoters of violence, 
demanding sacrifice.52  The pagan gods refused to prevent the ‘degradation of morality’ and 
‘did not offer moral instruction’, and furthermore sanctioned ‘obscenities and violence’ as a 
requirement for their proper ‘worship’.53  The pagans ‘sought glory and praise from people’, 
which ultimately lead to the desire for domination and power and produced wars and 
violence.54  And war is a ‘miserable state of existence’, to be deplored and lamented as 
violent.55  Ultimately, Augustine argues, this depravity led to the ‘destruction’ of the 
‘commonwealth’ – both as a general principle and in the specific case of the Roman Empire’s 
eventual decline.56     
 
This deconstruction of the pagan (Greek) virtue exposes the fact that it is intrinsically 
connected not with peace, but with aristocratic and heroic honour – that is, the ‘appropriation 
of status through victory’ in some conflict.57  For the antique, pagan understanding of virtue, 
it remains essentially a ‘heroic power’ to restrict a preceding violence and to ‘rein in forces 
around an unstable centre’, such as in the aforementioned case of the Greek war ‘hero’ 
Achilles.58  The pagans were resigned to inherently unruly social elements which required 
discipline and control.  Hence, the presence of virtue was merely that of ‘military’ virtue.59   
                                                            
52 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 395. 
53 Augustine, City of God, above n 1, 54. 
54 Ibid 212-215. 
55 Ibid 861-862. 
56 Ibid 72-77. 
57 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 355. 
58 Ibid 366. 
59 Ibid 415. 
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Augustine therefore argues that the Romans, the original pagans, had no real virtue because 
they knew no real peace, either at the level of practice or at the level of mythical or 
ontological conception.  The Roman heroic virtue only comes as a result of war, and the 
‘peace’ is a peace of suspended warfare caused by war – and thus, is no real peace at all.  It is 
claimed instead that Christianity construes virtue as that which aims towards and is possible 
within a fundamental condition of peace, a living together of different people in mutual 
agreement which is true peace, as opposed to the spurious Roman or pagan peace of 
suspended warfare and secular ‘heroic’ virtues which are the result of warfare.60  For 
Milbank, Christian peace has ontological priority over conflict, for it is what is most real, 
most secure and most guarantees human life.61 
 
III ENVISAGING THE PEACEFUL LEGAL COMMUNITY 
 
A John Milbank and Postmodern Critical Augustinianism 
 
This ontological priority of peace over violence marks the fundamental contrast between the 
two ancient cities, and parallels the contrast between the earthly city of the contemporary 
legal system and the heavenly city of a loving Christian community.  In this modern context, 
Milbank is following Augustine in the sense that Augustine deploys a Christian ontology of 
peace in a theological critique of pagan violence. However, due to Augustine’s ‘over-
                                                            
60 Ibid 332-333. 
61 Ibid 367. 
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intellectualism and interiority’, as well as developments in modern and postmodern critical 
thought which should be incorporated, Milbank also sees him as the primary thinker to be re-
interpreted and overcome in order to successfully arrive at a theology where God as being 
produces the good.62  Consequently, Milbank describes his theological project as 
‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism’, and it is partnered with the broader project of ‘Radical 
Orthodoxy’, which seeks to redefine cultural categories in terms of theology rather than the 
secular; the argument is that this will produce a community of peace rather than violence.63  
For Milbank, ‘Augustine already put the idea of the peaceful community at the centre of his 
theology; thought of God, of revelation from God, was for him inseparable from the thought 
of heaven… the heavenly city meant for Augustine a substantial peace’.64  Milbank 
recognises that ‘one way to secure peace is to draw boundaries around “the same” and 
exclude “the other”’.65  As we saw Martha Minow indicate above, drawing boundaries and 
dividing people into various categories is a form of alienating violence as it separates 
individuals; this is the characteristic process claimed of law.  Here there is the dualistic 
violence of the included versus the excluded, ‘an ever-renewed conflict’ which is the 
‘traditional mode of violence’.66  However, in Christianity there is no exclusion, but only 
‘that which denies and takes away from Being… the violent’ or the negative – evil.67   
                                                            
62 Wayne Hankey, ‘Theoria versus Poesis: Neoplatonism and Trinitarian Difference in Aquinas, John Milbank, 
Jean-Luc Marion and John Zizioulas’ (1999) 15(4) Modern Theology 387, 388, 390.  Milbank defines 
‘interiority’ as ‘access to the transcendent by a pure inward turn… at the expense of exteriority’ or at the 
expense of the external God revealing himself as gift.  See John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, 
Language, Culture (Blackwell, 1997) 206-207. 
63 John Milbank, ‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Short Summa in Forty-Two Responses to Unasked 
Questions’ in Graham Ward (ed), The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader (Blackwell Publishers, 1997) 
278.  The full nature and terms of these projects will be outlined in Chapter one. 
64 Ibid 269.  C.f. Jantzen, above n 10, 356-357.   
65 Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63, 269. 
66 Ibid 270. 
67 Ibid 269.  Milbank argues that evil is the ‘privation of Being’, following Augustine’s account of evil as 
negative, and that evil can be committed in the most extreme sense, even inadvertently, by those who imagine 
they are ‘fulfilling the goods of order, obedience, political stability and social peace’.   John Milbank, Being 
Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Routledge, 2003) 1-2, 4. For example, Milbank states that ‘if we allow that 
“totalitarianism” be replaced by the wider concept of “secular immanence”, which is totalizing and terroristic 
because it acknowledges no supra-human power beyond itself by which it might be measured and limited, then 
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To articulate an alternative Christian foundation for a (legal) community based on true peace 
rather than violence, Milbank proposes the model of the Trinity, God as three divine persons: 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit; this is an ‘infinite relation’ of love and perfect peace, since God 
as Trinity is both unity and ‘himself community’ – which can therefore be a ‘differential 
ontology’, or a mode of being which allows the harmonious existence of difference in a 
community.68  So put crudely, ontological peace is the affirmation of Being as the 
harmonious ordering of difference, and ontological violence is the denial of Being with the 
violent conflict or war of difference.    Peace itself therefore also is beyond virtue because 
peace is the final end and condition in which virtue can flourish, the culmination of Being 
itself – or, as above, the harmonious ordering of difference.69  Thus, the new Christian 
imagination of peace is more elegantly defined as ‘the reconciliation of virtue with 
difference’.70  In this sense, as shall be suggested, Christianity can rescue virtue from violent, 
agonistic difference, for the Christian multiple in the Trinity, the ‘infinite flow of excessive 
charitable (love) difference’, is in a much more genuine sense simultaneously unity, and 
manifests unity.71    So Christian Trinitarian ontology reconciles the one and the many, 
promoting peace through the unity of individuals in the community. 
 
Reconciling virtue with difference and consequently producing ontological peace initially 
involves forsaking the Roman or pagan virtues resulting from war.  As Augustine argued, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
we can still agree that twentieth-century politics has displayed something unprecedently sinister. For in the 
instances of the Holocaust, the Gulag and US foreign policy, law has itself consented to criminal principles and 
dedicated the resources of the State to mass murder on a legal, organized and bureaucratic basis’. John Milbank, 
Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Routledge, 2003) 5. 
68 Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63, 274.  The doctrine of the Trinity and its contested 
status throughout history and today will be explained more fully in Chapter one. 
69 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 367. 
70 Ibid 332-333. 
71 Ibid 380-381. 
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these virtues ‘sought for the sake of pride and self-glory’, apart from the ‘life of faith and 
love of God and others’, are to be reckoned rather as vices than virtues, for they come from 
below, and not from above.72  The ‘ultimate good’, peace, consists in the selfless sacrifice 
and love through the forgiveness of sins modelled and enabled by Christ rather than in the 
‘perfection of personal virtue’.73  Milbank further considers that this doctrine of the 
Incarnation allows us to ‘imagine a peaceful, totally charitable [loving] God’, and ‘it suggests 
that divine goodness is no generalised intention, but always takes a very particular form, that 
it is inseparable from aesthetic harmony [peace]’.74  Indeed, ‘the Christian claim is that the 
narratives of Christ show what love – a difficult and demanding practice requiring more 
subtlety, style, and correct idiom than mere “well-meaning” – is.  That here is the Logos, the 
lost harmonic pattern of human life, which can now be reappropriated’.75  This idea supposes 
the possibility of a community based on self-giving love and togetherness, a perfectly 
existing and peaceful unity in diversity – or a community existing according to what the 
Apostle Paul terms ‘the law of love’. 
 
B Trinity, Incarnation, Revelation: The Law of Love 
 
                                                            
72 Augustine, City of God, above n 1, 891. 
73 Ibid 892.  As Milbank says, the ‘positive assertion of private autonomy’ is ‘deprivation of our participation in 
being as gift: in this way privation theory attacks as evil not just exterior and visible destruction, but also interior 
and invisible self-assertion’.  Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 27.  This is one of the issues with liberal 
legal theories which centre upon the notion of the self-interested individual, such as those propounded by Locke 
and Rawls. 
74 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 273-274. 
75 Ibid 273.  For an enlightening extended discussion of Milbank’s concept of love as an integral attribute of 
God participated in by the creation as loved (created) by God, see Jason Avis, A Radical Phenomenology of 
Love: Divine Love as Understood by the Radically Orthodox John Milbank (MA Thesis, Liberty University, 
2009).  This requires the Incarnation and Crucifixion of Christ the God-man of love so that love can pass 
through the immanent/transcendent divide, humanity can be forgiven, and this love can then be passed on to 
one’s neighbour.  It is a love of participation, selflessness, and sacrifice.  See for example John 15:12-13: Jesus 
says ‘This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you.  Greater love has no one than 
this, that someone lay down his life for his friends.’  (English Standard Version, (Crossway, 2007).  All further 
references to the Bible are to this version unless otherwise specified.) 
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As shall be outlined more fully in subsequent chapters, Milbank’s understanding of truth is 
key in this context.   Ultimately, it shall be argued that the love and peace inherent in the 
Trinitarian relations are revealed (truth-as-aletheia) through the Incarnation of Christ and 
persuade (faith-as-pistis) members of the community to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’ – 
the law of love articulated by the Apostle Paul in the New Testament.76  This fulfils the 
codified law since ‘love does no wrong to a neighbour’.77  As a first (and very crude) 
approximation, law can be understood as a principle or set of principles which govern 
individual relationships within a community.  Love, as defined above and modelled by Christ, 
involves the voluntary sacrifice of oneself for another.  So the law of love, to ‘love your 
neighbour as yourself’, is the voluntary giving of oneself for another as the principle which 
governs individual relationships within a community.78 
 
The ultimate consummation of this community of differences in perfect peace and love, then, 
is heaven.  The vision of heaven (or for Augustine, the City of God) allows the ‘denial of the 
necessity of violence’, and ‘exposes the manner in which the assumption of an always-prior 
violence preserves violence’.79  Furthermore, it indicates that there is a ‘way to act in a 
violent world which assumes the ontological priority of non-violence’, and this way is called 
forgiveness of sins, brought through the Incarnation and loving sacrifice of Christ.80  This 
                                                            
76 Romans 13:9.  See Chapters one and five for an exposition of the Greek terms. 
77 Romans 13:10. 
78 Here one might claim that law and love are necessarily incompatible since law represents universal reason 
and love represents particular faith.  This assumption, in conjunction with the associated claim that law and love 
are synonymous with a dichotomised reason and faith respectively, is categorically rejected.  For although law 
(as claimed here) governed by secular reason may violently universalise and alienate (against love), this thesis 
argues for a theological critique of this view of law.  The suggestion is that law can be redeemed and made 
peaceful by uniting reason and faith, and it follows then that law and love can be one and the same, and 
reconcile the universal and the particular through the law of love.  C.f. Z Bankowski and C Davis, ‘Living In 
and Out of the Law’ in P Oliver et al (eds), Faith in Law: Essays in Legal Theory (Hart, 2000)  33. 
79 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 416. 
80 Ibid. 
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thesis suggests that such action can preserve a peaceful, loving community – the Christian 
community, and, by implication, the legal community.81   
 
This is contrasted with the pagan mythos, which is that the legality of the earthly city is based 
in the suppression of an anarchy that was ontologically prior.  This legality (as well as the 
modern legality) has claimed validity by preventing the dominance of what is an ‘essentially 
imaginary chaos’.82  Consequently, what came first was not anarchy, but this legal, coercive, 
and itself anarchic and ultimately violent assertion.83 So Christian theology rejects this 
dominance on the basis of a false anarchy, and instead re-orients the foundation of law and 
the legal system to the ontological peace of Christian theology, the truth or revelation of the 
law of love expressed through the Trinity and Incarnation.   
 
The law of love, modelled on and enabled by the Incarnation and crucifixion of Christ, 
consequently encourages love for one’s neighbour in terms of humility and sacrifice.  
Importantly, this is not forced or coerced (for this would necessitate violence), but rather 
freely volunteered as an imitation of Christ, for each member of the community participates 
by faith as their mind is persuaded by the revelation of love and peace in the Trinity.  It is in 
this sense that Augustine argues that the eternal city, or the Christian community, possesses 
the heavenly peace by faith, and ‘lives a life of righteousness based on this faith, having the 
attainment of that peace in view in every good action it performs in relation to God, and in 
relation to a neighbour, since the life of a city is inevitably a social life’.84  For  
                                                            
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid 397-398. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Augustine, City of God, above n 1, 878-879. 
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…just as the individual righteous man lives on the basis of faith which is active in love, so the 
association, or people, of righteous men lives on the same basis of faith, active in love, the 
love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and loves his neighbour as 
himself.  But where this justice does not exist… there is no commonwealth.85   
More specifically, Augustine allows that when a person is persuaded by faith, they will fulfil 
the law in accordance with the everlasting law (to love your neighbour as yourself) for the 
good and peace of the society.86 
 
Thus, through the paradigm of the law of loving your neighbour as yourself, which is the 
unity and diversity in the community of the Trinity, a model is provided from Christian 
theology which allows a harmonious relationship between the individual and the society, one 
which avoids the violence of antagonism and alienation, and provides for a peaceful legal 
community which privileges one’s neighbour as an individual and therefore strengthens the 
community as a composite of unique individuals.87   
 
IV THE SECULAR CHALLENGE 
 
A Rescuing Reason 
 
                                                            
85 Ibid 890. 
86 Ibid 873; c.f. Alex Deagon, ‘Rendering to Caesar and God: St Paul, the Natural Law Tradition, and the 
Authority of Law’, Law, Culture, and the Humanities, first published on March 10, 2014 as DOI: 
10.1177/1743872114524324, 13-14. 
87 C.f. Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many, above n 20, 210-222.  It should be noted that the thesis 
understands orthodox Christian theology or authentic Christian doctrine to be Western Christian theology.  
However, this does not mean that Eastern Christian theology cannot contribute to this notion of being as a 
harmonious community in the Trinitarian context.  For example, John Zizioulas has profoundly argued that 
human ontology resides in the ontological relationship of the Trinity such that the other can be embraced in a 
community of being.  He has also distinguished between the atomism of the liberal individual and the Christian 
person, where relationship is constitutive of the person; hence, being in communion.  These concepts resonate 
with the argument of this thesis and have the potential to deepen engagement.  See John Zizioulas, Being as 
Communion (RSM Press, 1985); John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness (T and T Clark, 2006). 
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Another central aspect of constructing a loving and harmonious community is to address the 
challenge of the secular, particularly manifested in the idea of a ‘secular reason’ or ‘pure’ 
rationality – namely, a reason that is separated from faith.  One of Milbank’s aims is to 
‘rescue reason’ from the ‘domain of the secular’, and restore it to its rightful position as 
fundamentally based in belief, or theology.88  This reason based in belief is universal in the 
sense that it undergirds all disciplines – theology, philosophy, law, science, economics and so 
forth.  Indeed, Milbank wishes to defend the idea that such a ‘universal logic’ is ‘necessarily 
theistic’, endorsing belief in a transcendent deity in operation with reason.89  He states that 
his most important task is to transform the Greek philosophical logos through encounter with 
the theological logos, so that thought or reason itself becomes inescapably Christian, and, as 
such, ‘beyond secular reason’.90  Reason may consequently subscribe to belief in a 
transcendent source.91 
 
This is important because, as shall be explored in subsequent chapters, Milbank argues that if 
Christianity is persuasive then this persuasion should be inherent to the Christian logos itself, 
not to the mediation of secular reason.  Milbank asserts that any positioning of theology by 
secular reason either idolatrously confines knowledge of God to immanent disciplines such as 
cosmology or psychology (idolatrous because it exalts these disciplines above a knowledge of 
God through faith), or causes appreciation of the divine in terms ‘beyond reason’, thus 
serving to confirm the myth of an ‘autonomous secular realm of reason’.92  Moreover, 
Milbank claims that secular reason, left entirely to its own devices, always destroys itself, 
                                                            
88 John Milbank, ‘The Double Glory, Or Paradox Versus Dialectics: On Not Quite Agreeing with Slavoj Žižek’ 
in Creston Davis (ed), The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? (MIT Press, 2009) 111. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 147. 
91 Ibid 181. 
92 Ibid 1.  See e.g. Andrew Davison (ed), Imaginative Apologetics: Theology, Philosophy and the Catholic 
Tradition (SCM, 2011). 
33 
 
since the over-abstraction of reason leads to scepticism and nihilism regarding reason.93  As 
chapters two and three will explain, this is particularly seen through the glorification of pure 
reason in modernity, and the subsequent transformation of reason in certain forms of 
postmodernism. 
 
If this is true, the thesis will argue that it is possible to see the violence present in legal 
ontology as resulting from the secularisation of reason – especially if we accept Milbank’s 
argument that the secular is not actually an ‘autonomous discipline’, but borrows ‘modes of 
expression from religion’ – in this sense, secular reason is actually constituted either by 
‘heresy in regard to Christian orthodoxy’, or a ‘wholesale rejection of Christianity that is 
more neo-pagan than anti-religious’ (one might recall the previous discussion of the violence 
associated with the pagans contrasted with the peace of Christianity).94  As shall be seen 
during this thesis, the governing assumptions of secular theory are bound up with the 
modification or rejection of orthodox Christian positions, and these are no more rationally 
justifiable than the Christian positions themselves.   
 
Two consequences follow from these claims.  Firstly, if one accepts them, it follows that a 
theological critique of secular reason by authentic Christian doctrine is the most appropriate 
course, bearing in mind the genesis of the concept of the secular.  This critique would seek to 
identify the contingent moments in theological history which led to this development, and 
propose an alternative interpretation that would reconcile faith with reason, and theology with 
philosophy.  Secondly, if the suggestion that the secular is the basis for legal violence were to 
be taken seriously, at least provisionally, it would open the possibility for considering an 
                                                            
93 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 216. 
94 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 1. 
34 
 
alternative foundation for law based in faith united with reason, a jurisprudence which 
removes the underlying assumptions of the secular (which have dominated jurisprudential 
discourse since the rise of modernity) and rescues pure reason from its allegedly violent ends, 
and establishes a community of peace.  It is just this kind of jurisprudence which the thesis 
proposes. 
 
B The Secular and the Sacred 
 
However, we must first canvass what is meant by the notion of secular.  In his work A 
Secular Age, Charles Taylor examines the question of this age as ‘secular’ in terms of 
‘conditions of belief’.95  He argues that ‘the shift to secularity in this sense consists… of a 
move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and… unproblematic, to one in 
which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to 
embrace’.96 It is a change which ‘takes us from a society in which it was virtually impossible 
not to believe in God, to one in which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human 
possibility among others’.97  Taylor proceeds to identify this problem of faith and reason in a 
secular culture, stating that where there is the identity of a reason without faith and the 
passions, an ‘autonomous’ or ‘disengaged’ reason – ‘disenchantment and instrumental 
control go together… this disengaged, disciplined stance to self and society has become part 
                                                            
95 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007) 2-3. 
96 Ibid 3. 
97 Ibid. 
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of the essential defining repertory of the modern identity’ and is a ‘central feature’ of 
secularity.98   
 
Milbank, commenting on Taylor, expands and states that the ‘secularised space’ is the space  
 
… that allows no sacramental mediation, that renders the divine will remote and inscrutable, 
that sharply divides nature from supernature, itself engenders an impermeable, drained, 
meaningless immanence that can readily be cut off from any transcendent relation 
whatsoever.99   
 
For Milbank the violence of this system occurs because when one ignores the mystical 
element of religion in favour of this disengaged reason,  
 
… one has the instability… of trying to ground “mutual benefit” upon basically individualistic 
presuppositions which can always disturb this through a resurgence of supposedly… 
“natural” egoistic violence or else the latent anarchy of sovereign political power and 
formal economic capital.100   
 
As Taylor also identifies according to Milbank, by contrast: 
 
Christian agape [love] operates through a network of direct relations and not through 
conceptual or legal imposition, [and] is precisely equivalent to the idea that the church, 
instead of founding universality on abstract and contract right, tries to found it on a kind of 
“universalizing” of pre-legal tacit bonds of trust and gift-exchange.101   
 
Connecting these ideas to the law of love articulated by the Apostle Paul, ‘the Pauline epistles 
show how Paul actually tries to put this sort of “personalist” international network into 
                                                            
98 Ibid 136.  Taylor defines disenchantment as a ‘denial of the sacred’ (77), a secular position which stands ‘in 
contrast to a divine foundation for society’ (192).  One thinks of the ‘reasonable’ person, a paragon of objective 
rationality and intelligence, instead of, for example, the ‘faithful’ person. 
99 John Milbank, ‘A Closer Walk on the Wild Side: Some Comments on Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age’ (2009) 
22 Studies in Christian Ethics 89, 94. 
100 Ibid 95-96. 
101 Ibid 99. 
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practice… Christianity uniquely mediates a personal – or rather interpersonal God – through 
interpersonal practice and not through the [secularised] law’.102   
The church has failed in practice to be orthodox enough because it has failed to be really true 
to the incarnation – and in the end has perversely produced excarnation and an impersonal 
order where we can negotiate “safely” (for a while) with strangers and we all face a sovereign 
centre in a fantasized simultaneous space rather than seeking to relate to each other.103 
 
 
Importantly, as alluded to previously, ‘secularisation is not inevitable’, but it has occurred as 
‘the result of a self-distortion of Christianity’ (in the sense of Christianity embracing a 
disengaged governing reason through the Middle Ages and Enlightenment).104  This ‘self-
distortion’ or ‘shift’ presumes a separation of faith and the sacramental from reasonable 
belief in God – one has to ‘reason towards’ God in this sense.105  The agents who engage in 
this ‘acquire knowledge by exploring impersonal orders with the aid of disengaged reason’, 
which is ‘the massive shift in horizon’ that has been ‘identified as the rise of modernity’.106  
‘The development of the disciplined, instrumentally rational order of mutual benefit has been 
the matrix within which the shift could take place. This shift is the heartland and origin of 
modern “secularization”’ – and the contingency of this shift implies that it can be critiqued.107 
 
Talal Asad also refers to Taylor as a thinker to be regarded in relation to understanding the 
secular.  In this sense of the modern ‘secular’ nation-state, the secular can be considered as 
the ‘lowest common denominator among the doctrines of competing religious sects’, and ‘the 
                                                            
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid 102. 
104 Ibid 90. 
105 Taylor, above n 95, 294. 
106 Ibid 294.  As explained below, this, for example, is the problem encountered by the secular philosophers as 
they seek to appropriate the Apostle Paul: they separate Paul from his faith context using a disengaged reason, 
and so their reading is inherently limited.  As shall be seen in subsequent chapters, there is a need to unite faith 
with reason to have a fuller understanding and therefore a more effective appropriation of the Apostle Paul. 
107 Ibid 295. 
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attempt to define a political ethic independent of any religious convictions altogether’.108  For 
the modern state (or legal community) then, secularism is a method of uniting people of 
different class, gender and religion through common human experience – a ‘transcendent 
mediation’ which paradoxically attempts to remove references to the transcendent real of 
religion.109  However, Asad importantly notes that despite claims of negotiation and 
persuasion being the methods used in such a secular society, ultimately there is recourse to 
the violence of law.  Indeed, negotiation with the threat of forced legal compliance in the 
event of disagreement is simply an exercise of power, for ‘the law does not deal in 
persuasion’, but always ‘works through violence’.110  He further argues that ‘a secular state 
does not guarantee toleration; it puts into play different structures of ambition and fear.  The 
law never seeks to eliminate violence since its object is always to regulate violence’.111 
 
Regardless of whether one agrees with these particular sentiments, there clearly exists a 
contemporary current of thought which has identified the secular and alienating (violent) 
nature of law.  This is corroborated by the fact that even secular philosophers and legal 
theorists have returned to Christian theology, particularly the writings of Apostle Paul in the 
New Testament.112  According to Milbank, one of the reasons that Christian theology has 
been mined by secular philosophers is its capacity to provide a critical stance against the 
                                                            
108 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, 2003) 2. 
109 Ibid 5.  For more on the way in which it is said that Christianity invented the ‘secular’ and distinguished it 
from the ‘religious’ (secularising itself?) and the interplay of the secular and the religious, see Gil Anidjar, 
‘Secularism’ (2006) 33(1) Critical Inquiry 52.  For jurisprudential implications of this contingent distinction see 
e.g. A Sarat, L Douglas and M.M. Umphrey (eds), Law and the Sacred (Stanford, 2007). 
110 Asad, above n 108, 6.  However, rather than merely being the overt exercise of force, this violence can also 
be subtle and institutionalised within many of the concepts modern secular liberal democracies hold dear, such 
as the rule of law.  See for example Rosa Brooks, ‘Violence, Norms and the “Rule of Law”’ (2003) 101(7) 
Michigan Law Review 2275; Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal (Blackwell, 
2008). 
111 Asad, above n 108, 8. 
112 J Caputo and L Alcoff (eds), St Paul Among the Philosophers (Indiana University Press, 2009) 14; See e.g. 
Jacob Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul (Stanford University Press, 2004). 
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basic assumptions and ruling ideologies of this world.113  Recognising in particular the 
problem of violent alienation and seeking to break free of it, atheist philosophers such as 
Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou take from the Apostle Paul his non-totalising experience of 
community and politics as expressed in the New Testament of the Bible.114  In this effort, 
they attempt to locate the necessary attributes to attain their hope of explicating a 
revolutionary, universal subjectivity beyond that produced by ruling ideologies (their main 
target is global capitalism).115     
 
Therefore, this thesis also rides the wave of the secular turn to theology, yet reflexively 
critiques the assumptions and methodology of the secular divide between reason and faith, 
between persuasion and revelation – and seeks truth at its most transcendent and most 
immanent in the Incarnation of Christ.116  In particular, this is applied to the realm of 
jurisprudence, where the secular and arguably violent ontology of law will be exposed, and 
the ontological peace of Christian theology through the Pauline law of love proposed in its 
place, in order to open the possibility for considering and instantiating a harmonious legal 
community. 
 
V A NATURAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 
                                                            
113 John Milbank et al, ‘Introduction’ in John Milbank et al (eds), Paul’s New Moment: Continental Philosophy 
and the Future of Christian Theology (Brazos Press, 2010) 2. 
114 See e.g. Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf (MIT Press, 2003); Alain Badiou, St Paul: The Foundation 
of Universalism (Stanford University Press, 2003); c.f. Giorgio Agamben, The Time That Remains: A 
Commentary on the Letter to the Romans (Stanford University Press, 2005). 
115 See e.g. D Holsclaw, ‘Subjects Between Death and Resurrection: Badiou, Žižek and St Paul’ in D Harink 
(ed), Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision (Cascade Books, Eugene, 2010) 155.  Regarding Agamben 
c.f. P Griffiths, ‘The Cross as the Fulcrum of Politics: Expropriating Agamben on Paul’ in D Harink (ed), Paul, 
Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision (Cascade Books, Eugene, 2010) 179-180. 
116 The salient point being that the secular philosophers ultimately fail due to their a priori rejection of faith and 
the truth of Christian theology – and it is only here that ultimate truth and peace is located.  This controversial 
point is progressively developed over the thesis. 
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So the thesis will argue that in a secular foundation for modern law, we actually return to the 
original pagan violence Augustine addressed – a society of self-interested individuals 
agonising to overcome chaos.  Milbank’s Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, specifically 
applied to jurisprudence, may then be seen as the contemporary equivalent of Augustine’s 
project to found a harmonious community which encompasses difference and diversity 
through the law of love, rather than the pursuit of individualism violently striving to defeat 
some sort of always-prior violence.  In this sense, theology can and often is used as the basis 
for a critique of law, and the most provocative interactions between them tend to occur at the 
interface of theology and questions about the nature of law and the foundation for law – that 
is, questions of jurisprudence. 117    
 
In particular, the jurisprudential discipline of natural law, within which this thesis is best 
characterised, tends to address these questions by finding the source of the civil law in a 
higher law.  Working in the tradition of medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, this higher 
law is arguably based in the existence and nature of the God of Christian theology, revealed 
through the Incarnation of Christ to be the law of love.118  As Jacobs emphasises:  
…it is clear that, in natural law theorizing from antiquity to early modern times, the role of 
theistic considerations is a crucial matter. Medieval Christian thinkers’ beliefs concerning 
                                                            
117 See for example G Evans, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (Routledge, 2002); J Witte, ‘Law and 
Religion: The Challenges of Christian Jurisprudence’ (2004) University of St Thomas Law Journal 439; Paul 
Babie, ‘Breaking the Silence: Law, Theology and Religion in Australia’ (2007) 33 Melbourne University Law 
Review 296; E Chase, ‘Law and Theology’ in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal 
Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 1999) 421-3; c.f. R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Butterworths, 1989) 1-3; M Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 
(Thomson Reuters, 8th ed, 2008) 1-3. 
118 C.f. Freeman, above n 117, 83.  Importantly, Bix notes that if a civil law does not adhere to the higher law, it 
may be viewed as an act of violence rather than law.  Indeed, this localised conclusion is expanded and 
universalised during this thesis – the argument is if the legal system is not based on this foundational law of 
Christian theology, it not only consists of acts of violence, but has an  ontology of violence.  Brian Bix, ‘Natural 
Law Theory’ in D Patterson, (ed), A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Blackwell Publishing, 
1999) 223, 226. 
40 
 
creation, revelation, and providence shaped their conceptions of the scope and power of 
unaided human reason, the relation of natural law to divine wisdom and divine will, and how 
“right reason” is to be understood.119   
 
We find uniquely within the Christian tradition of monotheism questions regarding rationality 
associated with revelation in the context of natural law theorising to be of distinct 
importance.120  As shall be seen, the medieval natural law theologians such as Aquinas 
viewed right reason as intrinsically connected with faith, and the rationale for these theories 
having such emphasis on right reason is the fact that ‘reason enables human beings to be 
responsive to the normative authority of law, and to pursue the good on the basis of an 
understanding of it’.121  Indeed, if reason is united with faith through the Incarnation, the 
mind appropriates the law of love as revealed from God, and pursues its implementation in 
the legal community.  However, this also goes beyond Aquinas, using theology not just as a 
foundation for normative law, but also as a critique of secularised law in the vein of John 
Milbank. 
 
When one bears in mind Milbank’s claims that the secular is actually a type of theology, it is 
significant that there is a type of theological soteriology implied in law, even its most 
‘secularised’ iterations: 
Great hope is placed in law, properly understood and administered, as a vehicle for the 
transformation of society.  Most movements for modern reform accept without question law’s 
account of itself as autonomous, universal, and above all, secular – meaning, in the first 
instance, religiously neutral, but also, more strongly, paradigmatically rational… law’s claim 
to the universal resembles – indeed arguably derives its power from – the universalism that is 
claimed by… Christianity.122   
                                                            
119 J Jacobs, ‘Introduction’ in J Jacobs (ed), Reason, Religion, and Natural Law: From Plato to Spinoza (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 8. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid 9. 
122 W Fallers-Sullivan, R Yelle, and M Taussig-Rubbo, ‘Introduction’ in W Fallers-Sullivan, R Yelle, and M 
Taussig-Rubbo (eds), After Secular Law (Stanford, 2011) 2-3. 
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Similarly, it might even be claimed that every legal system needs a supernatural, transcendent 
source to give authority to its contents – even if, in lieu of a ‘higher source’, that is law 
itself.123  In other words, if it is accepted that there is no transcendent source attracting 
people’s trust, law becomes the entity which people trust.  ‘To work effectively law must rely 
on more than coercive sanctions… it must attract people’s trust and commitment.  Quite 
simply, citizens must… place their faith in it’.124  Law encourages belief in its own sanctity in 
order to encourage obedience.125  Hence, the notion of faith may be viewed as essential to the 
effective functioning of law.  It is not this particular position that the thesis seeks to question; 
rather, it is the assumption that there is nothing beyond law to have faith in – an assumption 
which has arguably led to law’s violence.  For if there is no real transcendent source, it seems 
law has no intrinsic reason and can only coerce obedience by manipulating trust through 
force.126 
 
In addition to what we may call this transcendent or ‘universal’ question of faith in law, the 
relationship is also relevant to this thesis in a more immanent or ‘particular’ sense – namely, 
that legal interactions between persons require some level of personal faith, or mutual trust in 
the community.  Jantzen draws the contrast starkly: 
                                                            
123 Ibid 3.  Perhaps this even allows law to be considered in terms of the mythic (pagan?) – see e.g. Peter 
Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (Routledge, 1992). 
124 R Ahdar, ‘The Inevitability of Law and Religion: An Introduction’ in R Ahdar (ed), Law and Religion 
(Ashgate, 2000) 5. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Buchanan notes that sometimes in the pursuit of justice, legislation merely adds a penalty, attempting to form 
behaviour and habits through coercion and the use of power.  However, as he acknowledges, this is a ‘cruel 
regression’ and an illusion, for coercion cannot be the basis for law and order – instead, ‘persuasion is the 
reasonableness that can be imbedded in the law’.  (Buchanan, above n 2, 201)  Indeed, Buchanan refers in 
contrast to the theological natural law articulated by the likes of Augustine and Aquinas as that which is the 
logos, the divine law of heaven which exists in perfect justice, love and peace, and forms the foundation and 
orientation for the civil law through persuasion rather than coercion (288-289). 
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…the willingness to nurse hatred and grievances, to refuse to negotiate or compromise, to 
look to violence and ultimately to control rather than to mutual trust as a solution, and to use 
the rhetoric of justice as an excuse for violence can lead only to a situation in which 
everybody loses… all the killing was a tragic mistake; warfare solved nothing.127 
 
In the final analysis then, the claim of this thesis is that where a secularised law seeks to 
control and coerce an antagonistic conglomerate of self-interested agents (i.e. the Hobbesian 
state of nature), a community based in Christian theology interacts through the law of love 
and mutual trust modelled and revealed by the Trinity and Incarnation, producing a peaceful 
and harmonious existence. 
 
VI GENEALOGY AND METHOD 
 
A Thesis Methodology: Milbank, Nietzsche, Genealogy 
 
Following Milbank, this thesis will engage in a genealogical analysis.  As with the broader 
project of Radical Orthodoxy, it will both hold to tradition and extend it through a critical 
deployment.  This archaeology of ideas and concepts will be read in relation to law and 
jurisprudence, unpacking and exploring the following thesis: that secular law is based on a 
mythic or theological foundation which seeks to enforce peace by violence, coercively 
bringing ‘peaceful’ (pagan) civilisation to savage humanity.   
 
As Milbank observes, ‘[i]n the City of God, Augustine already adopted the “counter-
historical” strategy of retracing the story of the pagan virtues. The main gist of his great 
book… is that these virtues were hopelessly contaminated by a celebration of violence.’128  In 
a similar fashion, this thesis engages in a ‘Postmodern Critical Augustinianism’ to critique 
                                                            
127 Jantzen, above n 10, 111. 
128 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Blackwell, 2nd ed., 2006) 289. 
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the story of secular law and its violence and to propose the possibility of a different 
theological foundation to law – one which is founded on love of one’s neighbour rather than 
self-interest.129    Thus, following Radical Orthodoxy, I conduct a return to the resources of 
orthodox theology to propose a radical rethinking of jurisprudence. 
 
For Milbank, the method of genealogy  
… is dedicated to reducing the apparently same and persistent to its process of origination 
(not to “preceding” origins). On the other hand, this task is not undertaken disinterestedly, out 
of motives of curiosity, but rather the concern is to undermine some present constellation of 
power by exploding the “eternal verities” which it claims to promote, and exhibiting the 
“base” origins of its apparently noble pretensions… The limitations of each individual 
genealogist will be defined by the particular concern he has to unmask this or that form of 
domination of which, in the circumstances of his particular era, he becomes aware’.130   
 
The systemic and naturalised domination this thesis seeks to ‘unmask’ is the assumption of 
the secular as foundational for modern law and legal violence.  In particular, I will argue that 
through a series of historically contingent philosophical shifts, the secular became naturalised 
as the undergirding presupposition of modern jurisprudence.  This allows a sustained 
questioning of the secular assumption’s validity, and in turn opens the space for a 
reconstruction of jurisprudence based in Christian theology. 
 
Milbank states that he embraces ‘certain aspects of the Nietzschean approach: namely the 
method of genealogy and a version of an ontology of difference’, but does so ‘against 
Nietzsche himself’.131  He argues that since Christianity ‘understands all evil and violence in 
their negativity to be privation’, ‘positive differences’ as ‘instances of the Good’ must 
                                                            
129 Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63. 
130 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 2nd ed, above n 128, 281. 
131 Ibid xiv, xvii. 
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‘analogically concur in a fashion which exceeds mere liberal agreement to disagree’.132  If 
that is the case, a ‘counter-genealogy to that of Nietzsche becomes feasible’, and  
... one narrates not simply the military tale of the devices and victories of arbitrary power, but 
also the continuous and sometimes decisive interruption of this story by instances of the 
reflecting of perfect infinite peaceful power which is the Good in finite acts of goodness and 
their necessary compossibility.133   
 
Milbank is referring to the metanarrative of the two cities identified by Augustine: the first 
city, the earthly city of the pagan Romans and Greeks, is characterised by violence and 
celebrates power; the other city, the heavenly city or the ‘City of God’, is characterised by the 
good and celebrates peace.134  This ‘metanarrative of the two cities’ is not ‘ungrounded’, but 
may be chosen in contrast to the secular metanarrative of violence on the bases that it is a 
‘“seeing” by a truly-desiring reason of the truly desirable’, and moreover that there is an 
‘innate’ human preference for peace over violence in conjunction with a ‘certain bias towards 
reason rather than unreason’, by which Milbank means the secular, ‘cold reason’ which 
results in the ‘nihilistic vision’.135   
It then follows that to “choose” the Augustinian metanarrative and an Augustinian 
ontology of peace is also to “elect reason”… and yet, to save the appearances of reason in this 
fashion requires the supplementation of reason by true desire and by faith – including the 
desire for and faith in, infinite reason.  By contrast, to remain with reason alone turns out to 
mean (as Nietzche correctly saw) the election of unreason.136 
 
Milbank therefore insists that his ‘own version of an Augustinian metanarrative, while being 
a seamless weave of fact and interpretation, is still presented as a debatable account of actual 
real history – in relation to which one could urge facts, reasons, probabilities and persuasions 
                                                            
132 Ibid xvi. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Augustine, above n 1. 
135 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 2nd ed, above n 128, xvi-xvii.  Milbank’s understanding of nihilism 
will be clarified in Chapter One. 
136 Ibid xvii. 
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both for and against’.137  This metanarrative sees in history not ‘arbitrary transitions’, but 
‘contingent shifts towards or away from what is projected as the true human telos, a true 
concrete representation of the analogical blending of difference’ – shifts towards the 
analogical blending of difference being shifts towards peace, and the counter being 
violence.138  The thesis will attempt to map some of these shifts towards the secular and the 
violent in relation to jurisprudence, expose their contingency, and propose the alternative 
Christian narrative of a peaceful community. 
 
 
B Progression of the Argument: From Violence to Peace through a Jurisprudence of 
Truth 
 
This thesis proposes a jurisprudence of truth as an understanding of truth as the revelation of 
the law of love, which is foundational for a legal community of peace.  This jurisprudence of 
truth is informed by Christian theology and philosophy in the sense that it focuses on the 
Christian doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, and seeks to integrate them into a basis for 
legal theory and the modern legal system.  I distinguish between Christian ‘theology’ and 
Christian ‘philosophy’ only to underscore the relationship between the faith of theology and 
the reason of philosophy; namely, that both are indispensable for constructing a jurisprudence 
of truth and they are distinct without being divided.  The revelation of Trinity, Incarnation 
and the law of love cannot be fully apprehended without faith, nor can it be fully understood 
without reason.  Yet reason is not the same as faith – as I will argue in Chapter one, they 
inform and strengthen each other.  The ‘contours’ of truth refers to the structure or form of 
                                                            
137 Ibid xxi. 
138 Ibid 279. 
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truth.  In particular, truth is not merely abstract, propositional correspondence, but is evental 
and revelatory – truth is that which is revealed through the event of the Incarnation.  
Therefore, to examine the contours of truth and construct a jurisprudence of truth through 
Christian theology and philosophy is to express the Christian doctrines of Trinity and 
Incarnation, informed by a united faith and reason, in a structure which can become the 
theoretical foundation for a peaceful legal community through implementing the law of love. 
 
Chapter one sets out the content of the thesis by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s 
work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason.  It initially 
clarifies Milbank’s Postmodern Critical Augustinianism within the context of Radical 
Orthodoxy, exploring the rise of this new theology which seeks to critique and reclaim the 
secular, before suggesting that the secular genealogy of truth is about power, and therefore 
violence.  The chapter then moves to consider Milbank’s own use of the term ‘truth’, 
examining it in terms of correspondence.  It is found that Milbank’s idea of truth is not 
correspondence in the analytical, empiricist sense, but is instead intrinsically theological, and 
so is concerned with the revelation of the Trinitarian relations which persuades the mind, 
producing faith and participation in these relations.  The chapter therefore considers the 
relationship between faith and reason in Milbank’s work and in Christian thought more 
generally, arguing that the secular dichotomisation of faith and reason leads to the end of 
reason, and only reuniting faith with reason recovers reason and allows the possibility for 
peace.  Thus, it is concluded that truth is God’s gracious revelation of himself, and this leads 
to faith or persuasion of the mind, and consequently recovers reason, such that truth, faith and 
reason are in this sense interdependent in Milbank’s framework. 
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Having elaborated these definitions, Chapter two begins the genealogical analysis by 
focusing on science in order to explain how the contingent division of faith and reason was 
historically manifested, and how this violently affected faith and theology.  We can see this 
particularly through the approach of the early modern scientists Galileo, Kepler and Newton, 
who in various ways were revolutionary in their development of science in relation to faith, 
on the basis of how they understood the nature of God and the relationship between faith and 
reason.  Accordingly, the chapter analyses the underlying theology of these early modern 
scientists, indicating that they had a view of God as pure will, as a sort of divine architect.  
Following Milbank, I then argue that this idea has its foundation in a theological 
misconception of Thomas Aquinas, one that allows the distinction between reason and faith 
in obtaining knowledge (in this context, about the physical world).  This distinction in 
principle is consequently realised, and faith and theology is subsequently evacuated from 
scientific discourse.  Moreover, it is suggested that the early scientists assumed the Protestant 
focus on the will of God and the Catholic focus on the imperial nature of the church in their 
scientific pursuit.  It could even be contended that a reason without faith is ultimately itself 
reduced to blind faith.  However, by re-examining Aquinas with Milbank and emphasising an 
authentic Thomist participation in the divine, we are able to lay the foundation for a Christian 
theology which unites faith and reason. 
 
Chapter three picks up the contention that the secularisation of reason ultimately leads to 
blind faith, and traces this nihilistic end of reason through Jacques Derrida’s concept of 
deconstruction.  I focus on Derrida because, as Milbank identifies, in Derrida there is the 
potential to articulate a post-modern theology which avoids the modern or secular problem of 
separating faith and reason.  It is found that although Derrida claims to be an atheist, his 
language and concepts are (drawing on his Jewish heritage) infused with theology and law.  
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Moreover, together with Derrida’s notion of deconstruction as justice, an aporia or 
undecidability requiring faith which fulfils the law, this may even indicate that Derrida 
elaborates a form of Christianity.    But it is a distorted Christianity which embraces the 
pagan agon of difference and a peace of suspended violence, and ignores the appearance of 
truth in Christ.  Through expositing Derrida and working with his theology, we are able to 
complete the construction of a Postmodern Critical Augustinianism which can be deployed in 
a genealogical analysis of modern jurisprudence, which has a secular foundation that results 
in legal violence.  Therefore, as Milbank argues, Derrida’s postmodern turn is actually 
necessary for the return of theology, for the collapse of secular reason provides a space for 
the return of faith and the theological in Christ. 
 
Chapter four applies the proposition that there was a contingent separation of faith from 
reason, which results in violence, to the ontology of law.  Through a genealogical analysis, I 
demarcate the secularisation of law through the rejection of Thomist (theological) natural law 
to eventually arrive in favour of Hartian (secular) positivism.  The genealogy suggests that it 
was the adoption of the Voluntarist theology of Duns Scotus (God as pure will) in 
conjunction with the division between faith and reason which allowed Thomism to be 
discarded, and Hobbesian positivism to rise.  The pagan violence of this system was picked 
up by Machiavelli and eventually Austinian positivism, before it was displaced into the rules 
system itself by Hart.  An analysis of law through Cover, Derrida and Benjamin, key theorists 
of law and violence, further illustrate this violence of law detached from faith.  However, 
Benjamin and Cover also allude to the way law may be redeemed and positively reconfigured 
to have an ontology of peace rather than violence, with ‘peaceableness and trust’ as two of its 
subjective preconditions.  In other words, this way is the return of legal community united 
through faith and the theological. 
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The first four chapters are concerned with identifying, constructing and deploying a 
Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, or a ‘Christian theology and philosophy’ with a united 
reason and faith which can critique a secularised and violent jurisprudence.  The remaining 
chapters are concerned with articulating a ‘jurisprudence of truth’ and describing the 
‘contours of truth’.  Chapter five continues the process of recalibrating jurisprudence in the 
shape of a Christian ontology of peace through the revelation of theological truth by reading 
law and truth in the trial of Christ.  In particular, it explores the trial of Christ from the gospel 
narratives and the writings of the Apostle Paul on law and spirit in the New Testament, 
suggesting from these that the old, secularised law of the letter (attestation) ultimately leads 
to violence and death – even the death of Christ himself.  Indeed, the very nature of the 
secularised, rule-based trial implies that it cannot comprehend truth as the revelation of the 
divine, and so violence will inevitably follow.  However, the new law of the Spirit in faith, 
the law based on truth as aletheia or divine revelation, redeems this law of secular attestation 
and leads to life and peace.  This law is another name for the Pauline law of love, the 
command to love your neighbour as yourself which is the revelation of loving relations in the 
Trinity through the Incarnation of Christ.  Hence, it seems that a legal ontology of peace has 
its foundation in adopting the law of love, the truth of Christian theology revealed in the 
Incarnation of Christ. 
 
Chapter six presses the Incarnation as key to implementing the law of love through engaging 
directly with Slavoj Žižek, whose extensive interactions with Milbank require consideration 
and sharpen issues relating to the structure of the Incarnation.  I note the paradox of Žižek’s 
atheism and his view that the Christian legacy ought to be recovered, and observe that his 
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promotion of Christianity is based on its materialism – the dead God leaves behind the 
manifest church or ‘Holy Spirit’ – the pursuit of the sublime object.  However, I suggest that 
the far more material fact is Christ’s resurrection, the ultimately sublime defeat of death that 
we may participate in by faith.  For God has not truly left or ‘forsaken’ us, but has died and 
risen so that we too may live again with our sins forgiven and the capacity to forgive and 
exist harmoniously with others: the law of love.  This paradox of dying to live is precisely the 
Incarnational paradox from which truth emerges and which opens the possibility for a 
peaceful community. 
 
Milbank contends that truth is finally revealed through the paradox of the Incarnation, which 
is the meeting of the eternal and the temporal in Christ, his crucifixion, and his resurrection.  
Since reason is recovered in this paradoxical revelation of the divine being as the law of love, 
in Christ reason and faith unite to yield truth, and provide a foundation for a peaceful 
community in truth.  In this disclosure of the divine being in Christ is revealed the love and 
peace inherent in Trinitarian relations, particularly the law of love which is the basis of the 
divine relationship.  Thus, the law of love in the divine being ultimately yields truth in the 
incarnational paradox.  The uniting and reconciliation of humanity in Christ as the truth also 
leads to the passing of the law of love, which is obtained through the truth of the resurrected 
man and can redeem the law.  In this way, civil law needs the redemption of the law of love 
which is established by the truth of the Incarnational event.  Similarly, the Incarnational event 
assumes the law of love since love is the ultimate foundation for the revelation and function 
of the mystery of divine Being and relationship.  Hence, law and truth operate symbiotically 
to establish and maintain the other, and I argue that this produces an ontology of peace 
through implementing the Pauline law of love. 
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Chapter seven concludes the thesis by returning to Augustine and exploring the nature of this 
peace and the legal community.  I aim to summarise the preceding discussion, including how 
secular reason leads to blind faith and is recovered in Incarnational paradox, the definition of 
truth and its relationship to faith and law, and the claimed ontological violence of the secular 
(where the interests of the individual and the community clash, leading to antagonism and 
alienation) with the ontological peace of Christian theology (where the individual and the 
community exist harmoniously and for mutual benefit through love and forgiveness based on 
the model of the Trinity and enabled by the Incarnation of Christ) in a legal context.  Finally, 
the chapter analyses the shortcomings of the codified law through a critical comparison of the 
neighbour principle in doctrinal negligence with Christ’s Parable of the Good Samaritan, and 
suggests how we can begin to move towards this Christian community of peace. 
 
Ultimately, Milbank contends that the only alternative to a secular approach which sunders 
faith and reason and produces ontological violence through subjective alienation is the return 
of a theology which is able to mediate between faith and reason, and unite them.  This 
theology arrives in the form of Incarnational paradox, where reason is recovered through faith 
in the truth of divine being, and this is revealed in Christ as the interface between the finite 
and the infinite, eternal God and temporal man.  In the disclosure of divine being as love and 
ontological peace through the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, the law of 
sin and death is replaced by a new law, the law of love, which can then become the 
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theological truth which redeems law, restores reason to faith, and removes the violence of 
antagonism and alienation.139   
 
In short, this thesis provides a theological model for how to consistently recover a system of 
law which does not alienate or antagonise.  Secular philosophers have attempted this through 
appropriating the Apostle Paul, and are right to seek their solution in Christian theology, but 
their mistake is to approach that theology using a secular methodology which dichotomises 
reason and faith – effectively rendering that theology impotent to resolve the problem.140  
Instead, what is required is to revive an authentically Christian theologically-based natural 
law tradition in a modern context – that is, to articulate a way in which the system of modern 
law can be redeemed by theological truth, which is the law of love.  At its core then, this 
thesis is concerned with recovering the theological and using it to redeem a secular system of 
law, so that the individual may exist harmoniously within the community, based on the truth, 
faith and reason of Christian theology. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
139 John Milbank, The Future of Love: Essays in Political Theology (Cascade Books, 2009) 154. 
140 Bloechl, above n 24.  Also see Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
MILBANK’S MILIEU: THEORISATIONS OF TRUTH, FAITH 
AND REASON 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter seeks to provide the requisite theorisation for the key themes of truth, faith and 
reason, forming the basis for the arguments presented during the thesis.  In particular, it will 
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broadly introduce the theology of John Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy as the focal point for 
articulating these themes, and will explore his major interactions and precursors in relation to 
them.  It is important to properly explicate these terms, for Milbank can use them in various 
ways, and without a careful definition of what is meant in each instance the meaning can 
become ambiguous.  For example, although he endorses a correspondence theory of truth, his 
notion of ‘correspondence’ differs significantly from the typical philosophical notion of 
mirroring facts to reality.  Milbank states that reason ultimately leads to nihilistic violence 
and uncertainty, and reason leads to certainty and peace – which can seem strange without 
explicitly distinguishing between secular reason and the reason of faith.  So this chapter also 
aims to clarify what Milbank himself means by these terms with reference to his work.   It 
will argue: that he endorses a particular type of correspondence theory in contrast to the 
typical correspondence theory and other theories of truth; that he rejects secular reason in 
favour of the reason of faith; and also that he sees faith as trust or participation in the divine.  
With these themes demarcated, the proceeding chapters will build on this foundation by 
attempting to construct a jurisprudence of truth and participation which unites reason and 
faith, and leads to peace. 
 
This chapter continues in part II by pursuing the discussion of John Milbank’s Postmodern 
Critical Augustinianism introduced previously, with the particular object of defining what is 
meant by the frequently employed terms ‘postmodern’ and ‘nihilism’.  It situates Milbank 
within the broader movement of Radical Orthodoxy and outlines its nature, project, and 
various interactions.  The final section of this part notes the centrality of the doctrine of the 
Trinity to Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy and briefly canvasses its contested status in 
ancient and contemporary theology.    As part of Milbank’s project, part III then turns to 
55 
 
consider the relationship between truth and power in the secular genealogies of Nietzsche and 
Foucault, suggesting that these narratives of history instantiate violence.   
 
In part IV, I examine how Milbank ultimately rejects these positions in favour of an ontology 
of peace based in faith, which implies an idiosyncratic correspondence theory of truth 
through revelation and participation.  Part V subsequently moves to consider Milbank’s 
contentions regarding secular reason and violence in more depth, before examining his 
rejection of secular reason’s violence, and the promotion of peace through the reason of faith 
and theology (by Milbank and Christian thought more generally) in Part VI.  Finally, the 
chapter will conclude in Part VII by providing concise working definitions of truth, reason 
and faith in Milbank’s theological framework, in order to provide a foundation for the 
arguments in the ensuing chapters. 
 
II MILBANK’S THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
 
A ‘Postmodern’ Critical Augustinianism 
 
 
Milbank’s consideration of postmodernism and its connection with nihilism is of central 
importance to the argument of this thesis, because the idea of the post-modern follows from 
the modern separation of faith from reason.  In particular, Milbank argues that the post-
modern results from modern secular reason exhausting itself.  So ‘the most serious essence of 
the “postmodern” is best captured by [the] idea of an inevitable lapse of the “metaphysical” 
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liberal era of universal laws and abstractions towards the “positive” era of diverse given facts, 
reworked myths and rituals and novel or renewed papacies’.141  In postmodernism there is a 
rejection of liberal positivist metaphysics, the existence of universal laws, abstractions and 
brute facts.  In other words, postmodernism eschews the idea of abstract, culturally 
independent categories such as the liberal notion of the pure individual, and attempts to 
expose that so-called universal or eternal facts about physical or social reality are really the 
contingent outcomes of constructed narratives.  Milbank explains in more depth: 
  
Postmodernism… articulates itself as, first, an absolute historicism, second as an ontology of 
difference, and third as ethical nihilism. The task… is to show how its historicist or 
genealogical aspect raises the spectre of a human world inevitably dominated by violence, 
without being able to make this fearful ghost more solid in historicist terms alone. To 
supplement this deficiency, it must ground violence in a new transcendental philosophy, or 
fundamental ontology. This knowledge alone it presents as more than perspectival, more than 
equivocal, more than mythical.  But the question arises: can such a claim be really sustained 
without lapsing back into a metaphysics supposedly forsworn? It will be argued that 
differential ontology is but one more mythos, and that the postmodern realization that 
discourses of truth are so many incommensurable language games does not ineluctably 
impose upon us the conclusion that the ultimate, over-arching game is the play of force, fate 
and chance.  The impossibility of exceeding a merely mythical status for nihilism – as 
“neo-paganism”, or whatever – constitutes one aspect of “The Postmodern Problematic”.142 
 
According to Milbank then, postmodernism as involving a historical or genealogical aspect 
therefore tends to ground its analysis in a mythically violent ontology – the ‘pagan’ version 
of an ontology of difference.  A narrative is constructed which has violent difference at its 
core, and to bolster this narrative, difference is elevated to a fundamental mythical ontology 
or metaphysics.  However, rejecting an objective or universal metaphysics and 
acknowledging that there is now no associated ‘absolute truth’ does not imply that we are 
compelled to settle for the result of violence intermingled with fortune.  The very fact that the 
understanding is mythical (and therefore contingent) allows scope for critique.  In particular, 
this critique is a theological one, thereby enabling the Christian mythos which assumes an 
                                                            
141 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 2nd ed, above n 128, xiv. 
142 Ibid 278-279. 
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ontology of peace to be proposed in its place.  Given that nihilism is ‘a parody both of the 
Christian view that we are created from nothing and that therefore all that is finite is 
indeterminate, and equally of the likewise Christian view that ordered beauty is paradoxically 
in-finite’, it follows that there is scope for such a properly theological or Christian 
articulation – for nihilism as a theological distortion implies that its trajectory can be 
theologically corrected.143   
 
The nihilistic vision concludes – from a cold reason that disallows to the “moods” of eros, 
anxiety, boredom, trust, poetic response, faith, hope, charity and so forth an ontologically 
disclosive status – that, in the end, there is an incomprehensible springing of all from nothing 
and that further- more the real ultimate nothing only “is” through the unwarranted diversity of 
the all, which in turn constantly reveals its own secondary and illusory character as a 
papering-over of the void. Nihilism has then to take the form of a mystical monism. And the 
same is true of nihilism as a univocal ontology of difference: difference here, as “original”, 
must spring from a continuous auto-differentiation, in which, just because the One is never its 
unified self, it is all the more dominant even in its fated lapse… But however it is presented, 
nihilism is the conclusion of ‘pure reason’ (reason in the mood of cold regard), not just to the 
void or to ontological violence, but also to the ontological reign of non-sense or unreason. 
This indeed was Nietzsche’s central tragic crux: fully honest Western reason realizes that 
reason itself is but a pathetic human projection.144   
 
 
In other words, the postmodern and nihilist end results from a pure, secularised reason.  
When reason is separated from faith and the other virtues of feeling that Milbank describes, 
only uniform being remains.   Ontologically, there exists mere reason or rationality; being is 
uninterrupted and unchanging (univocal), with no variety – there is just a plain of 
nothingness.  When it is recognised that this reason is nothing but an illusion or projection, 
the immutable void of being, or nothingness (what Milbank calls nihilism) is revealed.  So to 
choose pure reason is actually to ultimately elect non-reason or nihilism.  More significantly, 
Milbank asserts that ‘nihilism narrates the nihilistic destiny of science, namely, the necessity 
for the discipline of truthfinding to admit that there are no truths, and therefore no objective 
                                                            
143 Ibid xiv-xv. 
144 Ibid xvi-xvii. 
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goods.’145  If this is so, there is only nothingness, a privation – no truths and no goods imply a 
void of violence.  This void is violent because it is a realm of pure difference, without the 
good.  As a result, the differences exist as inevitable conflict and strife, always in 
competition.  This is why Milbank summarises by saying: 
…a nihilistic genealogy requires an ontology of violence; second, that this ontology is only a 
mythology; third, that it is an entirely malign mythology. Running through all these 
demonstrations a fourth thematic will emerge: this mythology is the best, the least self-
deluded, self-description of the secular, which fails only at the point where it will not admit 
that it has shown the secular to be but another “religion”.146   
 
As mentioned, the fact that the secular is another religion allows a different religion to be 
proposed in its place – one which rescues truth, reason and the good, establishing a peaceful 
ontology rather than a violent one.  This, Milbank argues, is Christianity; but it is particularly 
a Postmodern Critical Augustinianism which (like any postmodernism) portrays itself as an 
absolute historicism through a genealogical account, and possesses an ontology of difference.  
While pure nihilism possesses a violent ontology of difference, ‘Christianity… pursued from 
the outset a universalism which tried to subsume rather than merely abolish difference: 
Christians could remain in their many different cities, languages, and cultures, yet still belong 
to one eternal city ruled by Christ, in whom all “humanity” was fulfilled’.147  Following this 
Augustinian aspect however, Christianity does not  
…imply mere mutual tolerance, far less any resignation to a regulated conflict… while it is 
open to difference… it also strives to make of all these differential additions a harmony… 
true community means the freedom of people and groups to be different, not just to be 
functions of a fixed consensus, yet at the same time it totally refuses indifference.148 
 
In this way, Christianity as deployed in Postmodern Critical Augustinianism acknowledges 
the necessity of difference.  Rather than trying to deny difference or regulate it with violence, 
                                                            
145 Ibid 284. 
146 Ibid 279-280. 
147 Ibid 267-268. 
148 Ibid 268. 
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at the ontological level Christian theology seeks a universal harmony of difference through 
incorporating the virtues contained in a faith united with reason, thereby enabling a 
community of peace at the political level. 
 
B Radical Orthodoxy 
 
1 Origin and Characters 
 
Pursuing the reconciliation of faith and reason and a society of peace is not unique to 
Milbank himself, but is also more generally associated with Radical Orthodoxy.  John 
Milbank, Graham Ward and Catherine Pickstock, as the prominent theologians of Radical 
Orthodoxy, are wary of promoting it with particular creeds and criteria of adherence.  It is 
rather a ‘theological sensibility’, a ‘theological engagement with the world’ bearing in mind 
the postmodern and linguistic turn, and seeking to confront that (secular) world through 
incorporating it into a Christian theological ‘narrative tradition’.149  Other sympathetic 
thinkers who have called for refinement and development include William Cavanaugh, 
Stanley Hauerwas and Nicholas Lash.150  Radical Orthodoxy owes a significant debt to 
historical Catholic theologians as well, particularly Augustine and Aquinas – Augustine for 
the fact that he is pre-modern (and therefore prior to the ‘invention’ of the secular) and was 
                                                            
149 James KA Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology (Baker, 2004) 66-68. 
150 Ibid 49, 235.  It should be noted that Radical Orthodoxy has also received critique, mainly in three categories 
– the historical or apologetic critique of Hankey and Hedley in terms of the defense of a ‘secular reason’ and a 
rejecting of Radical Orthodoxy as fideist; the deconstructive critique of Caputo which disagrees with Radical 
Orthodoxy’s apparent ‘dogmatism’; and Crockett and Hyman’s atheological critique of Radical Orthodoxy’s 
dogmatism and notion of autonomous reason.  See Ibid 49-61 and the further references contained there, as well 
as chapters three and five of that work which constitute a response.  These will not be examined here; it is hoped 
that the misplaced nature of these criticisms will become apparent over the course of the thesis. 
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engaged in a similar project in the City of God as compared to the contemporary project of 
the Radical Orthodox theologians, and Aquinas for his account of participation, faith and 
reason.151   
 
Radical Orthodoxy fashions itself against the modern theology of the twentieth century which 
sought to (sometimes unwittingly) ally with the tenets of modernism.  In other words, the 
postmodern critique of the Enlightenment project also calls for the demise of secular 
modernity, and with it, modern theology in both its conservative and liberal forms.  The result 
is a confessional theology proclaimed in the public or political sphere, yet not in a 
Constantinian-theocratic sense; rather, what is at stake is the transformation of this culture.152  
As a ‘post-modern’ movement then, Radical Orthodoxy also draws upon the likes of Derrida, 
Foucault and Nietzsche, and utilises their critical methods of genealogy and deconstruction.  
It can therefore engage in the vernacular of contemporary critical thought while 
simultaneously demonstrating the ‘paucity of postmodern nihilism’ (which is a critique of 
certain types of postmodernism) and returning to pre-modern sources of knowledge without 
simply reinscribing pre-modernity.153 
 
There are a number of key aspects which characterise Radical Orthodoxy.  The first is a 
critique of modernity and liberalism.  Radical Orthodoxy views modernity, with its elevation 
of reason above faith, as allowing theology to be shaped by culture rather than grounding 
theology in God’s revelation which then shapes culture.154  Secondly, Radical Orthodoxy is 
‘post-secular’, in the sense that it eliminates the modern distinction between secular and 
                                                            
151 Ibid 46-48. 
152 Ibid 33. 
153 Ibid 42-43. 
154 Ibid 70-71. 
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sacred, and the opposition between faith and reason.155  Thirdly, Radical Orthodoxy rejects 
pure materialism which it argues leads to nihilism (‘the real squandered into nothing’), and 
instead contends for a participatory ontology which advocates universal connection to the 
transcendent and immaterial through an incarnational account of revelation.156  More broadly 
then, Radical Orthodoxy eschews a modern theology which ‘accepts that philosophy has its 
own legitimacy, its own autonomy apart from faith’, and refuses to ‘concede the criteria for 
responsible public discourse to the neutrality of the secular’.157  Having influenced much of 
Radical Orthodoxy, John Milbank too emphasises that culture should be based in a 
reasonable Christian theology, and by appropriating Augustine, Milbank extends the notion 
of theology as foundational through articulating a theological narrative of Christian peace in 
contrast to the secular narrative of violence.  So, as the next section will specifically explain, 
Milbank can be broadly situated within the Radical Orthodoxy movement. 
 
2 Milbank as Radically Orthodox 
 
The Augustinian element of Radical Orthodoxy returns us once again to Milbank’s 
Postmodern Critical Augustinianism.  Though it was published a decade earlier, John 
Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory is often viewed as the starting point for the movement 
of Radical Orthodoxy.  In particular, Milbank’s crucial point is that the secular is not the 
neutral position one gets when theology is removed, but rather it is the replacement of a 
certain view of God and creation with a different view which makes theological claims 
                                                            
155 Ibid 74. 
156 Ibid 74-75. 
157 Ibid 35, 41-42. 
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regarding origins, purpose and transcendence.158  The problem is these claims are ‘bad 
theology’, which properly renders the secular as a ‘Christian heresy – an ideological 
distortion of theology’.159   Secular modernity then changes the context in which theories of 
nature and society are articulated, such that there is a ‘primordial violence’ in Creation which 
must be ‘tamed by the exercise of power’.160  According to the modern view, at the heart of 
this violence is ‘difference’.  For example, as already noted in the introductory chapter, the 
Hobbesian Leviathan as the ‘modern’ foundation for the legal society is premised on violent 
conflict emerging from a differentiated social body – with the result that this difference must 
be violently suppressed and eradicated through a central sovereign authority.161   
 
In response, Radical Orthodoxy proposes that peace is ontologically prior to violence, for 
difference exists in society and between God and the creation by divine inscription of the 
difference ‘at the heart of being itself’ – the perfect love and peace that exists in the 
Trinity.162  Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, among others, claim that this heavenly peace is 
realised on earth through a ‘metaphysics of participation’, where creation apprehends and 
instantiates the eternal peace via transformation of the mind by faith (united with reason) in 
the divine gift of Being (particularly seen in the Incarnation and Crucifixion of Christ).163  As 
Milbank and Graham Ward argue, this is not a gift in the sense of a trade or exchange, but 
                                                            
158 Simon Oliver, ‘Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: From Participation to Late Modernity’, in John Milbank and 
Simon Oliver (eds), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (Routledge, 2009) 3. 
159 Ibid 6. 
160 Ibid 7. 
161 Ibid 10. 
162 Ibid 11. 
163 Ibid 17. 
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rather a pure ‘expression of divine love – of charity’, so that we ourselves are constituted 
constantly by the flow of God’s gift and our response to it.164 
 
The phrase ‘Radical Orthodoxy’ as an identification of this emerging movement is not 
haphazard or ill-chosen.  Radical Orthodoxy means the ‘radicalism of orthodoxy as such… 
Christianity placed love above law; it put the person-in-relation before either the collective or 
isolated individual; it made the habit of association primary and yet it never instrumentally 
subordinated the person to collective interests’.165  It produced ‘a “true” body of ecclesial 
unity-in-diversity, neither atomically individualist nor collectively universalising on an 
abstract basis… a new sort of “interpersonal” society’.166   
The case of Radical Orthodoxy is that, to have all this in the most radical and least perverted 
form, it is always necessary to go back to Christian “roots”, because otherwise the whole 
thing will eventually collapse – towards individualism, a neo-pagan enslavement and a post-
Christian utilitarian control through false “care” of merely material bodies – without the quite 
specific Christian metaphysical underpinning.  In this sense a “radical” orthodoxy means a 
militant orthodoxy… the secular order must be overcome and a new mode of “Christendom” 
invented.167   
 
In this sense, the theology espoused is ‘orthodox’ through its commitment to creedal 
Christianity and the patristic matrix, and more specifically of affirming a richer and more 
coherent original Christianity gradually lost subsequent to the Middle Ages.  It wishes to 
recover and extend a fully Christianised ontology and a practical philosophy consonant with 
authentic Christian doctrine.  Its theology is ‘radical’ in its return to Christian roots and a 
rethinking of Christian tradition, and in the sense that such a vision should be deployed to 
                                                            
164 Simon Oliver, ‘Introduction’, in John Milbank and Simon Oliver (eds), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader 
(Routledge, 2009) 200-201. 
165 John Milbank, ‘The grandeur of reason and the perversity of rationalism: Radical Orthodoxy’s first decade’, 
in John Milbank and Simon Oliver (eds), The Radical Orthodoxy Reader (Routledge, 2009) 393. 
166 Ibid 393. 
167 Ibid. 
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boldly critique modern society and culture.168  Ultimately then, the central theological 
framework of Radical Orthodoxy is participation in the eternal, divine and infinite, that every 
discipline must have a transcendent foundation/source and be framed by a theological 
perspective in order to counter the violence of the secular.169 
 
3 Incarnational Paradox 
 
Participation in this context means that if we allow Christian theology to become the 
transcendent foundation of modern society and culture, society and culture will possess in 
part that which is possessed perfectly by God; namely, love and peace.  For Milbank, this 
participation occurs and is displayed through the Incarnation – the event of Christ where man 
and God are united in the person of Jesus – which he terms ‘incarnational paradox’.  He 
deconstructs the word ‘paradox’ etymologically and describes it as an ‘overwhelming’ or 
‘double glory (para-doxa)’ which is a ‘coincidence of opposites’ somehow mysteriously 
persisted with that ‘saturates our everyday reality’; it can be described as the ‘analogical’ and 
the ‘constitutively relational’.170  Such a coincidence of opposites occurs in the Incarnation, 
the event of Christ where man and God are united, and where infinite meets finite and 
temporal meets eternal.  Milbank contends that this is the moment of true theology, and so all 
philosophy and reason must be framed in terms of this event (while blending its intuitions 
with metaphysical reasoning and empirical appeal) in order to produce an ontology of 
                                                            
168 John Milbank et al, ‘Introduction’ in J Milbank et al (eds), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (Routledge, 
1999) 2. 
169 Ibid 3. 
170 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 163. 
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peace.171  In this way, the modern community participates in or apprehends a part of God’s 
very nature. 
 
Milbank therefore suggests that another part of the work of Radical Orthodoxy is to 
undertake a theological critique of philosophy itself in its instantiation of the specifically 
modern dualism between reason and revelation.  It is knowledge by faith and personal trust in 
the divine through poetic communion of the visible which simultaneously recognises God 
and rescues reason by providing access to the necessary, or transcendent infinite invisible.172  
It is because of this that Milbank also argues for the recognition and deconstruction of an 
‘autonomous secular reason’, aiming to return reason to its inherent and proper basis in the 
theology of Incarnational paradox, and return theology to its inherent reason.173  Theology 
fully arrives in the incarnational event, the coming of Jesus Christ as the God-man, which is 
comprehended not through pure reason, but through a reason combined with faith which can 
apprehend the unity of the Trinitarian relations.  For Milbank then, God’s Incarnation saves 
us by opening up a way beyond the material realm into the beyond of the infinite Trinitarian 
life of God.174   
 
C Doctrine of the Trinity 
                                                            
171 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, xxv. 
172 Ibid 4-5.  For Milbank, the conception of reason as achieving truth only when it gives creative expression to 
its recognition of God as visible in the world is far more critically viable.  This creative expression of the 
visibility of God may be ‘seen’ through the Holy Spirit and the communion of believers, and their interaction 
with the divine through the poetic.  God is no longer categorised and limited by secular human abstraction, but 
experienced and trusted through metaphor.  Milbank consequently argues that the insistence on knowledge only 
by faith, whereby we allow that the visible (finite) affords some clue to the invisible (infinite), alone prevents 
nihilism. 
173 Ibid 6. 
174 Creston Davis, ‘Introduction: Holy Saturday or Resurrection Sunday?  Staging an Unlikely Debate’ in 
Creston Davis (ed), The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic? (MIT Press, 2009) 16-18. 
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The notion of the Trinity in Christian theology is central both to Milbank’s Postmodern 
Critical Augustinianism and Radical Orthodoxy more generally, as well as to the argument of 
this thesis.  This is because the notion of unity in the diversity of the Trinity, a community of 
love and perfect relationship existing in an ontology of difference, provides a model which 
may be implemented in order to produce a legal community of peace.   The development of 
the doctrine is dependent on the reflection from Scripture that Jesus Christ is the divine God-
man and that God is fundamentally personal.175  Here, the ‘personal’ aspect of God is 
contrasted with the idea of God as an object or entity; in particular, that God is relational – 
possessing a mind, intellect, will and emotions which can interact with other ‘persons’.176  In 
the context of the economy of salvation, consideration of the Father as divine Being, Jesus 
the Son as divine Being, and the Holy Spirit as divine Being, all eternally uncreated, yet 
individual loving persons living in community, led the early church fathers to articulate God 
as Trinity – Tri-unity, or three persons existing together in one Being.  It is not three gods or 
one person, but three persons in a perfect community of personal Being.177  Despite the 
doctrine’s implicit teaching in Scripture, it was not explicitly articulated until the fourth 
century, and this after great dispute and in response to the objections of various sects and the 
Gnostic heresies.178 
                                                            
175 Alistair McGrath, Christian Theology (Blackwell, 2011) 288-289. 
176 Ibid 201, 288. 
177 Ibid 289. 
178 Ibid 288-289.  For further discussion and references regarding various views on the nature of the Trinity 
(including the distinction between the immanent and economic forms, the Trinity as a person in communion, 
etc), its historical development, and possibilities for using the Trinity as a model for human social relations, see 
Colin Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Study (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1998); Catherine 
LaCugna, God for us: The Trinity and Christian Life (HarperCollins, 1991); Mark Medley, ‘God For Us and 
With Us: The Contributions of Catherine LaCugna's Trinitarian Theology’ (2001) 35(4) Lexington Theological 
Quarterly 219; Miroslav Volf, ‘“The Trinity is our Social Program”: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Shape 
of Social Engagement’ (1998) 14(3) Modern Theology 403.  The critical point of whether the Trinity is an 
appropriate model for human social relations and how such a model may be implemented will be developed 
over the course of the thesis in Milbank’s sense of divine revelation and creaturely participation – most 
pointedly, through the Pauline law of love. 
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In this context, Milbank notes the problematic of divine simplicity held to by Aquinas.  
According to Aquinas, God is purely simple in the sense that He is purely constituted by his 
attributes, including being, such that existence is equated with being – ‘God is the same as 
His essence or nature… His essence is His being’.179  In principle, this causes conceptual 
difficulties for Aquinas in relation to the idea of the Trinity existing as three persons and one 
God, for this would appear to undermine simplicity. In Milbank’s view then, Aquinas’ divine 
simplicity fails to adequately reconcile the problem of unity and diversity, so Milbank 
postulates a fully Trinitarian ontology, where the difference of the three members of the 
Trinity is fully reconciled in their unity of the Godhead.180 
 
A similar problem exists in attempts to conflate creature and Creator, especially if they are 
viewed as subject to the same metaphysical principles.181  This arguably results in the 
dissolution of both creature and Creator, which is an act of unitary violence that authentic 
Christian theology attempts to redress, both in its clear distinction between God and 
                                                            
179 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (William Benton, 1952) vol 1 16-17. 
180 Hankey, Theoria versus Poesis, above n 62, 396-398.  More generally, Hankey has also been involved in the 
critique of Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy in regard to the claim that there is no philosophy without theology, 
as well as understandings and appropriations of the Trinity and the thought of St Augustine.  See e.g. Wayne 
Hankey and Douglas Hedley (eds), Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and 
Truth (Ashgate, 2005).  Colin Gunton has also had some brief critical engagement with Milbank – see Gunton, 
The One, The Three and The Many, above n 20, 139, 162, 193, 204.  This thesis as a whole attempts to 
generally address many of the salient issues.  Milbank has also received critique on the point that the Trinity 
provides a model for perfect equality and peace through unity in diversity.  See e.g. Sarah Coakley, ‘Why Gift?  
Gift, gender and Trinitarian relations in Milbank and Tanner’ (2008) 61(2) Scottish Journal of Theology 224, 
where Coakley critically examines the way in which Milbank appears to propagate an unequal human gender 
binary by restraining the work of the Spirit in terms of Trinitarian gift.  In response, suffice it to say that in 
Christ ‘there is no male or female’ in the sense of promoting patriarchy, for all equally participate in the divine 
love by faith (Galatians 3:28).  J. Todd Billings also notes important areas of commonality between Milbank’s 
theology of the gift and Calvin’s theology of grace, despite Milbank’s efforts to distance himself from Reformed 
theology – see J. Todd Billings, ‘John Milbank’s Theology of the “Gift” and Calvin’s Theology of Grace: A 
Critical Comparison’ (2005) 21(1) Modern Theology 87. 
181 This idea of ‘univocal being’ is central to Milbank’s critique of the secular, and will be examined in more 
depth in Chapters two and four. 
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humanity, and also in its Trinitarian ontology.182  For the peace of Christian Trinitarian 
theology is arguably found in the fact that the Triune God, existing in a divine loving relation 
of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, consequently exists ‘by the form of whose agency an 
unrelational individualism of will is ruled out.  The will of God is realised through a kind of 
community of love, so that the centrality of the Trinitarian mediators of creation ensure the 
purposiveness of the creation, its non-arbitrary character’.183  Hence God is not just a 
singular, arbitrary will, but a community of love and perfect relationship, and, I propose, the 
basis for such in the legal community. 
 
III CRITIQUING THE SECULAR GENEALOGY 
 
A Nietzsche and Truth 
 
As previously mentioned, the postmodern nature of Milbank’s project necessarily draws on 
the methods of postmodernism, including, in this context, genealogy.  To properly situate 
Milbank therefore requires a brief overview of the secular genealogy he aims to counter with 
an authentic Christian genealogy.  Since Milbank contends that a secular genealogy is related 
to the connection of truth with power, it is particularly instructive to consider Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Michel Foucault (as Milbank himself does) as theorists who attempt to 
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historicise a developing relationship of truth and power.184  The following remarks here are 
summary only, and draw largely upon the following sources. 
 
Nietzsche, in Beyond Good and Evil, defines truth as ‘semantic games’, ‘rhetorically 
intensified human relations’ which become ‘culturally entrenched’; as such, truth ‘is an 
illusion of which one has forgotten that it is an illusion’, a ‘vacuous metaphor’, and truth 
itself is not discovered, only ‘assumptions’.185  For Nietzsche, truth is the ‘will to power’ or 
an instrument of dominance, and inherently questionable as a matter of perspective.186  
Nietzsche notes that the true and the good are not necessary partners – something may be true 
while being ‘evil, harmful, dangerous and violent’.187  Indeed, he claims that Christianity is 
embraced only due to the ‘fear of truth’, and the ‘will to the inversion of truth’.188  We are 
ignorant in order to enjoy life, and on this ‘solid foundation of ignorance true knowledge 
rises’ – the ‘will to knowledge’ based on a far more fundamental will – the ‘will to ignorance, 
the uncertain and the untrue as knowledge’s refinement’.189  Ultimately, truth is ‘nothing 
more than appearance’, and there are ‘degrees of apparentness and perspectivism, gradations 
and shades’, no essential opposition of true and false.190   
 
According to Nietzsche in On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, this will to truth or power 
comes not from the desire for truth itself, but from a desire for the positive effects and 
                                                            
184 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 128. 
185 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (Vintage, 1966) 80. 
186 Ibid 10, 16, 48. 
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188 Ibid 71. 
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consequences of truth.191  Truth that is harmful or destructive is hostilely rejected.  Thus, the 
closest Nietzsche comes to defining truth is that:  
[Truth is] a movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum 
of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred and 
embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people fixed, canonical, and binding.192   
 
In this sense then, truth is a function of the will to power – the concept of truth is used as an 
instrument for dominance, antagonism and alienation.193  Nietzsche even claims that truth 
stands in a ‘hostile and destructive relationship to the world’ – ‘truth kills’ and even kills 
itself when it ‘realises error is its foundation’: it is the ‘tragic conflict’.194  Nietzsche therefore 
is concerned with truth, but not with metaphysical truth – he is rather concerned with truth as 
the ‘human economy of living’ and as a ‘product of perspectival conditioning’, of ‘impulses 
and drives’.195  Truth is a ‘belief that has become a condition of life’, and in that case 
‘strength is a criterion… truthfulness is only a means to a higher power of falsehood’.196   
 
Nietzschean genealogy therefore refuses to tell the metanarrative of the Kantian or Hegelian 
(or socialist or Marxist) transcendent, constant human subject, and instead seeks to articulate 
the different ‘fictions of subjectivity’ over history.197  Milbank notes that Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy of Morals is subtitled ‘an attack’, by which he means ‘an attack on Christianity, 
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and the illusion of eternal moral values’.198  This for Milbank exposes the nature of all 
genealogy – it is not disinterested, but specifically seeks to expose or undermine what it 
views as an underpinning societal fiction which has come to be viewed as ‘eternal truth’.199   
However, both Nietzsche and Foucault view their genealogy not just as another 
interpretation, but as an authoritative narration – which nevertheless is intimately related to a 
question of value.200  For in describing the ‘truths’ of human history as mere ‘ruse[s] of 
power’ and human history itself as a field of battle (or as power relations), this also 
apparently opens the space for humanist liberation (‘apparently’ because Milbank ultimately 
disagrees that genealogy is more than interpretation or that the story told is truly liberating), 
or for Nietzsche, the ‘emergence of an ubermensch, or a post-humanist human creature’.201 
 
It might be suggested that in Nietzsche we see evidence that for him the violence which is 
said to be a part of truth and power relations ultimately stems from the rejection of 
Christianity’s transcendent values.  For Nietzsche’s entire point could be understood as truth 
is simply a will to power because it is humanly situated (or a striving for human dominance) 
rather than divinely situated.  However, it is not a pure rejection of theology, for Milbank 
identifies intrinsically mythic and neo-pagan elements to Nietzschean thought.  In particular, 
it is arguably a rejection of Christian theology and a distortion of true theology, which 
replaces the Christian ontology of peace with a violent, neo-pagan mythos.  It is the fact that 
this ‘secular theology’ is nevertheless a distorted theology which gives Christian theology the 
scope to critique it. 
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For Milbank argues that if Nietzsche is correct, and all events are plays of power, then the 
cultures closer to realising this truth are more ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’.202  In articulating 
this view, Nietzsche therefore ‘celebrates a Homeric [pagan] nobility delighting in war, trials 
of strength, spectacles of cruelty, strategies of deception’.203  And unless it is clear that such 
really is a more natural form of life, this pagan perspective must be called into question.  
Indeed, Milbank claims that it is far from clear, for Nietzsche founds his account on the 
proclivity for human self-assertion, which is simply a ‘matter of taste… It follows that only in 
terms of Nietzsche’s own unfounded hierarchy of values is the primitive noble who tramples 
upon or patronises the weak free from blame’, and the Christian perspective of sacrificial 
love and peace is able to be proposed in its place.204   
 
B Foucault, Nietzsche and Power 
 
Similarly, Michel Foucault views truth as an instrument of oppression or power.  Again, the 
following remarks here are summary only, and draw largely upon the following sources.  For 
Foucault in Truth and Power, ideas are not preferable to other ideas because they are true or 
more true.205  Rather, claims to truth ‘perpetuate an exclusion where power hierarchies are 
strengthened’.206  Truth cannot be refuted, because following the genealogy of Nietzsche, 
truth was hardened into an ‘inalterable form’ through history, the ‘history of the error we call 
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truth’.207  Foucault argues in The Discourse on Language that the division between true and 
false is a ‘historically constituted division’, and the will to truth, as a system of exclusion (of 
the false), relies on institutional support which exercises a pressure or power of constraint on 
other forms of discourse.208   Ultimately, the abstraction of truth has ‘masked the will to truth 
and its associated desire and power at work’.209   
 
Foucault consequently defines truth as the ‘ensemble of rules according to which the true and 
false are separated and specific effects of power are attached to the true’.210  Truth therefore 
is not outside power or lacking in power: truth is a thing of this world, produced by multiple 
forms of institutional constraint, and inducing regular effects of power.  Each society has its 
regime of truth and its institutional criteria for determining between truth which is sanctioned 
and falsehood which is excluded.  Foucault’s hypothesis is this: that truth is a ‘system of 
ordered procedures for the regulation, distribution and operation of statements’, and is ‘linked 
in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it’, and to ‘effects of 
power’ which it induces and which extend it.211  In other words, truth is not about the 
revelation (transcendent or immanent) of reality.  Rather, truth is an organised system 
sustained by the mechanisms of power for the purpose of furthering that power.  So following 
Nietzsche, Foucault states that the essential problem is to acknowledge truth’s relationship 
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with power and devise a new ‘politics of truth’ which ‘detaches the power of truth from the 
forms of hegemony’ (social, economic and cultural) within which it currently operates.212 
 
Foucault argues that in a society, there are permeating relations of power which are shaped by 
discourse.  In particular, we are ‘subjected to the production of truth through power’ and we 
cannot ‘exercise power except through the production of truth… the rules of right and the 
mechanisms of power’ are equated to the ‘effects of truth’, particularly the power of true 
discourses.213  Foucault defines power in Power/Knowledge, not as an individual or class of 
individuals dominating others, but as something which ‘circulates and permeates’, as a 
‘web… individuals are the vehicles of power, and also an effect of power’, through systems 
of practice.214  In Discipline and Punish, Foucault illustrates the way this power is displayed  
through Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon, a picture of society as containing inmates 
which are constantly observed in order to ‘induce… a state of conscious and permanent 
visability that assures the automatic functioning of power’.215  That is, since the inmates do 
not know precisely when they are being observed (it could be at any given time), they act as 
though they are being observed at all given times.  In this way, power is maintained 
constantly without being constantly exerted. 
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Milbank critiques Foucault’s stage of society as spectacle, a pure object of observation for the 
functioning of power, as essentially violent.  For Milbank, ‘looking at violence is actually 
more violent than participating in violence – that to be violent is actually to survey in a 
detached, uninvolved fashion a scene of suffering… gazing at violence is the greatest 
violence, indeed the very essence of violence.’216  In the passive, voyeuristic observation of 
violence, violence can flourish.  If violence is unappealing, it would not be gazed at.  Hence, 
looking at violence in a condoning fashion creates a space where violence is embraced and 
can flourish, and so is even more fundamentally violent than the action of violence itself.  
Milbank implicitly connects this to the pagan celebration of violence through the Colosseum: 
… [The] modern “society of the spectacle” retreats from the pure liturgy of monotheism to a 
pagan theatricality. And like paganism, it invests its hopes in a controllable economy of 
violence: where this much and no more blood was once shed to appease the gods, now this 
much and no more simulated violence, or rather as much simulated violence as you like, will 
appease our “aggressive urges”; and in the absence of real wars to watch (from a safe 
distance) ensure that, indeed, no more real wars or mass oppressions ever again occur.217   
 
According to Milbank then, Foucault ultimately tells a similar (pagan) story to Nietzsche, for 
he traces the growth of Western society in terms of the development of disciplinary power, 
which permeates and regulates individuals through constant observation.218  ‘Like 
Nietzsche… Foucault has to conclude that power was the real substance of medieval natural 
law’.219   
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Having defined Nietzsche and Foucault’s genealogy in terms of power and violence, Milbank 
sketches a counter-genealogy, which views Christianity not as weak in relation to other 
individuals in terms of power, but weak in relation ‘to God, the source of all charity’.220  
Indeed, if we allow the presupposition of Christianity that the charitable will is to promote 
human flourishing rather than to stifle and dominate, in contrast to the Nietzschean 
presupposition that love is the greatest mechanism of power and dominance, it follows that 
there can exist an ‘analogical relation’, a harmonious and peaceful co-existence of 
differences.221  Fundamentally, this is to invert genealogy from stating that the natural act is 
the will-to-power to stating that the ‘natural act might be the Christian (supernatural) 
charitable act’.222  In other words, since nihilistic genealogy cannot properly position 
Christianity, there remains possible a Christian (Augustinian) conception or genealogy of 
history which reads war ‘as an absolute intrusion, an ontological anomaly’.223 
 
In saying all this, Milbank does not categorically reject Nietzsche.  Indeed, Milbank agrees 
with Nietzsche’s critical insight – that the foundationalism of modernity and the bastion of 
objective, autonomous reason must be overthrown, and in its place lies nothingness – the void 
of nihilism.  And it is uniquely Nietzsche who helps point the way forward, for he 
acknowledges that two of the ‘truest’ things in the world are love, for it ‘penetrates the core 
and suffers with the individual’, and religion, which ‘offers another world to console the 
sufferer’.224  So to arrive at the return of faith and theology, we must traverse the nihilistic, 
and rather than reinscribing the pagan violence of the heroic and powerfully victorious in its 
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place (as Nietzsche does in the form of the ubermensch), one should instead seek Christian 
theology, which through Christ’s crucifixion suffers with the individual, and through his 
resurrection allows the conception of a heavenly, life-giving peace.   
 
IV THE TRUTH OF THEOLOGY: PRODUCING PEACE THROUGH 
TRINITARIAN CORRESPONDENCE 
 
A Problematising Milbank and Correspondence 
 
In the most fundamental way then, Milbank takes Christianity to be the ‘absolute truth’.225  
This is because, however, he sees truth as ‘uniquely generated’ through the ‘tri-personed love 
of the Trinity’.226  Because he positions truth relationally, in terms of the fundamental 
interaction of relationship in the Trinity, truth itself can never be interpretively exhausted – it 
continues through the ongoing love relation both between the Trinity and between the Trinity 
and the world.  In situating the truth within the Christian concept of the Trinity, of particular 
importance is the function of the third member, the Holy Spirit, who produces and sustains 
the bond of love between the community of believers.  The love between Father and Son is 
‘perfect and infinite’, and the Holy Spirit allows ‘participation’ in this perfect and infinite 
(true) love through producing and sustaining the ‘bond between those of faith’ – both with 
each other and with the Father and Son.227  Therefore, it would seem that that Milbank 
endorses what may be termed a ‘Christian’ or Trinitarian correspondence theory of truth, 
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where it is this truth which can produce the necessary identity between human aspirations and 
existing reality.  Indeed, the ‘quest for a more human(e) world’ is the ‘quest for a world 
where human aspiration for peace and existing reality can be brought into a state of identity’, 
and human aspirations are only viable if they correspond with the way things ultimately are – 
that is, with the relationship between Father and Son. 228  It is on this basis that Milbank 
argues that Trinitarian theology is the best source for a political critique.  Such a critique, as 
we will see, is grounded in ‘truth’ as correspondence and produces peace. 
 
To understand further the foundations of this Trinitarian Correspondence theory of truth it is 
necessary to explain what precisely is meant by a correspondence theory of truth in 
philosophy.  The correspondence theory of truth is the view that a proposition is true only 
when it corresponds with reality.  There exists a proposition in the mind, such as ‘snow is 
white’.  This proposition is ‘true’ if it is reflected by or ‘corresponds’ to a real or factual state 
of affairs – that snow is, in fact, white.229  Correspondence theorists articulate this position 
generally in relation to three factors or elements: what has the property of truth (the truth-
bearer); the nature of the correspondence (the truth relation); and the reality to which it 
corresponds (the truth-maker).230  Most correspondence theorists agree that a plausible 
candidate for the truth-bearer is the proposition, which Kirkham defines as an abstract, trans-
linguistic entity which is the informational content of a complete sentence.231  Propositions 
are not identical to sentence types, for sentence types are composed only of their members, 
while a proposition would still exist even if it had not been expressed with a sentence 
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token.232  Theorists such as Armstrong and Alston have outlined a detailed system to describe 
the nature of the correspondence as a kind of reflection or mirroring between the proposition 
in the mind and states of affairs in reality; they have also contended that truthmakers exist for 
every type of proposition in the form of various states of affairs, an area of much 
contention.233   
 
However, the correspondence theory defined in this way does not sit comfortably with some 
of Milbank’s other statements.  For Milbank is also clear that 
The human mind does not “correspond” to reality, but arises within a process which gives rise 
to “effects of meaning”… our bodily elements are made “present” and articulate… through 
the happening of linguistic “meaning”, which is also the event of a “truth” which cannot 
“correspond”… Knowledge “surfaces” as the process of learning, which is true if divinely 
“illumined” – it is not a knowledge of an object outside that process.234   
 
In this sense, Milbank’s assumption is radically realist: there are no prior criteria for truth 
(such as correspondence to reality), since in that case truth would be governed by something 
other than truth, which would then be false.  Since ‘the truth is the truth’, it ‘declares itself’, 
with an ‘apparentness uniquely characteristic of truth’, so that it is ‘self-authenticating’.235  
There can be no method for seeking truth from the nature or structure of minds – for why 
should that be true and not an illusion – but instead, truth offers one some ‘advanced 
glimmering of its own character… truth must be a gift from truth itself’, which one must love 
and have faith in, and is ‘ontologically fundamental, principally personal’, and a ‘contingent 
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gift’.236  So truth, for Milbank, exists uniquely through the gift of divine illumination, and is 
more concerned with desire than pure intellect: 
The mind is only illumined by the divine Logos, if also our “preceding” energies, and… 
desires, correspond to the Father and the Spirit respectively.  We know what we want to 
know… if all that “is” is good and true, then no positive reality can be false as a “mistake”, or 
as “noncorrespondence”, but only false as deficient presence, embodying the shortfall of an 
inadequate desire.  Now desire, not Greek “knowledge”, mediates us to reality.237   
 
This is another way for Milbank to say that pure, secular reason cannot attain truth in the 
correspondence sense.  It is desire for pregnant being, awakened by faith in conjunction with 
reason, which enables us to fully participate in and correspond to the divine being – or, to 
apprehend truth. 
 
B Articulating a Genuinely Milbankian Correspondence 
 
1 Being and Participation 
 
It follows that for Milbank, truth is not correspondence (in the sense of mirroring between a 
proposition in the mind and the facts of reality), but participation of the beautiful in the 
graciously revealed beauty of God.  The measure of truth is likeness to the form of divine 
beauty of which our soul has some recollection through desire, and which has given or 
declared itself in a self-authenticating way rather than having been discerned in the mind.238   
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Importantly, this concept of participation is clarified by Aquinas.  In articulating notions of 
truth, faith and reason, Milbank draws heavily upon Aquinas, engaging in a creative 
interpretation to construct what he conceives to be more robust iterations of these perennial 
themes. Despite criticisms of Milbank’s appropriation or ‘interpretation’ of Aquinas, as one 
of the fundamental theorists of the relationship between faith and reason, theology and 
philosophy, Aquinas exhibits for Milbank an inordinate source of material for developing a 
Christian ontology capable of critiquing the secular, and so it is instructive to consider 
Aquinas in this context.239  Etymologically, Aquinas defines participation as simply ‘taking a 
part’ of something.240  More rigorously, he states that ‘when something receives in particular 
fashion that which belongs to another in universal (or total fashion), the former is said to 
participate in the latter’.241  Thus, when we find a quality or perfection possessed by a subject 
in only partial rather than total fashion, the subject is said to participate in that perfection.  
Appeal to a participation structure also accounts for the fact that a given perfection may be 
shared to various degrees by different subjects, raising the problem of unity in diversity, or 
the one and the many.242   
 
The final point in particular is instructive when one applies this Thomist notion of 
participation to human participation in the Trinitarian relationship.  It seems that (at least in 
principle) not only is the problem of unity in diversity paradigmatically resolved in the 
community of the Tri-unity, but the perfect quality of love and peace present in the divine 
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relationship is imparted to the community of believers to the extent that they also exhibit 
these qualities of love and peace, albeit imperfectly.243  As will be seen, the Incarnation can 
allow human or finite participation in the infinite relation (Trinitarian love) through the 
believing community partially apprehending the quality of this love, opening the possibility 
for an ontology of peace and reconciliation.   
 
Milbank has further attempted to recover a truly Christian correspondence theory through a 
more specific analysis of Thomas Aquinas.  Writing with Catherine Pickstock, Milbank has 
turned to Aquinas in this regard because his view allows the retrieval of truth firstly as 
‘correspondence without a sense of redundancy’ and secondly as both theoretical and 
practical and a matter of both faith and reason,244 and finally allows that truth is ‘accessible to 
the simplest apprehension’, and yet ‘amenable to profound learned elaboration... the notion of 
truth as correspondence is in crisis only because it is taken in an epistemological rather than 
ontological sense’.245   
 
The detractors argue that the correspondence theory must be abandoned since we have no 
unmediated access to reality, and instead disquotational or deflationary correspondence must 
be embraced, one which essentially reduces propositions of truth to that of being.246  
Deflationary theories state that truth has no inherent nature.  The basic intuition is that the 
proposition p is true is superfluous, since p is and p is true are equivalent.  Truth is equated 
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with being and the notion of truth can be discarded and requires no explanation.247  Milbank 
and Pickstock identify two primary problems with this position.  The first is that deflationists 
claim this is how truth really is, which would imply an inflationalist correspondence: ‘it is 
true that p is true’ where p = the correspondence theory of truth.  This makes no sense on a 
deflationist view.  Moreover, it leads to a contradiction, for this formulation nevertheless 
assumes correspondence to an (admittedly unverifiable) reality, and so is self-defeating.248   
 
The second problem is that such a theory of truth further implies that truth is merely 
instrumental, and this is analogous to the reduction of truth to relations of power and 
violence, which Milbank firmly rejects as a secular position.249  So for Milbank, such 
detractors are embracing a secular conclusion.  Milbank and Pickstock argue that only a 
Thomist theological approach can save the correspondence theory of truth.250  Indeed, 
correspondence must resurface, since for the Christian one seeks to imitate Christ, who is the 
Truth.  So Aquinas’ account of truth is the ‘incarnate Christ’s embodiment of the eternal 
truth’ (a Christological mode of correspondence where Christ the God-man is true in his 
imitation of, or accurately follows, the life of the eternal Trinity), and our participation in this 
by ‘imitation of Christ’.251   
 
However, Milbank argues that in Aquinas we also see correspondence as a ‘real ontological 
proportion between thought and being’ where these are regarded as transcendentally 
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convertible in the sense that our mind apprehends the divine mind and therefore the divine 
being – truth does not simply reduce to our mode of apprehension of what actually is the 
case, but truth as correspondence is salvaged in the strong sense of participation in the divine 
being.252  It is contended that one can only have correspondence at all if one has God, for 
truth as correspondence must be convertible with ultimate being. Secondly and in addition, 
such a correspondence theory is equally to be seen as a coherence theory, since the ultimate 
true ‘being of things’ is their ‘supreme intelligibility in the divine mind’.253   
 
On this point, correspondence and coherence do not apply in the same way as according to 
analytic philosophy. For correspondence, it is not simply a mirroring or reflection of reality in 
propositions (‘true to the facts’), but there is an analogy between the way things are 
materially and the way things are in our minds.254  According to the coherence theory in 
analytic philosophy, a belief is true if and only if it coheres with the entire set of one’s 
beliefs, assuming that the set itself is a strongly coherent one.255  Thus the truth or falsity of a 
belief is not a function of its match with a real, external world, but of the belief’s relationship 
with other beliefs within one’s web of beliefs.256  In other words, a proposition is true if it 
coheres with a system of propositions whose members cohere with one another, and 
coherence means that there must be both consistency and connectedness between the set of 
propositions.257  By contrast, theological coherence refers to the ultimate truth of the being of 
things in terms of their supreme intelligibility in the divine mind, and therefore in this sense 
coherence is intrinsically connected to Thomist correspondence. 
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Since truth is primarily in the mind of God then, Aquinas’ realist theory of truth as 
correspondence of a mind to a thing is qualified by the ‘subordination of all things to the 
divine mind’.258  The referral to the divine intellect entails that the ‘idea is oriented towards 
the reality of things’, and so the ‘truth of God as contained in the divine mind’ is expressed in 
the ‘reality of the created world produced from the divine mind’.259  It is real because truth, 
which exists in the mind, is convertible with being, the reality.  Milbank and Pickstock 
ultimately conclude that: 
What all this suggests is that correspondence in Aquinas’s theory of knowledge means 
something far more nuanced than a mere mirroring of reality in thought… there is an intrinsic 
analogy between the mind’s intrinsic drive towards truth, and the way things manifest 
themselves, which is their mode of being true… if there can be correspondence of thought to 
beings, this is only because… both beings and minds correspond to the divine being and 
intellect.260   
 
Therefore, rather than correspondence being ‘guaranteed by its measuring of the given’, it is 
‘guaranteed by its conformation to the divine source of the given’.261  In this formulation we 
can see the clarification of Milbank’s various statements regarding the correspondence theory 
of truth.  His notion of truth as correspondence consists not in a mirroring between 
propositions and the facts of reality, but in the unique, self-authenticating gift of the 
revelation of Trinitarian being and the divine mind through the Incarnation, which is 
participated in by humanity through imitation of what has been graciously revealed. 
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2 Revelation and Persuasion 
 
Since the truth of the divine being is the good and the good, in Christian thought, is peace and 
harmony (the perfect existence of the Tri-Unity), it is thus (according to Milbank) an 
ontology of peace which persuades people of the truth.  To opt for truth and peace is also to 
opt for the ultimate reality of reason, for reason then seeks roots in being.  Rather than reason 
being secular and a mere projection over the nihilistic void, reason is founded in Christianity 
– the divine ontology.  However, if there is no ultimate source – if there is no transcendence 
and violence is ontologically intrinsic within the void of nihilism – this implies reason itself 
is not sacred, but is instead unreason or nihilism – a mere projection or illusion.  As such, 
Milbank argues that only the ‘persuasion to the ultimate truth of reason is rational’.262  
However, it is important to emphasise that Christianity does not claim that the true is self-
evident to merely ‘objective secular reason’, but it instead first qualifies ‘philosophy as 
rhetoric in contending that the true are those things of which we are persuaded’.263  A 
rhetorical path to the true leads to the following implication: only ‘persuasion of the truth can 
be non-violent’, but ‘truth is only available through persuasion’.264  Therefore truth and non-
violence (or peace) have to be recognised as that by which we are persuaded (rhetoric or 
faith).265  Indeed, the very foundational Christian notion of faith is the Greek pistis, which 
means to have a conviction or trust in, and its root means to be persuaded.266  Thus, in 
Christian theology, to have faith is (at its most basic) to trust (in Christ) and be persuaded. 
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This notion of truth as persuasion harbours allusions to the discursive theory of truth 
promoted by Jurgen Habermas.  Habermas summarises his own position as a proposition 
being true if it could win argumentatively reached agreement in an ideal speech situation.  In 
other words, truth is what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions.267  We can 
imagine what such an ideal situation would look like with regard to argumentative 
presuppositions of general inclusiveness, equal rights to participation, freedom from 
repression, and orientation towards reached understanding.268  Acceptance of the validity of 
the proposition in question in such a situation constitutes truth, and argument remains the 
only available medium of ascertaining truth.269   
 
However, this actually leads Habermas to conclude that there is now a supposition of an 
independently existing reality about which we can state facts, and the truth of these facts is 
tested discursively.  It follows that ‘a proposition is agreed to by all rational subjects because 
it is true; it is not true because it could be the content of a consensus attained under ideal 
conditions’.270  Hence, Habermas seems to be articulating a realist theory of truth at least 
compatible with analytical correspondence if not itself correspondence, in conjunction with 
his epistemic view that this truth may be verified through argumentation.271  In short, under 
the assumption of ideal conditions, all available arguments are considered and exhausted, and 
this entitles us to take a proposition as true.  However, ‘the proposition’s truth signifies a fact 
– the obtaining of a state of affairs’.272    
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This implies a fundamental problem with adopting Habermas’ theory of discursive truth in 
conjunction with Milbank’s correspondence theory.  Milbank states that the notion of 
‘dialogue being a privileged mode of access to truth’ (in terms of mirroring between 
propositions and reality) is a ‘presupposition of liberalism’, which he firmly rejects as 
‘secular’ or even ‘neo-pagan’ – certainly not Christian.273  Since dialogue as a privileged 
mode of access to truth essentially characterises Habermas’ theory, it must be rejected on 
pain of inconsistency with ‘true’ truth: Trinitarian correspondence.   
 
We are then entitled to ask what exactly Milbank means by characterising truth as that of 
which we are persuaded, and the exact mechanism of this persuasion. The best interpretation 
seems to be that persuasion is apparently not that one is persuaded of truth by open 
intersubjective discourse, but rather one is persuaded through faith based on an unmerited 
revelation of the divine word.  In other words, it is the revelation of the divine word that 
persuades, or produces faith, and faith properly and peacefully animates persuasion.  In 
particular, God himself reveals truth through the Incarnation by demonstrating the Trinitarian 
relationship, that eternal relationship of love and perfect peace between Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit – or that law of love which corresponds with the created order through participation in 
the divine mind by faith or persuasion.  Truth is understood, then, as both love and 
correspondence.274   
 
To summarise, theology understands itself as studying objects which are absolutely real, in 
that they take their source in original, indefeasible actuality of being.  Theological reason, if it 
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is true to itself, contends that all other disciplines which claim to be about objects, regardless 
of whether those objects are related to God, are really about ‘nothing at all’ – indeed, ‘such 
disciplines are atheistic’, and atheism is really a ‘polite name for nihilism’, absolute 
nothingness or void.275  Only theology alone can ‘remain with the question of truth’.276  Truth 
is an ‘adequation’ or ‘correspondence of knowledge with the real’, since the one ‘entirely real 
reality’, God, is himself both ‘infinitely real and infinitely knowing’.277  As real he is also 
manifest and self-aware, or truthful.  To express a truth then means to correspond in our 
being to God (to a degree) via an awareness of aspects of the creation to whose lesser reality 
we also correspond, since creation is sustained by God and has its being in God.278  From this 
theological perspective alone it makes sense to say that knowing corresponds to being, even 
if this cannot be validated.  Hence a claim to know truly or to know at all amounts to a ‘faith 
and participation in that which is the origin of all things and the depth of all things’: the 
divine God.279   
 
It would seem to follow from this that unless secular disciplines are explicitly ordered to 
Christian theology, they can be seen as intrinsically impaired, altogether lacking in truth, 
which to have any meaning must consist of correspondence between knowledge and the real 
in the fashion described.280  The claim that secular disciplines are not ordered to Christian 
theology (and so have an ontology of violence through nihilism rather than an ontology of 
peace through divine being) is therefore Milbank’s primary reason for rejecting them, as is 
the subject of the following two sections. 
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V  REJECTING SECULAR REASON281 
 
Creston Davis states that Milbank’s fundamental aim is to interrogate the very foundation of 
(theological) reason, as opposed to modern secular reason which cannot be deployed against 
itself without collapsing.282  Consequently, he asks questions regarding reason’s function, 
actions and limits.283  As explained above, Milbank argues that since secular reason is 
disengaged from faith and is a mere projection covering over a uniform void of being, the 
secular means the nihilistic.  This nihilism is also violent because a pure reason, lacking truth 
or the good, is just the struggle of difference.   Milbank suggests that this nihilistic violence 
can be resolved by a recovery of what secular reason initially refused, a ‘social order 
grounded on virtue’, or being incorporating the good.284  However, virtue of the 
Platonic/Aristotelian type, though correctly oriented, is insufficient due to antinomies which 
arise in their accounts – such as peace being a ‘merely suspended violence’.285  However, 
Christianity provides a superior account based on its consistency, which ‘links the particular 
to universal’ by ‘conceiving its relationship as transcendence’, and so provides true peace.286   
 
Milbank illustrates this contrast between secular or pagan violence and a social order 
grounded on virtue by referring to Augustine.287  As explained in the introductory chapter, in 
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the City of God, Augustine attempts to demonstrate that pagan ontology is inherently violent 
(for even the ‘roman peace’ is violence suspended by violent domination), as opposed to the 
City of God, which is ontologically peaceful.  For example, Augustine argues that the earthly 
(secular/pagan) city was ‘founded on violence’, and will ‘continue in violence that leads to 
death’: even victory in war will lead to death through ‘arrogance inviting a violent 
overthrow’.288  However, he acknowledges that even the earthly city ultimately aims for 
peace, even if it cannot be attained.  By contrast, the heavenly city or the City of God 
possesses ‘eternal and perfect’ peace intrinsically since God is our peace, and this peace is the 
‘final fulfilment of all human virtue’.289   
 
Therefore, in Christianity and the City of God, one has a virtue which is not deconstructible 
to mere difference as antagonism and domination, but also allows analogical difference as 
participation in the very being of God, since Christian virtue ultimately seeks peace.290  So 
the rejection of secular reason is provided through faith’s explications, and the arguments of 
theology which are a violent critique on what is false: the ‘autonomous, exclusive citadel of 
reason’.291  But this violence is not received from theology itself, but from ‘reason’s 
implosion and self-dissolution as a function of the undoing of its violent self-assertion’.292  
Hence, pure secular reason in its final form is still ‘pagan and cultic’, as it ‘trades life for the 
nothing and only returns at the price of the obscuration of nothing’.293  In other words, the 
secular separation of faith from reason rejects the real life of truth and the good, substituting 
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it for nihilism.  The ‘reason’ that is left has no being, but is a mere illusion that obscures the 
nihilistic void – and this Milbank unequivocally rejects 
 
Another example of the violence of secular reason is the attempt of philosophy to exert its 
own paradigm in the market of ideas.  For example, Jantzen catalogues how philosophy may 
be viewed through a metaphor of violence – it is ‘adversarial’, in ‘strife’ and ‘sharp 
opposition’ through competing ideas.294  She even contends that ‘the violence and death-
dealing of western philosophical procedure has roots deep in Greek soil where intellectual 
combat became the philosophical version of Homeric warfare and its pursuit of fame through 
glorious death, even while aiming for eternal truth’.295  For Milbank, as a result of philosophy 
being produced through violence, the knowledge gained was exposed to be baseless (a 
product of the illusion of secular reason covering over a violent void) – and therefore this 
knowledge was not ‘true’ or ‘good’ knowledge.  Hence the (re)turn to Christian theology is 
necessary as a way to establish an incarnated pursuit of truth, since philosophy and theology 
have been inextricably linked, and indeed the destiny of philosophy is through the 
theological.296   
 
Modern secularity can thus be viewed as a mix of the heterodox, neopagan and antireligious.  
It is heterodox in the sense that it promotes a distorted and non-Christian theology, neo-pagan 
in the sense that it promotes violent ideological struggle, and antireligous in its rejection of 
faith in favour of a pure reason.   Milbank claims that with the distortion and rejection of 
these faith elements the pure reason of secular modernity is revealed as an illusion disguising 
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the nihilistic – and therefore an endless violence of biopolitics.  Such a position is no more 
inherently reasonable than Christianity, and Christianity is preferable since it allows 
differences to coexist peacefully.297  The separation of reason and faith is a secular modern 
construct, not a Christian one – theology must not and cannot conform to secular reason, but 
nor is it fideism, a ‘blind’ faith which is against or contrary to reason/evidence.298  The need 
to avoid these two extremes assumes discussion of the precise nature and definition of faith 
and the reason of theology, and this is what the next section seeks to address. 
 
VI PROMOTING FAITH AND THE REASON OF THEOLOGY 
 
A Faith and Reason in Christian Thought 
 
Milbank, despite his trenchant criticisms of pure, cold, secular reason which he equates with 
the ‘perversity of rationalism’ (mere discursivity and intellect which lacks desire or 
imagination), nevertheless boldly proclaims the  
… grandeur of reason in its unlimited reach, beyond the transcendentalist confines of the 
finite, which can only be insinuated by a philosophy that is “metaphysical” in the bad sense of 
reducing the ontological to the univocal and ontic and finally the epistemological and thereby 
seeking to corral it against theology.  A true metaphysical confidence in reason, on the other 
hand, only enjoys this confidence because it has a faith in the infinity of reason beyond our 
grasp – the infinity of the Logos which is participatively mediated to us… the grandeur of 
reason is therefore also the nobility of faith… and… is… anything but rationalism and is 
severely impaired and undermined by the latter.299 
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Indeed, throughout the history of the Christian faith, its proponents have always seen 
themselves as simultaneously faithful and reasonable, and have seen their faith and reason as 
fundamentally intertwined.  This is the case across the full array of Christian religious and 
philosophical traditions, including such luminaries of the church as Saint Augustine, Saint 
Anselm, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvin.300  More recently, Alvin Plantinga in the 
analytical school of philosophy has provided a robust philosophical critique of the claim that 
reason is inherently secular and consequently faith is by definition irrational or 
unreasonable.301  Consequently, this section endeavours to indicate how Christian faith and 
reason may work together, and that the operation and basis of purely secular reason may in 
fact be seen as (blind) faith. 
 
1 The Historical Catholic Perspective 
 
Saint Augustine viewed truth as something progressively discovered by faith in conjunction 
with reason.  As a foundation, Augustine argued that according to the etymological definition 
of philosophy (‘love of wisdom’), since wisdom is ‘identical with God’ and wisdom 
personified is God, ‘lovers of God’ are the ‘true philosophers’, and come nearest to the 
truth.302  It is by reason that humanity is separated from the brute animals, and is alone among 
the creation able to appreciate the Creator God.  However, the fact that human reason has 
been corrupted by sin necessitates that reason must be initially ‘purified’ by faith as humanity 
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proceeds along the journey to truth, ultimately to God himself.303  Hence for Augustine, faith 
is required for the proper operation of reason, since trust in and love for Jesus Christ, the 
Word and Truth of God, is the foundation for true knowledge.  Otherwise, the ‘powers of 
natural reason are prone to deception and error’, rather than truth.304  Although faith is a 
necessary condition for understanding religious truth, it is not a sufficient condition since 
reason is also required.  Hence, neither faith nor reason alone is sufficient, but both are 
necessary, and together, they are sufficient.305    So Rist for example states that: 
Since we are rational beings, it would be absurd to suppose that the prerequisite that faith 
precede reason is irrational – and we have now seen in what way it is eminently rational… it 
is loving faith which prepares the mind for reason to be able fully to perform its proper and 
most important functions.306   
 
In addition, Cushman argues that according to Augustine’s view, faith precedes reason, 
because unless one believes they will not understand, and that this position is rational.  
Consequently, ‘the faithful shall at last see God by the instrument of reason; but reason 
cannot attain the vision of God unguided by faith.’307  Augustine, however, does not advocate 
fideism: his is a faith seeking understanding.  Faith is required a priori due to the internally 
contradictory nature of a rationalistic, secular approach: ‘it cannot reach God because it does 
not want to have God.  It withholds commitment until it has sight; but it cannot achieve sight 
until it yields commitment.’308  The purely secular rational approach underestimates the 
sinfulness of the human heart and is ultimately against true reason, according to Augustine.  
Indeed, ‘faith and reason are required one of the other.  They are co-implicates; and it is error, 
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in Augustine’s view, to divorce them.  Faith presupposes reason; reason urgently requires the 
correction of faith.’309   
 
Thomas Aquinas, following Augustine, defines belief or faith to be ‘thinking with assent…. 
to believe is an act of the intellect’, and the ‘formal object of faith is the first truth’.310  An act 
of faith is ‘related to the object of the will’ (the good) and the ‘object of the intellect’ (the 
true).311  Importantly, the truth of reason is not opposed to the truth of the Christian faith, for 
‘God himself is the source of all truth’, and these truths do not contradict as there is ‘no error 
or falsity in truth’.312   For Aquinas it is the very notion of faith that the intellect should 
always tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith.  However, Aquinas 
notes that the human intellect cannot know God ‘naturally’, but must be ‘illuminated’ by his 
grace through the divine spark or ‘light’ of participation.313  Thus, Aquinas contends that faith 
is, by definition, in the intellect, it inclines towards the truth, and is the most ‘certain of the 
intellectual virtues’, for it is based on divine truth.314   
 
Milbank argues that in Aquinas, reason and faith only represent ‘different degrees of 
intensity’ of ‘participation and divine illumination’.315  Reason itself requires faith since it 
‘presupposes the operation of faith’, while faith still ‘demands discursive argumentation’ and 
is ‘higher than reason’ only because it ‘enjoys a deeper participation in the divine reason’, 
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which is ‘pure intellect’.316  In other words, faith and reason are on the same plane and 
strengthen each other insofar as they take part in the divine intellect – though faith is closer to 
the divine mind than reason is.  So ‘good reason’ is an ‘attentive reception’, via the 
‘mediation of the senses and discursive operations’, of the ‘divine light of the logos’, through 
faith.317  Thus, Aquinas offers no support to those who claim there can be a philosophical 
approach to God independent of theology, or to those who demand confinement to Scripture 
without metaphysical reflection.  Rather, revelation supplements metaphysical reflection and 
enables the theoretical ascent to truth.318   
 
2 The Protestant Perspective319 
 
A central aspect of truth as revelation of the divine is the fact that it points to the beyond.  In 
other words, the very notion of revelation directs us to what is not-yet-revealed.  This lack of 
knowledge which is nevertheless trusted based on what is known and has been revealed, is 
the essence of faith.  So truth as revelation which is certain produces faith since it points 
towards a lack of knowledge to be trusted.  This means that merely secular reason cannot 
arrive at truth, for faith is required to supplement and transform reason to yield truth.  This 
was the fundamental Protestant insight – the need for faith to purify and supplement reason in 
order to produce truth.  For example, John Calvin agreed that faith must be ‘preceded by a 
work of grace in the heart’, due to the ‘sinful propensity’ of human reason alone.320  
However, for Calvin, faith is a ‘certain belief in the divine veracity’, not discernment taught 
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by any ‘demonstration of reason’.321  Faith is something ‘higher than human understanding’, 
for without divine illumination faith cannot be produced - faith then ‘purifies the mind’, 
giving it a ‘desire for divine truth’ and ‘establishing it in that truth’.322   
 
Karl Barth argues that faith believes in the Word of God, Jesus Christ.  That is, faith is trust 
or reliance on the faithfulness of the divine.323  Importantly, Barth rejects the notion of faith 
based on pure human reason – we never believe ‘because of’ [reason], but ‘in spite of’ 
[reason], and we do not believe based on the proofs of reason.324  Barth does not mean 
Christian faith is irrational, anti-rational or supra-rational, but rather it is rational in the 
‘proper sense’ that ‘human reason is illuminated by the divine reason’, the logos.325   In this 
sense, faith is belief based on the revelation or truth of the glory of Christ, and is fully 
compatible with reason.326   
 
According to Lochman, ‘faith involves understanding, and being related to the truth; it is not 
a blind irrational act’.327  Similar to Augustine, faith precedes but aims for understanding.  It 
is based on the truthfulness of God in the sense of his revealed fidelity, faithfulness and 
reliability; it is not irrational.328  As such, the orthodox Christian position (both Catholic and 
Protestant) involves an affirmation of truth as the divine revelation of Christ, and that both 
faith and reason are instrumental in apprehending this truth.  Berkhof provides a useful 
summary: 
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Faith is more than a subjective relationship of trust.  Trust is based on knowing the 
dependability or person of the object that is trusted; it therefore includes and presupposes 
knowledge.  It belongs to the essence of the faith that it pretends [claims] to have to do with 
truth, and even with the all-inclusive and universally valid truth.  Thus the study of the faith 
cannot relinquish the claim that it tries to articulate the truth.329   
 
So Milbank fundamentally claims that the very notion of a divide between revelation and 
reason, far from being an authentic Christian legacy, itself results only from the rise of a 
questionably secular mode of knowledge.330  In the orthodox Christian position, both faith 
and reason are included in the more general framework of participation in the mind of God.  
For Aquinas as the key example, all human rationality is the participation in the divine 
reason, and therefore all knowledge requires faith.331  The light of revelation thus 
‘strengthens our grasp of natural principles’.332  What this means is that ‘theology [also] 
mediates knowledge’ in all other disciplines.333  As Milbank notes, to ‘reason truly one must 
be already illumined by God’.  Revelation, then, is ‘just a higher measure of illumination’, 
which is ‘conjoined’ intrinsically and inextricably with a ‘created event which symbolically 
discloses that transcendent reality’, and to which ‘all created events to a lesser degree 
point’.334  This ‘created event’ is the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, 
the God-man.  Hence there can be no separation of reason and revelation, for ‘true reason 
anticipates revelation’ in the sense that a reason illumined by faith will always point toward 
revelation – the arrival of true reason in the event of Christ the Word.335 
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B The Limits of ‘Secular’ Reason 
 
In contrast to this understanding of the co-dependency of faith and reason, and the 
understanding of truth as revelation, secular reason separates faith from reason and attempts 
to discern the truth of reality independent of faith or revelation.  Milbank proposes that pure 
(or secular) reason is supposedly able to resolve the four fundamental Kantian antinomies and 
uncover the truth of reality: beginning/no beginning, freedom/causality, ultimate constituent 
parts/no such parts, and necessary being/contingent being.  However, according to Milbank, 
since these cannot be ‘conceptualised by the understanding’, any transcending of the 
antinomies becomes a ‘pure act of faith’, not a ‘necessity of reason’.336  Indeed, it will be 
seen that only through the incarnational paradox of Christ may these antinomies be 
transcended.337  In addition, Christian theology needed to show that the way things are is a 
mode of perfection.  Here, ‘faith achieved what reason could not’ by transcending the 
antinomies, and it did so by claiming such perfection in terms of the ‘derivation of things 
from a perfect being, however inscrutable’.338  In other words, since God is perfect being, the 
way things are (truth as revelation of being) is also a mode of perfection.  Consequently, the 
Kantian antinomies can never be resolved through pure or secular reason, but may be 
transcended through faith in the divine. 
 
It may even be contended that faith is actually a presupposition of reason, which implies that 
the notion of secular reason is inherently problematic.  For if reason is viewed as independent 
of or autonomous from faith, and reason has no absolute foundations based in faith, then 
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argument between different positions is precluded and pragmatically absurd.  Any arguments 
which seek to go beyond tautology have to ‘assume areas of given agreement’, and to ‘win an 
argument means to show the contradiction of alternative positions’ – outside a ‘horizon of 
shared faith’ (or ‘common feeling’) no arguments would get off the ground.339  Beyond the 
level of formal logic there is no single ‘reason’ without presuppositions, there are only many 
different, complexly overlapping traditions of reason (such as practical reason or speculative 
reason).340  It follows that if theology is to be a logos, its own Word or reason which has a 
right to speak, it must be in some fashion convincing in itself, rather than a mere expression 
of a ‘faith’ wrongly thought of as ‘preceding a rational and linguistic reflection’.341   
 
This means theology will have to provide an account of human history on the basis of its own 
particular and historically specific Christian faith.342  Theology may do this in an intrinsically 
convincing way by refusing to treat reason as an ahistorical universal, but instead asking how 
Christianity has affected human reason.  For Milbank, such a theology will turn to the 
patristics and go beyond them to elaborate a Christian logos, or a reason which fundamentally 
bears the marks of the Incarnation.343  For Christianity ultimately claims that only the 
Incarnation of Christ fully restores truth and reason.344   
 
 
 
                                                            
339 John Milbank, ‘Hume vs Kant: Faith, Reason and Feeling’ (2011) 27(2) Modern Theology 276, 278. 
340 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 35. 
341 Ibid 77. 
342 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 382. 
343 Ibid 383. 
344 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, above n 245, xiii-xiv. 
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C An Incarnational Reason 
 
The contrast being articulated here is between a cold, pure, abstract reason which cannot 
apprehend reality because it does not have its foundation in true being, and a reason 
combined with faith through the Incarnational event.  In particular, there is an element of 
feeling, desire and love which consists in faith united with reason, in contrast to a uniform 
and purely rational reason.  As such, the qualification of reason by myth and poetry (the 
dimension of feeling or affection) ensures that reason will not degenerate into pure 
abstraction.  This alludes to the notion that revelation should be understood in its aesthetic as 
well as logical and ethical dimensions.  The revelation of Christ through the Incarnational 
event is not merely propositional with moral import, but is also an event which displays the 
beautiful and evokes the affections, especially love.  In particular, Milbank places emphasis 
on the imagination and the ‘poetic moment’, which is the ‘realisation or manifestation of the 
Beautiful’, an integral part of our ‘poetic existence in Christ’.345  This metaphysics of the 
person points the way to ‘understanding humanity as fundamentally poetic being’, which is 
fully participated in through the revelation of Beauty in the Trinitarian relations.346  ‘Poetic 
existence can then be described as a fundamental [Christian] activity and as a fundamental 
mode of knowledge’.347  Ultimately then, charity (love) or ‘doing good’, requires a ‘free, 
gratuitous response to God’s free gratuitous gift’ as something beyond boundaries or 
precedents, something ‘creative’ – and this requires an engagement with the poetic and a 
‘discovery of true poetic bounds of possibility’ – ultimately modelled by the love of the 
Trinity God displayed in the Incarnation of Christ.348 
                                                            
345 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 123. 
346 Ibid 124. 
347 Ibid 129. 
348 Ibid 134. 
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In contrast, pure or secular reason results in a form of paganism, since its absolute abstraction 
disguises the struggle of difference.  The Bible, especially the New Testament, ‘resists this 
advance to pure abstraction by reinvoking the poetic’, yet in a nonpagan way which seeks a 
‘positive relationship to the properly vague abstraction of nondogmatic reason’ (for example, 
the wisdom literature and New Testament engagement with Greek philosophy).349  The 
balance is proclaimed paradoxically in the idea that reason itself (logos) becomes Incarnate, 
which means the ‘rational is fully and only accessible by the indirectness of a poetic 
discourse concerning this event’; reason thus is more ‘realistically rational’ as disclosing a 
‘rational though mysterious universe’.350  As such, reason is uniquely accessed through faith 
in the divine, and faith involves both the intellect and the affections. 
 
This is in fact central to the Christian concept of faith.  Milbank defines faith (pistis: to trust 
or be persuaded) and trust interchangeably: to trust is to have faith in, and to have faith is to 
trust.351  Faith includes both the affective element of trust, and the intellectual element of 
persuasion through a reason specifically based in Christ, the divine Word.  It follows that 
there are not ‘many faiths’, but ‘one faith’ – a ‘trust in the transcendent God that involves 
being persuaded by the divine word beyond the scope of secular reason’.352  It is a trust in 
‘specifically disclosive sacramental processes of mediation between the universal and the 
                                                            
349 This may be seen in the way the Apostle Paul quotes the Greek poets in his preaching to the Gentiles in Acts 
17, seeking to teach them about the nature of the true God (that in him we live and move and have our being) 
through poetic discourse. 
350 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 217-218. 
351 John Milbank, ‘Sublimity: The Modern Transcendent’ in R Schwartz (ed), Transcendence: Philosophy, 
Literature and Theology Approach the Beyond (Routledge, 2004) 230; Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 
150-153. 
352 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 150-153. 
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particular, mind and reality, the intellect and the senses’.353  Thus, in the final analysis, faith 
in the Triune God is a recognition of and trust in the ‘transcendental/ontological possibility of 
participation’ in the infinite/divine.354  Since this faith ‘construes the universal sway of 
difference as analogical’, by faith the proclamation is made that ‘theology is a meta-
discourse’, and ‘pure reason is viewed as private reason’.355   
 
In short, pure secular reason (even when modest) always courts danger and drives us to the 
accomplice of violence in knowing, and to dread in ignorance.  Secular reason itself is finally 
‘uncertain’.356  This is the conclusion which pure reason must reach, while the intersection of 
reason by faith establishes commonsense reason and allows the progression of philosophy 
through establishing reason in true being.  In this way, for Milbank, ‘theology may outwit 
secularism and nihilism’.357  It is worth noting that in Knowledge Milbank importantly 
distinguishes the object of his argument here from that in Theology and Social Theory: here 
the object of philosophy (being) is not denied, but it is instead argued that the pursuit of being 
by pure reason will reach aporetic and nihilistic conclusions – that, for example, reason itself 
is an illusion and there is nowhere for secular philosophy to proceed.  Reason therefore 
cannot ground the rational disclosure of being, but by faith (truth as revelation of divine 
being), disclosure remains possible.  Thus, theology ‘saves reason and fulfils and preserves 
philosophy’, but ‘secular philosophy left to its own devices brings itself… to an end’.358 
 
                                                            
353 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 16. 
354 Milbank, Hume vs Kant, above n 339, 277-278. 
355 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 162. 
356 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 150-153. 
357 Milbank, Knowledge, above n 334, 32. 
358 Ibid 37. 
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To conclude then, discursive reason should recognise that it operates within strict limits and 
is therefore not competent to pronounce judgment against metaphysical or religious positions.  
A certain stance of faith is involved.  Hence, if one ‘restricts reason to the formal’ and ‘insists 
it only operates in knowable boundaries’, one may ‘encourage entirely irrational and emotive 
political movements’ that exhibit violence.359   The converse implication of this is that the 
combination of reason and faith open the possibility for a theological ontology of peace 
through revelation of Trinitarian relations and Incarnational paradox. 
 
Milbank further argues that any sharp separation of reason and faith is ‘dangerous’, because it 
implies that ‘faith at its core is non-rational and beyond the reach of argument’, while 
simultaneously implying that ‘reason cannot impact on issues of substantive preference’.360  
But in reality, reason and faith are always intertwined in a beneficial way.  Reason has to 
make certain assumptions and trust in the reasonableness of reality.  Faith has to continuously 
think through the coherence of its own intuitions in a process that often modifies these 
intuitions.  Thus, ‘critical faith becomes a more reflective mode of feeling’, and ‘reason has 
always to some degree to feel its way forward’.361   
 
Some might ask whether a sound basis has been provided for rejecting secular foundations 
and pure reason in favour of Christian theology and a faith united with reason.  I have argued 
that for reason to effectively operate a certain stance of faith is always involved, and so the 
more appropriate approach is faith and reason working together.  However, for those 
entrenched in the secular setting who may reject faith a priori, perhaps there is no possible 
                                                            
359 Milbank, Hume vs Kant, above n 339, 276-277. 
360 Ibid 277. 
361 Ibid. 
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argument that will be convincing from a faith perspective.  In such a case, I ask the reader to 
be patient and to reflect on the arguments of Chapter Six, which suggest the particular value 
of the Christian tradition within the context of modern secular jurisprudence, and consider 
why the Christian heritage might be worth advocating for from the perspective of the secular. 
 
VII SUMMARY REFLECTION: WORKING MILBANKIAN DEFINITIONS OF 
TRUTH, FAITH AND REASON 
 
This chapter has aimed to construct working definitions of truth, faith and reason within the 
framework of Milbank’s theology in order to provide a foundation for the arguments in the 
ensuing chapters.  It commenced by contextualising Milbank’s Postmodern Critical 
Augustinianism within the greater theological movement of Radical Orthodoxy, exploring 
how this movement as a whole and Milbank as an individual simultaneously seek to reclaim 
faith and theology as an autonomous and ‘reasonable’ meta-discipline from the dominance of 
secular reason.  The chapter subsequently explored a secular genealogy of truth through 
Nietzsche and Foucault, and it was indicated that if secular reason is the operational 
presupposition, it seems to follow that truth is nothing but the effects and relations of power 
which manifests an ontology of nihilism and violence.   
 
In contrast we saw how Milbank, along with historical Christian thought, rejects this 
genealogy and promotes an ontology of peace.  Here faith and reason are harmoniously 
united, and truth is the gracious revelation of the divine Trinitarian relations through 
Incarnational paradox, in conjunction with the ‘correspondence’ of personal participation in 
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this relationship of the divine by faith.  It was suggested that since the Trinitarian relations 
are intrinsically characterised by love and peace, such truth and participation in the truth also 
promotes a community of peace. 
 
So the rejection of hegemonic secular reason does not result in fideism, where faith is 
antithetical to or divorced from the operations of reason.  Rather, faith is trust in and 
persuasion of the truth and occurs through the gracious disclosure of this truth by the truth – 
namely, the Trinitarian relation of love and peace revealed in the Incarnation.  This faith both 
illumines and is articulated by reason through participation in the divine reason, which allows 
both critical reflection and a reliant trust in God.  The articulation of reason is found in the 
Incarnated Christ, the logos which is the sum and genesis of all reason as it is the divine 
reason, and reason is therefore the recognition of God as visible in the world. 
 
It is finally worth noting that truth, faith and reason are mutually interdependent in Milbank’s 
framework, such that each entails the others and one cannot exist without the others.  Truth 
assumes participation in the divine mind by faith, and participation in the divine mind 
constitutes reason.  Faith depends on being persuaded by the revelation or truth of the 
Trinitarian relations and Incarnational paradox, which reveals the divine mind and 
demonstrates the logos as the divine reason.  And reason only achieves truth through the 
creative expression of its recognition of God in the world by faith.  Reason consequently 
requires the persuasion of faith by the truth to avoid becoming secular or ‘pure’ reason.  In 
this way, a framework of truth, faith and reason is provided which stands as a foundation in 
the utilisation of Milbank to articulate a jurisprudence of truth. 
108 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
SECULARISING SCIENCE: THE DIVORCE OF REASON 
AND REVELATION 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The first chapter of this thesis explored the working definitions of truth, faith and reason as 
employed by John Milbank.  It was found that reason and faith are not incompatible, but are 
fundamentally united and inextricably intertwined in a mutually beneficial way.  The 
corollary of this is that the divorce of reason and faith is problematic, for the secularisation of 
reason seems to result in violence.  This chapter explores that claim in the context of 
scientific discourse, bearing in mind Milbank’s contention that the secular is just another 
mode of theology, and so can be subject to a theological critique or counter-genealogy.  
Following Milbank, I argue that the understanding of Aquinas as dividing faith and reason 
and a view of God as pure sovereign will form the theological framework undergirding the 
early modern scientists, as well as the institution of the church – and that these perspectives 
produce violence.   Therefore, recognising Aquinas as articulating a united faith and reason 
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with a view of God as participatory being are essential components of constructing a 
Christian theology which leads to peace.  
 
Initially, part II of the chapter engages in a genealogical account of the development of 
science.  The first section explores the theological characteristics of the early modern 
scientists Galileo, Kepler and Newton, identifying their view of God as a type of pure will or 
sovereign architect.  The next section argues that such views of God are related to a 
scholastic misinterpretation of Aquinas on faith and reason, which subsequently allows the 
separation between faith and reason.  In other words, science as knowledge may be 
apprehended by pure reason, without faith – in effect allowing the possibility for reason to 
become the autonomous foundation for scientific inquiry.   This distinction, noted by 
Laplace, allowed the redundancy of theological considerations in scientific analysis, 
eventually leading to the evacuation of theology and methodological naturalism in scientific 
endeavour.   
 
In part III there is a genealogical analysis of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, 
which is parallel to the development of modern science.  This analysis occurs in the context 
of suggesting how the respective theologies of these movements further entrenched a view of 
God as pure sovereign will, and the separation of faith and reason.  The emphasis on the 
sovereignty of God in conjunction with the approach of faith alone and Scripture alone 
espoused by the Reformers also isolates reason from faith through confining faith to 
theology, as well as preventing recourse to natural revelation for knowledge of God.  This 
notion of God as sovereign, in conjunction with the Catholic Counter-Reformation response 
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of more stringently regulating the pursuit of knowledge, arguably fostered a community of 
imperialisation and struggles for dominance. 
 
Since such science or knowledge resulted from the initial divorce of reason and revelation (or 
faith), I propose in part IV that the way to restore certain, true science which pursues peace is 
through uniting reason and faith through the model of Christian Trinitarian theology, and 
allowing Christian theology to reign with its ontology of peace.  In other words, this chapter 
concludes by proposing a counter-narrative which views God as not pure sovereign will, but 
as participatory being or loving community.  Furthermore, through Milbank, we see a more 
charitable interpretation of Aquinas, one which unites reason and faith.  It is suggested that 
this opens the possibility for a future vision: where the pursuit of knowledge is no longer 
antagonistic, but where faith is united with reason and science is a peaceful participation in 
the divine being. 
 
II THE THEOLOGICAL GENESIS AND SUBSEQUENT SECULARISATION 
OF SCIENCE 
 
Milbank claims that modern science was ‘intended to promote objective truth’ and was 
essentially ‘positivist in character’, relying upon ‘indefeasible sense-impressions of external 
facts of reality’, which was governed by an immutable system of natural laws.362  However, 
rather than providing a ‘true ontology’, in reality it only provides a ‘very limited disclosure of 
                                                            
362 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 264. 
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certain aspects of reality lending themselves to manipulation and prediction’.363  As he 
incisively observes, the only ‘possibly universal truth’ that science can entertain is the rule of 
contingency, or uncertainty.364  Thus, it is suggested that due to the emphasis on God’s will 
and the separation of faith and reason, science is ‘indifferent to anything but abstract power’, 
and does not merely ‘override past attachments or theoretical prejudices, but keeps them in 
reserve’, so it can potentially ‘recruit them to the interests of domination’.365  In other words, 
for Milbank science is not absolutely objective, but assumes a certain kind of theology which 
ultimately displays itself in the violent manipulation of the limited knowledge gained.  
Moreover, in the end the removal of faith from reason in the context of science 
(secularisation) also results in uncertainty – a blind faith. 
 
A Voluntarism and the Early Scientists 
 
As mentioned, this theology is an understanding of God as pure sovereign will, as the great 
divine architect – or what is otherwise known as theological voluntarism.366  It would give 
Milbank’s claims more plausibility if it were found that these assumptions were shared by the 
pioneers of modern science.  Indeed, we do see that various sociological and historical 
analyses have revealed the extrascientific influence undergirding the so-called scientific 
revolution, particularly a Christian theological framework of God as the Creator and 
                                                            
363 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, above n 245, xii. 
364 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 259-60. 
365 Ibid 274-275.  It should be noted that there would be individual exceptions to this, but it is the discipline 
generally that is being described. 
366 McGrath, above n 175, 70.  This priority of the divine will was championed by John Duns Scotus in contrast 
to Aquinas, who argued for the priority of the divine intellect/mind.  The distinction is critical for Milbank, and 
will be referred to later in this chapter.  However, it will be explained and analysed in more depth in Chapter 
four. 
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Institutor of natural laws.367  This theological framework will be considered specifically in 
the thought of Galileo, Kepler and Newton.  I will focus on these three early modern 
scientists and thinkers for two reasons.  Firstly, they are foundational in terms of the 
development of modern science as part of the scientific revolution.  Secondly, and more 
importantly, I will argue that forthright in their thinking was a particular theology.  This 
theology was fundamentally influenced by the scholastic emphasis on the will of God and the 
corresponding separation of reason and faith; these beliefs were also the primary motivation 
for their scientific pursuits. 
 
1 Galileo and the Unity of Truth 
 
Galileo Galilei was a famed though notorious physicist and astronomer over the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, whose predictions and discoveries allegedly contradicted the theological 
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.  For Galileo, the foundation for his unpopular 
espousal of Copernican cosmology was the fact that ‘God is omnipotent and can do 
anything’.368  This focus on the power and will of God in the creation and function of the 
universe caused Galileo to praise the ‘marvelous construction of the vast celestial sphere’.369  
In this sense, God was viewed as the all-powerful designer or architect, one who is able to 
construct the universe by virtue of his incontrovertible, sovereign freedom.  Moreover, 
Galileo believed that ‘God acts, not through miracles, but in the most natural, simple, direct 
                                                            
367 D Griffin, ‘Introduction: The Reenchantment of Science’ in D Griffin (ed), The Reenchantment of Science: 
Postmodern Proposals (State University of New York Press, 1988) 10.  See e.g. also M Osler (ed), Rethinking 
the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2000); R Giere and R Westfall (eds), Foundations of the 
Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century (Indiana University Press, 1973); J Hannam, God’s Philosophers: 
How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science (Icon Books, 2009). 
368 Galileo, cited in W.L. Wisan, ‘Galileo and God’s Creation’ (1986) 77(3) The History of Science Society 473, 
484. 
369 Ibid 475. 
113 
 
way’.370  This acknowledgement of God working through natural means rather than 
supernatural means enables, in principle, an analysis of the physical world without reference 
to God or special revelation. 
 
In this context Campanella, a clergyman who defended Galileo at the time of the controversy, 
advocated what is termed the doctrine of the unity of truth – that religious truth cannot 
contradict truth discovered by natural reason in any discipline, including science.371  This is 
expressed through the metaphor of God’s double gift of truth – the book of Scripture (special 
revelation) and the book of nature (general revelation).  Since the same good and truthful God 
is the author of both books, they cannot disagree with each other, assuming both books are 
properly understood.  If this is granted, there is an a priori guarantee that religion (faith) and 
science (reason) will not disagree – the problem is the correct understanding of both.372   
 
According to this view, allowing the study of the physical world apart from God’s special 
revelation is not ultimately problematic, for it is all God’s truth.  Any attempt to forbid 
Christians to study the book of nature is a crime against Christianity itself, for if Christianity 
is true, it should not fear the discovery of other truths in nature which will provide greater 
insight into the wisdom and goodness of God.373  Hence Christian belief provided a 
foundation for exploring the natural world, since neglecting this cut off access to learning 
about God through the general revelation.374  This is reflected in the significant scientific 
progress in the Middle Ages, actively supported by the church as long as it did not endanger 
                                                            
370 Ibid 482. 
371 R Blackwell, ‘Introduction’ in T Campanella,  A Defense of Galileo (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 
24-5. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Ibid 29. 
374 Ibid. 
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accepted theological teachings.375  As Hannam notes, ‘…Christian theology turned out to be 
uniquely suited to encouraging the study of the natural world, because this was believed to be 
God’s creation’.376   
 
 
2 Kepler and the Precision of God’s Decree 
 
The medieval Christians expected that God had arranged things in an elegant way, without 
restricting his sovereign decree, and although this was the presumption, one still had to 
confirm empirically to see if God had in fact operated this way.377  For them the desire to 
worship God by actively studying his creation is a distinctly Christian imperative, for when 
we observe the orderly causes of the world, it drives us to know that first cause of all other 
causes: God.378  For example, the most important fact about the world for Johannes Kepler, 
the celebrated German mathematician and astronomer of the seventeenth century, was that 
God had created it.379  In his eyes, the structure of the heavens should reflect the perfection of 
the Creator, and this perfection would reveal itself through the precision of geometry.380   
 
For Kepler, ‘God himself the Creator has adjusted… the operations of the world’ and the 
‘celestial motions’.381  God ‘assigned the motions of the heavens in harmonic proportions’.382  
                                                            
375 Hannam, above n 367, 1-2, 7-8. 
376 Ibid 5-6. 
377 Ibid 185. 
378 Ibid 227. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Ibid. 
381 Johannes Kepler, The Harmony of the World (American Philosophical Society, 1997) 129. 
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‘The harmonic faculties explained… have been breathed out by that essential harmony, God 
himself, in the act of creation, inasmuch as he is “existence in activity”’.383  So God is viewed 
again as the sovereign divine architect who freely and precisely designs the structure of the 
universe.  Kepler even goes further, equating the nature of God’s being with this precise 
mathematical structure, and emphasising the accomplishment of His will and activity.384  He 
extends this character to the rest of creation, arguing that ‘indeed all spirits, souls and minds 
are images of God the Creator if they have been put in command each of their own bodies, to 
govern… they also observe the same patterns along with the Creator in their operations, 
having derived them from geometry’.385  If we are images of God insofar as we command 
and govern ourselves according to the patterns of geometry, it seems apparent that what we 
are reflecting is the idea of God as one who commands and wills according to precise rules. 
 
It follows that the world’s ‘construction is not arbitrary, as some may suppose, not a human 
invention which may also be changed, but entirely rational and entirely natural, so much so 
that God Himself the Creator has given expression to it in adjusting the heavenly motions to 
each other’.386  All has been ‘arranged by God the supreme Regent’, who is the ‘eternal 
craftsman’.387  Once again, there is an emphasis on God as the sovereign designer who 
accomplishes his will through intricate construction of the natural laws.  In Kepler’s view, 
God was exalted through his study of astronomy – for God was not imprecise and did not 
make mistakes.388  Kepler then completed the link between religion and science, for his ideas 
about God provided him with a hypothesis, he had the mathematical ability to systematise his 
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findings, and the progress of previous medieval scientists enabled him to check whether this 
system was empirically accurate – and for the most part, it was.389   
 
For these scientists, the emphasis on God’s nature and his decree implies that the starting 
point for all natural philosophy (science) was that nature had been created by God.  That 
foundation rendered it a legitimate area of study, for through the study of creation humanity 
could learn about its Creator.  Because God was consistent and not capricious, these natural 
laws were constant, orderly, immutable, and worth scrutinising.  The way to find out which 
laws God had chosen to use was from experience and observation.  These motivations and 
justifications were maintained almost uniformly by the pioneers of modern science, for 
scientific inquiry is a religious duty because nature reflects the creativity of its maker.390 
 
3 Newton and the Sovereign Architect 
 
The close relationship between nature and divinity further underscored the importance of 
religious belief in scientific study for the early modern scientists.  Faith was an important 
prerequisite for reading the book of nature, and knowledge of God provided the reason to 
study nature.  Each science provided a different means of understanding God’s wisdom 
through discerning the patterns that linked all forms of knowledge to its original source.391  
For example, Isaac Newton, the celebrated English physicist and mathematician of the 
                                                            
389 P Barker, ‘The Role of Religion in the Lutheran Response to Copernicus’ in M Osler (ed), Rethinking the 
Scientific Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 85-86. 
390 Hannam, above n 367, 340-341. 
391 P Findlen, ‘The Janus Faces of Science in the Seventeenth Century: Athanasius Kircher and Isaac Newton’ in 
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seventeenth and eighteenth century, claimed that ‘we can know by natural philosophy 
[science] what is the first Cause’.392  Some early scientists, such as Newton and Robert 
Boyle, were voluntarists who emphasised God’s freedom and omnipotence, and believed that 
a priori knowledge of nature was impossible.  As such, since God had freely chosen to create 
this particular world, the only way to learn what kind of world God had created was to study 
it empirically.393   
 
In this sense Newton attributes the order of creation to the ‘counsel and contrivance of a 
voluntary Agent’.394  ‘To compare and adjust all these things together in so great a variety of 
bodies, argues that cause to be not blind and fortuitous, but very well skilled in mechanicks 
[sic] and geometry’.395  For Newton then, the design apparent in creation implied a sovereign 
designer acting freely, a divine architect.  In other words, ‘such a wonderful Uniformity in the 
Planetary System must be allowed the Effect of Choice’.396  Therefore, to adequately 
understand and appreciate the subtlety of Newton’s method in science, one must take into 
account his metaphysical considerations: acknowledging the Lord God who designed and is 
in control of the universe through general established laws of nature and special intervention 
at will, and the blending of the books of Nature and Scripture.397  The whole of creation is 
subordinated to God and his will, for God is ‘omnipotent’ and ‘governs all things’ with ‘true 
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dominion’.398  This is the proper theological and metaphysical background for Newton’s 
statement of scientific method:  
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by general induction 
from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses 
that may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they either be made 
more accurate, or liable to exceptions.399 
 
In other words, scientific laws articulated by virtue of observing the natural world are true 
reflections of reality for Newton, because God has created the world with orderly, constant 
natural laws which may be discovered and expressed.  Returning to the issues surrounding 
Galileo as a paradigmatic illustration, Hannam summarises in this way: 
The most significant contribution of the natural philosophers [scientists] of the Middle Ages 
was to make modern science even conceivable.  They made science safe in a Christian 
context, showed how it could be useful and constructed a worldview where it made sense.  
Their central belief that nature was created by God and so worthy of their attention was one 
which Galileo wholeheartedly endorsed.  Without that awareness, modern science simply 
would not have happened.400   
 
More specifically for our purposes, the particular theology which undergirded the 
development of modern science involved an emphasis on God’s sovereignty and will in 
design and providence as a divine architect.  As we shall see, it also involved a particular 
theology of the relationship between faith and reason. 
 
                                                            
398 Newton, above n 392, 153. 
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attitude to science in general and motivated their interest to study nature carefully in order to know God better 
(Barker, above n 389, 61-62). 
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B Aquinas, Faith and Reason 
 
The cornerstone of modern science was a widespread acceptance of reason as a valid tool for 
discovering truth about the world.  It was initially required for the Church, as the guardian of 
almost all intellectual endeavours in the Middle Ages, to approve this use of reason.  The 
relationship between faith and reason are important parts of this narrative.401  At this point, it 
is useful to recall Campanella’s statements regarding God’s gift of the double book of truth.  
Since one truth cannot contradict another truth, human science cannot contradict divine 
revelation, nor can the works of God contradict the word of God.  Campanella proceeds to 
argue that theology does not need proofs taken from the sciences, and yet it does take those 
proofs so that faith can be strengthened by understanding the supernatural in terms of the 
sensible and the natural.402  This is allowed since the root of wisdom, understanding and 
reason (particularly in regard to scientific inquiry) is God and from God, and those Christians 
who are wise and rational are so through him.  Christ, the word of God, is the highest reason, 
and we are called rational by participation in Christ.  Therefore Christ wishes us to be rational 
by being as similar to him as we can in action and truth.403  In this sense, God’s existence (or 
at least the belief in God’s existence) is foundational to the development of science and the 
scientific method operating as a function of reason.  Since human reason is a dim reflection 
of divine reason, and nature is constructed according to divine reason, human reason can 
comprehend nature.  All this makes scientific sense because there is a God who acts 
reasonably.404   
 
                                                            
401 Hannam, above n 367, 7. 
402 T Campanella, A Defense of Galileo (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994) 55-56. 
403 Ibid 70. 
404 L Williams, ‘Kant, Naturophilosophie and Scientific Method’ in R Giere and R Westfall (eds), Foundations 
of the Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century (Indiana University Press, 1973) 9-11. 
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1 The Initial Misconception 
 
These notions of participation, human reason and the distinction between the truths of faith 
and the truths of reason ultimately have their foundation in the work of Thomas Aquinas.  In 
particular, it was Aquinas’ five proofs of God’s existence allegedly by reason apart from 
revelation which demonstrated to Christians that reason was their ally and not something they 
needed to be afraid of, because if rational arguments could be mustered to demonstrate what 
was believed by faith, such reason was worth pursuing.405  However, certain interpretations 
of Aquinas (for example, that of John Duns Scotus) took this notion of reason apart from 
revelation too far.  According to these interpretations, Aquinas espouses a full divide between 
faith and reason, theology and philosophy.  However, John Milbank argues that this dualistic 
reading of Aquinas is false, and actually emerges from later theological tendencies and 
readings.406  In particular, Milbank claims that Aquinas’ focus on God as ‘analogical’ ‘Being’ 
was transformed through Duns Scotus redeploying the notion of God as pure ‘act’ or ‘will’, 
and together with Duns Scotus’ emphasis on God’s being metaphysically identical to human 
being this implies that there is ‘purely natural access’ to knowledge of God and the world, 
and the exclusion of subjective participation by faith.407  The work done in the previous 
sections indicates the influence of this view of God as pure sovereign will on the early 
modern scientists. 
 
Therefore, Milbank and Radical Orthodoxy specifically seek to ‘dissolve the 
philosophy/theology disciplinary boundary in its modern academic form as both the offspring 
                                                            
405 Hannam, above n 367, 97, 100.  See Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 1, above n 179, 12-13.  
406 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, above n 245, 17. 
407 Ibid 22, 106-107.  See for example John Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection (Hackett, 1997); 
Allan Wolter, Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Catholic University of America, 1997).  Again, this will be 
unpacked in more depth in Chapter four. 
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of bad theology and as the entrenchment of secular reason’.408  Although passages can be 
ostensibly cited from Aquinas in support of a position which divides faith from reason, and 
although he does distinguish between reason and faith, it is rather the case that faith and 
reason represent for Aquinas ‘differing degrees of divine enlightenment’ – they nevertheless 
are intrinsically united and involved in the creature’s participation in and understanding of 
the divine creation.409  However, for the purposes of genealogically tracing the separation of 
faith and reason in science, it is initially important to examine this (mis)interpretation of 
Aquinas, in order to see how he could be viewed as separating faith and reason. 
 
According to Aquinas, there are two types of truth: that which is ‘accessible by human 
reason’, and that which is ‘above reason’ and must be ‘received by faith’.410  Both are 
‘divinely revealed’, since ‘human reason is prone to error’, and as such even those truths 
which are ‘demonstrable by reason’ may be ‘held in faith’.411  Importantly, the truth of reason 
is not ‘opposed’ to the truth of the Christian faith, for God himself is the ‘source of all truth’, 
and these truths do not contradict, for ‘there is no error or falsity in truth’.412  However, if one 
does not hold to Scripture, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by 
reasoning, but only of answering his objections against faith – ‘arguments from human reason 
cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith’.413  In saying this, human reason may 
be used to prove those elements of Scripture which may be known by natural reason, for 
                                                            
408 Milbank, Grandeur of Reason, above n 165, 390. 
409 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, above n 245, 18-19. 
410 Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, above n 311, 106, 108. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid 109-111. 
413 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 1, above n 179, 8. 
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‘sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which 
they were able to know the truth by natural reason’.414 
 
Hence, Aquinas agrees that it is necessary to also accept by faith those things which may be 
proved by natural reason.  This allows people to ‘arrive more quickly at divine truth’, so that 
the ‘knowledge of God may be more general’, and for the sake of ‘certitude’, since ‘human 
reason is very deficient’.415  For example, God’s existence can be demonstrated by reason, 
being understood ‘through the things that are made’.416  That is, God’s existence may be 
perceived and demonstrated through the effects of him as the first cause.  Aquinas goes on: 
The existence of God and other like truths about God which can be known by natural reason, 
are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles.  For faith presupposes natural 
knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature… Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a 
man who cannot grasp a proof accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is 
capable of being known and demonstrated.417 
 
So from this it might seem that in principle, though natural human reason is deficient and in 
some sense needs faith, it is also the case that truths can be naturally known through pure 
proof or demonstration. 
 
Despite Aquinas apparently being anxious to combine reason and faith in a mutually 
beneficial way, it was his desire to affirm that truth could be independently known by both 
reason and faith which not only allowed the use of pure reason in science to become 
acceptable, but also allowed a fundamental divide to be made between reason and faith.  
                                                            
414 Ibid. 
415 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (William Benton, 1952) vol 2, 393-394. 
416 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 1, above n 179, 12. 
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Aquinas states that ‘it was necessary for men’s salvation that there should be a knowledge 
revealed by God, besides the philosophical sciences built upon human reason… because man 
is directed to God as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason’.418  Firstly, Aquinas 
appears to implicitly acknowledge that the philosophical sciences (which include the natural 
sciences) are built upon human reason, and he in particular seems to acknowledge that truths 
about God are discoverable by reason through the philosophical sciences.419  Adopting this 
view arguably rendered acceptable the use of human reason alone, without faith, in the 
pursuit of truth in the natural sciences.  Aquinas then appears to further distinguish between 
truths about God which human reason can discover through the philosophical sciences, and 
the knowledge or truth revealed by God through faith, or ‘sacred science obtained through 
revelation’, which ‘surpasses the grasp of… reason’.420  Since these truths of faith cannot be 
accessed by natural reason, according to this interpretation the unity of faith and reason is 
sundered and faith and reason begin to operate on separate planes. 
 
2 The Laplace Transform(ation): Collapse of the Architect 
 
The fact that Aquinas allegedly permitted truth to be demonstrated apart from faith arguably 
allowed the possibility for faith and theology to be entirely excluded from scientific 
endeavour.  This can be observed in the previously mentioned arguments provided by 
Campanella, where he advocates the view that truth may be discovered in the natural world 
purely by reason.  Consequently, if a truth such as God’s existence, or even a general 
knowledge of the natural world, can be demonstrated by human reason alone, it follows that 
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the possibility remains for faith and theology to become entirely redundant and irrelevant.  
This possibility was subsequently actualised, particularly with the advent of Newtonian 
physics. 
 
For those Christians (such as Galileo, Kepler and Newton) who were scientists and embraced 
nature as governed by a series of invariable physical laws discoverable by reason, this 
demonstrated the power and omniscience of God who willed and designed these laws.  
However, what they did not realise was that by removing God as an active agent and 
relegating him to a deistic author of immutable and independent laws, they were 
inadvertently constructing the way for his complete expulsion from science.421   
 
This can be illustrated by a conversation said to have taken place between the then French 
Emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, and eighteenth/nineteenth century French mathematician 
Pierre Laplace.  Napoleon asked Laplace about his apparent omission to mention the role of 
God in his deterministic physical theory, and Laplace is said to have replied that he ‘had no 
need of that hypothesis’.422  Whether historically accurate or not, the prominence of that 
account indicates the rise of completely secular or non-theological accounts of the world.423  
Thus, allowing the assumption that it is possible for reason to discover truth about the world 
apart from faith can be seen to have effectively enabled faith and theology to be vanquished 
                                                            
421 D Hull, ‘Charles Darwin and Nineteenth Century Philosophies of Science’ in R Giere and R Westfall (eds), 
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American Philosophical Society 578, 583. 
423 S Meyer, ‘The Return of the God Hypothesis’ (1999) 11 Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 1, 1. 
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as explanations or considerations, arguably resulting in the fundamental secularisation of 
science.424 
 
One way this secularisation of science has been manifested is through the notion of 
methodological naturalism.  Methodological naturalism argues that the goal of natural science 
is to explain contingent natural phenomena strictly in terms of other contingent natural 
phenomena.425  Explanations should therefore refer only to natural objects and events and not 
to the personal actions and choices of divine agents.  This notion of seeking explanations only 
within the natural order is to be contrasted with philosophical naturalism, which states that 
the natural world is all that exists and that there is no spiritual realm where God or other 
beings exists.  Methodological naturalism does not assume the non-existence of God and any 
metaphysical reality, but it does resist ascribing metaphysical explanations for physical 
events, similar to the statement by Laplace.  However, it goes further than this by contending 
that any scientific explanation must be a priori natural, and not supernatural.  In other words, 
God, faith and theology are excluded from science by definition.426  Therefore, by initially 
viewing God as pure will and a sovereign architect, divorcing reason from revelation, and 
allowing scientific discovery of divinely constructed immutable natural laws by reason alone, 
one can see that the way was made for the complete secularisation of science. 
 
III (NO) SALVATION BY FAITH ALONE: HOW THE REFORMATION 
FURTHER DIVIDED FAITH AND REASON 
                                                            
424 Obviously this secularisation did not mean that theists could not also be scientists.  The secularisation 
operated at a greater theoretical level, where the use of reason separated from faith (secular reason) became the 
very basis of scientific enquiry.  No particular ‘event’ heralded this secularisation, but as we have seen the 
genealogy may be traced through Aquinas, Duns Scotus and the early modern scientists. 
425 Craig and Moreland, above n 233, 358-359. 
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A Reformation: God as Sovereign 
 
However, it is not only secular reason that divides faith and reason.  The Reformation, and in 
particular its theology of God as executing pure sovereign will (which results in salvation by 
faith alone and the authority of the Scriptures alone), provided further artillery for the divorce 
of faith and reason.  The Reformation of the sixteenth century marks one of the great epochs 
in the history of Western Civilisation.  Its pioneer was Martin Luther, who published his 
ninety-five theses mainly in response to the Roman Catholic doctrine of indulgences, and one 
of its most prominent minds was John Calvin, who published and continually revised his 
magnum opus, Institutes of the Christian Religion.427  With others, and across generations, 
traditions and geography, these men known as the Reformers sought to return the church to 
what they saw as authentic biblical Christianity.428   
 
Reformation theology can be generally summarised into a series of solae, which is Latin for 
‘alone’.429  The first is that we are saved sola fide, or by faith alone.  A person’s 
reconciliation with God is based purely on that person’s faith or trust in the divine offer of 
forgiveness through the life, death and resurrection of Christ.  Knowledge of this is based on 
sola scriptura, or on the Scriptures alone.  According to this teaching there is no source of 
Christian truth apart from the Bible, and the Bible is the final authority for determining truth 
about God.  From these follow sola gratia and solus Christus: that a person is saved purely 
                                                            
427 B Reardon, Religious Thought in the Reformation (Longman, 1981) 47, 164-165. 
428 B Shelley, Church History in Plain Language (Thomas Nelson, 2008) 238, 240. 
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attempt to summarise the Reformed position which is overviewed here.  See H Hillerbrand, The Protestant 
Reformation (Walker and Company, 1968) xxii-xxiii. 
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by God’s grace alone through the person and work of Christ alone.  Finally, since a person 
contributes nothing to their salvation, the final result is soli Deo gloria – glory to God 
alone.430  In other words, God alone by sovereign decree, or the exercise of his 
incontrovertible will, arranged for people to be saved, and so it is God alone who gives the 
gift and receives glory.  In the context of this chapter, by examining the doctrines of faith 
alone and Scripture alone as articulated by Luther and Calvin under the assumption of God’s 
sovereign decree, I will argue that they allowed the further separation of reason and faith. 
 
As the foundation for all his theology, Luther held that the Scriptures were the supreme 
authority.431   All Christian doctrine was to be traced back to the Scriptures, and in the event 
of dispute between the patristic writings, papal authority, or any other man-made 
proclamation, the Scriptures were to be the deciding factor.432  When asked to justify the 
authority of his teachings, Luther stated that ‘unless I am convicted of error by the evidence 
of Scripture, or… by manifest reasoning I stand convicted by the Scriptures to which I have 
appealed… I cannot and will not recant anything’.433   For Luther, it is the Scripture which 
authenticates and validates itself as the authority in all matters of Christian truth, and all must 
submit to and obey the Scripture.434  Luther also emphasises that we are ‘saved by faith 
alone’ in response to Scripture, trusting in Christ and his work.  It cannot be ‘seen or 
reasoned or conjured by human effort’, but is something ‘granted’ by God as a matter of 
sovereign decree.435   
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Luther holds this faith to be in explicit contrast with human or secular reason, which is 
unacquainted with heavenly things.  Indeed, he states that ‘faith must believe against 
reason… and against its understanding which grasps and admits the validity only of that 
which is empirical’.436  Luther further disparages reason, saying that ‘she talks nothing but 
follies and absurdities, especially… on sacred subjects’; reason is ‘perverse’, ‘foolish’ and 
‘blind’, for she seeks to ‘measure divine things by the concepts of men’.437  However, it 
should be noted that Luther implicitly distinguishes between this human or secular reason, 
which he rejects, and reason that is the servant of faith and based in faith, as well as operating 
with faith.438  Secular reason is a reason that is based in the immanent and only accepts the 
validity of the empirical or physical; it rejects faith and God at first instance.439  So for 
Luther, the use of this type of reason in the attempt to comprehend divine things is absurd.  
Conversely, discursive reasoning based in the acceptance of faith which is used to understand 
God’s revelation in the Scripture is part of the process of knowing God.440 
 
Similarly, John Calvin affirms the authority of Scripture alone and salvation by faith alone.  
Calvin argued that since the Scripture is God’s Word and God is the absolute Sovereign will, 
it is invested with inherent and ultimate authority.441  Attacking those who claim that the 
authority of the Scripture is based in the authority of the Church, Calvin scoffed at the notion 
that ‘the eternal and inviolable truth of God could depend on the [relatively impotent] will of 
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men’.442  Instead, Scripture is self-authenticating, ‘carrying its own evidence along with it’.443  
‘It does not submit to proofs and arguments, but judges them, as from the very mouth of 
God’.444  So Scripture as the word of God is the supreme authority and source of Christian 
truth, and Calvin concludes: 
Such, then, is a conviction which asks not for reasons; such, a knowledge which accords with 
the highest reason, namely, knowledge in which the mind rests more firmly and securely than 
in any reasons; such, in fine, the conviction which revelation from heaven alone can 
produce.445 
 
This provides a segue to consider Calvin’s teachings on the relationship between reason and 
faith.  Calvin defines faith as the ‘firm and sure knowledge of the divine favour towards us, 
founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our 
hearts, by the Holy Spirit’.446  It is this faith alone which saves us, apart from works.447  This 
faith ‘is higher than human understanding’, for ‘such is the proneness of our mind to vanity, 
that it can never adhere to the truth of God… without the illumination of the Spirit’.448  The 
Spirit originates faith and gradually increases it, ‘purifying the mind to give it a relish for 
divine truth’.449  In contrast, mere human discernment is ‘defective and lost’, for ‘neither the 
eye sees nor the mind comprehends’.450  Hence, Calvin distinguishes human reason from 
faith, arguing that human reason is too corrupted by sin to attain the things of God.  Instead, 
faith alone is required to comprehend the divine. 
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Therefore, on the basis of God’s sovereign will, Luther and Calvin also proffer a framework 
which fundamentally isolates faith from human or secular reason.  It is faith alone which 
saves, and faith alone which can attain to the knowledge of God.  Although faith is in 
accordance with the highest reason found in the divine mind, the notion of a faith distinct 
from human reason allowed theology to be based on faith at the expense of reason, for human 
secular reason is rejected as blind and lost.  As such, science is left free to appropriate this 
secular reason and completely reject faith.  The doctrine of sola scriptura also contributed to 
this isolation of faith from reason by rejecting the Book of Nature as an authority, effectively 
forcing the operating process of science to be non-theological and reject faith, embracing 
reason without faith.451  Thus, through emphasis on God’s sovereignty, faith alone, and 
Scripture alone, it seems the Reformation further contributed to the divorce of reason and 
faith by continuing to allow for a space devoid of faith.  Not only this, but the almost 
dogmatic alienation of faith from reason in this theology indicates a type of violence in its 
structure of knowledge – a violence that, as we shall see, was followed through in the 
reaction to the Reformation as parallel to the development of the scientific discipline.   
 
B Counter-Reformation: Imperialising Knowledge 
 
The Catholic response to the Reformation (known as the Counter-Reformation) was a period 
of spiritual revival for the Catholics, an opportunity for them to continue reform and to purify 
their church.452  It was also a period of doctrinal debate, both in terms of confronting 
Reformed theology, as well as jurisdictional controversy over the disciplinary implications of 
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practical reform.  These debates culminated in the Council of Trent, where the official 
Catholic doctrine was settled and promulgated.453   
 
However, as well as being remedial, this move was also repressive, for in response to the 
Reformers the church sought to militarily enforce the papal monopoly of doctrinal 
determination by declaration.454  While the Reformers emphasised the sovereignty of God’s 
will and unique authority, the Catholics retained this idea but transformed it in terms of 
replacing the sovereignty of God with the imperialism of the Papacy, or the magisterium of 
the church.  The attempt by Tridentine Catholicism to gain a monopoly on human thought 
also extended into philosophical inquiry, and most significantly the developing discipline of 
the natural sciences.  The typically cited case of Galileo indicates that the church 
monopolised authority both to approve and to condemn.  Although approving of scientific 
experiment by Galileo (or anyone), they did condemn works of theory which contradicted 
Catholic doctrine, such as Copernican cosmology as opposed to the prevailing Aristotelian-
Ptolemaic system.455  This control further extended to papal regulation of the materials 
contained and taught within the universities and the libraries.456   
 
Intimately involved in the Catholic arrogation of authority and promotion of imperial rule 
was the continued divide of reason and faith.  For as Milbank summarises, the consequence 
of separating reason and faith 
… was not benign, but instead itself encouraged, with and not against early modernity, a 
theocratic and hierocratic authoritarianism.  For the more science and politics were confined 
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to immanent and autonomous secular realms, then the more faith appealed to an arational 
positivity of authority invested with a right to rule, and sometimes to overrule, science and 
secular politics … [with a] resulting blend of theological voluntarism and physicalist theory 
of the rights of de facto power.457 
 
In other words, the creation of an apparently autonomous secular realm of science and 
politics caused theocratic faith (now devoid of reason) to exert its authority over this secular 
realm through violence.  This clash of authority between the secular and the various 
manifestations of the sacred was not merely institutional.  In the previously mentioned events 
surrounding Galileo for example, we see that the church sought to forcibly prevent Galileo 
from publishing scientific work it viewed as contradicting its teaching regarding the structure 
of the universe.458  Far more severe than this, the clash between the Reformation and 
Tridentine Catholicism resulted in open warfare over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
sickening both the people and rulers in Europe and killing thousands as well as displacing 
many others.459  MacCullough grimly concludes that the ‘Reformation and Counter-
Reformation thus shed much blood and shortened or ruined countless lives in the course of 
their warfare’.460   
 
The Reformation and Counter-Reformation emphasised the absolute voluntaristic sovereignty 
of its authority, whether God or the Pope as the Vicar of Christ, and therefore solidified the 
divide of reason and faith.  This was manifested in the attempt to increase the regulation and 
control of science and reason in the institutional context of the church, and featured the most 
undesirable characteristics of totalitarian dogmatism and a lack of charity.  Ultimately, it 
seems that the particular focus on will and sovereignty, in conjunction with the separation of 
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reason and faith, produced violence.  The use of violence to regulate knowledge effectively 
meant that belief was coerced, rather than persuaded using reason.  In this sense, the removal 
of reason from faith exacerbated the violence of knowledge and effectively rendered faith 
‘blind’, or without reason. 
 
Hence, it seems that violence exists in the institution of knowledge, particularly science, 
following from the Scotian emphasis on God as a pure sovereign will.  For as the early 
scientists advocated in accordance with Duns Scotus, we are in the image of God – and if we 
are in the image of God as absolute sovereignty and pure will, we too are characterised by 
will, unanchored from the Good: and it is the clash of wills which produces antagonism.  
Present too in the ostensibly noble aim of learning more about God through discovery of the 
natural world constructed according to his sovereign decree is the imperialisation of 
knowledge, the dogmatic alienation of those with differing views.  However, as I have 
mentioned, there is one more element central to this ontology, an element which reinscribes it 
as characterised by a distorted theology: the presupposition of a secular reason which 
eventually becomes a blind faith. 
 
C From (Pure) Reason to (Blind) Faith 
 
The concept of reducing secular reason to blind faith can again be traced to Aquinas, who 
seems to distinguish between the science of natural reason and the science of sacred doctrine, 
while simultaneously implying that their respective processes are based on faith.  He states 
that: 
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Sacred doctrine is a science.  We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences.  
There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of the intellect, 
such as arithmetic and geometry and the like.  There are some which proceed from principles 
known by the light of a higher science.  Thus the science of… music proceeds from principles 
established by arithmetic.  And in this way sacred doctrine is a science, because it proceeds 
from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and 
the blessed.  Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the 
mathematician, so sacred science believes the principles revealed to it by God… the 
principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the knowledge 
of a higher science.461 
 
Aquinas attempts to demonstrate that the process of the natural sciences and the process of 
sacred doctrine both rely on faith, for both are either self-evident or reducible to the 
knowledge of a higher science which is self-evident, and simply accepted on the basis of that 
authority.  Nevertheless, on this interpretation they appear to remain distinct.  As has been 
explained, this distinction provides the foundation for the eventual rejection of Christian 
theology in the sciences under the masquerade of operating under reason separated from 
faith.  However, an interpretation which separates reason and faith while also  understanding 
that reason and faith are in the above sense based on faith ultimately seems to lead to a pure 
reason which reduces to irrational or blind faith.  In other words, according to this 
(mis)interpretation, both matters of reason (science) and matters of faith (doctrine), though 
operating on different planes, are based in faith – but this becomes a blind faith, one without 
reason. 
 
V UNITING FAITH AND REASON TO RESTORE TRUE SCIENTIA: THE 
PARTICIPATION MODEL  
 
A Illuminating Aquinas 
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As I claimed at the beginning of the chapter, the key to articulating a reason combined with 
faith appears to be found through properly interpreting Aquinas.  It was the movement of 
Duns Scotus to focus on God’s will rather than his intellect, combined with the separation of 
reason and faith, which resulted in the loss of the idea of the understanding subject 
discovering the world through participation in the divine.  Instead, in the face of a universal 
sovereignty and cosmic geometry, science is resigned to a cold, pure, ‘mathematical’ reason.  
I claim that this is a fundamental misunderstanding of Aquinas, a distorted theology centred 
about a pure will unanchored from the Good, which consequently results in antagonism and 
imperialism, characterised by a blind faith.  Based on the need to reinvigorate reason and 
pursue peace, this part proposes a different kind of theology through a ‘proper’ return to 
Aquinas – us as participating subjects, inquiring and understanding the diversity of Being, 
embracing the divine mystery.  This arguably allows the return of an authentic Christian faith 
and restores reason as true participation in the divine, which then leads to harmony rather 
than strife.   
 
An initial aspect is the previously discussed interpretation that results in faith and reason 
beginning to operate on separate planes.  An implication of this can be observed in Aquinas 
explicitly distinguishing between faith and the natural sciences.  According to Aquinas, ‘all 
science is derived by principles self-evident and therefore seen; and therefore all objects of 
science must be, in a fashion, seen… the object of faith is unseen… consequently faith and 
science are not about the same things.’462  In other words, science is derived by self-evident 
principles, which means to be seen.  Since God, the object of faith, is unseen, faith and 
                                                            
462 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 2, above n 415, 383-384. 
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science operate on different planes.  This presents a problem in terms of our claim that faith 
and reason may operate on the same plane, in a united front.  Aquinas recognises this and 
clarifies that theology is in fact a science ‘because the articles of faith are self-evident to the 
faithful as revealed by God’.463  In other words, since the faithful have their reason purified 
by faith and see God, the truths of faith are self-evident to them as revealed by God.  Hence, 
faith and science (or natural reason) are not mutually exclusive, but operate to sharpen and 
extend one another.  Faith and reason must be combined for true knowledge (or ‘science’) to 
be apprehended.  For as Aquinas clearly states: 
To see the essence of God belongs to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature… it is 
impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power… to 
know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone… for no creature is its own 
being but rather has participated being.  Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence 
of God unless God by his grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made 
intelligible to it.464 
 
Our human intellect and our human ability to discover truth is based purely in God’s grace, 
his gift of participation in the divine being.  We cannot see God by our own ‘natural’ power 
because to see God is exactly to participate in his being, which is a matter of grace rather than 
nature.  So the grace of God giving Himself so that we can participate in His being makes 
Him intelligible to our human intellect.  This participation amplifies our already existing 
(natural) rational powers to properly comprehend the things of God and His creation: 
Our intellect… because it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised above its 
own nature to a higher level by grace... now this increase of the intellectual powers is called 
the illumination of the intellect… by this light the blessed are made “deiform” – that is, like to 
God… hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine 
nature, which is impossible.  But by this light the rational creature is made deiform.465 
 
                                                            
463 Ibid 384. 
464 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 1, above n 179, 53-54. 
465 Ibid 54-55. 
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Thus, by grace, which is the light of participation in God’s nature, our intellect is illuminated 
to become ‘deiform’, or like God.  By grace we as rational creatures participate in the very 
divine nature of God. 
 
As Milbank observes, this implies that even though there is natural reason which can observe 
the material (what one might call ‘science’), no ‘pure scientific cognition is ever exercised by 
us without discursive mediation’ – that is, without divine illumination through the logos.466    
It follows that Aquinas’ entire treatment of truth (including what is observed in relation to the 
physical sciences) must be brought within his philosophical theology, for ‘were one to 
attempt to comprehend a finite reality not as created, that is to say, not in relation to God, 
then no truth for Aquinas could ensue, since finite realities are of themselves nothing and 
only what is can be true’.467  In other words, our rational comprehension of physical reality, 
expressed as ‘truth’, is predicated on the fact that this reality is created by God and our 
understanding of it is on the basis of participating in what ‘is’: the divine Being.  By the same 
token, even as faith ‘involves an intensification of participation in divine intellectual 
intuition’, this can only be disclosed through ‘acts of interpretation… as essential for faith as 
for reason’ – which is the same ‘discursive mediation’ given through the logos, or reason.468   
 
It follows that faith and reason are intrinsically united in Aquinas, and indeed one cannot 
have true knowledge without faith and reason working together, based fundamentally on 
participation in the divine.  More specifically, in combining metaphysics with theology, 
Aquinas demonstrates that there is a kind of continuum where reason (metaphysics), 
empowered ultimately by faith, allows some limited and uncertain knowledge, while at the 
                                                            
466 Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, above n 245, 19. 
467 Ibid 20. 
468 Ibid 21. 
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other end there is purely intuitive faith or revelation, which is absolutely certain and true.469  
So reason and faith are united in producing truth, metaphysics cannot be separated from 
theology, and science (true knowledge of the physical world) cannot be attained except by 
acknowledging the physical as created by God, with the emphasis being on us as knowing 
subjects participating in the divine nature.  Extending what was proposed in the previous 
chapter,  
 
From Augustine and Anselm, therefore, Aquinas has inherited a deep identification of the 
Platonic problematic of knowledge with Christian eschatological tension. For the first two 
thinkers, reason itself is faith seeking understanding, since for thought to get going it must not 
only trust its first sight… but must first believe… and if, for all these thinkers, reason for now 
can only be faith, then, inversely, faith… can only develop its insights rationally and 
discursively.470 
 
So for Aquinas, following Augustine, faith and reason can never be separated.  Reason must 
have faith that it is correctly apprehending the divine, and faith needs reason to develop its 
primitive gaze into the transcendent. 
 
B Seeking a Science of Peace 
 
This notion of faith and reason as partners in the process of participating in the divine being 
also allows a movement from ‘science’ as the systematic pursuit of natural or immanent 
knowledge towards science engaging in the quest of comprehending and replicating the 
divine nature of love and peace: 
Theology as science in Aquinas redefines the very idea of science, away from discursivity and 
towards pure intuition, on its way to the beatific vision.  Thus to receive, obscurely, the first 
principles of divine science from God, is also to receive obscurely all the conclusions of 
                                                            
469 Ibid 23-25, c.f. 31. 
470 Ibid 32.   
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divine science, which are the principles, since God only sees… even though sacra doctrina 
[theology] is now conceived as more “scientific” than previously, this now implies that it 
receives divine principles/consequences with a greater non-discursive immediacy. But since 
we, as embodied creatures, can only enjoy an intense intuition via the senses, we now aspire 
higher only by attending more closely to the lower sensory realm to which God 
condescends.471 
 
Here Milbank alludes to the idea of a true science not merely seeking its purpose and 
fulfilment in discovering the nature of physical reality, but as ultimately reaching for higher 
things, beginning to better grasp the nature of divine reality through participation in the 
reality of ubiquitous creation.  It is precisely this telos which reveals true science not just as 
the pursuit of knowledge (in the pure or abstract sense), but as revealing the Good through 
seeing God.  As Aquinas argues: 
Hence the intellect which participates more of the light of glory will see God the more 
perfectly.  And he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity, 
because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire, and desire in a certain way 
makes the one desiring apt and prepared to see the thing desired.  Hence he who possesses the 
more charity will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more happy.472 
 
In other words, the person who has more charity (as supposed to the ‘secular’ science of 
dominance) will see God the more perfectly and will increase one’s desire to see God.  This 
beautiful cycle of increasing charity, desire and knowledge of God opens the possibility for 
not only redeeming the scientific community, but the entire human community as 
characterised by interacting relationships.  It points the way forward towards a proper 
knowledge of God by grace, the reanimation of reason through faith, and an ontological 
community of peace through participation.473 
 
                                                            
471 Ibid 37. 
472 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 1, above n 279, 55. 
473 C.f. Milbank, Hume vs Kant, above n 339.  Here Milbank argues that there may be a narrative in science 
which does not embrace power or the arbitrary, and this is Christian theology.  In particular, Milbank argues that 
Hume only rescued modern scientific rationality by bringing in feeling by the back door, so to speak.  Pure 
reason leads to scepticism and blind faith – and so, as we have already proposed, all reason requires faith. 
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This chapter argued that science is secularised, and therefore characterised by violence.  This 
was suggested through a genealogical analysis of science, which revealed that science 
operates on the basis of particular theological assumptions regarding the nature of God as a 
pure sovereign will and architect, and the divorce of reason and faith.  This distorted theology 
allowed and naturalised the evacuation of God, faith and theology from scientific 
explanations and methodology, which resulted in the secularisation of science.  However, the 
pre-eminence of theology does not imply an approach based in faith alone.  This chapter also 
argued that the Reformed proclamation of faith alone and Scripture alone, with the emphasis 
on God’s sovereignty, removed science and reason from theology, so that the divorce 
between faith and reason was exacerbated.  The Counter-Reformation re-directed this issue of 
authority and vested it in the Pope, and the common emphasis on will resulted in antagonism 
and strife.  This argument is further refined in chapter seven, where it is explained that those 
who perpetrate violence in the name of Christianity fail to fully comprehend Christianity’s 
Trinitarian theology in terms of the peaceful reconciliation of sameness and difference. 
 
This chapter finally argued that a return to an authentic Christian theology in Aquinas allows 
a focus on the intellect rather than the will, on peaceful participation rather than violent 
sovereignty.  In particular, when we as knowing subjects participate in the divine nature, 
reason is strengthened and united to faith, and we pursue charity and the Good.  Within the 
divine (Trinitarian) nature, the Father is faith, the trust that exists between the divine persons 
and is granted to the faithful by participation, that they may know the Father.  The Son is 
reason, the divine logos or Word, who was with God and is God, and made his dwelling 
among us, enlightening our natural rationality.  And the Holy Spirit is love or charity, the 
binding force of the church community and the divine relationship, which enervates 
knowledge and belief, reason and faith.  These are three, and yet one, so they are distinct but 
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united.  This unique formulation allows true ontological peace in science, the Trinitarian 
uniting of reason and faith through love. 
 
So the invocation of the transcendent, triune God (in which the divine persons love, trust and 
reason themselves) permits one to think of reason itself as unknown and yet real – that is, of 
an infinite reason in which we faintly participate by faith working through love.  Through this 
way of uniting faith and reason and seeking Trinitarian theology to reign in the harmony of 
the objective universal of truth and the subjective particular of faith, trusting and participating 
in the divine reason revealed by God, both matter and reason are saved, and a foundation is 
provided for a true, certain science with an ontology of peace. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DECONSTRUCTING DERRIDA: LAW, SPIRIT, LOGOS 
 
I THE POSTMODERN AND THE PAGAN 
 
The first chapter of this thesis explored the working definitions of truth, faith and reason as 
employed by John Milbank.  In particular, it was claimed that reason and faith are not 
incompatible, but are inextricably intertwined in a mutually beneficial way.  The corollary of 
this appears to be that the divorce of reason and faith is problematic, for it leads to the 
secularisation of reason which results in violence.  This claim was examined in the second 
chapter with regard to the institution of knowledge, particularly in the sciences; it was 
suggested that the focus on God as sovereign will rather than God as analogical Being or 
intellect contributed to the division of faith and reason, and consequently for the violent 
regulation of knowledge.  It was further argued that re-interpreting Aquinas on faith and 
reason so that they are united opens the possibility for an approach which seeks peace and the 
Good. 
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This chapter continues to articulate the way in which Christian theology may allow the 
possibility for harmoniously coexisting difference through specifically presenting itself as a 
genuinely post-modern theology (in the sense of rejecting the secular reason of modernity), 
existing as a metanarrative which is more desirable than the narrative of paganism or 
nihilism, yet one which is at least as electable.  Centring upon a genealogical analysis of 
Jacques Derrida, it will be argued that in his deconstruction there is a type of theological 
metanarrative with particular Christian elements.  Following Milbank, I focus on Derrida for 
two reasons.  The work of Derrida aims to deconstruct the bastion of pure, objective 
rationality or reason characteristic of modernity.  As I will show, he does this in a way which 
is similar to the work of Christian theology in the sense of rejecting a secularised reason 
through displaying its nihilistic end.  Thus, in Derrida we find the tools necessary for 
articulating a post-modern Christian theology – the deconstruction of secular reason as 
producing a nihilistic violence of difference – which may then be appropriated to finalise the 
construction of a Postmodern Critical Christian (Augustinian) theology, or a theology which 
unites faith with reason and creates a space for the peaceful coexistence of difference. 
 
Part I of the chapter briefly notes Derrida’s philosophical background and context.   It also 
outlines Milbank’s contentions that Derrida’s ‘post-modern’ deconstruction of reason is 
indispensable for the return of Christian theology, since the exposure of secular reason’s end 
implies that the only way to save reason is through reinstating a Christian theology of peace.  
Part II considers Derrida’s seemingly conflicting atheist and Jewish heritage, indicating the 
ways in which Derrida propounds a type of Christian theology.  However, part III attempts to 
show that this theology is distorted and contains specifically pagan elements, namely an 
144 
 
ontology of violent difference associated with the destruction of reason.  Part IV therefore 
acknowledges with Milbank that the movement from violent paganism (the end of secular 
reason) to the equally electable Christian peace is the desirable one.  With Milbank and 
Derrida then, part V argues for the need of a developed, genuinely post-modern theology: an 
authentic Christian theology which goes beyond a reason of pure rationality and allows for 
the harmonious existence of difference, yet without the violence of pagan agonism and strife.  
Part VI briefly considers how the construction of this theology through the thesis so far will 
be critically deployed in relation to jurisprudence. 
 
A Derrida and the Text 
 
To deconstruct philosophy is to think in the most faithful way the structured genealogy of 
philosophy’s concepts, and simultaneously to determine what this history has been able to 
forbid or is motivated to repress.  By means of this simultaneously faithful and violent 
circulation between the inside and outside of philosophy, a certain textual work is 
produced.474   
 
 
This seminal quote from Derrida indicates the nature of his deconstruction process and his 
attitude towards the text.  For Derrida, all readings of a text are misinterpretation as well as 
interpretation because all terms are devoid of meaning except the meaning constructed for 
them.  There is always more to the text that our interpretation fails to appropriate, and there is 
‘nothing outside the text’ in the sense that the words do not refer to what they signify and 
there is no purely objective or neutral perspective: all meaning is in the text itself.475  These 
                                                            
474 Jacques Derrida, Positions (University of Chicago Press, 1981) 6-7. 
475 J Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism (Routledge, 1983) 96-97. 
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claims stem from Ferdinand de Saussure, a linguist foundational for Derrida, and Saussure 
argues that words as linguistic signs are arbitrary.  For example, regarding a ‘tree’, there is 
nothing that connects the sign of a tree with any particular tree, or the concept of tree-ness.  
The signifier is the sound pattern or written form of the word, the signified refers to the 
concept itself, and the sign is the combination of the signifier and signified, so it follows that 
the signifier is arbitrary.  The meaning is conferred by virtue of the difference between any 
one signifier and all other signifiers.  In other words, tree is defined by what it is not, and as 
such, in language there are only differences.476   
 
Derrida proceeds from this point, claiming that it follows that there exist signifieds apart from 
signifiers, which he calls the transcendental signified (or Master-signifiers, such as God, 
truth, or consciousness).  In reality, such things do not exist but are constructed through 
language – they are only defined by what they are not.  Meaning is present only as the effect 
of linguistic difference.  Here Derrida defines his new term, differance, which, following 
Saussure, is not an entity, but that which makes concepts possible in linguistic expression.  
No single element can be simply present or absent itself, for any element achieves meaning 
precisely by what it is not.  Derrida consequently makes two crucial conclusions: firstly, one 
should elevate the written word above the spoken word because the written word connotes 
absence or difference, and secondly that all language refers only to other language, and it is 
incapable of referring to anything other than language.477  Derrida thus uses Saussurean 
linguistics to argue that the presence of a philosophical concept is not pure or fully 
comprehensible, but is qualified by the construction of the concept through the things which 
                                                            
476 F Saussure, ‘Course in General Linguistics’ in L Cahoone (ed), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An 
Anthology (Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 122-126. 
477 See Jacques Derrida, ‘Difference’ in L Cahoone (ed), From Modernism to Postmodernism: An Anthology 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 225-240. 
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are absent from it (differences).  This differance indicates the conceptual instability in 
language which differs and defers.478   
 
The concept of deconstruction has been variously presented as a philosophical strategy or 
position, and a mode of reading texts.  In particular, Derrida understands deconstruction to be 
the reversal of a textual hierarchy in which there is a violent hegemony of oppositions and 
ideas.  To deconstruct a text is to expose and remove those philosophical assumptions and 
displace the prevailing system, privileging aspects previously dominated.  This is one of the 
senses in which Derrida states that deconstruction is justice.479  As just mentioned, in the 
history of Western metaphysics speech has been set over against the written word and 
incorrectly privileged.  However, deconstruction exposes the fact that speech depends upon 
the very qualities predicated of writing, and theories grounded in presence (speech) are 
ultimately inconsistent with themselves as their foundations are difference (absence).  
Conversely, the written word as containing absence is consistent.480   
 
Hence for Derrida, deconstruction breaks down traditional interpretations of texts, which may 
be nothing more than instrumental use of power to manipulate the community.  The purpose 
of deconstruction is to expose the superfluous meaning attributed to texts and demonstrate the 
way in which the text fails to communicate what some might think it communicates.481  
Although it might be concluded from this that Derrida is merely advocating a relativistic 
nihilism, it is important to note that deconstruction is not an abandonment of philosophy, but 
alerts reason and philosophy to its own limitations and latent motives, contingent 
                                                            
478 M Davies, Asking the Law Question: The Dissolution of Legal Theory (Law Book Company, 2002) 338-339. 
479 Culler, above n 475, 85-86. 
480 Ibid 108-109. 
481 Ibid 74-75. 
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metanarratives, and oppressions on the basis of reason and philosophy.  Deconstruction does 
not reject reason as a groundless will to power or nihilistic rhetoric, but continues to question 
the reasons of reason and the role of epistemological institutions.482  For example, Derrida 
does not deny that truths are needed, but emphasises truth in terms of required vigilance to 
reverse the persecution of dissidents.  Deconstruction shows how the other is inevitably 
installed in the self, and that there is a proliferation of meanings, and meanings of meanings, 
such that no one meaning or metanarrative should dominate the other.483 
 
B The Necessity of Postmodernism for Theology 
 
In this way, Postmodernity can mean ‘a philosophy of alterity, an incredulity towards 
metanarratives’ which seek to violently dominate.484  It is ‘expressing the self without 
limitation, without closure’ with a focus on the Other (as opposed to the self).485  ‘It is 
perhaps by definition, indefinable’, and there are ‘some tensions, if not outright 
contradictions, contained within’, because there is no arrived canon of postmodern thought.486  
Such a canon would tend to reinscribe a dominant paradigm of thinking and marginalise the 
‘Other’ differing views. 
 
As pure reason is turned against itself through deconstruction and it is found that there is 
apparently no universal foundation for reason, the question may legitimately be asked 
                                                            
482 R Warrington et al, Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law of Texts in the Texts of Law (Routledge, 1991) 11. 
483 Ibid 50-51. 
484 J Thacker, Postmodernism and the Ethics of Theological Knowledge (Ashgate, 2007) 5. 
485 Ibid 6. 
486 Ibid 5. 
148 
 
whether there is anything at all.487   It is the nihilistic gesture of this question which 
ultimately leads to a pagan postmodernism, for if there really is a metaphysical nothing then 
there is only an infinity of warring perspectives in the void.488   If we concede that 
deconstruction tends to expose this nihilistic and violent limit of pure secular reason, Milbank 
contends that postmodernism is a necessary step in returning us to theology and a more 
fundamental truth.489   
 
In particular, for Milbank, deconstruction exposes the fact that ‘modernist pure atheism’ 
actually ‘echoes theology by beginning with an unadulterated nothingness’, in the sense that 
‘reality is derived in an ordered series from pure nullity (or pure divine simplicity)’, in such a 
way that ‘all of reality can be logically situated with respect to this nothing’.490  Similarly, 
‘entirely rational metaphysical theology’, without faith, always ‘proves to be exercising some 
arbitrary subjective preference’.491  Milbank argues that this pagan, nihilistic type of 
postmodern thought actually represents a ‘heightened form of rational discourse’, or the end 
of secular reason.492  A ‘legitimate postmodern critique of negative dialectics as dogmatically 
metaphysical’ therefore points the way to resolution by ‘newly legitimating a belief in 
transcendence’.493  In other words, a postmodern critique of the true lack of foundation 
undergirding a purely rationalist metaphysics (whether theological or atheological) exposes 
the fact that at its core is really a nihilistic violence – a nothingness which operates through 
coercion and the force of an arbitrary preference.  This in turn opens reason to a theological 
critique, and an alternative Christian metaphysic based in faith and divine peace. 
                                                            
487 See Davis, Introduction, above n 174, 14-15. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 158-159. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 156. 
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There seems to be some similarity here between the rationale of deconstruction and the 
pursuit of Christian theology.  For just as deconstruction proclaims the ‘end of modernity’, 
which ‘means the end of a single system of truth based on universal reason, which tells us 
what reality is like’, similarly theology ‘no longer has to measure up to accepted secular 
standards of scientific truth or normative rationality’.494  However, in the extreme relativist or 
crude nihilist versions of postmodernity, ‘there are infinitely many possible versions of truth, 
inseparable from particular narratives’.495  This kind is really about a ‘thoroughgoing 
perspectival historicism’, and it seems to follow that ‘if Christianity is just one of many 
possible perspectives, then why believe any of them?  Is not each perspective a strategy of 
power, every discourse but a means to assert that discourse?  [This] Postmodernism seems to 
imply nihilism, albeit of a “positive” kind, embracing contingency and arbitrariness as the 
real natural good’.496   
 
Thacker indicts such a mode of thinking as pagan postmodernity, because it is a fractured 
multiplicity in conflict, and only a violently imposed metanarrative can resolve it.497  This is 
where Christian theology comes to the fore.  By faith (with reason), Christianity can propose 
its own metanarrative as one option among many, yet as the most desirable one since it can 
instantiate peace – the harmonious ordering of difference, rather than the violent striving 
between differences.  Here also we can make an important distinction: there is a pagan 
postmodernism which, having rejected pure reason, is left with nothing but nihilistic struggle 
between equally competing perspectives.  However, there is also a Postmodern Critical 
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Augustinianism, explained in previous chapters – one which rejects a pure secularised reason, 
yet by faith proposes Christian theology as the desirable metanarrative, and claims to give 
peace.  As we shall see in the subsequent parts of this chapter, Derrida articulates some of 
these valuable elements of Christian theology, but also seems to mix it with the pagan idea of 
violent difference.  Seeking the justice Derrida too desires, we therefore move to untangle the 
pagan from the Christian, and pursue with Derrida a metanarrative which is not dominant or 
violent – one which rejects the hegemony of pure reason and trusts in a Christianity of peace. 
 
II DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES: THE METANARRATIVES OF JACQUES 
DERRIDA 
 
A The Atheist Derrida 
 
It is possible to read the trace pagan elements in Derrida’s deconstruction as symptomatic of 
the competing metanarratives which constitute his personal background, views and work.  
For example, it seems that he fundamentally rejects Western metaphysics, and in particular 
Christian theology.  Derrida himself states that he ‘quite rightly passes for an atheist’.498  
Furthermore, he rejects the notion of logocentrism as the self-presentation or presence of 
meaning in writing, and similarly as ‘the belief that the first and last things are the Logos, the 
Word [of God], the Divine Mind, the infinite understanding of God…’499  He denounces the 
                                                            
498 Jacques Derrida, cited in John Caputo, ‘Adieu-sans Dieu: Derrida and Levinas’ in J Bloechl (ed), The Face of 
the Other and the Trace of God: Essays on the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Fordham University Press, 
2000) 278. 
499 G Spivak, ‘Translator’s Preface’ in J Derrida, Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 
lxviii; B Johnson, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in J Derrida, Dissemination (University of Chicago Press, 1981) 
ix. 
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concept of writing containing the fullness of metaphysical presence as ‘vulgar’, thus 
conflating and rejecting metaphysics and a Christian theology of divine presence in the 
Word.500  This atheist Derrida appears to be against the Being of God and his metaphysical 
presence in writing (such as Scripture or Christ as the divine Word). 
 
B The Jewish Derrida 
 
1 Law and Book 
 
However, it is also arguable that Derrida’s deconstruction and emphasis on the law and the 
book (or text) is due to his Jewish genealogy of life and thought.  For example, Ofrat 
contends that Derrida’s Jewish upbringing and culture and his Jewish identity is the ultimate 
source of his writings.501  Derrida’s philosophy is the corroboration of the fragments of 
Jewish identity from which it grew, and Judaism or Judeo-centrism may be there ‘as essence, 
logocentric substance, primary source of truth’ in this philosophy.502  In addition, Bass notes 
that Derrida tends to adopt Hegel, who articulates the notion of the unhappy consciousness 
which is always divided against itself.  Its paradigmatic figure is Abraham, ‘the prototype of 
the “Jewish” consciousness for which there is an intrinsic conflict between God and 
                                                            
500 M Dumitrescu, ‘Derrida vs Saussere: Two Ways of Looking at the Linguistic Sign’ (2007) 3 Cultural and 
Literary Studies 118, 119. 
501 G Ofrat, The Jewish Derrida (Syracuse University Press, 2001) 2-3.  It may seem problematic to be labelling 
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paganism, Judiasm and Christianity, paradoxically passing through them all yet not reducible to any.  The labels 
are not intended to be categorical, but merely to denote ideas which have their culmination in a postmodern 
Christian theology – a paradoxical system of unity in difference.  This is indispensable for the development of a 
Postmodern Critical Augustinianism which argues for a fundamental unity in difference through the law of love. 
502 Ibid. 
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nature’.503  This theme runs throughout Derrida’s work, where he opposes the Greek ‘happy’ 
(at one with nature) with the Hebraic ‘unhappy’ consciousness.504  The inherited opposition is 
programmed by a logic of presence which demands a resolution to the conflict, and Derrida 
pushes it to the limit where it becomes irreducible.  Derrida’s interrogation of the Jewish 
divided consciousness is thus particularly poignant as the experience of the people of the 
Book.505 
 
Moreover, Derrida’s notion of deconstruction is justice carries in its roots the Jewish 
conception of divine violence as justice articulated by Walter Benjamin.506  In Force of Law, 
Derrida specifically examines a paper by Benjamin which distinguishes between the mythic 
or founding violence of law, and the divine or annihilating and destructive violence of law.507  
According to Benjamin, mythical violence is a mere manifestation of the (pagan) gods, for 
God opposes myth and mythical violence is confronted by the divine, which is its antithesis.  
Mythical violence brings guilt and retribution, while divine violence expiates, the former 
threatens and the latter strikes, the former is bloody while the latter is lethal but bloodless.  
The pagan legend of Niobe (mythical violence) may consequently be confronted with God’s 
judgment on the company of Korah: ‘it strikes them… and does not stop short of annihilation.  
But in annihilating it also expiates, and a deep connection between lack of bloodshed and the 
expiatory character of this violence is unmistakeable’.508   
 
                                                            
503 A Bass, ‘Translator’s Introduction’ in J Derrida, Writing and Difference (Routledge, 1978) xix-xx. 
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Hence, ‘mythical violence is bloody power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence 
pure power over all life for the sake of the living.  The first demands sacrifice, the second 
accepts it’.509  Benjamin’s mythical violence appears to be fundamentally pagan.  Similarly, 
divine violence, despite its claim to be divine, always inaugurates a new law with violence.  
In other words, it replaces violence with violence.510  It might consequently seem that Derrida 
has received some (pagan) elements of this cycle of violence into his concept of 
deconstruction being justice. 
 
2 Justice, Spirit and Revelation 
 
In leading up to his famous phrase ‘deconstruction is justice’, Derrida argues that the origin 
or foundation of the law is mystical in the sense that it is essentially neither legal or non-
legal, but a positing by force – and that laws maintain their authority not because they are 
just, but simply because they are laws.  This normative proposition is therefore essentially 
deconstructible, and it is this deconstructible nature of law that ensures the possibility of 
deconstruction itself.511  For Derrida, it follows that ‘justice in itself, if such a thing exists, 
outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible.  No more than deconstruction itself, if such a 
thing exists.  Deconstruction is justice’.512   
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Derrida’s deconstruction may actually have more in common with Christianity than it 
appears.  In a practical sense, Derrida’s process of deconstruction is also justice because (like 
Christianity) it essentially involves exposing and reversing the hierarchical and violent 
assumptions of Enlightenment reasoning and argumentation, usually in the context of 
removing binary oppositions and demonstrating the dependence of binaries on each other.  
Arguably then deconstruction does not eradicate established realities, but generates alternate 
understandings of dominant views, as well as enabling transformation through detailed and 
particular questioning and reconstruction.513   
 
This can be observed in Derrida’s explicit discussions of deconstruction, justice and law.  
‘Justice is an experience of the impossible… law is the element of calculation… but justice is 
incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the 
experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice’.514  Justice is ‘infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic’, 
while law is ‘stablizable or statutory, calculable, a system of regulated and coded 
prescriptions’.515  Justice must go through ‘the ordeal of the undecidable’, and therefore 
requires ‘fresh judgment’ which is ‘both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve 
the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, remystify 
it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its 
principle’.516 
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Hence for Derrida, at the moment of justice there is a paradoxical or aporetic place of 
undecidability where a decision must be made.  This opens the space for a new judgment 
which in some novel way re-invents law.  There is, in other words, a revelatory moment, 
where a renewed legal principle emerges or is revealed by virtue of interpretation, the 
outcome of deconstruction and justice.  It is an intrinsically creative process, a process of 
redemption whereby the old has gone and the new has come.  In the arrival of this 
particularly Pauline space, there appears to be an incalculable spirit of decision, unbound by 
rules and outside of statutory categories, yet also within the letter or regulated system of law 
itself.  So it may be that Derridean deconstruction is redeemable as a fundamentally Christian 
endeavour. 
 
C The Christian Derrida? 
 
1 A Theological Language 
 
We can also see Derrida the Christian in his explicit employment of theological language, 
and he even implicitly or inadvertently utilises theological concepts.  This is because 
deconstruction also renders God and theology possible as discourses.517  Indeed, when 
articulating the limits and subjectivity of language and representation in Writing and 
Difference, Derrida’s words are replete with theological references, such as Bible, the one 
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true established text of the earth (but not referring to the Christian Bible), God (as its author), 
Father and logos.518 
 
Derrida’s emphasis on this text of the earth is understood against the background of his 
theory of language.  He argues that all language necessarily refers to other language – it does 
not refer to some external reality independent of language.  The meaning of a word is defined 
by other words which have always been defined by other words and previous structures.  
Hence, there is an infinite regress of language having been defined by always-existing prior 
structures, and so it is impossible to determine the creation of language as an ‘event’, as such.  
This nonsynthetic alternation between structure and event is what Derrida terms to be 
differance.  In this linguistic system, there are only differences and absence, no present 
external referent.519  So for Derrida in this sense the world could be viewed as a text.  The 
notion of the world as a text has a certain affinity with Christianity.520  As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, viewing the world in this way is an entirely Christian approach, for God has 
revealed himself in creation through the ‘book’ of Scripture and the ‘book’ of nature, 
encapsulating all of reality in the text.  The fact that there is no creative event for language 
may also allude to the divine logos, Christ, as eternal and uncreated. 
 
Another parallel element of Christianity and Derrida’s deconstruction is its rejection of the 
purely rational metaphysics of the Western enlightenment.  Litowitz observes that Derrida 
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deconstructs ‘all asserted metaphysical foundations as logocentric fictions’.521  Hence, 
Derrida’s deconstruction is anti-foundationalist, ‘a sustained argument against the possibility 
of anything pure and simple which can serve as the foundation for the meaning of signs’.522  
It strikes at the very idea of a transcendental phenomenology or a transcendental signified.  
What Derrida rejects is the notion that experience can be pure in the sense that it can be fully 
understood as it is found in our private mental life, without reference to transient 
circumstances or actual empirical objects.523  Similarly, John Milbank argues that the strength 
of Christian theology lies in its independence from a modern secular reason, and this 
Christian view may be affirmed all the more strongly if its ‘purely rational demonstrability is 
denied’ and it is believed through faith, for only then can it be ‘undergirded by belief in a 
transcendent, creator God’.524   
 
2 The Three Become One: Derrida’s Trinity 
 
Even more significantly, Derrida’s broader concepts are also distinctly comparable to central 
tenets of Christian theology.  Consider Derrida’s own definition of differance in 
Dissemination: 
Differance differs from itself.  On the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, 
inequality, or discernability; on the other, it expresses the interposition of delay, the interval 
of a spacing and temporalisation that puts off until later what is presently denied, the possible 
that is presently impossible… in the one case to differ signifies non-identity; in the other case 
it signifies the order of the same.525   
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Thus, differance is both difference and sameness, to differ and to defer, a ‘sameness which is 
not identical’.526  Differance as simultaneously difference and sameness, or unity and 
diversity, carries the import of the Christian Trinity, or Tri-unity.  For in the Trinitarian 
nature, God is one, the unity and uniquely divine being or essence.  However, this one God 
also exists in diversity through three divine persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  In addition 
according to Derrida, ‘to differ is to temporalise, to resort, consciously or unconsciously, to 
the temporal… mediation of a detour that suspends the accomplishment or fulfilment of 
desire or will’.527  This difference component of differance may be observed in the Trinitarian 
relationship through the Incarnation of Christ, where the transcendent, eternal God 
temporalises in Christ and mediates between humans and God.  However, in this process 
Christ ‘detours’ from his presence in heaven and suspends his own will for the sake of dying 
on the cross to save humanity from their sin, since he says to the Father ‘not as I will, but as 
you will’.528   
 
This may be further demonstrated through an analysis of his concepts of presence and 
absence, as well as trace.  According to Derrida, a sign is put in place of the thing itself, the 
present thing.  Indeed, 
…signs represent the present in its absence… the sign would thus be a deferred presence.  
This classical determination presupposes that the sign (which defers presence) is conceivable 
only on the basis of the presence that it defers and in view of the deferred presence one 
intends to reappropriate.529  
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This sign is both secondary in the sense that it is second in order after an original and lost 
presence, and provisional with respect to this final and missing presence.530  Consequently, 
one can see Christ as the sign of Trinitarian presence, Christ as the divine presence on earth 
representing the Trinity in their absence from earth.  In addition, the Incarnation is only 
conceivable on the basis of the deferred presence of the Trinity, a final heavenly presence 
provisionally represented by Christ on earth which will be reappropriated by believers in 
heaven.  However, one may well question the designation of Christ as ‘secondary’, for ‘in 
Him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell’.531  Derrida notes that if one does question 
this secondary and provisional character of the sign, a particular consequence follows: ‘we 
question the authority of presence or its simple symmetrical contrary, absence or lack.  We 
thus interrogate the limit that has always constrained us… to form the sense of being in 
general as presence or absence’.532  Similarly, to question Christ’s character as secondary and 
provisional, or to affirm Him as the God-man, implies that He is both present and absent, for 
he died and was resurrected, dwells in heaven and in believer’s hearts.533   
 
Regarding trace, Derrida states that ‘the trace is not a presence but rather the simulacrum of a 
presence that dislocates, displaces, and refers beyond itself’.534  What is perceptible and 
imperceptible about the trace of difference is that ‘it is lost in an irretrievable invisibility, and 
yet even its loss is covered, preserved, regarded and retarded.  This happens in a text, in the 
form of presence’.535  Hence Derrida’s trace is the mark of the absence of a presence, an 
always already absent present.536  This can be compared to the work of the Holy Spirit, who 
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refers beyond Himself to Christ, for Christ says ‘He will glorify me, for He will take what is 
mine and declare it to you’.537  In addition, the Holy Spirit covers the loss of the presence of 
Christ by being present in the believer, and marks the absence of Christ by his presence.538  
Bringing the concepts together, the structure of presence is thus constituted by difference and 
deferment, and through trace indicates the suspended status of the subject as neither absent 
nor present.539  Therefore, there seems to be a Christian dimension to Derrida’s 
deconstruction, one which indicates some of the commonality of goal and method. 
 
III THE PAGAN DIFFER(A)NCE 
 
However, as we have so far signposted without much detail, there also seems to be a strong 
pagan dimension to Derrida’s ontology.  For example, Derrida claims that ‘differance is not, 
does not exist, has no being-present’ and consequently has no existence or essence.  He 
emphasises that ‘differance is not theological... (and is) irreducible to every ontological or 
theological… appropriation’.540  And yet, he equivocates and concedes that ‘differance 
remains a metaphysical name’.541  So there seems to be some conflict or strife 
(contradiction?) within Derrida, where he expresses his discourse in terms of theological 
concepts and admits some aspect of metaphysics while simultaneously insisting that his 
deconstruction is not theological.  Moreover, the fact that differance is endless difference and 
deferring reminds us of the endless difference and warfare of the ancient pagans, particularly 
the continual flux and becoming advocated by Heraclitus in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. 
                                                            
537 John 16:14. 
538 John 16:7. 
539 Spivak, above n 499, xliii. 
540 Derrida, Dissemination, above n 525, 134. 
541 Ibid 158. 
161 
 
 
Heraclitus fundamentally argues that ‘everything moves on and nothing is at rest’.542  Jantzen 
proceeds to explain that ‘it is evident from his fragments that he does not consider the 
continuous reciprocal exchange of elements to be a matter of smooth transition but of 
opposition and war’.543  Indeed, Heraclitus states that ‘it is necessary to understand that war is 
universal and justice is strife, and that all things take place in accordance with strife and 
necessity’.544  He thus ‘assimilates the transformation of the elemental opposites with war and 
conflict between people; violence is a fundamental principle of the universe’.545 
 
The pagan similarities in Derrida’s work can initially be observed in his analysis of Western 
Theatre, where he argues that it is inherently cruel, and describes it as declining, decadent and 
negative, for it is made to do that for which it is not made.  The theatre destroys 
representation and imitation.  Furthermore, it expels God, for the theatrical practice of cruelty 
inhabits and produces a nontheological space.  The stage is theological when it is dominated 
by speech or representation, a logos which governs from a distance in the sense that an 
objectively removed author constructs the performance to represent their own thoughts.  With 
the removal of the objective author and their intent, representation and the spoken word, the 
logos, comes the violence and non-theological status of theatre.546   
 
Derrida further notes in Writing and Difference that at the origin of cruelty is a ‘murder’, and 
‘firstly a parricide’ – the murder of the ‘Father of the word’, the ‘author-God’, with the 
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following murder of speech, text and representation.547  If we understand the murder of the 
Father of the Word and the author-God as the rejection of theology, we thus see that Derrida 
not only invokes the violence of murder, but this violence explicitly rejects and destroys God, 
theology, and the word (logos) as representation while simultaneously adopting theological 
language such as logos and the parricide of the author-God to describe it.  In other words, 
Derrida’s deconstruction associates the rejection of theology (or the invention of the secular 
realm) with violence.  Furthermore, in his usage of the term differance, Derrida links it with 
wordplay on totalitarian and solicitation.  He views structuralism as a form of philosophical 
totalitarianism, and submits this violent structural project to a counterviolence of 
‘solicitation’, which derives etymologically from the latin word meaning ‘to shake’.548  As 
such, Derrida’s identification of violence is (not) resolved by violence. 
 
Derrida further addresses how deconstruction rejects God and theology.  He argues in Acts of 
Literature that the dispossession of presence in language is a law of language, and operates as 
a ‘power of death in living speech’ because it ‘threatens the possibility of the spoken word’ 
and ‘dislocates the subject’ – in other words, it is a ‘violence done to the natural destiny of 
language’.549  As we have noted, it follows that there is no transcendental signified, no 
outside the text in the sense that nothing in reality escapes the features of textuality.  Context 
is not determined by a transcendental signified such as God, so that context has no 
discernable boundary.  This is what motivates deconstruction.550  Any talk of God or theology 
is shaken and blocked by difference, for the sign is essentially theological, and difference 
rejects the sign.  As such, deconstruction rejects God and theology, but also renders them 
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possible as discourses.551  Thus, since the sign is theological and difference rejects the sign in 
conjunction with the transcendental signified (of which God is the paradigm), it would seem 
to follow that theology is rejected from deconstruction (and this secularist conclusion makes 
sense in light of Derrida the atheist).  In addition, since the features of textuality are 
inherently violent (i.e. writing) and nothing in reality apparently escapes these features, this 
implies that Derrida articulates a fundamental ontology of violence. 
 
This ontology of violence in the deconstructive process may be seen in Derrida’s 
deconstruction of Levinas, where Derrida argues that Levinas’ contention that we must break 
with Parmenides signifies a parricide, the ‘murder of the Greek father who is dominating us’, 
the ‘killing of a speech’.552  Language ‘cannot lend itself to inclusion in or modification by 
the object without violence’ – the limits of language.553  Language can only infinitely tend 
toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it, as violence against 
violence, or an economy of violence.  Violence did not exist before the possibility of speech, 
the logos – on this view, it is transcendental or ontological.554  The finite totality is inherently 
violent, unlike the infinite totality, and according to Derrida totality is a theological notion.555  
Juxtaposing these characterisations is Derrida’s ultimate failure to engage with and resolve 
the ‘contestation, antagonism, struggle, conflict, and dissension’ of politics, as Critchley 
observes.556   
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Derrida’s inadvertently violent engagement due to traces of paganism appears even more 
fundamental when one considers his further statements on the violence of writing.  According 
to Derrida in Of Grammatology, writing is the dissimulation of the natural, primary and 
immediate presence of sense to the soul within the logos, and its violence befalls the soul as 
unconsciousness.557  Indeed, ‘metaphysics has constituted an exemplary defense against the 
threat of writing’.558  Thus, writing is aggressive, a disease, the defeat and fall of innocent 
language, and consists of relations of power and violence.559  In the final analysis, ‘writing 
cannot be thought of outside the horizon of intersubjective violence’.560  Derrida therefore 
states in Margins of Philosophy that philosophical language is a fund of forced metaphors, 
and this is how philosophy has traditionally understood meaning and reference in language – 
the twisting return of the already-there of a meaning and production, but also as revelation or 
unveiling, as truth.  As such, forced metaphors must be correct and natural.561   
 
A written sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context, and this force of breaking is 
inherent in the very structure of the written.  The force of rupture is due to the spacing which 
constitutes the written sign, which separates it from other elements of the internal contextual 
chain, and from all the forms of a present referent, whether objective or subjective.562  Once 
again, the ontological relationship between violence and pagan mythology emerges, with the 
notion of a forced metaphor combined with the theological language of ‘revelation’. More 
importantly however, Derrida’s indictment of writing as inherently violent and the fact that 
he advocates the privileging of writing over speech puts him in the unenviable position of 
appearing to advocate and participate in the very violence he is insightfully identifying. 
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Derrida himself testifies that deconstruction does not consist of removing violence from 
writing and reversing this process, but aims to show why the violence of writing does not 
befall an ‘innocent’ language – there is an originary violence of writing because ‘language is 
first writing’, and it is ‘mythological and usurpatory’.563  According to Derrida then, 
‘deconstruction is the overturning and displacement of a conceptual order which is an 
organisation of forces that has constituted the remainder of the dominant force which 
organised the logocentric hierarchy’.564  Critchley notes that deconstruction is characterised 
by the traversal of the space between commentary and interpretation, which he calls a 
‘violation and transgression’.565  Thus, what we ultimately see is that Derrida’s 
deconstruction, despite its positive Christian elements and the way in which it insightfully 
exposes the limits and end of secularised reason, also contains pagan elements which 
violently and transgressively expose originary force, mythology and usurpation – 
unfortunately promoting an ontology of violence.   
 
Indeed, Milbank notes that there is a ‘hidden connection between premodern pagan dualism 
and postmodern dualism’, for the latter’s ‘self-proclaimed paganism is a kind of 
deconstructed paganism’ since the ‘real pagans were always hoping to subordinate that 
admitted conflictual diversity of the gods to a harmonious order’, and the open celebration of 
violence was latent.566  Christianity, which admits difference and is therefore not dualistic, is 
already beyond the reach of Derridean deconstruction.567  The analysis in this chapter so far 
has identified the pagan emphasis on regulating difference through violence in Derrida’s 
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work.  However, let us not throw out the baby with the bathwater.  As the chapter has also 
identified, Derrida’s deconstruction has much in common with Christianity in the way that it 
foregrounds an ontology of difference and deconstructs the pure reason which is the secular 
foundation for a violent modernity.   
 
Derrida’s work is therefore indispensable for articulating the end of secular reason and an 
ontology which incorporates difference.  The question then is how to remove the pagan 
emphasis on violent difference while maintaining the perceptively critical elements which 
undermine secular reason, and finally arrive at a Christian theology beyond secular reason, 
one which peacefully admits difference in the community.  In other words, I propose to move 
from a nihilistic, pagan postmodernity of violence to a Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, 
and this is the task of the following parts. 
 
IV MOVING PERSPECTIVES: FROM SECULAR REASON TO CHRISTIAN 
THEOLOGY 
 
Milbank acknowledges that religions may ‘conceal historical contingency and human 
invention’, but this is ‘just as true of modern secular systems of thought’, which are unable to 
admit their own choice of values with respect to the ‘conjunction of an empty freedom with 
instrumentalist reason’.568  Such an admission requires on the part of secular thought a 
nihilistic courage (for example, Nietzsche and the original movement to postmodernism from 
modernity).  However, it is ‘much easier for religions to admit this’, for they ‘admit that they 
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are not fully explicable but shrouded in mystery and the requirements of faith’.569  ‘Religion 
is more forthright regarding the inexplicable character of cultural existence than science dares 
to be’.570  Indeed, ‘Nietzsche himself advocated the inevitability of myths, and the need for a 
mythology embodying the nihilistic realisation that we always construct on mythical truth’.571  
‘Every secular positivism is therefore also revealed to be a positivist theology, and it is 
impossible to explain theology either scientifically or humanistically’ (in other words, non-
theologically).572 
 
Indeed, Milbank observes that the faith of humanism has allegedly become a substitute for 
transcendent faith, and the associated genealogies reveal a world inevitably dominated by 
violence, yet without a solid ground in historicism.  This knowledge it presents as more than 
mere perspective, but the question is raised whether such a claim can be sustained without 
reference to metaphysics.  Milbank claims that it cannot, and this differential ontology is but 
one more mythos, and that the realisation that discourses of truth are so many 
incommensurable languages does not inescapably lead us to the conclusion that society is the 
combination of force, fate and chance.  In other words, nihilism cannot exceed a merely 
mythical status.  Consequently, Milbank shows that the ontology of the secular is inherently 
violent, that this ontology is only mythology, and that it results from the contingent embrace 
of pagan violence in the refusal and rejection of Christianity.573  There remains an alternative 
to escape the violence: to propose Christianity as an equally selectable mythos (by faith), yet 
one which is infinitely more desirable since it embraces an ontology of peace where 
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differences are conceived as analogically related, rather than equivocally at variance.574  
Moreover, as we have seen, this faith is not against reason, but through the peace of 
analogical participation in divine Being, reason and faith work together in the revelation of 
the Trinity – the paradigm of harmonious unity in diversity. 
 
 
V A GENUINELY ‘POSTMODERN’ THEOLOGY  
 
We have seen that Christianity and Derrida’s post-modern deconstruction have a common 
emphasis on a linguistic ontology of difference which attempts to subvert Enlightenment 
foundations of secular reason.  However, we have also seen pagan elements to Derrida’s 
deconstruction, which arguably lead to violence.  Christian speech ‘fades to make way for the 
arrival of a new sign and a new speaker, or a new speaking-event’ – the person and work of 
Christ.575  This grants difference a known content, whereas Derrida’s difference is always 
deferred ‘and therefore nothing, no-difference’.576  Writing tends to abstract and so it is more 
the text that appears ideal and empirical, rather than the voice as Derrida claims.  Milbank 
then presses the point, arguing that  
Derrida simply pursues (for deconstruction only reveals the essence of what it deconstructs) 
this idealism of the text to its logical conclusion: if the sign is not oral, if it is not also an 
embodied event with a certain concrete “expression” of what it conveys, if it is not also 
something which dies, can be wiped out, forgotten, but is defined… by its survival of the 
death of the speaker… then… it is death, is “the impossible”, is absolute deferral, is no-thing: 
the ideal.  The absolute stasis, formalism, obscurity and fetishized capacity for manipulative 
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tyranny of the regime of “pure writing”… is preserved by Derrida, and simply more precisely 
defined – as nihilism.577 
 
And as we have seen, in nihilism  
the flux is a medium of perpetual conflict, a pagan agon where the most powerful rhetoric 
will temporarily triumph, only to succumb to an apparently or effectively more powerful 
discourse in the future.  Because there are no fixed categorical areas for different 
discourses/practices, they ceaselessly overlap and contest for influence.  Lyotard and others 
rightly do not envisage a peaceful coexistence of a plurality of discourses alongside each 
other, without mutual interference.  The best that can be hoped for is some mitigation of the 
severity of conflict, a set of formal rules of engagement… for this reason, postmodern 
nihilism remains in continuity with liberalism and the Enlightenment.578 
 
In other words, though Derrida is on the right track, the pagan elements of his deconstruction 
yield problematic results.  His emphasis on differance, the infinite difference and deferral of 
language, reveals that there is really nothing at the foundation of language.  There is only the 
nihilistic void.  But since there is always difference(s), in the nihilistic void the different 
rhetorics exist in a state of perpetual war by the exercise of pure power, and only the further 
exercise of power can impede the extent of this conflict.  Conversely, ‘Christianity can 
become “internally postmodern” in a way that may not be possible for every religion or 
ideology… through its belief in creation from nothing’ it is a ‘reality suspended between 
nothing and infinity’, and is ‘a reality of flux… composed only of relational differences… 
like nihilism, Christianity can, should, embrace the differential flux’.579   
 
Christianity uniquely provides ‘an allowing, by faith… that a lust for “present” knowledge 
does not refuse the guidance of desire (whereas a Derridean discovery that presence is 
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absence still refuses this guidance) which will render, precisely, faith possible’: that is, enable 
us to trust our written narratives as realised through a transcendent linguistic encounter with 
Christ, the word of the speaking God.580  Christian theology is able to ‘think unlimited 
semiosis… which articulates the deferrals of the sign… where the nihilists seem only to think 
of signified absence in terms of a necessary suppression, betrayel or subversion’ – that is, 
violence.581  ‘For theology, and theology alone, difference remains real difference since it is 
not subordinate to immanent univocal process or the fate of a necessary suppression.  Instead, 
the very possibility of substitutive transference is here held to be a peaceful affirmation of the 
other, consummated in a transcendent infinity’.582 
 
So in the new era of postmodernity, the human has become ‘subordinate to the infinitely 
many discourses which claim to constitute humanity’, and ‘universality can no longer pose as 
the identical, but must be paradoxically invoked as the different’.583  Postmodernity poses the 
challenge to theology that the ontology of difference is inseparable from an absolute 
historicism, a philosophy which only thinks truth as the narrative of the constitution of the 
strategies of power.  Indeed, according to this critique, the many-varied nature of truth and 
truths reveal truths as arbitrary, the will-to-power.  This postmodern suspicion is ‘all-
encompassing, leaving no residue of humanist meaning’.584  ‘Such an ontology of difference 
is found to be true, yet not just, which results in despair’.585   
 
                                                            
580 Ibid 78. 
581 Ibid 112. 
582 Ibid 113. 
583 Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63, 260. 
584 Ibid 261-262. 
585 Ibid 262. 
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More moderate forms of postmodernism, which admit irreducible difference and the 
historical/contextual nature of truth claims without lapsing into denials of absolute truth and 
value, may be of use.  Indeed, the ‘tradition-governed inquiry is rational and makes objective 
progress’, and so it seems that the ‘response to nihilism is to adopt a tradition and derive an 
ontology from the implicit assumptions of its narrative forms’.586  Milbank argues that 
Christianity is such an ontology, but it is unique in the sense that it alone presents an ontology 
of peace and ‘refuses to submit ultimate reality to conflictual phenomena’.587  Where 
Derrida’s deconstruction submits that difference is intrinsically violent, Christianity submits 
that difference is intrinsically peaceful.  Christianity is therefore a redeemed version of 
Derridean deconstruction: deconstruction is required to remove the secular reason founding 
society, leaving a space for faith to come to the fore; Christianity is required to construct this 
space as difference without violence.  Nihilism ‘sustains its ontology as another mythos’, and 
therefore the ‘critique beyond nihilism must be theological’.588 
 
However, this is not to say that reason per se is rejected.  As we have seen, Milbank appeals 
to a ‘bias toward reason which is both innate and a post-Christian residue’, in contrast to a 
‘pure, cold nihilistic vision’, which concludes that ‘in the end there is an incomprehensible 
springing of all things from nothing’, and reveals its own ‘illusory character as the covering 
of the void’.589  Nihilism is the giving over of (secular) pure reason, to the ontological reign 
of non-sense or unreason.  By contrast, a Christian perspective ‘saves the human bias toward 
reason’, for reason in this framework is consistent with the infinite and ‘leaves no residue of 
                                                            
586 Ibid 263. 
587 Ibid. 
588 Ibid. 
589 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, xvi-xvii. 
172 
 
chaos’.590  In other words, rationalism is linked to the biblical mythos alone, and to save 
reason in this fashion requires the supplementation of reason by faith, including faith in 
infinite reason.   
 
To reiterate more specifically, after modernity lies a disappointment with pure reason, leaving 
only a formalistic nihilism as its pale echo.  This nihilistic will to reject reason also promotes 
abstract difference as necessary conflict or ontological injustice.    However, Augustinian 
Christianity promotes a more hopeful metaphysic of peace in the City of God.  In the Trinity 
and the Incarnation there is an original difference without violence, and so justice and an 
ontology of peace is possible, by faith.591  Christian reason recognises no such necessary or 
original ontology of violence, but recognises the infinite as peace, from which true 
theological reason which promotes peace may spring.592  It can be argued then that Christian 
theology with its ontology of peace can overcome nihilism.593 
 
If theology embraces a more thorough-going perspectivism, pragmatism and historicism in 
this sense, it can escape the modernist illusions that a purely finite, immanent science can 
give us a true ontology.  Our thoughts depend entirely upon contingent, theoretically 
unjustifiable assumptions, and it is precisely this historicist confinement of our thought which 
renders it irreducible to immanent process, and ‘always dependent on divine participation and 
opening up to the transcendent’.594  However, Milbank’s argument is not simply that in a 
postmodern world every perspective is as good as any other and therefore a single Christian 
                                                            
590 Ibid. 
591 See Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 126-129. 
592 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 5. 
593 Ibid 6. 
594 Ibid 219-221. 
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perspective remains possible.  On the contrary, the postmodern valuation of the 
unsurpassability of plural difference or perspective is upheld – what is contested is the mode 
of this valuation or the precise construal of the transcendentality of difference itself.  The 
nihilistic difference is the ‘ultimately contested universal’, the ‘impenetrable flux of 
perspectives’.595  This view cannot construe difference as peaceful and never describes it as 
analogical, but for Christianity difference can be construed peacefully through the theological 
virtues of faith, hope and love.596   
 
In this way Christian theology, believed by faith, but in contrast to the postmodern nihilism 
of secular pure reason, imagines the temporal process in its very temporality as reflecting 
eternity, as the possibility of a historical progress toward God, and as something recuperable 
within memory whose ultimate purpose is forgiveness and reconciliation.  Conceptions of the 
‘below’ (human subjectivity and relationship) are only constituted within the narrative that 
simultaneously postulates the ‘above’ (transcendence).  Christianity pursued from the outset a 
universalism which tried to accommodate rather than merely abolish difference: Christians 
could live in their different societies yet are fundamentally united in the Body of Christ and 
as citizens of the eternal city, the City of God.597   
 
 
VI THE THRESHOLD OF LAW AND TRUTH: CONSTRUCTING A 
CHRISTIAN ONTOLOGY OF PEACE 
                                                            
595 Ibid 145-146. 
596 Ibid 148. 
597 See Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63, 266-268. 
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This chapter sought to reveal the conflicting metanarratives which comprise the work of 
Jacques Derrida.  In particular, it was seen that Derrida draws upon the atheistic, the Judaic, 
and the Christian.  However, it was also suggested that this genealogical competition is linked 
with the incorporation of pagan violence in Derrida’s ontology.  In particular, though 
correctly oriented, Derrida’s ontology consists of difference as violence.  However, it is the 
orientation of his ontology which opens the possibility for the recovery and restoration of true 
reason which leads to a Christian peace – difference without violence.  The destruction of 
secular reason opens the space for the return of the theological, a reason reconciled with faith 
and theology which participates in the unique economy of the truth-disclosure of the Trinity 
through the analogical relation of difference.  
 
This is because Christianity has a different kind of logic, one of peace: not to simply abolish 
the law, which would be replacing violence with violence akin to Benjamin’s divine violence, 
but redeeming the law through the Spirit and love.  This allows true justice – God as just and 
the justifier of the one who has faith in Christ through doing away with the letter of the law 
and replacing it with the Spirit.  It is justice not as de(con)struction, but as (de)construction, 
such that it combusts the violence of secular reason and constructs the peace of faith, thereby 
sublating both.   Indeed, the event of Christ disrupts the false peace of pagan postmodernism, 
that there really is nothing external to language and all is warring perspectives – Christ 
cannot be covered over by language, but as the Word or logos He comes through language.   
He is outside the law of the letter, yet enables the law of the spirit, the law of God’s love that 
brings peace. 
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Hence, a genuinely postmodern, Christian theology which allows the mutual coexistence of 
difference in an ontologically peaceful way provides an alternative genealogy through which 
one can critique the development of law’s allegedly distorted theology, secularisation and 
violence.  In the following chapters, these foundational arguments are reiterated and extended 
with particular regard to the ontology of law and its relation to authentic Christian theology.  
It is eventually claimed that a peaceful legal community where differences exist in harmony 
can be articulated through a ‘symbiotic’ or ‘paradoxical’ understanding of law and truth. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
A GENEALOGY OF SECULAR(ISED) JURISPRUDENCE: 
VIOLENCE FROM DUNS SCOTUS TO DERRIDA 
 
I LAW AND POSTMODERN CRITICAL AUGUSTINIANISM 
 
In the previous chapters, this thesis has sought to develop Postmodern Critical 
Augustinianism as a critical analysis of the secular to argue that focusing on God as pure will 
and separating reason from faith leads to antagonism and alienation, or violence.  In 
particular it has been suggested that the development of the secular and the associated advent 
of violence is contingent on adopting distorted theological assumptions.  These have been 
genealogically outlined and it has been proposed that there exists a counter-genealogy which 
may just as well be accepted, and is even preferable since it rescues reason and allows peace 
– Christianity.   
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Chapter four engages this analysis and articulation of a Postmodern Critical Augustinianism 
in a specifically jurisprudential space by mapping the contingent development of secular law, 
and suggesting that this is associated with the emergence of ontological violence in the legal 
community.  Part I attempts to outline common ground for considering ‘law’, before Part II 
considers the theological nature of traditional natural law through examining the 
jurisprudence of Thomas Aquinas, the Thomist genealogy, and some contemporary 
interpretations.  Part III analyses the theology of John Duns Scotus, particularly his emphasis 
on the univocity of Being, God as pure sovereign will, and purely natural knowledge of God, 
with the end of suggesting that there is a theological shift which characterises the genealogy 
of law from Aquinas to Duns Scotus which creates the space for a secular, violent, posited 
law.  The notion of God and humanity as pure will governed by a secularised reason is traced 
through to Machiavelli and Hobbes in Part IV, before Part V completes the genealogy by 
arriving with the secular positivism of Austin and Hart.   
 
Parts III through V argue that according to these thinkers, notions such as pure reason, 
univocal being, and sovereign will are foundational for law’s formation, with the result that 
their respective legal communities are characterised by antagonism and alienation, a 
fundamentally ontological violence.  In particular, what these thinkers have in common is 
their explicit or implicit emphasis on society governed by some type of concentrated 
sovereign authority exercising its will in the form of violence.  The genealogy traces the 
movement of this theme from the theological in Duns Scotus through to its secular (where 
faith or theology is excluded from law) manifestation in Hobbes, Austin and Hart; in 
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accordance with its Augustinian approach, the genealogy also notes the pagan influence on 
the idea of violent governance which may be seen in Machiavelli. 
 
Part VI catalogues the nature of this violence more specifically through Cover, Derrida and 
Benjamin as prominent theorists of law and violence.   However, Part VII identifies that 
Cover and Benjamin may also allow for a counter-genealogy of law, one which embraces 
peace rather than violence.  Indeed, they arguably point toward an alternative Christian 
genealogy which can positively reconfigure the ontology of law based on the harmonious 
existence of difference found and revealed in the relations of the Trinity.  The remaining 
thesis chapters subsequently set about proposing the contours of this jurisprudence of truth, 
opening the possibility for considering how such a jurisprudence may interact with and 
redeem our current Western legal system.   
 
Before proceeding, it will be useful to engage in some attempt to define law, or at least 
outline its primary concepts.  Such a task is obviously a mammoth one and cannot be 
comprehensive, but it is hoped that it will be sufficient to convey some notion of what is 
meant when one uses the term ‘law’.598  We can perhaps initially understand law as the 
attempt to justly govern human interaction through a system of enforced principles.  Such a 
definition is advantageous in the sense that it includes normal civil law (such as criminal, 
evidential, tort or contract, which is what one usually thinks of), yet importantly in the 
                                                            
598 C.f. W Morrison, Jurisprudence: From the Greeks to Post-modernism (Cavendish Publishing, 1997) 1-3. 
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context of this thesis is also potentially able to incorporate the theological notion of law 
found in the Pentateuch and the Pauline corpus.599   
 
So the answer to the question ‘what is law’ is deceptively easy, and in 2500 years of 
attempting to answer the question, no consensus has been reached.  This question also begs 
further questions, such as whether law is a discrete entity or a social process, or whether there 
is a range of intersecting disciplinary phenomena which may be properly termed ‘law’.600  
Law is therefore a complex, interwoven, dynamic system.  Three functions of law include 
‘rules of organisation and function’, the ‘facilitation of interpersonal transactions’, and the 
‘protection of the public interest’.601  As surveyed in the introductory chapter, the legal 
system lies at the heart of any society, protecting rights, imposing duties, and establishing a 
framework for the conduct of any social, political or economic activity.  This includes 
punishing offenders, compensating the injured, and enforcing agreements.  Overall, law aims 
to achieve justice, promote freedom, uphold the rule of law and protect security.602   
 
There have also been various answers to the standard and central question of jurisprudence – 
the definition of law itself.  However, to have a theory of (the nature of) law presupposes that 
law itself is a distinct category to be theorised, and this is by no means clear.  Some have 
advocated the unitary category of law, others have advocated that there is no substantive 
distinction between law and non-law, and others have advocated some type of combination of 
                                                            
599 It could also be observed that the invocation of the Pauline law of Christ or law of love removes the element 
of enforcement and therefore in principle removes the violence in favour of peace – in other words, a just 
government of human interactions based on love for one’s neighbour rather than external enforcement.   
600 Morrison, above n 598, 1-3. 
601 P Smith, (ed), The Nature and Process of Law: Introduction to Legal Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 
1993) 9-10. 
602 Wacks, above n 23, 1. 
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the two.603  Typically, there are two types of responses to this issue of defining law.  The first 
is that law is a set of universal moral principles in accordance with nature (natural law), and 
the second is that law is a collection of valid rules or norms which lack moral content 
(positivism).604  Correspondingly, law is defined differently according to particular 
jurisprudential schools and methodologies.   
 
For example, schools of legal sociology focus on the social significance of law and its 
relation to politics, positivists focus on an examination of the framework of rules and 
regulations governing society, and natural law jurisprudence examines metaphysical issues 
associated with the essence of law and its connection with morality.605  For some, law is 
simply the rules created and recognised by the legal institutions of the state and is a distinct 
category from other disciplines.  However, it is not so straightforward.  For at the heart of law 
lies paradox: it is separate from politics yet inherently political, different from morality yet 
broadly reflective of social concerns, a constraint on power by the exercise of power, and is 
concerned with fair procedures yet is often inaccessible and sometimes unjust.606  It is this 
notion of the law as a complex, interwoven, non-unitary system incorporating various 
disciplines with the most artificial of boundaries which gives it scope for critique by and 
through such disciplines.607  With this in mind, we may now proceed to consider the theology 
                                                            
603 Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (Carolina Academic Press, 2006) 9-11. 
604 Wacks, above n 23, 2-3. 
605 P Butt, Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis, 2004) 252. 
606 E Ellis, Principles and Practice of Law (Lawbook Co, 2005) 1, 3-4. 
607 In relation to Chapter three for example, according to Douzinas, the task of postmodern jurisprudence is to 
deconstruct the focus of power as legitimate if it follows law and law follows (secular) reason, and it does this 
by initially recognising that postmodern legality defies the positivist and the moralist image – law is not a 
coherent ensemble, and the aspiration for unity has been abandoned.  The methodology of postmodern 
jurisprudence is similar to that of general postmodern deconstruction: the close reading of legal texts to expose 
omissions, repressions and distortions.  Therefore, as with its approach in other disciplines, deconstruction in 
law fundamentally seeks to invert or reverse the ontology of violence and hegemony it exposes.  This implies 
initially that such violence does exist in law, and in particular, as Douzinas notes, this violent ontology is 
legitimated by secular reason.  See Costas Douzinas, ‘Law and Justice in Postmodernity’ in S Connor (ed), The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism (Cambridge University Press, 2004) 202-207. 
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which undergirds traditional formulations of (natural) law, before genealogically elucidating 
how this theology became distorted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II FAITH, REASON AND A THEOLOGICAL NATURAL LAW 
 
A Thomas Aquinas and the Classical Tradition 
 
1 The Thomist Framework 
 
Thomas Aquinas, a thirteenth century scholastic theologian and the classical proponent of 
natural law, defines law as ‘a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who 
governs a perfect community’, and so there is an eternal law or lex eterna, which is God’s 
law and which fulfils these criteria.608  Since the eternal law of God is a subset of the content 
of the divine intellect and is therefore unchangeable truth, and to some extent people by grace 
                                                            
608 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 2, above n 415, 208. 
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know God and know truth, to this extent they know the eternal law.609  The ‘divine law’ or 
lex divina allows people to participate ‘more perfectly in the eternal law’ through clarifying 
the eternal law against the limitations of pure human reason, and consists of the true 
revelation contained in Holy Scripture, the Old and New Testaments of the Bible.610  Those 
who do not have this law of revelation nevertheless do by nature (illuminated by grace) those 
things which are of the law, and so know what is good and what is evil by conscience.611  
This is the ‘natural law’ or lex natura, which humans apprehend through their possessing a 
‘share of the Eternal Reason’, and so they are able to ‘participate in the eternal law through 
reason’; hence, the natural law is ‘the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law’.612   
 
Through human reason (enlightened by grace as a subset of the divine reason or logos), the 
precepts of the natural law ‘proceed to the more particular determinations’, which are called 
positive or ‘human laws’.613  All human law or lex humana, as it accords with right reason, 
ultimately derives from the eternal law.  Hence, if a law deviates from right reason (implying 
it does not accord with the eternal law of God or immutable truth), it is necessarily unjust, 
and therefore lacks the necessary quality of law.614  It is also worth noting that Aquinas’ 
articulation of the natural law illustrates the discussion in chapter two of his relationship 
between reason and faith (or grace) – namely, that divinely illuminated human reason 
participates in the eternal law of God by faith (grace), and if human law does not accord with 
this eternal law, it is necessarily against reason. 
 
                                                            
609 Ibid 216-217. 
610 Ibid 210-211. 
611 Ibid 208-209. 
612 Ibid 209. 
613 Ibid 210. 
614 Ibid 216-218. 
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2 The Thomist Genealogy: Augustine, Cicero and the Stoics 
 
This brief summary of the Thomist framework for law belies the extent of contemporary 
dispute over what precisely Aquinas meant in articulating this framework, and particularly 
just how theological the framework is.  It is hoped that by briefly outlining a genealogy of 
Aquinas’ thought, followed by consideration of some of the different perspectives, we may 
arrive at a reasonably plausible foundation for understanding Thomist jurisprudence in the 
context of its theological nature.615  To begin, Aquinas quotes Augustine as an authority for 
stating that ‘there exists an eternal law’, which is ‘Supreme Reason’ and ‘Unchangeable’.616  
Similarly, Aquinas argues that Augustine ‘distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the 
other temporal, which he calls human’.617  Humans may access the eternal law through 
reason, which is sharing in the eternal reason, and this ‘participation’ is the natural law from 
which may stem human or positive law.618  Hence, following Augustine the eternal law is 
‘imprinted’ in our nature by the ‘Divine light’.619   
 
Aquinas also cites Augustine’s statement saying ‘that which is not just seems to be no law at 
all’ in order to justify his further contention that the force of a law depends on its justice, or 
whether it is from God. 620  Aquinas, further using Augustine, argues that the ‘new law is 
instilled in our hearts’, and not written down, but ‘inscribed on the hearts of the faithful’.621  
This is the law of faith and of the Spirit.  This new law is also the law of love, which contains 
                                                            
615 Also see information on the way in which Plato and Aristotle influenced the development of natural law in 
the literature cited in the rest of this part.  Since we are here focusing on the theological sources of Thomist 
natural law, a more detailed discussion of Plato and Aristotle is beyond the scope of this part. 
616 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 2, above n 415, 208. 
617 Ibid 210. 
618 Ibid 208-210. 
619 Ibid 209; C.f. M Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1977) 143. 
620 Aquinas, Summa Theologica vol 2, above n 415, 227; c.f. Ibid 233. 
621 Ibid 321. 
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the old law and fulfils it.622  Ultimately then, according to Aquinas and following Augustine, 
the laws of the secular state have their justification and authority from the fact that they are 
part of the eternal and natural law of love – or, in other words, that they are given by God.623 
 
Given Aquinas’ apparently heavy reliance on Augustine, it is worthwhile considering 
Augustine’s own framework for natural law.  He contends that in order to live in peace, a 
person ‘subordinates their primal tendencies to the rational soul’.624  However, ‘divine 
direction’ is required to know what to do, and ‘divine assistance’ is required to obey.625  A 
person requires grace, in order to apprehend obedience and consequent peace in the context 
of the everlasting law, and to be ‘in subjection to this law for the good of the society’.626  The 
basis for this is ‘two precepts taught by God’ – to love God, and to love one’s neighbour as 
themselves.  If one follows these, it will result in ‘obedience to the law of society’ and peace 
in that society.627  For if the law of society is love of neighbour in the power and manner 
provided by Christ, it seems that this society will be characterised by selfless sacrifice, 
charity and generosity – a harmonious community. 
 
From the Roman jurist Cicero particularly, Augustine adopted the Stoic notion of natural law 
and the eternal law (or, as he terms it, ‘everlasting law’) as the supreme moral norm, and the 
sublime rational orderliness which characterizes the universe and is instituted by God – in 
other words, the divine wisdom is the universal law.  Augustine distinguishes between the 
                                                            
622 Ibid 326-329. 
623 C Anton-Hermann, ‘The Fundamental Ideas in St Augustine’s Philosophy of Law’ (1973) 18 American 
Journal of Jurisprudence 57, 75. 
624 Augustine, City of God, above n 1, 873. 
625 Ibid. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid. 
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human or temporal law and this eternal law, which is the supreme immutable reason and must 
always be obeyed.  Hence, the eternal law is the ultimate norm or standard for the human 
law.628  This theistic (in contrast to the Stoic) definition of the natural law became the basic 
concept and authoritative pronouncement of law for medieval jurisprudence, and was most 
notably adopted and extended by Aquinas.629  The eternal law manifests itself in the eternal 
reason of all created reason, and so humans are governed by and are aware of this eternal law 
through the eternal reason.  This participation of the rational person in the eternal law by the 
law of reason is the natural law, and even the person who does not acknowledge God may 
nevertheless appropriate the eternal law through rational participation enabled by grace.630   
 
Focusing on Cicero particularly as a major influence for Augustine, and therefore by 
extension for Aquinas, the natural law is the law of a harmonious Stoic universe which could 
be objectively perceived and is reflected in human nature.631  This law is eternal and rational, 
immutable and supreme, part of the divine reason and from God.632  Furthermore, Crowe 
observes a plausible influence for the Apostle Paul in the Stoic philosophy of the natural law.  
In fact, the early church fathers such as Augustine seemed quite satisfied to view Paul as 
articulating a theory of natural law similar to that of Cicero, which was subsequently put into 
a Christian framework by Paul and elaborated by Augustine and Aquinas.633  Therefore, as 
far as a brief, purely historical analysis goes, Aquinas’ thought and genealogy in regard to 
                                                            
628 Anton-Hermann, above n 623, 59-62. 
629 Ibid 63.  For the Stoics, the eternal law was god, so the Christian conception of natural law articulated by the 
likes of Augustine and Aquinas is a point of break from the Stoic conception articulated by Cicero. 
630 Ibid 66, 68-69. 
631 Richard Brooks, ‘Introduction’ in Richard Brooks (ed), Cicero and Modern Law (Ashgate, 2009) xxxviii. 
632 J Kroger, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Roman Law: Aristotle, the Stoics and Roman Theories of 
Natural Law’ (2004) Wisconsin Law Review 905, 934-935; Jean Porter, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory 
of Natural Law (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005) 2. 
633 Crowe, above n 619, 54, 57-58.  Consider for example Romans 2:14-15, where Paul argues that those who do 
not have the law do by nature what is required by the law (e.g. are moral by a divinely enabled or enlightened 
conscience). 
185 
 
natural law and the authority of law appear to be consistent with it being inherently 
theological.  However, the question remains as to whether contemporary perspectives 
regarding Aquinas are equally consistent with this historical construal.  These perspectives 
are many and varied, but it is hoped that a brief sample will suffice in order to establish the 
argument that Aquinas’ foundation for law is indeed theological.  
 
 
 
B Thomism as a Theological Framework: Some Contemporary Interpretations 
 
1 John Finnis: Secularising Thomism? 
 
John Finnis, a twentieth century legal theorist who articulates a modern formulation and 
revivification of Thomist natural law, claims that Aquinas considers the natural law to be 
self-evident, but that the existence of God is not self-evident, and that his will cannot be 
discovered without revelation.  Finnis proceeds to arguably articulate a theory of natural law 
‘without needing to revert to questions of God’s existence and will’.634  He states that 
according to Aquinas, ‘a positive or human law is derived from the natural law by a 
deductive process’, and ‘obtains its force from the natural law’, which Finnis defines as ‘the 
set of principles of practical reasonableness which order human life and community’.635  
From a historical perspective, Finnis also alludes to the fact that Cicero, Augustine and 
                                                            
634 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 1980) 48-49. 
635 Ibid 280-281. 
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Aquinas all espouse a principle similar to ‘an unjust law is not law’.636  Finnis further 
discusses the origin of the phrase ‘natural law’ in Cicero and the Stoics, emphasising that a 
primary use of natura refers to ‘practical reason according to human nature’.637  Hence for 
Finnis, according to Aquinas, even though the eternal law is from God, human apprehension 
of the eternal law by the natural law is ‘through human reason’.638 
 
 
2 Re-establishing the Theological Tradition 
 
However, Lloyd Weinreb and Jean Porter as contemporary natural law theorists reject this 
interpretation of Aquinas, for according to them Finnis claims that the Thomist natural law 
theory is not ontological, and is severable from Aquinas’ context of the eternal law of God.  
This is to ‘radically distort the Thomist framework’, and to ‘misconceive’ the fact that the 
‘natural law exists on the basis of the eternal law and eternal reason rationally ordering the 
universe’ – in other words, for Weinreb and Porter, Finnis’ account of natural law in Aquinas 
is not theological enough.639  Jean Porter in particular argues that the ‘usual approaches’ to 
natural law, and ‘particularly to Aquinas’, are ‘too focused on philosophy to the neglect of 
theology, the scholastics, and Scripture’.640  To redress this balance, she seeks to ‘articulate a 
theological account of the natural law through the accounts of the scholastics’ (and especially 
                                                            
636 Ibid 363. 
637 Ibid 374-376. 
638 Ibid 400. 
639 See Lloyd Weinreb, Natural Law and Justice (Harvard, 1987) 109; Porter, above n 632, 38-39. 
640 Porter, above n 632, 1-2, 5, 45. 
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Aquinas), in order to ‘properly incorporate Scripture’, as well as provide a bridge to other 
perspectives.641   
 
Although Porter’s sentiment is appreciated, her claim that Finnis’ account of Aquinas is not 
theological enough is probably overstated.  Holistically considered, the account provided by 
Finnis is manifestly theological.  It can be contended that this human reason referred to by 
Finnis is not a secular reason, divorced from faith and God’s grace, but actually further 
illustrates the connection of reason to faith.  According to Finnis, the term ‘natural’ law and 
the consequent distinction between ‘natural’ reason and revelation drawn by some 
theologians has given ‘credence to the supposition that the term “natural” signifies 
immanence and secularism at the expense of transcendence or the supernatural’.642  Finnis 
rejects such a supposition as ‘muddled’, arguing that what Plato, Aristotle and others mean by 
nature actually ‘implies participation in the divine intellect and divine reason’, entailing ‘faith 
in the existence of God’ (however one conceives God to be).643  The ‘assertion of objective 
norms of human flourishing and principles of human reasonableness’ then lead to the 
‘affirmation’ of some transcendent source of these, which the philosophers term God.644  
Reason is something God-given, and ‘practical reasonableness entails the imitation of God’ 
and forms the foundation for the civil legal system, where practical reason refers to the 
human reasoning process which considers what would be good for humans to do, have, get 
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and be.645  Moreover, the ‘basic values grasped by practical reason’ gain an ‘objectivity’, 
‘constancy’, and ‘impartiality’ reinforced by faith in God.646   
 
Regarding Aquinas and natural law as divine participation in the eternal law, Finnis argues 
that for Aquinas, it is ‘necessary to postulate an intellect far superior to the human intellect’, 
which has the ‘power of understanding without imperfection’, ‘allows us to reason’, and 
‘activates our individual intelligences through light or illumination’.647  Aquinas then 
‘identifies this separate intellect as God’, and God’s grace is necessary for proper 
participation in the eternal law by divinely assisted human reason.648  Finally, according to 
Finnis, Aquinas concludes that ‘every activity of reasoning derives from nature’ – which, 
bearing in mind Finnis’ earlier definition of the term nature as participation in the divine, puts 
reason and faith in the same dimension.649  This basis is logically, if not chronologically, 
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prior to Finnis’ articulation of the basic forms of human good, which form the first principles 
of natural law.  In particular, the ‘basic good of practical reasonableness shapes the relation 
with the other goods’ by ‘guiding one’s commitments’, ‘selection of projects’, and 
‘implementation’.650  Therefore Finnis, following Aquinas, appears to utilise the 
interconnection of faith (or grace) and reason to articulate his version of a natural law. 
 
To these perspectives can be added John Milbank, for Milbank argues that the natural law of 
Thomas Aquinas is ‘intrinsically theological and transcendent’, in contrast with the secular 
modern law in its being ‘positivistic and immanent’.651  Indeed, Milbank’s framework for 
understanding reality, and consequently for interpreting Aquinas, is that accounts of human 
life, law and nature must be integrally theological, and this entails the rejection of any 
recognition of the secular or a ‘pure nature’ – that is, a nature apart from the enlightenment of 
God’s grace.652  For Milbank, ‘medieval modes of governance’ avoided the use of political 
power and external sovereign authority to govern all facets of life, since the ‘resort to 
unlegislated power was seen as necessary in those instances where the written law no longer 
served justice’.653  In other words, following the model of Aquinas, ‘appeal was made to a 
natural law of equity rooted in an eternal, divine law’, and this to an extent ‘provides an 
escape’ from violent coercion by an overwhelming political force.654  Milbank thus concludes 
that a way out of this ‘conundrum is through authentic Pauline theology’, which ‘provides the 
theological framework for Thomist natural law’.655  Therefore, taking into account the work 
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of Aquinas and its historical geneaology in conjunction with contemporary perspectives, it 
seems reasonably clear that Aquinas’ account of law is that it has an integrally theological 
foundation.  More precisely, law is founded upon faith united with reason, the rational 
creature’s participation in the divine intellect enabled by grace.  As we shall see in the next 
part, this theological foundation was distorted, and effectively created the notion of the 
‘secular’ – an autonomous foundation for law governed and accessed by a pure reason, 
detached from faith and God’s grace. 
 
 
III ‘CREATING’ THE SECULAR: DUNS SCOTUS, UNIVOCITY AND 
SEPARATING PHILOSOPHY FROM THEOLOGY 
 
A Voluntarist Theology: The Univocity of Being 
 
According to Milbank, the genealogy of Radical Orthodoxy in terms of tracing the contingent 
development of the secular can be ‘… crudely summed up as “it all went wrong with 
Scotus”’.656  With the shift in theology following John Duns Scotus (in the 13th and 14th 
centuries), a number of things changed.  They included: the displacement of the Trinity as an 
essential relation of the divine persons, a loss of analogical participation through advocating 
the univocity of Being in the sense that God and humanity exist in a metaphysically identical 
way, prioritising the will over the intellect in God, and the denial of the Augustinian theory of 
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illumination.657  Milbank argues that Duns Scotus’ emphasis on the pure, singular will of God 
(a theologically voluntarist position) rather than the intellectual relations of the persons of the 
Godhead signalled the displacement of relationship as the paradigmatic Trinitarian theme, 
and (eventually) a denial of the participation of the creature in this divine relationship.658  
Associated with this singular will  Duns Scotus affirms the univocity or singular existence of 
all Being.  He argues in Philosophical Writings that 
For whatever is of itself intelligible either includes essentially the notion of “being” or is 
contained virtually or essentially in something else which does include “being” essentially.  
For all genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being 
[God] all include “being”… hence, all to which being is not univocal… are included in those 
to which “being” is univocal in this way.659   
‘To put it briefly then, “being” is univocal for all’.660  Duns Scotus explains what he means 
by univocal being in this way:  
A man can be certain in his mind that God is a being and still be in doubt whether He is a 
finite or an infinite being, a created or an uncreated being.  Consequently, the concept of 
“being” as affirmed of God is different from the other two concepts but is included in both of 
them and therefore is univocal.661 
 
In other words, the concepts of infinite/finite or created/uncreated being which may be 
applied to God have the concept of being in common.  It follows that being is a universal in 
the sense that it is a shared, general concept of being possessed by all creatures – God, 
humanity, animals and the like.  So Duns Scotus asserts that the mode of being for God and 
creation is exactly the same, implying that Being itself is an abstract or neutral category that 
is attached to God.  If Being is not something unique to God, but is shared in the same way 
by the creation, Being is a concept separate from God.  It is a contingent attribute of God 
which is equally possessed by all creation.  Since Being is then independent of God, it allows 
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existence apart from God, as well as philosophical or metaphysical reflection apart from God.  
In other words, this opens the space for the world to be ‘an autonomous realm’, a realm of 
philosophy apart from theology – ultimately, I argue, resulting in the emergence and eventual 
domination of the secular.662  Moreover, since Duns Scotus carries the assumption that God 
can be naturally known as the basis for his argument that being is univocal, it seems to follow 
that this would produce an associated ‘natural’ or secularised reason appropriate for 
approaching philosophy as separate from theology.   
 
Duns Scotus’ univocity of being can be contrasted with Aquinas’ analogy of being, which 
understands the mode of God’s being by analogy of the creation’s being – in other words, 
they do not exist in the same way, but the creature’s being is founded from or a participation 
in the ‘ultimate’ Being of God.  As James KA Smith summarises, ‘God’s very essence is 
existence, whereas the creature “is” only to the extent that it receives the gift of being from 
the Creator or, in other words, to the extent that the creature participates in… or is suspended 
from… the being of the Creator’.663  Indeed, Smith argues that ‘for Milbank, following 
Aquinas, there is no metaphysics apart from revelation.  This contrasts with the autonomous, 
non-revelational metaphysics of Scotus, who subjects God to a conception of being that is 
anterior to God’s self-revelation’.664  In other words, where Aquinas’ view of Being is 
grounded in God’s self-disclosure through revelation, Duns Scotus evaluates the nature of 
God’s Being on the ground of an autonomous, secular category of being apart from God’s 
revelation.  Aquinas unites faith with reason, while Duns Scotus invents a secular reason. 
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This also implies that Scotus articulates  
… idolatry towards creatures… the invalidity of a now autonomous “metaphysics”’ by 
granting finite creatures (like the infinite) their own subsistence and autonomy, where 
Aquinas argues that the being of creatures is graciously granted through participation in 
God’s unique being.665   
 
In other words, ‘finite and infinite being are seen as equally and univocally “in being” – 
hence esse threatens to become greater than God and God to be idolatrously reduced to the 
status of a partner with his Creation in causal processes’.666  This means that the concept of 
univocal being equates finite and infinite being, reducing the being of God to equal that of the 
creation.  Moreover, since God is understood according to this universal concept of being, 
Being (rather than God) becomes the entity which mediates knowledge and philosophical 
reflection, rendering Being greater than God and reducing God to just another category. 
 
As a result Milbank argues:  
In the thought of the nominalists, following Duns Scotus, the Trinity loses its significance as a 
prime location for discussing will and understanding in God and the relationship of God to the 
world.  No longer is the world participatorily enfolded within the divine expressive Logos, 
but instead a bare divine unity starkly confronts the other distinct unities which he has 
ordained… a union of mind, and an identity of motion, and a convergence of the elements to 
unity... what matters is the overwhelming nominalist stress on the gulf between God’s 
potentia ordinata, his declared will, which is factually, precisely known and serves as the 
basis for legal covenants with humanity, and his potentia absoluta, the infinite power of God 
which is absolutely unknowable for theology and knowable only formally, for logic… they 
derive the force of these concessions, our obligation with respect to them (for example, our 
obligation to keep the natural law, if we wish to merit grace, which God is not absolutely 
bound to grant) from the formalism of a logic about power and rights.667   
 
We may now move to consider specifically how Duns Scotus inaugurated this theologically 
distorted notion of purely natural knowledge, leading to a secular realm and reason.668  In the 
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next part, we will also see how this theological distortion resulted in a violent (Hobbesian) 
conception of humans (and for that matter, God Himself) as creatures of pure will who exist 
in purely logical or contractual interactions, enforced by some external power. 
 
B Knowledge by Pure Nature 
 
For Duns Scotus, knowledge of God and His nature can come apart from God’s direct 
revelation.  Instead, it comes through pure human reason.  Duns Scotus contends that: 
 If there are some necessary reasons for what we believe, it is not dangerous to set them 
forth… if you say, otherwise, that God gives such knowledge to whom he wills, then it would 
follow that we labour in vain in our study and inquiry into the truth.  A far better and easier 
way of coming to theology would be to sit in church and ask God to give us this light.669 
 
So we can use our reason to come to the knowledge of God, apart from God’s grace.  In other 
words, ‘we can infer, then, in metaphysics from act and potency, finiteness and infinity, 
multitude and unity, and many other such metaphysical properties, that God or the First 
Being exists’.670  Duns Scotus explicitly connects this idea of purely natural knowledge to his 
univocal theology and emphasis on God as pure will.  In particular, if God exists as pure will, 
and we exist in a way that is metaphysically identical to God, we too are primarily 
characterised by will.  So he says in relation to God: 
You are the first efficient cause… at one and the same time you possess the power to freely 
and contingently will each thing that can be caused and by willing it through your volition 
cause it to be.  Most truly then you are of infinite power… you are the ultimate in simplicity, 
having no really distinct parts, or no realities in your essence which are not really the same.671   
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Correspondingly he says of humanity that ‘the will is the motor or moving cause throughout 
the soul, and all else obeys it’.672  For Duns Scotus, it follows that ‘because of… conformity 
of the will to right reason… I concede the conclusion that by purely natural means any will 
could love God above all’.673  In other words, since our will by natural reason conforms to 
God’s will as the ultimate will, it is purely by our natural will, apart from God’s gracious 
enlightenment, that we can love God.  So Milbank concludes that ‘the [Augustinian] doctrine 
[of illumination] is rather finally abandoned by Scotus, who sees the divine influence, when 
seen in various ways as alienating human powers, as superfluous.  This leaves “illumination” 
as only applying to faith and helps encourage a nature/supernature duality’.674   
  
In short, Milbank argues that Duns Scotus’ univocity of Being and separation of theology 
from philosophy are related since the univocal nature of Being implies an a priori notion of 
being which is then applied to God (and equally to the creation), rather than considering God 
the very paradigm or distinctive pinnacle of being.  This notion of Being detached from the 
divine nature and revelation therefore fundamentally separates ontology from theology, or 
metaphysics from revelation.  Being can be apprehended by pure reason apart from faith.675 
 
All the preceding ‘indicate[s] the kind of theology that emerges on the basis of “pure reason” 
which must rationally reduce revelation to that which concerns the only “extra-rational” 
which reason can recognise, namely the purely positive and “factual”’.676  For in place of a 
Thomist participatory framework which understands the immanent as ‘suspended from’ the 
transcendent, Duns Scotus assumed an ontology based on a univocal or ‘flattened’ being, one 
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which denied the depth of being and ‘unhooked’ it from the transcendent, allowing the 
emergence of a ‘secular’ plane and ‘secular’ reason which are completely independent of the 
transcendent.677  I suggest that this theological distortion led to particular political 
developments which undergird our modern Western legal system, particularly the reduction 
of human being to the ‘self’, an ‘isolated subject’ – ultimately resulting in, as we shall see, 
the Hobbesian ‘picture of the social order as an aggregate of competing, atomistic, self-
interested subjects… quasi-united in a supposedly neutral space called the “public”, where 
relationships were no longer governed by charity, but by contract’.678   
 
In other words, the claim is that ‘behind the politics of modernity (liberal, secular) is an 
epistemology (autonomous reason), which is in turn undergirded by an ontology (univocity 
and denial of participation)… Scotus’s marking out of an autonomous creation opens up the 
space for a new emphasis on human autonomy in the political sphere’.679  And as shall be 
argued in the subsequent parts, this emphasis on human autonomy in a secular political 
sphere, isolated from the foundation of authentic Christian theology, produces relations of 
violence in the legal community – in the next part, for example, I examine the Hobbesian 
notions of the state of nature and the Leviathan.  Identifying this then allows the alternate 
conception of the possibility of a redeemed legal system alluded to in the final part – a legal 
system based in the ontological peace of communal, harmonious participation in the divine 
Being through the law of love. 
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IV MACHIAVELLI AND HOBBES: SECULAR LEGAL ONTOLOGY AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF GOVERNING VIOLENCE 
 
A Machiavelli, Dominance and Paganism 
 
However, before we arrive at the Hobbesian picture, there is another historical occurrence 
which involves a different conception of the secular, one which (on the basis of Duns Scotus’ 
separation of philosophy and theology) is premised on a purely philosophical (partial) 
rejection of Christianity and the substitution of pagan struggle, strife and competition to gain 
authority and power – a moment which is equally influential in the development of a modern 
Western legal system characterised by violence.  This is the Machiavellian moment, which is 
important for this genealogy because it represents the space where the pure will of the ruler is 
connected with pagan ‘virtues’ of manipulation and dominance in order to maintain that rule.  
Not only is governance associated with violence, but violence is actually rendered desirable 
in this space.  This pagan conception of violence as virtue arguably forms the foundation for 
modern legal systems which regulate through violence; more importantly, it is antithetical to 
the Christian idea of virtue. 
 
In this sense, Milbank identifies this Machiavellian moment as the 
… astonishing re-emergence of pagan political and philosophical time no longer as a 
makeshift, nor a Thomist preparation for grace, but rather as something with its own integrity, 
its own goals and values, which might even contradict those of Christianity… Here then is 
another and completely different root of the secular. Yet the Machiavellian secular was not an 
area of pure neutrality with respect to faith.  On the contrary, it only came to exist as the 
discovery of a new sort of virtu` which could not be reconciled with the Christian virtues. If 
the Hobbesian field of power seems to be constructed by a perverse theology, then the 
Machiavellian field of power is constructed by a partial rejection of Christianity and appeal to 
an alternative mythos.680   
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In other words, it is contended that there is a theological demarcation between the Hobbesian 
framework of distorted theology and the Machiavellian framework which rejects (Christian) 
theology, with a common genealogy stemming from the secularisation allowed by Duns 
Scotus and a common convergence in providing the foundation for a pagan, ontologically 
violent legal system.  The Hobbesian emphasis on sovereignty as the violently exerted pure 
will of the state has its genesis in Duns Scotus’ conception of God, and the Machiavellian 
emphasis on secular governance through the virtues of manipulation and consolidating power 
has its genesis in the pagan idea of virtue within the framework of the secular as allowed by 
Duns Scotus.  Hence, from the secular allowed by Duns Scotus, Hobbesian politics pursued 
this distortion of Christian theology, and Machiavellian politics rejected the virtues contained 
within Christian theology in favour of the pagan; these culminated in a modern legal system  
characterised by violence.  I will now turn to the substantiation of these claims. 
 
Machiavelli fundamentally argues that in order for a wise prince to function properly as the 
leader of the society and its members, and to appropriate and retain power, he must 
manipulate and dominate his competition.  He argues that the lands of a Prince, or ‘these 
dominions … are acquired either with others’ arms or one’s own, either by fortune or 
virtue’.681  Here Machiavelli claims that war and violence are necessary to establish a 
political system.  His formulation is pagan in the sense that it equates the circumstances of 
acquiring the relevant lands either to fortune (i.e. ‘fate’), or to virtue, incorporating the pagan 
idea of military virtue where effectiveness in battle (here to acquire lands) is privileged.  He 
further argues that ‘diversities in the form of government spring up by chance… the 
vicissitudes of fortune’, underscoring the emphasis on arbitrary fortune and fate as 
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determining factors of governing success.682  However, fortune and (military) virtue seem to 
be intimately related, for ‘those princes or republics of the present day who lack forces of 
their own, whether for attack or defence, should take shame to themselves’.683  In other 
words, what is followed is the ancient (pagan?) adage that fortune favours the brave, where 
the brave means those who are skilled in war. 
 
Machiavelli approvingly cites the Romans as doing what ‘wise princes must do… seeing 
inconveniences from afar, always remedied them and never let them go on in order to run 
from a war, because they knew that one does not escape war, but one defers it to the 
advantage of others’.684  The wise prince must also know to take advantage of the right 
opportunity to engage in war for his own advantage; he must be strategic and manipulate the 
situation to promote his own ends.  This corresponds with Machiavelli’s argument that fraud 
is the indispensable companion of force, and both are necessary to achieve ‘greatness’ or 
military dominance – ‘I hold it as most certain that men seldom if ever rise to great place 
from small beginnings without using fraud or force, unless, indeed, they be given, or take by 
inheritance the place to which some other has already come. Force, however, will never 
suffice by itself to effect this end, while fraud often will’.685 
 
The Machiavellian promotion of greatness (presumably in contrast to humility) is worth 
further exploration.  Machiavelli advises the wise prince that ‘you shall often find that 
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humility is not merely of no service to you, but is even hurtful’.686  This is because humility 
(the centrally Christian virtue) will lead to thinking of others as better than yourself, to seek 
the good of the other, to love and serve the other.  Ultimately, it will lead to peace.  And for 
Machiavelli, peace is antithetical to greatness, for greatness is fundamentally characterised by 
military prowess.  We see this in his veneration of the Romans:  
… having treated of the methods followed by the Romans for increasing their power, we shall 
now go on to consider those which they used in making war; and in all they did we shall find 
how wisely they turned aside from the common path in order to render their progress to 
supreme greatness easy.687   
Thus, the wise ruler progresses to greatness by making war even more effectively, and as 
such greatness is really attained by the one who has the greatest violence. 
 
Milbank in particular identifies this pagan, violent Machiavellian foundation and connects it 
to the modern political or legal system.  For Milbank, ‘the idea of the sovereign ruler able to 
manipulate internal conflicts in the interests of an outward-facing political strength is 
connected with the possibility of a political-economic surrogate for political virtu’, and 
possesses a fundamentally ‘Machiavellian colouring’.688  ‘In the Machiavellian mode’, there 
is an ‘irreplaceable role of war in maintaining internal solidarity’.689  Furthermore, 
… in Machiavelli the supremacy of virtues of heroic strength related to the “glory” of the 
republic becomes much more marked. Along the lines of Machiavellian logic, it was possible 
to conceive of an individual pursuit of civic virtue transformed into a “passion for glory” 
which is no longer even an aspiration to the heroic substance of nobility, but merely the quest 
for a public repute.690   
 
So ‘the Machiavellians embedded their vision of a lawful conflict within a Christian stoic 
account of a providence distilling continuous or final order from the tensional play of warring 
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forces’.691  This led to the ‘acceptance of a perpetual violence within the rules, that is 
sustained and re-created by the rules themselves’.692 Ultimately then, ‘in the Machiavellian 
tradition, pagan chaos is… restored’.693   
 
In the final analysis, Machiavelli is integral to a genealogical analysis of the development of a 
secular and violent political system, because in his view 
The aim of political virtu` is to “use” and surmount, for a time, this fortune… his explicit 
preference for the Roman option and his return to the etymological root of virtue as “heroic 
manliness”, to be cultivated supremely in war… [makes] Machiavelli a forebear of a modern 
and non-Christian politics.694 
 
In other words, Machiavelli provides a foundation for the use of violence according to the 
will of the ruler in the maintenance of political power and control over society.  The other 
part of this foundation is found in Thomas Hobbes, who articulated a view of society 
constituted of and by violence – and it is only through the exertion of concentrated political 
power in violence that this violence may be stayed.  
 
B Hobbesian Legal Ontology: A Clash of Pure Will and Rule by Force 
 
As was briefly indicated in the introductory chapter, Hobbesian legal ontology seems to be 
fundamentally characterised by antagonism, a clash of wills.  In this section that claim is 
explored in more detail, specifically in the context of its theological genesis and adoption in 
the modern, secular legal system.  Hobbes foundationally argues that ‘the right of Nature, 
whereby God reigneth over men, and punisheth those that break his Lawes [sic], is to be 
derived, not from his creating them, as if he required obedience as of gratitude for his 
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benefits; but from his Irresistible Power’.695  In other words, the pure sovereign power and 
will of God is the founding idea of the legal system.  Hobbes continues the emphasis on 
clashing wills in his characterisation of the state of nature: ‘the condition of man… is a 
condition of war of every one against every one, where everyone is governed by his own 
reason’.696   
 
Contractual relationships between God and humanity, as well as among the members of 
humanity, are also paramount for Hobbes.  These are presumably predicated on the priority of 
the will (to make agreements, and so forth).  For example, ‘God Almighty promised paradise 
to those men that can walk through this world according to the precepts and limits prescribed 
by Him’.697  Hobbes proceeds to argue that there must then be some external power or 
authority to compel people to fulfil their obligations.  
Even though the origin of justice is the making of covenants, until the fear of the other not 
performing is taken away, there can be no injustice.  But while men are in the natural 
condition of war, taking away this fear cannot be done.  Before the names of “just” and 
“unjust” can have a place, there must be some coercive power to equally compel men to the 
performance of their covenants.  This can be done by the terror of some punishment greater 
than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant… there is no such power before 
the erection of a commonwealth.698   
 
So with will as paramount, human relationships are characterised by the clash of these wills, 
and contracts to restrain these wills.  However, according to Hobbes, there is only one way to 
construct a state power that will ultimately protect the citizens from actual or threatened 
internal or external violence and forsaking of covenants: 
This way is to confer all of their power and strength upon one man, or upon an assembly of 
men, that will reduce all of their wills, from a plurality of voices into one will… Everyone 
thereby submits their wills to his will, and their judgments to his judgments… when this is 
done, the multitude is united in one person that is called a commonwealth… This is the 
generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that immortal god, 
to which we owe our peace and defense under the immortal God.  By the authority given him 
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by every particular man in the commonwealth, he has the terror derived from so much power 
and strength conferred on him, that he is enabled to perform the wills of all of them… the 
essence of the commonwealth consists in this: By mutual covenant with one another, a 
multitude have made by their individual authority one person who can act for the ends of 
using his strength and any means he thinks is expedient for the multitude’s peace and 
common defense.699 
  
So on the basis of a (fictional) state of nature characterised by violence, Hobbes proposes a 
contract between the members of this state of nature to submit all of their wills to one 
mammoth will, the Leviathan, which is charged with the protection of the society and its 
members through absolutely sovereign coercive force, or violence.  It is precisely this 
fictional state and its corresponding interpretation of the legal society which warrants 
critique.  For ‘what Thomas Hobbes concluded as disclosed by mere reason – a fundamental 
war of all with all – is unveiled as a particular interpretive decision or commitment, not the 
self-evident truth of a universal logic.  As such, this logic can be contested’.700  Radical 
Orthodoxy contests this account of violent social relationships and immanent human nature 
by exposing its basis in secular rejections or distortions of Christian theology, and clarifies 
Christian theology as characterised by transcendent participation in the divine Being, 
resulting in human relationships of love and peace.701  In other words, according to an 
ontology of immanence allowed by Duns Scotus’ separation of human being from God’s 
being, ‘notions of human community reduce intersubjective relations to flattened, immanent 
relations of power’, such as that provided by Hobbes.702   
 
Milbank in particular attempts to substantiate these claims:   
With the writings of … Hobbes… political theory achieved a certain highly ambiguous 
“autonomy” with respect to theology… For Aquinas, natural law had meant transcendental 
equity and therefore precisely that which conjoined the particular instance of justice to the 
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divine and eternal in the surpassing of all mere regularity of convention.  But now, for 
modernity, natural law transcribes the sealed-off totality of nature, where eternal justice 
consists in the most invariable rules. These are not derived (as for Aquinas) from the inner 
tendencies of the Aristotelian practical reason towards the telos of the good, but rather from 
purely theoretical reflections on the necessity for every creature to ensure its own self-
preservation.703 
 
So Duns Scotus’ movement away from Aquinas’ analogy of Being and allowance for the 
autonomy of philosophy from theology provided the conceptual ground for Hobbes to 
envisage the society as characterised by self-preservation from a purely natural perspective.  
Hobbes’ emphasis on God’s absolute power and the universal privileging of contractual will 
also represents a culmination, in a sense, of Duns Scotus’ work.  
This dominance of logic and of the potentia absoluta is finally brought to a peak by 
Hobbes… In two ways, therefore, theology helped to determine the new anthropology and the 
new “science” of politics. First of all, it ensured that men, when enjoying unrestricted, 
unimpeded property rights and even more when exercising the rights of a sovereignty that 
“cannot bind itself”, come closest to the imago dei. Secondly, by abandoning participation in 
divine Being and Unity for a “covenantal bond” between God and men, it provided a model 
for human interrelationships as “contractual” ones.704 
 
According to Milbank therefore, since Hobbes associates God with the ‘operation of arbitrary 
and material power’, ‘the Hobbesian field of power seems to be constructed by a perverse 
theology’.705  Hobbes consequently attempted to build social theory ‘solely upon the rational 
calculation of self-interest’, and the public interest is ‘mostly confined to the securing of the 
private interests of life, property and contract’.706   
 
This contingent theological interpretation and its subsequent societal implementation for 
Hobbes  
… presupposed the myth of the self-present and self-sufficiently initiating “person” who 
echoes the pure will of a creator God… only the theological model permits one to construct 
the mythos of the sovereign power, or sovereign person, so that it is not a case of “essentially” 
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secular and pragmatic realities being temporarily described in antique theological guise. In the 
midst of the crisis posed by religious conflict… Hobbes contrived solutions at once sacred 
and pragmatic, founded upon a new metaphysics of political power. Only within the terms of 
[his] new theology is divine sanction pushed into the remote background, and this sanction is 
nonetheless still required to legitimate the human power which authenticates itself in the 
foreground, as the purely arbitrary. It is when theology finally drops out of modern theories of 
sovereignty that the real moment of mystification occurs, because here the “mythical” 
character of sovereignty is forgotten.707 
 
In other words, if it is accepted that the Hobbesian legal system has a fundamentally 
(distorted) theological character and connotations, when this system is explicitly secularised 
as in more modern articulations, the mythical and theological character of this kind of 
sovereignty is neglected.  Re-introducing and exposing the theologically contingent character 
of the Hobbesian system through a genealogical analysis opens such a system up for 
theological critique, and the proposition of a different theological system – one of ontological 
peace in the political or legal community.708 
 
Ultimately, Milbank concludes that the Hobbesian political system gained traction because it 
was theologically promoted.  After all, Hobbes drew upon the analogy of the ‘immortal God’ 
– in his view, an individual, absolutely authoritative sovereign will – in describing the ‘mortal 
god’, or the Leviathan, as an individual, absolutely authoritative sovereign will.  However, 
the vesting of absolute power in the state meant there was no longer any need to appeal to the 
authority of God, giving birth to the modern idea of the secular state.709  As we will see in the 
next part, this idea of the secular state with an absolute sovereign authority was further 
developed by John Austin. 
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V THE FINAL STAGE: AUSTIN, HART AND THE VIOLENCE OF SECULAR 
POSITIVISM 
 
It can be observed that the Hobbesian promotion of a secular system of law as command 
provided the foundation for the secular command theory of law espoused by the eighteenth 
century legal positivist, John Austin.  Hobbes states that ‘it is manifest that law in general is 
not a type of counsel, but a type of command… it is a command of one to another who has 
been formerly obliged to obey him’.710  In this sense, Hobbes defines law in terms of the 
command of the sovereign, the entity which has been obliged to obey.711  Austin adopted this 
idea of law as command and explicitly articulated its secularist basis, excluding God from 
law in that according to him, the ‘laws of God’ are not ‘within the province of 
jurisprudence’.712   For Austin, the ‘province of jurisprudence’ (i.e. the definition of law) is 
positive law or law that is ‘posited by political superiors to political inferiors’ (law by 
position).713  In other words, it is a ‘rule laid down by an intelligent being by an intelligent 
being having power over him’.714  The ‘political superior’ with power is termed the 
‘sovereign’.715  So every law, ‘properly so-called’, is a ‘species of command’ issued by the 
sovereign, which is the entity owed habitual obedience by the majority of the society.716  
Command is ‘distinguished from wish or desire’ by the fact that the party issuing the 
command has the ‘power to inflict evil’ or pain in the event that the command is not obeyed, 
and this ‘evil incurred through disobedience’ is called ‘sanction’, or enforcement of 
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obedience.717  Therefore, law strictly so-called according to Austin may be defined as a 
command from a sovereign enforced by sanction.   
 
The very term ‘positivism’ itself connotes the violent positing of law, a use of force to 
establish and preserve the law, as well as to compel obedience to it.  Integral to Austin’s very 
definition of law is this notion of sanction for disobedience, namely that obedience by which 
the legal subject is (en)forced through inflicted evil and pain.718  Furthermore, this violence is 
integrated with the use of theological language such as ‘sovereign’ and ‘command’, for 
sovereign is an attribute traditionally ascribed to God, as it is (particularly in the Duns 
Scotian/Hobbesian genealogy of Austin) God who is a willing, superior being and has the 
power to enforce commands through the violent threat of punishments for disobedience.  
Austin explicitly admits this much when he notes that God is the ultimate sovereign.719  
Hence, it seems that Austin’s theory of law is not only characterised by violence, but that this 
violence is linked to a distorted (pagan) theology.   
 
In his critique of Austin, twentieth century legal theorist HLA Hart (a positivist himself) 
agrees, arguing that Austin’s law of the sovereign giving coercive orders (commands 
enforced by sanction) is nothing more than the law of the gunman: ‘A orders B to hand over 
his money and threatens to shoot him if he does not comply’.720  Not only does this seem to 
strengthen the contention that Austinian positivism is violent, but for Hart it also 
demonstrates the failure of Austin to give a proper account of the nature of the legal system 
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as a series of rules producing obligations.721  In particular, Hart states that two types of legal 
rules exist.  The first or primary rules are those rules under which people are required to do or 
abstain from certain actions.  The secondary rules introduce, extinguish and modify primary 
rules, and determine the nature of their operation.  The most important of these is the 
secondary rule of recognition, which identifies and gives validity to the primary rules of 
obligation.722  This obligation stems from what Hart terms the internal aspect of rules, where 
the citizen as part of the society (internal to it) is under some duty or obligation to obey the 
rule through something like habit or social pressure to conform, as opposed to the external 
point of view which merely views rules as predictors of human behaviour, with the external 
observer experiencing none of the obligation to comply.723 
 
However, William MacNeil argues that Hart never really resolves the latent violence in the 
command theory of Austinian positivism – instead of replacing this violence with rules, Hart 
displaces the violence to the rule system itself, especially to the rule of recognition.724  
MacNeil also notes Hart’s apparent indifference to the violence of law, symptomatic of his 
anxiety (as a positivist) to avoid invoking moral concepts of the good.725  Even Hart’s rule of 
recognition imbibes violence due to its circular nature (the officials recognise the rule that 
recognises them as officials), for it proclaims certainty when there is only ambiguity, and 
papers over what Derrida terms the ‘mystical foundation of law’ – that on this view, there is 
no foundation – only coercion.726  Indeed, it appears that Hart ultimately appeals to law being 
recognised as that which parliament enacts, which indicates no fundamental difference with 
                                                            
721 Ibid 79-80. 
722 Ibid 80-81, 100. 
723 Ibid 86-89. 
724 William MacNeil, Lex Populi (Stanford, 2007) 44. 
725 Ibid 49-50. 
726 Derrida, Force of Law, above n 3, 10. 
209 
 
Austin’s theory.727  Although, this is not quite so – MacNeil identifies that there is one 
problematic difference.  Due to the internal aspect of Hart’s rule system, the Austinian 
violence displaced there is no longer external, but internal.  In other words, the gunman is 
now inside your head, so to speak; there is a mental ‘shootout’ between law and morality.  
Thus, MacNeil appeals for the return of Austinian positivism and the rejection of Hartian 
positivism, for at least Austin leaves room for inner thought and reflection, while Hart gives 
us a violence ‘(fascism) of the mind’.728 
 
VI DIAGNOSING LEGAL VIOLENCE: COVER, BENJAMIN AND DERRIDA 
 
Having traced the theological roots of the secularisation and violence of law through 
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Austin and Hart, this part seeks to specifically 
elucidate the notion of contemporary law as violence using Robert Cover, Walter Benjamin 
and Jacques Derrida.  This triad of thinkers are not only the key theorists of law and violence, 
but they can also show us what is missing from the violence of secular law, and what ought to 
be recovered to redeem it – the love of Christ. 
 
A Law’s Cover: Logos, Nomos, Agon 
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Robert Cover initially claims that law is not merely an external or categorical system of rules, 
but actually constitutes our existence:  
We inhabit a nomos – a normative universe… No set of legal institutions or prescriptions 
exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning… Once understood in the 
context of the narratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be 
observed, but a world in which we live.729   
 
It would seem to follow from this that insofar as law is constructed according to a mythical 
narrative of secularism and violence, so our world will be ontologically characterised by 
secularism and violence.  Conversely, if law is constructed according to a theological 
narrative of peace, so our human relationships will consist of harmony.   
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex normative world. The tradition 
includes not only a corpus juris, but also a language and a mythos - narratives in which the 
corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it. These myths establish the paradigms 
for behaviour. They build relations between the normative and the material universe, between 
the constraints of reality and the demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of 
moves - a lexicon of normative action - that may be combined into meaningful patterns culled 
from the meaningful patterns of the past. The normative meaning that has inhered in the 
patterns of the past will be found in the history of ordinary legal doctrine at work in mundane 
affairs; in utopian and messianic yearnings, imaginary shapes given to a less resistant reality; 
in apologies for power, and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled at the 
justificatory enterprises of law.730 
 
Cover proceeds to argue that legal interpretation takes place in a ‘field of pain, death, 
violence and suffering’, for ‘acts of legal interpretation occasion and signal the infliction of 
violence upon others’.731  For example, a judge ‘articulates their understanding of a text’, and 
as a result ‘people lose’ their freedom, property, children or lives.732  Interpretations can also 
constitute justifications for violence which has occurred or is about to occur, and this 
                                                            
729 Robert Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97(4) Harvard Law Review 4, 4-5. 
730 Ibid 9. 
731 Robert Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1601, 1601. 
732 Ibid. 
211 
 
violence is intrinsic in organised social practice.733  The term interpretation ‘suggests a social 
construction of interpersonal reality through language’, but ‘pain and death together destroy 
one’s ability to construct interpersonal realities’, and even ‘destroy language itself’.734   
 
Religious (and particularly Judeo-Christian) ‘martyrdom’ is the ‘correct starting point for 
considering the nature of legal interpretation’, because it is only through this ‘extreme 
resistance against violence and commitment to uphold the law that law itself is constituted’, 
and ‘legal interpretation joined with systematic domination’.735  A different but ‘equally 
violent response’ is that of revolution or rebellion, which ‘forms the basis of American 
constitutional history’.736  This produced the conditions for embedding the understanding of a 
political text (interpretation) in the institutional capacity to take collective action, which is 
precisely what distinguishes legal interpretation from other forms.737 
 
Cover defines legal interpretation as a ‘practical activity designed to generate credible threats 
and actual deeds of violence’ in an effective way.738  Legal interpretation is practical in the 
sense that it seeks to impose meaning on the legal institution and to restructure it in light of 
that meaning.739  In this sense, legal interpretation also ‘institutionalises particular language 
acts’ so that they become social practice.740  Ultimately, Cover concludes that violence in law 
is socially organised, for  
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… were the inhibition against violence perfect, law would be unnecessary; were it not capable 
of being overcome through social signals, law would be impossible… legal interpretation as a 
practice is incomplete without violence – because it depends upon the social practice of 
violence for its efficacy…741   
 
The violence of law exposed by Cover is also associated with theological language.  For 
example, Cover notes that the ‘Word’ (writing or the letter – the object of interpretation) is 
the site of violence in law, associating Christ as the Word or logos (the divine reason) with 
violence.  He further uses the concept of Christian ‘martyrdom’ as the starting point for 
considering the nature of legal interpretation, since this symbolises resistance against 
violence.742  However, in Cover’s framework, martyrdom connotes extreme violence, for it 
was the martyrs who suffered immensely torturous and excruciating deaths for the sake of 
upholding their faith.  Thus, martyrdom is really a resistance against violence which in fact 
produces further dominance, implying that Cover’s employment of the term indicates that the 
discourse and social practice of legal interpretation and law in general involves a primary as 
well as tertiary violence.   
 
B Critiquing the Mystical Position of Law 
 
1 A Performative Force 
 
This is further demonstrated by Derrida, who argues in Force of Law that the origin or 
foundation of the law is mystical in the sense that it is essentially neither legal nor non-legal, 
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but a positing by force – and that laws maintain their authority not because they are just, but 
simply because they are laws.743  Derrida notes that through the language of ‘enforcing the 
law’ that law is a ‘force’ that ‘authorises or justifies itself’, and raises the question of how we 
can distinguish between the (legitimate?) force of law, and the ‘originary violence that 
established that force of law as legitimate’.744  Since justice is not necessarily law, it cannot 
become justice legitimately ‘without recourse to force’ – whether by withholding force or 
rather by appealing to force at its first moment – ‘at the beginning of justice there was logos, 
and force’.745  ‘The very emergence of justice and law implies a performative force’, or a 
moment where the law is put down.746  Since law ‘prohibits individual violence in order to 
preserve itself’, it actually ‘monopolises violence’, and there is a corresponding fascination 
with the person who exposes the violence of the legal system by defying the law.747  
According to Derrida, the law is transcendent and theological, violent and non-violent, 
because it depends on who is before it or who institutes it.748   
 
Any expression of law shows itself to be violent through the making of a determination or the 
taking up of a position, for all law is dependent on a positing and no such positing manages 
without violence.749  According to Derrida, law tends towards universality and transcendence; 
it operates to maintain, and is self-preserving so monopolises violence.750  The mystical 
foundation of law is the silence in the violent structure of the founding act.  This violence is 
ungrounded, or grounded only on itself.  The foundation of law is mystical because it 
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reiterates and propagates law, despite being a silence.751  Law-making violence is the very 
condition of violence, so that the ontology of violence is inherent in law as positing.  Law-
preserving violence is the corollary of this and maintains the hegemony of the dominant and 
violent juridical order.752  This violence that founds and conserves law guarantees nothing but 
power.753   
 
It is important to initially emphasise that Derrida’s starting premise is the secularisation of 
law.  His statement that laws maintain their authority because they are law implies Austinian 
positivism, bearing in mind the fact that according to both Derrida and Austin all law is 
dependent on a positing.  Derrida consequently proceeds to acknowledge that no such 
positing is possible without violence or force, implying that at the foundation of law is an 
ontology of violence through both its establishment and its preservation by the imposition of 
force.  Derrida describes such a foundation as ‘mystical’, ‘theological’ and ‘transcendent’, 
and associates these theological descriptions with violence.  This is most explicitly seen in his 
statement that ‘at the beginning of justice there was logos, and force’.754 
 
Borrowing the first verse of the Gospel of John, Derrida conflates this Christian mode of 
expression with violence, secularising it by contending that this force or imposition of law is 
law’s very (immanent) authority, rather than appealing to the divine.  Hence, as we have seen 
from the above, Derrida implicitly identifies the secularisation of law, and he explicitly 
argues that law has an intrinsic violence in its foundation, structure and practice.  He also 
notes the association of this violence with theological terms and modes of expression 
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borrowed from Christianity.  This implies law possesses pagan elements, in the sense that in 
this secular framework, there are ‘religious’ modes of expression associated with violence.   
 
The theologically distorted or pagan nature of this legal ontology is exacerbated through 
Derrida’s claim (while deconstructing Benjamin, to whom I will turn in a moment) that in 
law, reason is seen as irrelevant to the operation of violence, and is ultimately subordinated to 
‘fate-imposed violence’.755  In other words, this violence is inevitable and not subject to 
reason or persuasion – it just is.  Indeed, the inability of violence to be rationalised, and the 
aporia or lack of certainty in the very foundation of law, is precisely what gives violence the 
power to originate, generate and create justice and law, resulting in the recurrent co-
implication or involvement of force and violence in the generation of justice and law.756  
Consequently, it seems that secular reason (which really appears to be blind faith and the 
rejection of reason, for here we see that reason is made redundant by the imposition of 
violence by fate) is a distorted theology which produces violence. 
 
2 Benjamin’s Critique of Legal Violence 
 
Derrida continues by examining Walter Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’, which 
distinguishes between the mythic or founding violence of law, and the divine or annihilating 
and destructive violence of law.757  Derrida notes in this context that any critique of violence 
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‘must find meaning in the fact that violence is not an accident external to the law’.758  ‘That 
violence which threatens law is inherent in the right to law, the law of law, and the origin of 
law’.759  The foundation of all states thus occurs in a way which may be termed revolutionary 
– it ‘inaugurates a new law’, and does so ‘always in violence’.760  For example, after a war a 
new state is established by law, so that it is the violence that causes and establishes law.761  
Another example is the mixing of ‘founding and conserving violence in law’ through the 
police.762 
 
Benjamin himself defines a critique of violence as ‘expounding the relation of violence to law 
and justice’.763  The legal system ‘tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be 
usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can only be realised by legal power’.764  The law 
sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the legal system, and 
consequently the law employs systemic violence to prevent individual violence.  As such, the 
law has an ‘interest in a monopoly of violence’ in order to preserve itself and prohibit any 
existence of violence outside the law.765  There is inherent in all military violence, the 
‘violence that declares peace subsequent to war’, a ‘lawmaking character’.766  This is the first 
function of violence, the lawmaking function.  The second function of violence is the ‘law-
preserving function’, a ‘threatening violence’ which inhibits the criminal based on their 
ignorance of whether they will be apprehended by and suffer the punishment for breaking the 
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law, as a ‘matter of fate’.767  As Benjamin notes, ‘if violence, violence crowned by fate, is the 
origin of law, then it may be readily supposed that where the highest violence, that over life 
and death, occurs in the legal system, the origins of law jut manifestly and fearsomely into 
existence’.768  All violence as a means has either of these two functions, and this is implicated 
in the problematic nature of law itself. 
 
According to Benjamin, in distinguishing mythical violence from divine violence, mythical 
violence is a ‘mere manifestation of the [pagan] gods’, for ‘God opposes myth’ and mythical 
violence is ‘confronted by the divine’, which is its ‘antithesis’.769  Mythical violence ‘brings 
guilt and retribution’, while ‘divine violence expiates’, ‘the former threatens and the latter 
strikes, the former is bloody while the latter is lethal but bloodless’.770  The pagan legend of 
Niobe (mythical violence) may consequently be confronted with God’s judgment on the 
company of Korah: ‘it strikes them… and does not stop short of annihilation.  But in 
annihilating it also expiates, and a deep connection between lack of bloodshed and the 
expiatory character of this violence is unmistakeable’.771  Hence, ‘mythical violence is bloody 
power over mere life for its own sake, divine violence pure power over all life for the sake of 
the living.  The first demands sacrifice, the second accepts it’.772   
 
Benjamin’s mythical violence is then fundamentally pagan, given its basis in pagan 
mythology.  Mythical violence is also law-making violence, and fate ‘in all cases underlies 
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legal violence’.773  ‘Lawmaking is power making, and, to that extent, an immediate 
manifestation of violence.  Justice is the principle of all divine end making, power the 
principle of all mythical lawmaking’.774  Fundamentally according to Benjamin, in mythical 
violence myth has been ‘bastardised with law’, and mythical, lawmaking violence is 
‘pernicious’.775  Hence, violence alone can guarantee law, and ‘the mythical manifestation of 
immediate violence shows itself fundamentally identical with all legal violence’.776     
 
Benjamin echoes Cover and Derrida by diagnosing the indissoluble connection of law with 
violence, implying a fundamental ontology of violence in law.  However, we can see that the 
language Benjamin uses uniquely links this violence in law with neo-pagan mythology, 
connoting the operational process of law as a type of supernature.  For example, as noted 
above, Benjamin refers to the notion of ‘fate’, or violence crowned with fate, as the origin of 
law itself, and instrumental in its monopolisation of violence as self-preservation.  The notion 
of fate is irretrievably pagan, where for example in Greek mythology one’s destiny is subject 
to the foibles of the gods.  The fact that Benjamin appropriates this language and associates it 
with violence as the origin and foundation of law serves to profoundly indicate both the 
discourse and social practice of law as possessing an intrinsic ontology of pagan violence.   
 
In particular, mythical violence is the manifestation of the pagan gods, and Benjamin relates a 
pagan parable to illustrate its function, and the fact that myth has been ‘bastardised’ with law 
renders it ‘pernicious’.  Moreover, Benjamin’s claims that divine violence is antithetical to 
mythical violence fares no better in terms of evacuating a violent ontology of law, for divine 
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774 Ibid 67. 
775 Ibid 69. 
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violence, despite its claim to be divine, always inaugurates a new law with violence.  In other 
words, it replaces violence with violence.777  Hence, both Derrida and Benjamin seek to 
rationalise this notion of bloodless divine violence, which is arguably no less violent than 
mythic violence.778   
 
LaCapra, a commentator on Derrida, law and violence, develops this point further, observing 
this fixation upon violence and its uncontrolled operation, aiming to stress the desirability of 
demystifying violence in order to permit control over this image, which can become 
extremely powerful in conjunction with secular faith and the loss of the sacred, and can lead 
to violent action independent of knowledge or security regarding the action.779  LaCapra 
identifies the fact that Benjamin’s binary of mythic and divine violence can therefore be 
deconstructed as holistically violent, for not only does Benjamin fail to demystify divine 
violence by explaining how it is bloodless, but he implicates both mythic and divine violence 
as mutually involved in the sacrifice.780  Thus, divine violence is no less an ontology of 
violence than mythic violence, and such an ontology in law is fundamentally non-Christian.  
 
VII ESCAPING LEGAL VIOLENCE AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR CHRISTIAN 
PEACE 
 
This chapter conducted a genealogical analysis of the development of secularisation in law 
and the consequent emergence of ontological violence in law, tracing these ideas from their 
                                                            
777 Derrida, above n 3, 35. 
778 Cornell, above n 756, 1048; c.f. LaCapra above n 755, 1077.  Both agree in comparing an example of this 
bloodless ‘divine’ violence with the acts perpetrated by the Nazis. 
779 LaCapra, above n 755, 1065-1066. 
780 Ibid 1072-1073. 
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foundation in the theological natural law of Thomas Aquinas, their distortion in the 
voluntarism and univocity of Duns Scotus, their amplification in the paganism and conflict of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes, and their implementation in the secular positivism of Austin and 
Hart.  This violence was explicitly diagnosed using the work of Cover, Benjamin and 
Derrida.  The salient point is that this development is a contingent one, and if we wish to 
redeem our contemporary legal system and remove its violence, there is a need to propose a 
counter-genealogy, the return to and extension of a peaceful natural law theology. 
 
This need to redeem law is recognised by Benjamin and Cover.  For example, Benjamin 
poses the question of whether there are ‘no other than violent means for regulating conflicting 
human interests’.781  In addressing this question, Benjamin argues that there is, and includes 
‘peaceableness and trust’ as two of its subjective preconditions.  The ‘objective manifestation 
of these preconditions is determined by the law of unalloyed means and indirect solutions’.782  
In particular, Benjamin points to a ‘wholly transformed interaction’, no longer ‘enforced by 
violence’, but more ‘consummates than causes’ in its effects.783  This chapter, and indeed this 
thesis, argues that this non-violent means of producing an ontology of peace in law may be 
found in Christian theology, which opens up the space for revelation of the truth in the 
Incarnation, and most particularly in the law of love.  This is because Christianity does not 
advocate the simple abolition of law, which would be replacing violence with violence akin 
to Benjamin’s divine violence, but instead advocates transcending and redeeming the law 
through the Spirit and love.  Christian theology meets Benjamin’s preconditions, for 
Christianity has an ontology of peace and communicates peace between people and God 
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through the Incarnation, and allows unparalleled mutual trust through the law of love, 
demonstration of the divine trustworthiness in Christ. 
 
Cover too notes that under the secular law of violence, or in the ‘civil’ or ‘imperial’ 
community,  
… norms are universal and enforced by institutions… discourse is premised on objectivity – 
upon that which is external to the discourse itself.  Interpersonal commitments are weak, 
premised only upon a minimalist obligation to refrain from the coercion and violence that 
would make impossible the objective mode of discourse and the impartial and neutral 
application of norms.784  
 
To this he contrasts Karl Barth, who, writing of Christian community, ‘emphasizes the 
absence from civil community of strong interpersonal bonds, of the common meanings found 
in shared ritual or prayer, and of a common corpus - Torah, creed, or gospel – that is taught, 
believed in, and recognized as the moving normative force of the community’.785  In other 
words, one can have a secular system of self-interested antagonistic struggle requiring 
external violence for its mitigation, or one can have a peaceful community of strong 
interpersonal bonds, loving relationships based on the revelation of the divine as the 
governing principle of the community – a stark contrast between an ontology of violence or 
an ontology of peace. 
 
Milbank argues that modern law is characterised by its typically proceeding from a sovereign 
power granted legitimacy through a general popular consent as mediated by representation.  
If such a procedure is taken to be normative, it can be seen as the embodiment of a Hobbesian 
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natural law for the derivation of legitimate power from conflicts endemic to human life.786  
Ultimately for this reason, life and law are supposed to harmonise but cannot always or 
ultimately at all save, negatively and catastrophically.  Because the formal framework of law 
is absolute and taken to proceed from universal consent, an absolutely sovereign power must 
be erected to enforce this law, leading to the artificial control of human life.787  Furthermore, 
the formal system of laws never provides a complete guarantee of order and so they must be 
supplemented and defended through violence, in a way that overrules the principles of these 
laws themselves.  To justify this, a new appeal to a positive transcendence is made. 788   
 
However, Milbank then contends that ‘the immanent secular political sphere is defined by a 
positivity regulated by formal rules, the aporetic fracture of such reveals that the 
circumscription of the secular is never finally secure’.789  The secular can never fully 
regulate, and its attempts to do so exacerbate violence.  However, as mentioned previously, 
when the law was ineffective or unjust in medieval modes of governance, an appeal was 
made to an eternal, divine, transcendent law.   To address the violence in our modern mode of 
governance, I argue that the transcendent law required is found through the Incarnation: the 
law of love, which restores reason to faith and fulfils the need for transcendence while 
producing a community of peace.790 
 
The remaining chapters explicate this counter-genealogy, this proposed legal ontology of 
peace, beginning in the next chapter through conducting an analysis of Paul’s description of a 
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legal ontology of violence following from secular reason, in contrast with the peaceful 
ontology of the Spirit.  It then applies these principles to a case study of the trial of Jesus 
Christ, exposing the tension of violent (secular) attestation and peaceful (theological) 
revelation or truth.  It is concluded that law can be ontologically peaceful through the truth of 
Christianity, which is the revelation of the peace and love of the Trinitarian relations with the 
corresponding uniting of reason and revelation, and the following manifestation of these 
relations interpersonally through the law of love.   
 
For as much as secularised law tends towards antagonism and alienation and is thus violent 
since it cannot take account of particularity or difference, so conversely the law of love and 
the Trinity does take account of difference and the welfare of one’s individual neighbour.791  
As much as the emergence of secularised law and justice implies a performative force, by 
contrast the emergence of the Christian legal ontology of peace is based on the Incarnation 
and love displayed in Christ, who exposes the violence of the law in his crucifixion by 
defying death through the letter of the law in his resurrection.792  In short, it is not necessary 
to succumb to the constant inauguration of a new law in violence, one governed by the ‘fate’ 
of neo-paganism.  Rather, like Augustine writing against the violence of original paganism, 
one can embrace the inauguration of the new law of Christ which governs the City of God: 
the law of love producing a community of peace.793 
 
 
 
                                                            
791 C.f. Buonamano, above n 750, 105. 
792 C.f. Derrida, Force of Law, above n 3, 13, 33. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
VIOLENCE, ATTESTATION AND REVELATION: READING 
LAW AND TRUTH IN THE TRIAL OF CHRIST 
 
I THE TRIAL AS A NARRATIVE OF LAW AND TRUTH 
 
In this chapter, a critical analysis of the trial of Jesus Christ anchors the genealogical counter-
narrative of peace through articulating the tension between attestation and revelation in a 
legal context.  Here, attestation refers to a secularised, formalistic idea of law as a series of 
rules exercised by and through power, a law of the letter which lacks spirit.  Conversely, 
revelation refers to the truth of Christ divinely revealed; namely, that law as secular rules of 
certainty can never comprehend the mystery and faith of the divine, with the result that the 
secular attempts to suppress the divine through violence.  This chapter shall argue that this is 
paradigmatically displayed in the crucifixion of Christ, and yet in this tragic event there is 
hope – the death of Christ in our place bears the violent curse of the law, and his resurrection 
allows the institution of a new law, one of love and peace.   
 
The first part of the chapter identifies the trial as a repository of law and truth, what is in 
effect a genealogical account of a series of events in terms of legal rules which produce 
‘truth’.  This forms some legal foundation for the subsequent analysis of Christ’s trial, which 
is overviewed with reference to the four gospel accounts.  Part II furnishes the theological 
foundation for this analysis, examining some of the writings of the Apostle Paul regarding his 
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contrast between the law of the letter, the Mosaic Torah (which leads to death) and the law of 
the Spirit, also known as the law of love enabled and modelled through Christ’s sacrifice.  
The concept of this truth as revelation is also outlined, with particular regard to the notion of 
truth as divinely instantiated and divinely revealed.  The chapter then moves to specifically 
discuss the Jewish and Roman law forming the legal milieu for the trial of Christ in part III, 
before analysing the details of the trial itself (as they are related in the four distinct gospel 
accounts) as the violent clash of rules and power; it is proposed that its prosecution is 
therefore characterised by a secularised law which by definition cannot comprehend the 
divine, but always tries to suppress it.  Part IV contends that in the event of Christ, revelation 
becomes primary, for Christ is firstly a figure that disrupts the idea of law as certain, formal 
rules through injecting faith and mystery, and secondly an atoning figure who redeems this 
violent and relentless drive for decision (certainty).  With the space opened for a new law in 
Christ, Part V therefore proposes that this is the law of love and faith, and begins to envisage 
a community existing based in mutual trust and self-sacrifice through participating in the 
divine love – a community with a spirit of life and peace.  Part VI concludes and points 
towards the resurrection as the key to the law of love and a community of life in preparation 
for the next chapter. 
 
In this chapter it is contended that there are some aspects of the trial which are universal.  
Indeed, 
… to pose the question, “What is a trial?”, is to invite an answer which aims to transcend 
particular times, places and cultures. It is to suggest that, stripped of the rules that are peculiar 
to particular legal systems, those processes that are properly called “trials” contain some inner 
essence. It is to claim that the proceedings against Socrates under Athenian law in 399 BC 
and those brought against Jesus in AD 30 under Jewish and Roman legal procedures have 
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features in common with the televised ordeal of O. J. Simpson in a Los Angeles courtroom 
two thousand years later.794   
 
In particular, the rationale and process of trials appear to be fundamentally genealogical in 
the sense that a trial (regardless of differing jurisdictional rules) ideally attempts to discern 
the backstory or context of a particular factual accusation regarding a person, or a set of ideas 
or ‘facts’ about a person which are taken as given.  In other words, the term ‘trial’ can be 
understood in its ‘forensic sense, which, in addition to involving a test of an issue, implies a 
procedure or ritual to try that issue in a forum whose authority and validity are accepted as 
binding by the community subject to its jurisdiction’.795  In particular, it can involve ‘the 
finding out by due examination of the truth of the point in issue or the question between the 
parties whereupon judgment may be given’, and this includes both criminal trials where the 
outcome will put the person on trial in jeopardy, and civil trials where law can be seen as the 
‘reconciliation of competing interests’.796  So the trial includes the tracing of alleged ideas 
and concepts to reveal whether those concepts are substantiated in fact regarding a person. 
 
The general features of a trial process can be briefly stated as  
… the accusation; the response to it of the accused; the interrogation of witnesses; argument, 
largely oral, on the factual and legal issues by the opposing sides, whether in person or 
through the medium of professional advocates; the culmination of the process in the delivery 
of judgment of the tribunal; and, if so required, the announcement of the sanction to be 
inflicted.797   
                                                            
794 Joseph Jaconelli, ‘What is a Trial?’, in Maureen Mulholland and Brian Pullan (eds), The Trial in History: 
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Ultimately then, the central function of a trial ‘is to arrive at a determination, whether that the 
person charged is guilty or that he is to be absolved from guilt’.798 
 
A so-called ‘fair’ trial requires ‘rationality’ or objectivity, the use of certain canons or rules of 
evidence to ensure appropriate balance between the competing parties, and decisions are not 
made capriciously or with a particular purpose in mind.799  Both the civil law (inquisitorial) 
system and the common law (adversarial) system are designed to ascertain the ‘true facts so 
as to come to a just judgment’.800  Another requirement of a fair or just trial is publicity or 
openness – justice must be ‘seen to be done’.801  A third requirement is that there must be 
independence of the judiciary from the government and any of the parties, or ‘no bias in the 
tribunal that decides the issue.  Freedom from bias is an essential characteristic of the judicial 
function’.802 
The rationalistic matching of evidence to the question of the guilt or innocence of the accused 
is tempered by values associated with the liberty of the subject. This is a relatively modern 
phenomenon.  It finds its clearest expression, at the point of drawing inferences from the 
evidence, in the presumption that the accused is innocent. More controversially, some legal 
systems impose constraints on the methods used in the fact-gathering process, thereby curbing 
the excesses of the investigating force. They might, for example, disallow the use at trial of 
evidence obtained illegally (or improperly) by the police, even in circumstances where the 
evidence is undoubtedly related to proof of the accused’s guilt.  These observations on 
rationality as an aspect of trials presuppose societies where there is a sharp differentiation 
between social norms and legal norms, and the enforcement of the latter is attended by a 
distinctive formality.803   
 
As this chapter analyses the trial of Christ, we must initially overview the characteristics of 
his trial and establish firstly whether it is a ‘trial’ in the sense described above.  We can then 
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describe the extent to which we can connect the modern aspects of a Western legal trial to the 
events described in the gospel accounts pertaining to the trial of Christ.  To begin with the 
account according to Matthew, in Matthew 26:57-68, Jesus is taken before the Sanhedrin at 
night in secret (see verses 34, 55).  The Sanhedrin then seek testimony against Jesus so that 
they may put him to death, but they find none.  Eventually, a witness comes forward telling 
of Jesus’ claim to destroy and rebuild the temple, and Jesus admits that he is the Son of God.  
The High Priest, Caiaphas, proclaims this as blasphemous and the Sanhedrin decide to put 
him to death.  This is confirmed by another meeting of the Sanhedrin at dawn, and Jesus is 
then taken before Pilate in Matthew 27:1-2.   In verses 11-26 Pilate interrogates Jesus but 
Jesus remains silent; Pilate, pressured by the crowd, delivers Jesus over to be crucified 
despite concluding that he is innocent.  Unique to Matthew is the description in verse 19 of 
Pilate’s wife asking Pilate not to become involved in the dispute over the innocent Jesus after 
being warned in a dream, as well as Pilate symbolically washing his hands of Jesus and the 
people declaring that his blood was on their heads (verses 24-25).804 
 
Apart from the details described in Matthew 27:19, 24-25, Mark’s account of the trial in 
14:53-65; 15:1-15 tells much the same story as Matthew’s account.  Luke’s account in Luke 
22:66-70 places the trial before the Sanhedrin in the morning after Jesus’ arrest and 
mocking.805  Here the Sanhedrin question him in a similar way (though there is no mention of 
false witnesses), and Jesus implicitly admits that he is the Son of God.  The Sanhedrin require 
no further testimony and take Jesus before Pilate in Luke 23:1-5.  They accuse him of 
claiming kingship in competition with Caesar, and again, Pilate finds no guilt in Jesus.  In 
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verses 6-16 Pilate sends Christ to Herod because he is a Galilean within Herod’s jurisdiction.  
Despite questioning from Herod and vehement accusations from the Sanhedrin, Jesus stays 
silent and Herod returns him to Pilate.  Pilate plans to release Jesus since he is innocent 
(according to verses 18-25), but due to the protests of the Jews Pilate eventually accedes to 
their request. 
 
John’s account in John 18:12-14; 19-24; 28-40; 19:1-16 is far more detailed than the 
synoptics and includes many unique details.806  Jesus is initially led to Annas, rather than 
Caiaphas, in 18:12-14 for questioning.  Caiaphas had been legally installed as High Priest and 
leader of the Sanhedrin by Rome in AD 15, but Annas as his predecessor would still have 
been considered the rightful man for the position because the Jews considered the role of 
High Priest to be until death.807  Annas questions Jesus in verses 19-24, and Jesus responds 
by saying that his teachings have always been public.  Jesus is then taken to Caiaphas.  In 
verses 28-40 Jesus is taken to Pilate in the early morning.  Pilate asks the Jews to resolve this 
dispute internally, but they respond by saying they do not have authority to put anyone to 
death.  Pilate questions Jesus about the nature of his kingship and Jesus states that he is a 
king, but that his kingdom is not of this world.  His purpose is to bear witness to the truth and 
everyone who is of the truth listens to him.  Pilate responds by asking ‘what is truth’, before 
leaving to tell the Jews that he finds no guilt in Jesus.  In John 19:1-16, Pilate appeals to Jesus 
to contend for his innocence since Pilate has the authority to release or condemn, but Jesus 
refuses, noting his own authority and the sin of those who delivered him up.  Pilate sought to 
release Jesus, but eventually gave in to the crowd’s demands to have him crucified, as the 
crowd was claiming that Jesus’ kingship was in opposition to Caesar. 
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From these observations it can be argued that Jesus’ trial is in fact a trial in the sense 
described earlier.  There is an accusation or charge, questioning of the accused, testimony and 
questioning of witnesses, arrival of determination of guilt, delivery of the verdict, and 
sanction by a tribunal.  More accurately, there are really two trials – the initial trial before the 
Sanhedrin which occurs in a number of phases, and the trial before Pilate.  The accounts note 
that Jesus is questioned by the Sanhedrin and accused of being a blasphemer (Matthew 26:57-
68; Mark 14:53-65; Luke 23:66-71; John 18:19-24).  Matthew and Mark uniquely record that 
in the midst of this there is also the testimony of (false) witnesses as evidence for the purpose 
of establishing the accusations against Jesus (Matthew 26:59-61; Mark 15:55-59).  Mark’s 
account states that none of the false witnesses agreed, but the Sanhedrin nevertheless required 
Jesus to answer the charges; Matthew’s account states that two of the witnesses agreed on the 
charge of destroying and rebuilding the temple and so Jesus was required to answer the 
charges.  Matthew and Mark explicitly record the Sanhedrin’s determination that Jesus is 
guilty of blasphemy and that the penalty deserved is death (Matthew 26:65-66; Mark 14:63-
64), while the accounts of Luke and John only imply this verdict and sanction (Luke 22:71-
23:1; John 18:24, 28-31).  All four accounts record the Sanhedrin taking Jesus to Pilate so 
that Pilate may question him; though Pilate’s inquiry finds no guilt in Jesus, Pilate acquiesces 
to the verdict of the Sanhedrin and condemns Jesus to death (Matthew 27:1-2, 11-26; Mark 
15:1-15; Luke 23:1-5, 13-25; John 18:28-19:16). 
 
In these trials, there are connections with the modern Western trial through, for example, the 
use of witness testimony, arguably a lack of objectivity, and in some situations a lack of 
publicity (though the trial was very public in other situations).  Nevertheless, the unique 
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processes and issues associated with Christ’s trial(s) before the Sanhedrin and Pilate are 
indicative of the legal, political and theological context of the time – and it is precisely that 
which this chapter seeks to analyse in the context of articulating a jurisprudence of peace 
rather than violence. 
 
For Christ then, we should bear in mind the various rules and theological ideas which 
characterise the ‘jurisdiction’ of his trial, and particularly consider how these are assumed or 
manipulated in order to manufacture the desired (violent) outcome.  The aim here is not to 
construct a genealogy of the trial in general, but rather to use the trial as a genealogical 
example of how these concepts are incorporated or distorted in the trial of Christ, and how 
they may be questioned in terms of the allegedly violent result.  In any case, having 
considered some of the central characteristics and purposes of the trial in general and Christ’s 
trial in particular, we may now proceed to articulating the specifically underlying theological 
concepts and rules. 
 
II LAWS OF SIN AND LAWS OF SPIRIT: PAUL, FAITH AND THE TORAH 
 
A The Law of Death 
 
The theology undergirding the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (and the 
interpretation of this event by the early Christians) is contained in the New Testament of the 
Bible.  The New Testament is a collection of twenty-seven writings by various authors 
shortly after Christ in the first century AD.  These writings include the four gospels 
(historical accounts of Jesus’ life and ministry), the Acts of the Apostles (a historical account 
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of the early church and particularly the ministry of the apostles Peter and Paul), the Pauline 
epistles (letters written by the Apostle Paul to various churches and individuals) and epistles 
by other prominent members of the early church such as James, John and Peter, and finally 
the Revelation, an apocalyptic prophecy experienced by the apostle John.808  In particular, the 
epistles, written by the apostles and their associates, contain theological reflections on the 
significance of Jesus’ life, death and resurrection, giving advice on how one should live in 
response to this.809 
 
Included among these is the Apostle Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.810  Paul, a self-proclaimed 
apostle of Jesus Christ, was a missionary sent to preach the good news of salvation by grace 
through faith to the non-Jewish nations in the mid-first century AD, and to establish churches 
among these nations.  However, Paul had not personally established the church at Rome, nor 
had he visited there.811  His desire to travel as an itinerant evangelist, in conjunction with his 
desire to visit the city of Rome, led him to compose a letter to the church at Rome.  In this 
letter he informed the Romans of his plans and outlined the entirety of the message he had 
been preaching as an introductory gesture, and to refute prevalent false teaching.  As a former 
Pharisee, and expert in the Jewish law, his doctrine had a natural emphasis on law, both 
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divine and civil.812  Thus, Paul comprehensively sets forth his position on the internal and 
external functions of the divine and civil law in his Epistle to the Romans. 
 
One of the major themes in Romans is the contrast between the law (of sin) which leads to sin 
and death, and the (law of the) spirit which leads to life and peace.  When Paul refers to ‘the 
law’ in Romans, he usually means the Pentateuch or Torah, the first five books of the Old 
Testament containing moral, civil and ceremonial laws for the Jewish people.  It is this law 
that Paul sees as leading to violence, sin and death.813  However, this is not to say Paul’s 
discussion of law exclusively refers to the Torah; it could, for example, include reference to 
the (Roman) civil law.  According to E.P. Sanders, a leading commentator on Paul’s Jewish 
background in his discussion of the law, when Paul says that the law kills, he means all the 
law – Sanders notes that Paul appears to make no distinction between the ritual law and the 
moral law.814  The law of God is the whole law, given by God and connected with sin.815  
One could presume that this also includes the civil law, both that of the Jews in the Torah, 
and that of the Gentiles which Romans 13 explicitly discusses.  The discussion of law applies 
to civil and ceremonial, Gentile and Jew.   
 
Sanders goes further, and explicitly connects the Torah with the Roman civil law, not making 
any distinction between the function of the two.816  This implies that in Paul’s mind and the 
Jewish context, the question of the authority of law could not be divided with reference to the 
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type of law considered.817  Paul’s contention is that the law should be fulfilled, including 
ceremonial, moral and civil law, and the method of fulfilling it is by the law of love (Romans 
13:8-10).818  Consequently, such admonitions by Paul in regard to the civil law are 
remarkably in accord with the Torah and Jewish tradition.819  Sanders even goes so far as to 
state that: 
Since the point is not controversial… Rom. 13:8-10 makes no obvious distinction between the 
law that Christians should obey and the Mosaic law. There Paul not only quotes Lev. 19:18, 
but also itemizes four of the Ten Commandments and adds "and any other commandment" as 
being included in Lev. 19:18.820   
 
It is therefore not inconsistent with Paul’s Jewish content and heritage to apply his discussion 
of the Torah in Romans 3-8 to his discussion of the civil law in Romans 13:1-10.  Indeed, the 
general view in Judaism is that God ordained all parts of the law, and rejecting any of the law 
was tantamount to rejecting God himself.821  
 
Returning to the text of Romans specifically, Paul states that: 
If it had not been for the law, I would not have known sin. For I would not have known 
what it is to covet if the law had not said, ‘You shall not covet.’  But sin, seizing an 
opportunity through the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness. For 
apart from the law, sin lies dead.  I was once alive apart from the law, but when the 
commandment came, sin came alive and I died.  The very commandment that promised 
life proved to be death to me.   For sin, seizing an opportunity through the commandment, 
deceived me and through it killed me.822 
 
                                                            
817 Ibid 96. 
818 Ibid. 
819 Ibid 94-95. 
820 Ibid 99. 
821 Ibid 103.  For a more detailed  overview of Romans, the New Perspective on Paul and an argument for how 
Paul’s discussion of the Jewish law (Torah) in Romans 3-8 connects to his explicit discussion of the Roman 
civil law in Romans 13, see Deagon, above n 86,  3-9.  Milbank too states that Paul’s use of ‘law’ refers to both 
Roman and Jewish law (see Milbank, Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651, 44. 
822 Romans 7:7-11. 
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In Romans 7:7-11, Paul connects the law with sin.  Sin may be defined, apart from guilt or 
moral awareness, as ‘all that prevents a person from realising God’s purpose and… obeying 
the commandment’.823  Though law is not equated with sin, the law makes us aware of sin 
and produces guilt.  The very function of the law itself is not to produce obedience or 
goodness, but instead to cause moral struggle and inner tension.824 Therefore, it is the law 
which empowers sin, for without the law sin lies dormant.  When sin is then given 
opportunity to manifest through the law, it promises life by holding up the standard for 
obedience but delivers death due to the impossibility of attaining that standard.  Thus, 
according to Paul the reason the law fails to give life and instead brings knowledge of sin is 
because in the law, or the ‘old way of the written code’ where stringent obedience to a 
standard is demanded, faith is ‘null’ because this is irrelevant to striving obedience, and the 
law ‘brings wrath’ since one cannot obey it.825  In other words, the law as written code, as 
just a series of mandates and prohibitions, renders faith useless and brings violence.   
 
Paul also engages in an extended discussion of the law in his letter to the Galatians.  
However, in Galatians Paul is not as free to systematically develop his thoughts as he is in the 
(later) letter to the Romans – here Paul is dealing with the intense controversy of legalism, or 
the claim by Jewish Christians that Gentiles must keep the Torah to be Christians.826  
Therefore, Paul is anxious to expose the destruction that comes from reliance on the law, or 
the ‘works of the flesh’ (which may specifically allude to the requirement for physical 
                                                            
823 Edwin Cyril Blackman, ‘The Letter of Paul to the Romans’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s 
Concise Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abingdon, 1983) 137. 
824 Ibid 143. 
825 Ibid 132; Romans 3:20; 4:14; 7:5-6. 
826 Victor Paul Furnish, ‘The Letter of Paul to the Galatians’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s Concise 
Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abingdon, 1983) 272-273. 
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circumcision to be part of the church).827  Paul broadens the problem and describes the way 
that this type of law leads to violence in Galatians 5:18-21, contrasting it with the Spirit: 
But if you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.  Now the works of the flesh are 
evident: sexual immorality, impurity, sensuality, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, fits 
of anger, rivalries, dissensions, divisions, envy, drunkenness, orgies, and things like these. I 
warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom 
of God. 
 
In other words, Paul argues that under the law sin dominates and manifests in all manner of 
violent acts, with the result that those who engage in such conduct will not inherit the 
kingdom of God.  This is why Paul describes the law as a ‘curse’ which ‘imprisons’ us and 
inevitably leads to violence, sin and death, ‘for if a law had been given that could give life, 
then righteousness would indeed be by the law’.828  The law ‘demands doing, in a formal, 
legalistic sense’.829  Therefore, elsewhere Paul refers to the law, the written code devoid of 
spirit, as ‘the ministry of death’, for ‘the letter kills’.830  It is finally worth noting that Paul is 
here primarily referring to ‘internal’ spiritual death, but this chapter will also argue that this 
encompasses an ‘external’ physical death through legal violence, specifically displayed 
through the crucifixion of Christ.  Paul appears to refer to this in Romans 5 in explaining how 
death entered the world through sin in relation to Adam. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
827 Ibid 288, 298-299. 
828 Galatians 3:10, 21, 23. 
829 Furnish, Galatians, above n 826, 289. 
830 2 Corinthians 3:3, 6. 
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B The Law of Life 
 
1 Paul For and Against Law 
 
The astute Pauline scholar may recognise a difficulty here.  I (allegedly following Paul) have 
so far been quite critical of the (Mosaic) law, claiming that it leads to violence and death, and 
in some sense annuls faith.  However, this does not mean that Paul is intrinsically against the 
law.  Indeed, he says ‘What then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means!... the law is 
holy, and the commandment is holy and righteous and good’.831  So the problem is apparently 
not with the inherent notion of the law.  Nor is it an issue of the law’s ‘secular’ origin, for the 
Mosaic law was revealed to Moses by God (see e.g. Exodus 19-20).  Instead, the problem 
appears to be the legalistic, codified, formal nature of law – not that it lacks faith in the broad 
sense of being from the secular, but that it lacks faith and spirit in the more specific sense of 
lacking the revelation of Christ and our participation in this revelation.  In other words, it is 
not that the law is intrinsically evil, but that it has been distorted (secularised) and 
superseded, such that continuing to attempt its application results in violence – the 
circumscription and limitation (alienation) of interactions between persons and the divine. 
‘Summarizing, we can state that for Paul the law is still holy and of divine origin - this is 
denied nowhere in his texts. Yet the law is no longer valid for the Christians who should not 
even attempt to comply with it: it expired when Christ appeared.’832   
 
Paul explains why in Romans: 
                                                            
831 Romans 7:7a; 12. 
832 Thuren, above n 810, 181. 
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For the law of the Spirit of life has set you free in Christ Jesus from the law of sin and 
death.  For God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do. By sending his own 
Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that the 
righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not according to the flesh but 
according to the Spirit.  For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of 
the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit.  For 
to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace.833 
 
For Paul, the life, death and resurrection of Christ is foundational for breaking the curse of 
the secularised letter of the law, since the same Spirit which raised Christ from the dead gives 
life to the law and redeems it, transforming it by faith.  In this passage Paul uses law ‘in the 
sense of “authority” or “principle”.  The new regime is inaugurated by the Spirit… which is, 
or creates, life.  It cancels out the results of that other regime which spread sin and death.’834  
Though the law is still in place, it is a fundamentally different system – one which produces 
life rather than death.  In the similar context of refuting the claim that adherence to legalistic 
ordinances is necessary for salvation, Paul states in Colossians that through faith in the 
powerful working of God, those who believe in Christ were ‘raised to life together with 
Christ’ by his ‘cancelling of the demands of the letter of the law’.835  Christ in his death and 
resurrection ‘brought freedom this enslavement to an external code’.836  In this way, with 
Christ the Christian has died to the old law and is consequently released from its 
imprisonment constraining us to endless and impossible adherence, and were raised from the 
dead with him ‘so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way of the 
written code’.837  In other words, through the resurrection of Christ law has been redeemed in 
the sense that the old law is gone and the new has come, so that we may obey this law in the 
                                                            
833 Romans 8:2-6. 
834 Blackman, above n 823, 147. 
835 Colossians 2:12-15; Victor Paul Furnish, ‘The Letter of Paul to the Colossians’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The 
Interpreter’s Concise Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abingdon, 1983) 382. 
836 Furnish, Colossians, above n 835, 382-383. 
837 Romans 7:4-6. 
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new way of the Spirit of life, and not the old way of the written code which leads to sin and 
death.838   
 
In Romans, Paul argues that this obedience of faith is found in the type of Abraham, who 
obeyed the commands of God through a spirit of trust in the faithfulness and truth of God.  
Hence, if we have the same faith as Abraham, the same righteousness will be accounted to us 
who believe that the dead Jesus Christ was raised for our justification.  This Pauline notion of 
justification by faith is the essence of Christian peace, for Paul contends that ‘since we have 
been justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ’.839  The 
specific importance of faith will be explained later in this chapter, but for now it should be 
noted that faith in the resurrection of Christ is fundamental in Paul’s explanation of how the 
law is redeemed in the Spirit from the old written code which leads to death.  It is on this 
basis that Paul can argue in Romans 8:2-6 (quoted above) that the law of the Spirit of life in 
Christ Jesus has set us free from the law of sin, violence and death, instituting a new law so 
that the law of the Spirit consequently produces peace. 
 
Paul expands on some implications of this new covenant, the law of the Spirit which gives 
life rather than the law of the letter which kills, in 2 Corinthians 3.  2 Corinthians is written to 
the church at Corinth at a time when it is rife with sin and false teachers.  In particular, these 
false teachers claim Paul is a false apostle, and Paul responds by arguing that his authority as 
an apostle is grounded in the fact that God has made him competent as a minister of the new 
covenant in the Spirit, which in turn forms the foundation for the establishment of the church 
                                                            
838 C.f. 2 Corinthians 5:17. 
839 Romans 4:20-5:1. 
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itself.840  In particular, Paul notes that since the former ‘ministry of death’ came with a degree 
of glory such that the Israelites could not even gaze upon it, the new ministry of life through 
the Spirit comes with ‘even more glory’ – the glory of the Lord Jesus Christ.841  However, 
those who are captive to the old law of the letter are ‘veiled’ in their perception of the glory 
of Christ, and so what is required is the true glory of Christ to be revealed.  Such occurs 
through the Spirit, which brings freedom.842   
 
This revelation of the glory of Christ is also discussed in the opening chapter of the Gospel 
according to John.  John is fundamentally writing in order to demonstrate to his audience of 
fledgling churches that Jesus Christ is the Son of God so that they may believe; Jesus is 
viewed as the revelatory Word of God, revealing the truth of the ultimate reality of God’s 
person and character.843  The light of Christ’s glory illuminates those who believe and is the 
full display of God’s magnificence to the world.844  So John states that we have ‘seen the 
glory of Christ as the only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth’.845  The glory of Christ 
bringing grace and truth is then explicitly contrasted with the Old Testament law, ‘for the law 
was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ’.846  With this contrast 
John aims to transform the prevailing paradigm that the law is the Word or logos of God, the 
                                                            
840 James Price, ‘The Second Letter of Paul to the Corinthians’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s 
Concise Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abingdon, 1983) 245. 
841 2 Corinthians 3:7-8.  Importantly, John Milbank’s notion of Christ as Incarnational Paradox, where paradox 
is etymologically divided into para-doxa, or double/overwhelming glory, would seem to allude to this. 
842 See 2 Corinthians 3:6-17. 
843 Robert Gundry, A Survey of the New Testament (Zondervan, 1970) 104-105. 
844 Ibid 118. 
845 John 1:14. 
846 John 1:17. 
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ultimate communication of God to humanity.847  Instead, the way to know God, to participate 
in his being, is through Jesus Christ, not through the law.848 
 
It would seem to follow from these observations that the ministry of the Spirit is central to 
revealing the glory (and thus the divinity) of Christ, and that revealing the glory of Christ is 
equivalent to grace and truth.  Indeed, the connection between revelation and truth is key, and 
may be explained through linguistic analysis of the New Testament in conjunction with the 
above textual considerations.  If that is so, in contrast to the attestation of the truth of the 
glory (or divinity) of Christ according to the Old Testament law, which leads to death, the 
new way of the Spirit which leads to life and peace involves divine revelation of the glory of 
Christ, and this is truth – as the Gospel of John states, God in this way has made Christ 
known.849  We consequently turn to consider the linguistic context of this argument that New 
Testament truth is divine revelation. 
 
2 The New Law: Truth, Revelation, Participation 
 
The New Testament was written in a particular dialect of Greek known as koine or ‘common’ 
Greek (as opposed to the classical Greek used by the philosophers), since it was the standard 
language of routine commerce and communication.  This language originated from the 
ancient Hellenes who settled in the Greek peninsula in the thirteenth century BC, and was 
spoken by both the cultured and the laity.  Therefore, it was a language uniquely suited to the 
                                                            
847 John Painter, ‘John the Evangelist as Theologian’ in David Peterson and John Pryor (eds), In the Fullness of 
Time (Anzea, 1992) 99. 
848 Ibid 102. 
849 John 1:18. 
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effective propagation of the good news of Christ to the nations of the world.850  Uniquely, the 
primarily Jewish background and consequent Semitic influence on the New Testament 
writers often resulted in a nuanced use of common Greek, blending the wisdom of Hebrew 
with the dialectic philosophy of Greek, and the candour of Hebrew thought with the precision 
of Greek expression.  As such, New Testament Greek frequently created its own idiom.851  
Therefore, it is particularly necessary that an analysis of the New Testament linguistic 
concept of truth reflects an understanding of the relevant New Testament Greek. 
 
There are eight words in the New Testament which are consistently translated as truth, or 
some derivative or equivalent.852  The most common of these is aletheia, and its translation is 
multifaceted not because of its ambiguity, but because of how its meaning alters according to 
the context in which it is used.  This is an example of the comments regarding the precision 
and clarification available to New Testament Greek, with its idioms and nuances.  Aletheia is 
derived from alethes, which has its root in the combination of a, the first letter of the Greek 
alphabet and a particle used as a prefix to express a negation, with lanthano, a prolonged 
form of a primitive verb which means to be hidden, concealed, or secret.  Thus, the root form 
of aletheia expresses a meaning equivalent to the notion of negating a secret, revealing a 
thing that has been concealed, or exposing something hidden.853  This equivalence of 
revelation (revealing) with truth (and therefore concealing with lies/falsehood) provides the 
framework for considering the New Testament use of aletheia. 
 
                                                            
850 D Black, Learn to Read New Testament Greek (Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1994) 1. 
851 L Walker, ‘Biblical Languages’ in D Horton (ed), The Portable Seminary (Bethany House, 2006) 60-65. 
852 R Young, Analytical Concordance to the Bible (W.B. Eerdmans, 1977) 1005. 
853 Thayer and Smith, Greek Lexicon Entry for Aletheia (15 February 2012) The New Testament Greek Lexicon  
<http://www.studylight.org/lex/grk/view.cgi?number=225>  
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A major way that aletheia is used in the New Testament is to express the truth of the 
Christian Religion, or that which is revealed by God about himself and humanity through the 
Scriptures.854  For example, in John 17:17 Jesus prays to God the Father, asking him to 
sanctify believers in the truth (aletheia), and stating that his word is truth (aletheia).  
Specifically, the truth of God which is able to sanctify (make believers holy) is the good news 
that Jesus died on the cross and rose again from the dead, so that sinners who repent and trust 
in him may have their punishment forgiven, being reconciled with God and inheriting 
everlasting life.  In the New Testament, this expresses an objective reality, such as when the 
apostle Paul states that the truth (aletheia) of the gospel was preserved for the Galatian 
church in Galatians 2:5.855  This truth is opposed to and contrasted with the sinful ‘lies’ of the 
pagans, Jews, and false teachers claiming to be Christian.  Similarly, Jesus states in John 
8:31-32 that if people obey his word, they will know the truth of the gospel, and this truth 
will set them free from their sin.856  Finally, aletheia also has a subjective meaning, referring 
to truth as a personal excellence where a person is free to speak forthrightly without adverse 
affection, falsehood, simulation, or deceit, such as in Ephesians 4:25 when Paul encourages 
believers to speak truth to one another, for we are all of one body.857 
 
So even though truth or revelation is required for life and peace, this is not due to the law 
being intrinsically evil.  Rather, ‘secularised’ law – law as a pure series of technical, formal 
and legalistic rules – is incompatible with the Christian life of the Spirit, the truth of giving 
and receiving love revealed from and through the divine.    More specifically, it can be 
argued that the modern Western legal system is incompatible with aletheia and the 
                                                            
854 Ibid. 
855 A Kostenberger, Exegetical Commentary on John (Baker, 2004) 496. 
856 W Hendrickson, Exposition of the Gospel According to John (Baker, 2004) 52. 
857 Thayer and Smith, above n 544. 
244 
 
participatory life of the Spirit, for its attempt to categorise, prohibit, mandate, contract and so 
forth can ultimately be seen as an act of exclusion and communal alienation, or violence.858  
With this context in mind, we may now move to consider how this paradigmatically occurs in 
the trial of Christ. 
 
III CHRIST CRUCIFIED: CONVICTION BY THE LAW OF DEATH 
 
A Law as Rules 
 
1 Old Testament Context and Rules 
 
The first relevant element of Christ’s trial is the use of and emphasis on law as a series of 
rules – particularly, the laws contained in the Old Testament.  This can be seen in John’s 
account, where Pilate tells the Sanhedrin to judge Christ according to their own law, and the 
Sanhedrin respond by saying that it is not lawful for them to put anyone to death.859  It is 
implied that the Sanhedrin have already judged Jesus according to their law, and that the 
verdict reached was death.  As summarised in the first part of this chapter, all the accounts (in 
various ways) record this process.  Since Christ was tried under this law, it is instructive to 
initially outline the governing legal framework of the Old Testament.  All four gospel 
accounts agree that Jesus was accused of blasphemy (Matthew 26:65; Mark 14:64; Luke 
22:70-71; John 5:18), or claiming equality and identity with God – a crime punishable by 
                                                            
858 It is this idea that Milbank attempts to unpack in Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651.  Specifics of this 
argument will be discussed later in the chapter. 
859 John 18:31.  The reason why the Sanhedrin required Pilate’s permission to put Jesus to death will be 
discussed later. 
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death according to Leviticus 24:16: ‘Whoever blasphemes the name of the Lord shall surely 
be put to death’.  The Sanhedrin explicitly confirm this in John 19:7: ‘We have a law, and 
according to that law he ought to die because he has made himself the Son of God’.  This is 
contained in the Pentateuch and is part of the Old Testament corpus referenced by Paul as 
‘the law’.  The Old Testament is the collection of Hebrew Scriptures which are said to record 
the history of the world and particularly the Jewish nation, from the creation of humanity to 
God’s inception of the Abrahamic Covenant of reconciliation through to the establishment of 
the nation of Israel.  It includes genres such as historical narrative, wisdom literature, 
prophecy, and most significantly, law.860  Its major theme is the problem of disobedience to 
the law and human rebellion against God, and God’s plan to forgive this and to reconcile 
humanity with himself through the sacrifice of a promised Messiah.861   
 
The Old Testament was originally written in Hebrew, though a few passages are in 
Aramaic.862  Biblical Hebrew is part of a family of languages known as Semitic.  The 
similarities in the grammar, syntax and vocabulary of the Semitic languages have caused 
historical linguists to infer a common origin, and the study of Biblical Hebrew in particular is 
important for understanding the origin and character of the Old Testament, as well as the 
many Hebraisms and Semitisms found in the New Testament.863  Lexicographically, Biblical 
Hebrew is essentially distinct from Indo-European languages and Germanic languages, such 
as English.864  It is concrete, emotional and vivid, of a picturesque quality such that abstract 
                                                            
860 Pfeiffer, above n 813, 20. 
861 P Ferris, ‘Background to the Old Testament’ in D Horton (ed), The Portable Seminary (Bethany House, 
2006) 199-200. 
862 Walker, above n 851, 49. 
863 A Ross, Introducing Biblical Hebrew (Baker, 2001) 11, 16. 
864 E Kautzsch, (ed), Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (Clarendon Press, 1898) 4. 
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intellectual or theological terms like truth, sin or thought are expressed visually by physical 
actions or natural objects.865   
 
There are approximately ten Hebrew words in the Old Testament which are consistently 
translated as ‘truth’, or some derivative or equivalent.866  The most common of these is 
emeth, which can be variously translated as firmness, reliability and solidity, and is used in 
the context of the spoken and written word, testimony, doctrine and divine instruction.  The 
primary sense in which emeth is used is to express certainty and reliability that particular 
events have transpired, which is confirmed through eyewitness testimony or attestation.867  
As a general example, in Deuteronomy 17:4, the people of Israel are commanded to inquire 
as to whether idolatry has occurred amongst them, and if that event is found to be true (i.e. it 
is established that the event has certainly and reliably occurred), particular consequences 
follow.   
 
In the Pentateuch there is a major relationship between law and truth, and correspondingly it 
has numerous references to witnesses and testimony.868  The first and most important of these 
is the ninth of the Ten Commandments, the injunction to ‘not bear false witness against your 
neighbour’.869  As shall be seen, this commandment is essential to the effective functioning of 
the Jewish legal system, for faithful witness testimony was central to the determination of 
guilt or innocence, and ultimately to the reputation and even life of the accused person.870  
Thus, the Hebrew law compelled truthful and faithful testimony: that the account of events 
                                                            
865 Pfeiffer, above n 813, 15. 
866 Young, above n 852, 1004-1005. 
867 Ibid. 
868 Pfeiffer, above n 813, 129. 
869 Exodus 20:16. 
870 C Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s One-Volume Commentary on the Bible (Abingdon Press, 1971) 55. 
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would be emeth: sincere, reliable and conform to the facts of reality.  According to Exodus 
23:2, bearing false witness through siding with a majority would pervert the course of justice, 
since it would be unjust for the person to be convicted and punished for a crime they had not 
committed due to a false witness.   
 
In Numbers 35:30, in the particular context of murder, safeguards are implemented to ensure 
that justice is done – ‘If anyone kills a person, the murderer shall be put to death on 
the evidence of witnesses. But no person shall be put to death on the testimony of one 
witness’.  Deuteronomy 19:15-21 expands: 
A single witness shall not suffice against a person for any crime or for any wrong in 
connection with any offense that he has committed. Only on the evidence of two witnesses or 
of three witnesses shall a charge be established. If a malicious witness arises to accuse a 
person of wrongdoing, then both parties to the dispute shall appear before the Lord, before the 
priests and the judges who are in office in those days. The judges shall inquire diligently, and 
if the witness is a false witness and has accused his brother falsely, then you shall do to him 
as he had meant to do to his brother. So you shall purge the evil from your midst. And the 
rest shall hear and fear, and shall never again commit any such evil among you. Your eye 
shall not pity. It shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot. 
 
There is much here that is similar to our earlier summary of the trial.  The laws of witness 
testimony are a complex series of stringent rules designed to uncover the facts and dispense 
pure justice as retribution.  No one shall be convicted on the evidence of one witness; there 
must be at least two or three corroborating testimonies, in conjunction with a detailed inquiry 
by the judges to see whether the testimonies correspond to the reality of the events.  Guilt or 
innocence was fundamentally established through the multiple attestations of personally 
veracious and characteristically reliable witnesses who described events according to the 
reality of their transpiration. 
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The probability of true witness testimony was increased by the corroboration of accounts and 
severe punishment in the event of false witness.  Where witness testimony was contradictory, 
the sitting judges would inquire diligently into the truth of the events (i.e. what actually 
occurred), and the true testimony would be discovered.871   In this way, the ancient Hebrews 
dispensed justice (punishment of the rule-breaker) by establishing the guilt or innocence of 
the relevant parties according to the reality of the facts through witness testimony and 
detailed inquiry: in other words, by discerning the truth of the events.  Therefore, establishing 
truth through attestation was a major theme of the Hebrew legal system expressed by the 
Pentateuch. 
 
2 Roman and Jewish Rules 
 
Having established the legal context of Jesus’ trial, we can now turn to specifically consider 
the trial itself.872  The Roman law in operation at the time of Christ had numerous sources, 
including vote by people’s assembly, resolutions of the senate, decrees from the emperor, and 
judicial decisions.  In particular, the provincial governors (including Pilate) held the 
‘imperium’, which gave them almost complete power over the life and death of the people 
under their control – only the governor could impose the death sentence, and this power was 
non-delegable.873  This is the reason why the Sanhedrin needed to deliver Jesus to Pilate as 
recorded in all four accounts, and why John explicitly records that it was ‘not lawful’ for the 
                                                            
871 Ibid. 
872 Apart from what is about to be explained, for additional background on the interaction between the Roman 
and Jewish legal procedures in relation to the trial of Christ, see Paul Winter, Studia Judaica: On the Trial of 
Jesus (Walter de Gruyter, 2010).  Milbank also furnishes some relevant background in Being Reconciled, above 
n 67, 82-93, ultimately concluding that ‘one could argue that the Cross exposed the structure of arbitrary 
sovereign power in its ultimate exceptional yet typical instance… This is its act of discernment of the worst 
human violence’.  (93) 
873 Everett Ferguson, Backgrounds of Early Christianity (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003) 64. 
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Sanhedrin to put anyone to death.874  Though the Sanhedrin could deliver guilty verdicts and 
sanction death, they needed Pilate’s permission to do this.875  The normal judicial procedure 
involved the drawing up of charges and penalties and the formal act of accusation by an 
interested party (as there was no public prosecutor).  The Jewish officials illustrate this in 
regard to Jesus’ trial; their meetings or ‘Jewish trial’ would have been to settle on what 
charges could be sustained before Pilate (see Matthew 26:59, 27:1; Mark 14:55, 15:1; Luke 
22:66; John 18:19), and after the trial process where the accused and accuser would meet 
together and lay out their case before the governor (see Matthew 27:11-14; Mark 15:2-5; 
Luke 23:1-4; John 18:28-19:15), the governor would make whatever decision he deemed to 
be just and proper (see Matthew 27:24-26; Mark 15:15; Luke 23:23-25; John 19:16).876 
 
The legal status of first century Jews under the occupation of the Roman Empire was 
determined by three systems of law: the Roman civic law or ‘Common law’, the ‘Jewry law’ 
or ‘privileges based on custom and on legal dispositions enacted by Hellenistic and Roman 
magistrates’, and the laws of traditional Judaism or halachah.877  This tiered structure was 
hierarchical, with Roman law at the apex, followed by Jewry law and the halachah at the 
bottom.  As such, there was much flexibility and compromise between the different systems, 
which occasionally resulted in conflict.878  However, ‘Roman policy… generally affirmed the 
right of people to live according to their ancestral laws.  This right was granted to Greek 
                                                            
874 John 18:31. 
875 Matthew 27:26; Mark 15:15; Luke 23:25; John 19:16. 
876 Ibid 65. 
877 Amnon Linder, ‘The Legal Status of the Jews in the Roman Empire’, in Steven Katz et al (eds), The 
Cambridge History of Judaism: Volume 4, the Late Roman-Rabbinic Period (Cambridge, 2006) 131.  For a 
more detailed analysis which remains a seminal contribution, see A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Society and 
Roman Law in the New Testament (Oxford, 1963). 
878 Linder, above n 877, 128-129, 131. 
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cities as well as to Jewish communities… the reason for this was simply that it was the 
easiest way to keep peace’.879   
 
In particular, the first century Jewish judicial system was comprised of five different courts, 
with the Sanhedrin as a supreme court.880  Christ’s trial occurred before the Sanhedrin, which 
was constituted of Sadducees (the priestly aristocracy), Pharisees (the moral and religious 
leaders) and Scribes (the experts in Jewish law and legal procedure).881  This body exercised 
both civil and criminal jurisdiction according to Jewish law, and had administrative authority 
and its own officers of justice to perform arrests.882  With the Roman occupancy at the time 
of Christ, it was empowered to judge cases not involving capital punishment, but could only 
make recommendations of its findings to the Roman procurator in cases of capital 
punishment, who then had the power to affirm or deny the finding.883  However, in Jewish 
law the Sanhedrin also had the power of life and death, so that the procurator’s judgment was 
usually in accordance with the demands of the Sanhedrin.884  The Sanhedrin had two main 
areas of responsibility where it rendered judgments: the political (administrative and judicial), 
and the religious.885 
 
In terms of Christ’s trial specifically, he is brought before the Sanhedrin in three phases: an 
informal hearing before Annas uniquely recorded in John 18:13, 19-24, a more formal trial 
                                                            
879 John Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and 
Roman Rule (Brill, 2005) 209. 
880 Linder, above n 877, 136. 
881 See Matthew 26:57-59; Mark 14:53; Luke 22:66 (‘chief priests’, ‘elders’, ‘scribes’); John 19:6 (‘chief 
priests’, ‘officers’).   
882 J Thompson, ‘Sanhedrin’ in J Douglas (ed), The Illustrated Bible Dictionary Part 3 (Intervarsity Press, 1980) 
1390-1391. 
883 Ibid. 
884 Ibid.  Recall, for example, the process described in John 18:29-31 where the Sanhedrin persuade Pilate to 
find Jesus guilty so that he may be condemned to death. 
885 Ibid. 
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before Caiaphas and the rest of the council while it is still dark (recorded only in Matthew 
26:57-68 and Mark 14:53-65, though alluded to in John 18:24), and finally a brief formal 
verdict by the same court in the morning (recorded with detail in Luke 23:66-71, and referred 
to in Matthew 27:1; Mark 15:1; John 18:28) which New Testament scholar Craig Blomberg 
surmises was to create an ‘aura of legality’.886  In terms of court procedure, the Sanhedrin had 
specified times and places to meet.  There was no ‘jury of peers’, but instead the Sanhedrin 
themselves were both judge and jury.  There were 23 judges required for quorum, and for 
acquittal an absolute majority judgment sufficed, whereas for condemnation a two-thirds 
majority was required.887  If more than half and less than two-thirds of the judges voted for 
condemnation, two judges were added and the process repeated until a verdict was reached, 
up to a total of 71 judges.  The entire process was designed so that the benefit of the doubt 
always lay with the accused.888  
 
B Law as Power 
 
1 The Political Sanhedrin 
 
Despite the existence of these rules and procedures, many were not followed by the 
Sanhedrin in regard to the trial of Christ in the gospel accounts.  Blomberg observes that the 
law can be manipulated by people in the name of a higher political cause, and that this was 
                                                            
886 Blomberg, above n 807, 396. 
887 Thompson, above n 882, 1391. 
888 Ibid. 
252 
 
displayed through an instrumental breach of the rules in regard to the trial of Christ.889  The 
Sanhedrin, as represented by the gospels, was not interested in seeking the truth, only in 
silencing Christ.  For example, Matthew records that the Pharisees ‘conspired against him, 
how to destroy him’ (12:14) and they ‘were seeking to arrest him’ (21:46), and they ‘plotted 
together in order to arrest Jesus by stealth and kill him’ (26:3-4).890  They had already 
determined Christ’s guilt before the questioning and deliberation occurred, such that the trial 
was a sham for their political rationale of silencing Christ and concealing truth, and therefore 
it was ultimately a ‘miscarriage of justice’ – even though they still needed to implement the 
death penalty through Pilate.891  As will be explained in more detail below, the Sanhedrin had 
not received aletheia or divine revelation regarding the truth of Christ, and did not have faith 
in him.  Since the discourses of Christ threatened their power and position, it was arguably 
their purely secular or pagan reason or selfish desires in the sense of seeking to protect their 
sovereign authority, their own political power, which precluded the operation of true, divine 
law which would have exonerated Christ as the divine truth.  Instead, a miscarriage of justice 
occurred, divine law was not applied, and Christ was condemned.  
 
To facilitate this condemnation of Jesus, the Sanhedrin manipulated the rules by constructing 
false testimony and adducing false witnesses.  Matthew records that initially none of the false 
witness testimony was able to stand, for the testimony did not agree and could not be 
corroborated.  However, two witnesses then came forward and charged that Jesus claimed he 
would destroy the temple and rebuild it in three days.892  Mark also records that the false 
                                                            
889 Blomberg, above n 807, 399. 
890 See also Mark 14:1-2; Luke 22:2; John 11:45-57. 
891 Blomberg, above n 807, 399. 
892 Matthew 26:59-61. 
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witnesses disagreed, including on the matter of the temple’s destruction.893  Since the Jewish 
law requires witnesses to agree, Jesus was not declared guilty on the basis of this testimony 
since he refused to answer the charge.894  It was Jesus’ tacit admissions during the trial which 
secured the charges, in conjunction with his more explicit statements during his public 
ministry pertaining to his claims to be God and equal with God.895  The relevant question 
then is whether the evidence adduced by Jesus establishes the truth of his claims, for if Jesus 
was in fact not God or equal with God, contrary to what he claimed, he was guilty of 
blasphemy according to the Jewish law and deserved the punishment of death such that 
‘justice’ was done.  If Jesus was in fact God as he claimed, he is not guilty of blasphemy 
since he is merely attesting to the truth. 
 
Firstly, Jesus states that, as according to the Jewish law, if he bears witness of himself, his 
testimony is not true (reliable), for there is only one witness.896  He proceeds to argue that his 
testimony alone is sufficient to prove true in the sense of being reliable because he comes 
from God the Father and will return to God the Father.897  Hence, it would seem in this 
circumstance that the character of the witness directly impacts the reliability of the testimony, 
for God himself requires no corroborator as one that is eminently reliable.  The problem here 
is that this would seem to beg the question in this instance, for the divine veracity of Jesus as 
a witness is assumed when his divinity is precisely what is being investigated through witness 
testimony.  So for the moment the conclusion must be that Jesus’ solitary witness cannot 
assist in establishing his divinity, leading to uncertainty.  Jesus subsequently argues that in 
the case of concurring multiple (two or more) witnesses, the testimony is true.  Not only does 
                                                            
893 Mark 14:55-59. 
894 Laymon, above n 870, 18; Mark 14:55-59. 
895 Matthew 26:57-58; Luke 22:66-71; John 5:18; John 8:58-59. 
896 John 5:31. 
897 John 8:14-16. 
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Jesus bear witness of himself, but so does John the Baptist, the works Jesus performs, and the 
Father through the Scriptures.898  These witnesses combine to give concurring testimony 
regarding the divinity of Christ, and therefore according to the Jewish law the testimony is 
reliable.  It follows that Jesus’ personal testimony regarding himself is also reliable, 
strengthening the truth of the witness.  Therefore, since according to the Jewish standard it is 
true that Jesus actually is God, according to the Jewish law he is not guilty of blasphemy, and 
it seems the Sanhedrin was unjust and false to condemn him. 
 
2 The Truth of Pilate 
 
However, it is not merely the Jewish Torah and Jewish politics which contributed to Christ’s 
crucifixion, so as to succumb to the charge of anti-Semitism.  We have seen in each of the 
four gospel accounts that there is an emphasis on condemning the Jews as rebelling against 
God’s will and rejecting the promised Messiah, while Pilate is exonerated as essentially 
coerced by the political climate; he is unable to declare Jesus innocent and release him even 
though he desires to.899   This is most apparent in Matthew’s account, which includes the two 
unique elements of Pilate’s wife being warned in a dream that Jesus is innocent and for Pilate 
not to become involved, as well as Pilate washing his hands of Jesus’ fate with the recording 
of the Jews declaring that Jesus’ blood will be on them and their children.900  The warning is 
an additional divine evidence of Jesus’ innocence and the corresponding guilt of the Jews, 
                                                            
898 John 5:30-46.  These witnesses, however, are not adduced at Jesus’ trial.  At this point John the Baptist is 
dead (see Mark 6:14-29; Matthew 14:1-12), and the Jews rejected the other two witnesses a priori as they were 
already convinced of Jesus’ guilt. 
899 See for example Mark 15:12-15; Luke 23:20-25. 
900 Matthew 27:19, 24-25. 
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emphasised by their taking full responsibility for the shedding of Jesus’ blood.901  These 
aspects may be explained by the fact that Matthew was writing primarily to Jewish Christians 
who were living in tension with the traditional synagogues; Matthew sought to establish that 
Jesus is the true Messiah and contrast this faithfulness to divine revelation with the guilt and 
blindness of those Jews who rejected Christ.902  It is from these considerations that blame for 
Jesus’ execution has been placed on the Jewish people as a whole, resulting in bitterness and 
anti-Jewish sentiment.903  It may also have been the case that the early Christians, living 
under the rule of the Roman Empire, wished to show their loyalty to Roman authority and 
minimise the perception of threat.904 
 
However, I will argue that Pontius Pilate and the Romans are equally culpable, because their 
secular reason and pagan politics of power condoned and effectively allowed Christ’s 
death.905  At the time, Pilate was the procurator of Judaea in Israel, which meant he had full 
control of the province. 906  He was in charge of the occupying army and had power over life 
and death, being able to reverse capital sentences passed by the Sanhedrin, which had to be 
ratified by him. 907  Importantly, he also appointed the High Priests and controlled the temple 
as well as its funds and contents, including the High Priest’s vestments. 908  Pilate presided 
over a tumultuous period in Judaea, with numerous rebellions and slaughters occurring under 
his rule.  Consequently, in the context of the trial of Christ, Pilate was wary of imperial 
displeasure if the (contemporary) Roman Emperor Tiberius heard of further unrest in the 
                                                            
901 Kee, above n 804, 92-93. 
902 Blomberg, above n 807, 150-151. 
903 Kee, above n 804, 93. 
904 Shepherd, above n 806, 329. 
905 Blomberg, above n 807, 400. 
906 D Wheaton, ‘Pilate’ in J Douglas (ed), The Illustrated Bible Dictionary Part 3 (Intervarsity Press, 1980) 
1229-30. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Ibid. 
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area.909  In other words, it was Pilate’s power relations with Rome which resulted in his 
ultimate approval of the violence.   
 
When the Sanhedrin took Jesus to Pilate to obtain his permission for crucifixion, even though 
Pilate believed Christ was innocent of anything deserving death, he dared not alienate the 
Jews and risk a rebellion, instead affirming their testimony for fear of losing his power as 
procurator of Judaea.910  The Sanhedrin emphasised the claims of Jesus’ kingship and set this 
against the Roman kingship of Caesar: ‘if you release this man, you are not Caesar’s friend.  
Everyone who makes himself a king opposes Caesar’.911  This crafty approach constructed a 
dangerous dilemma for Pilate: condemn an innocent man to death, or risk politically 
destabilising claims that he was acknowledging Jesus as king in competition with Caesar.  
Pilate ‘yields to the fear of his own political position’ and takes the former option.912  In 
essence, while himself being manipulated, Pilate selfishly manipulates the legal situation in 
order to maintain his own power.  Therefore, for both Jew and Gentile, the law is a 
secularised, formal set of rules which can be manipulated in a Machiavellian (pagan) sense to 
achieve particular political outcomes: in this situation, the crucifixion of Christ. 
 
This is particularly exposed in the Gospel according to John, when Pilate and Christ converse 
about truth, or aletheia – divine revelation: 
So Pilate entered his headquarters again and called Jesus and said to him, ’Are you the 
King of the Jews?’  Jesus answered, ’Do you say this of your own accord, or did others 
say it to you about me?’  Pilate answered, ‘Am I a Jew? Your own nation and the chief 
priests have delivered you over to me. What have you done?’  Jesus answered, ’My 
                                                            
909 Ibid. 
910 Blomberg, above n 807, 401. 
911 John 19:12. 
912 Shepherd, above n 806, 328. 
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kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would have 
been fighting, that I might not be delivered over to the Jews. But my kingdom is not from 
the world.’  Then Pilate said to him, ‘So you are a king?’ Jesus answered, ’You say that I 
am a king. For this purpose I was born and for this purpose I have come into the world – 
to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice.’  Pilate said 
to him, ‘What is truth?’913 
 
Here Pilate, despite later affirming the innocence of Jesus in John 19:4, in response asks what 
truth is in an apparently rhetorical way.914  It is apparently rhetorical because Pilate does not 
stay to hear an answer, or discuss it; instead, he walks back out to the Jews.915  It would seem 
that if this was a genuine inquiry by Pilate, rather than a haphazard statement, he would have 
remained to discuss the matter with Jesus.  John Milbank agrees with this interpretation.  In 
order to justify his claim of theology critiquing philosophy, Milbank approvingly cites 
Johann Georg Hamann, an eighteenth century German philosopher, deploying a critique of 
the figure of Pontius Pilate during the trial of Christ.  ‘Pilate represents the Enlightenment, 
which rules and inquires after truth.  But, notoriously, he only jests and does not stay for an 
answer’ – if he had, he would have seen the truth as the suffering Christ before him.916  The 
apparent rejection of this sight or spectacle of Christ may indicate that pure philosophic 
reason has a fundamentally non-realist impulse which leaves commonsense perception 
behind.  By contrast, a kind of faith is involved in everyday life when we recognise the real, 
particularly a faith or trust in perception, which is ultimately faith in God who creates out of 
nothing and sustains everything in being.917   
 
                                                            
913 John 18:33-38. 
914 John 18:38. 
915 Ibid. 
916 Milbank, Knowledge, above n 334, 25. 
917 Ibid 25-27. 
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The fact that this is the Old Testament law, which Paul understands as formalistic rules 
devoid of faith and life, implies that the faith of the pure philosophic reason described above 
cannot be trust, and particularly cannot be trust in God.  Instead, it may be that the operation 
of secular reason results not in a trust or faith in perception in the theological sense, but rather 
an indeterminacy or barrier – a blind faith, operating without reason.  This, as has been 
indicated, is the ultimate end of secular reason.  Pilate, in Hamann’s depiction, representing 
this secular reason of the Enlightenment, scoffs at the notion of defining truth, exposing 
nihilistic uncertainty and indeterminacy as the fundamental limit and impasse of secular 
reason.  And this reason without revelation cannot yield truth.   
 
Hence, as is revealed, Jesus’ contentions to demonstrate the truth of his claims that he is the 
truth or that he is God according to the laws of witness testimony under the Old Testament 
are fruitless.  Despite his perfect adherence to the system of rules, the nihilistic uncertainty 
remains and produces a violent drive for decision in regard to Christ; the crowd, the 
Sanhedrin, and even Pilate himself do not believe that Jesus is God and his attestation is true.  
So they decide to crucify him, and Pilate washes his hands of the matter.918  As explained by 
Paul in Romans 7:10, ‘the very commandment that promised life proved to be death’ for 
Christ.  The promise of the Old Testament laws of witness testimony to yield truth and 
consequently life only produced death.  Therefore, it seems that the (secular) formalism of the 
rules in conjunction with the pagan power relations within the law ultimately lead to violence 
and death.   
 
                                                            
918 Matthew 27:24. 
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For Christ, this violence and death occurred through him being beaten, mocked, whipped and 
finally crucified.919  According to Paul in Galatians, Christ in this way ‘becomes a curse’ as a 
result of the law being ‘not of faith’ – for ‘cursed is everyone who is hanged on a tree’.920  
Christ suffers the law’s curse by manifesting the way in which the law demands a formalistic 
adherence which can never be satisfied, as well as displaying the violence and death that 
comes as a result.921  Hence the law simultaneously curses Christ by causing him to suffer its 
violence and death through its condemnation, and endorses this violence and death by 
affirming the curse through the given method of violence and death – that is, crucifixion is 
hanging on a tree and consequently Christ is cursed by virtue of his crucifixion.   
 
C Law as Secular and Pagan? 
 
Both the Jewish law and the Roman law fail to exonerate Christ.  It then seems that the 
secular, formal, codified, legalistic nature of these laws cannot confront aletheia, the truth or 
revelation of Christ’s divinity, and so attempt to suppress it through violence.    Exacerbating 
this is the pagan ontology represented through the actions of the legal actors involved.  Pilate, 
as a Roman governor described above, is intimately involved with this pagan toleration of 
difference and regulation of violence by violence – an instrument in the so-called ‘Roman 
peace’.  In addition, both Pilate and the Sanhedrin adopt a Machiavellian attitude in their 
dealings with Christ.  They are centrally concerned with maintaining their own power, and 
they engage in deception and tricks to achieve this.  As discussed above, the Sanhedrin 
manipulates the rules in an attempt to convict Christ, and also manipulate Pilate by implicitly 
                                                            
919 See for example Mark 15:15-37. 
920 Galatians 3:10-14. 
921 Furnish, Galatians, above n 826 , 289. 
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threatening to cause a riot if he does not accede to their wishes – aware that Pilate could not 
politically afford more unrest.  Pilate too, despite protesting the innocence of Christ (that he 
has done nothing deserving of death), cared more for retaining his position as governor, and 
so is willing to condemn an innocent man to do this.  Such actions exemplify law as secular 
and pagan, and the result is violence and death. 
 
However, even if we assume a ‘good faith’ trial of Christ – possibly in our modern context of 
the trial – it is entirely conceivable that he still would not have been acquitted.  When one 
considers the complex system of rules that govern the admissibility and weight of evidence, 
Christ’s ‘witness’ of miracles may not have sufficed.  Not only this, but the testimonial 
evidence from Christ and others may well be called into question in terms of its reliability.  
For example, according to these rules there would seem to be nothing (in principle) to 
distinguish Jesus from other Messianic claimants of the time.922  Perhaps it is an inevitable 
legal truth that Jesus is not really the Christ. 
 
The problem with this approach is that it is already operating under secular assumptions and a 
focus on rules.  These issues involve questions that assume a formal certainty and exclude 
faith with divine revelation.  The really critical point is that ‘the Sanhedrin is implicitly told 
[by Christ] that their problem is not lack of evidence for his Messiahship but lack of openness 
to the possibility of belief’.923  So Milbank argues that ‘God himself had pronounced the 
ultimate verdict on the Christological claim which is now on trial… and the evidence for this 
                                                            
922 See e.g. Acts 5:27-42. 
923 Alexandru Neagoe, Trial of the Gospels (Cambridge, 2002) 65.  This entire work contains an insightful 
discussion of how the theme of trial is adopted in the Gospel of Luke and Acts in relation to the accounts of the 
trials of Jesus and the Apostles.  See for example John 8:39-47. 
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verdict is already available in the event of Jesus’ resurrection-exaltation’.924  In other words, 
the revelation of Christ as gloriously raised and exalted testifies to and ultimately verifies his 
claim to divinity.925  It is not verified according to a secular canon of rules or reason, but by 
the nature of the work.  As Milbank notes, the Gospel of John in particular  
… suggests that Jesus realises in his own person the Father’s work because he is the Father’s 
proper work, the radiance of glory which is not dissoluble from the Father’s very being.  Both 
witnesses cohere together.  Nothing can prove or establish the perfection of Jesus’s human 
work, for if it is perfect, then the work must itself define the character of perfection.926   
 
In other words, ‘Jesus is not recognised as the… Christ, before being recognised as the divine 
Logos, which realises and establishes, without thereby displacing, the Father’s infinite power 
of origination’.927  So only divine revelation, the Father revealing the Son, can actually 
establish that Jesus is the Christ as aletheia, or theological truth.  This occurs through a faith 
enlightened by grace – recognition of Christ as the divine logos or reason. 
 
Milbank claims that there were only two possibilities for representing the various images of 
God: Judaism which focused around the Law, on ‘one figure at the expense of the others’, or 
an ‘abstract synthesis’ which ‘can only be a betrayal of the plenitude of meaning of the 
individual figures… by contrast, the poetic synthesis in Christ returns us to the figures, 
because he establishes them for the first time in total interrelation as the true human 
representation, the true human text’.928  This indicates why law as a series of formal, 
exclusive, alienating rules fails – it does not and cannot recognise Christ as the logos so it 
cannot linguistically represent him (nor can it represent the ‘total human intent’).929  Instead, 
                                                            
924 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 66. 
925 See e.g. Acts 2:22-33. 
926 Ibid 135.  See John 1:1-18. 
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928 Ibid 136. 
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it focuses on one figure at the expense of the others (for example Christ claims to be God so 
he must necessarily be a blasphemer, rather than God) or abstractly synthesises (for example 
Christ performs so-called miracles so he must be demonic like other so-called miracle 
workers).930  Since Christ cannot be categorised according to the legal rules, he is rejected.  
This rejection is violent not only in terms of its theological distortion of Christ’s identity, but 
also ultimately leads to the physical violence of crucifixion.  The legal truth which then 
emerges through a secular series of rules is not only false, but violent.  If this is accepted, the 
key to establishing theological truth in peace conceivably lies not in attestation, but 
revelation. 
 
IV THE REVELATION OF CHRIST: FAITH, MYSTERY, ATONEMENT 
 
A Christ as Disrupting Secular Formalism 
 
In Christ we see a figure of indeterminacy and ambiguity, the exemplary figure of paradox.  
He is both God and man, dead yet raised, present and absent.  The claim that only the divine 
revelation of Christ can yield truth, apart from the secular rules of pure reason, anticipates the 
mystery that shrouds comprehension of Christ’s identity and disrupts the certainty and 
formalism of the secular law, exposing only its violence in the face of such mystery.931  With 
the deconstruction of secular reason and rule systems, this opens the space for faith based on 
aletheia, divine truth or revelation. 
                                                            
930 John 10:33; Matthew 12:24. 
931 C.f. Derrida on the ‘mystical foundation’ of law, above n 3. 
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1 Christ, Faith and Aletheia 
 
In such a context, it is instructive to consider how Jesus Christ establishes the relationship 
between himself and aletheia in the Gospels, particularly in John’s account which seeks to 
identify Jesus as the Son of God, co-equal with the Father.932  Jesus unambiguously identifies 
himself as the truth (aletheia) in John 14:6 when he states ‘I am the truth’.  Bearing in mind 
the prior analysis of aletheia, as well as the Bible’s position on Jesus Christ himself, the 
profundity of this assertion cannot be overestimated.  Firstly, as aletheia refers to the 
revelation of God, Jesus is saying that he is the divine reality, equating himself with God and 
his revealed truth in the Bible.933  Indeed, this can be observed in the fact that to confirm this 
Jesus says ‘whoever has seen me has seen the Father’.934  In other words, Jesus is the 
revelation or aletheia of the Father, and therefore Jesus is the truth.  This is the sense in 
which the Gospel of John describes Christ as bringing grace and truth, as compared with the 
Law of Moses - Christ is the divine reality and fulfilment of the Mosaic Law in the sense that 
he perfectly adheres to it and is the material to which it points, the substance comprising 
God’s complete revelation of his plan, and therefore the truth of it.935   
 
Furthermore, there are numerous ways in which God himself has revealed, or made known, 
the glory of Christ.  The first such occasion was when Christ was baptised by John, and ‘the 
Spirit descend[ed] from heaven like a dove, and it remained on him’.936  The Spirit by 
revelation affirmed the glory of Christ, and it is surely no coincidence that the Spirit appeared 
                                                            
932 Gundry, above n  843, 104-105. 
933 John 1:1 – Jesus is the Word of God and is God. 
934 John 14:9. 
935 Hendrickson, above n 856, 89; John 1:17; Colossians 2:16-17. 
936 John 1:32. 
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in the form of a dove, a symbol of peace.  As Christ said to his disciples, ‘the Spirit of truth 
will lead you into all the truth… he will glorify me’.937  So through aletheia or revelation the 
truth of the glory of Christ was displayed, and there seems to be an indication that this truth is 
peace, as signified by the dove. 
 
There are further examples of God revealing the divinity of Christ, particularly in Matthew’s 
account which seeks to demonstrate that Jesus is the true, divine Messiah or Christ.938  There 
is the ‘Transfiguration’, where Christ is transfigured before his disciples, with his face 
shining like the sun and his clothes as white as light.  At this point, God the Father says that 
Jesus is his beloved Son, with whom he is well pleased.939  Thus, the glory of Christ is 
explicitly or physically revealed by the Father.  Still, possibly the clearest instance of the 
aletheia of Christ is where the Apostle Peter affirms the deity of Christ.  In response to this, 
Jesus says ‘Blessed are you, Simon Bar-Jonah!  For flesh and blood has not revealed this to 
you, but my Father who is in heaven’.940  Here, according to Christ’s assertion, the Father 
reveals the nature of Christ to Peter, so that by revelation he comes to the knowledge of the 
truth.  Jesus explicitly contrasts this divine revelation with ‘revelation by flesh and blood’, or 
what is effectively secular, human attestation. 
 
However, this is not to say that attestation is completely excluded.  To the extent that 
attestation is combined with divine revelation and jettisoned of its secular, violent aspects, 
attestation remains an effective means of revealing truth.  An example of this is found in the 
attestation of the prophet Malachi in the Old Testament, where God is revealed as testifying 
                                                            
937 John 16:13-14. 
938 Blomberg, above n 807, 150-151. 
939 Matthew 17:2, 5. 
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that ‘my covenant with him was one of life and peace… true law was in his mouth, and no 
wrong was found on his lips.  He walked with me in peace and uprightness, and he turned 
away many from sin’.941  In addition, Isaiah the prophet testifies that ‘out of Zion shall go the 
law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem’.942  There are a number of valuable insights to 
be observed:  Firstly, it can be noted that in these passages, the Septuagint, the Greek 
translation of the Hebrew Old Testament, uses the terms aletheia, nomos and logos which are 
translated truth, law and word respectively.943  Secondly, Augustine confirms that both these 
passages speak prophetically of Christ, and the covenant mentioned refers to the new 
covenant.944  Finally, Isaiah 2:3 is an example of synonymous parallelism, a Hebrew literary 
device where the first part of a thought is repeated or clarified by the second part of the 
thought.945  So Zion is clarified to mean Jerusalem; the word of the Lord, whom we know to 
be Christ from John 1:1, is equated to the law.  Combining the passages, from this attestation 
combined with revelation we see that in Christ is the unity and symbiosis of truth and law, 
and that his covenant brings life and peace, which is the new covenant of the Spirit: the law 
of love.  Hence, testimony combined with divine revelation points to a redeemed attestation, 
one which brings life and peace through the law of love. 
 
This can be further observed in the fact that, as mentioned above, the root form of aletheia is 
alethes, which literally means to reveal or uncover.  However, in the New Testament alethes 
is typically used in the sense of some particular witness or testimony being genuine, honest, 
                                                            
941 Malachi 2:5-6. 
942 Isaiah 2:3. 
943 Strong, Malachi 2:5-6 (7 October 2013) Strong’s Interlinear Bible 
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7. 
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sincere and trustworthy – and therefore true.  It is also used in the sense of loving and 
speaking the truth.946  For example, in Titus 1:13 a person from a certain people group gives 
testimony regarding the negative character of that people group, and that witness is said to be 
true (alethes).  This is the case for any faithful witness, especially including God himself as 
the divine revealer, who loves truth and is honest and trustworthy.947  However, in Christ this 
truth is not expressed in propositions, but is instead personal, knowable and reliable due to 
the stability and integrity of the truth-bearer.  Jesus as the truth embodies and materially 
personifies God and his word as truth, allowing the reality of the divine relationship to be 
conceptually apprehended and expressed, and thus truth divinely revealed is to be understood, 
trusted, and personally committed to.948  Here we begin to see hints of how the Old 
Testament law of secular attestation is not abolished, but redeemed and transformed, for 
Christ is revealed as truth and divine peace through the resurrection and his consequent 
bringing of life and peace.  As Jesus says in John 8:31-32, knowledge of the truth brings 
freedom, for divine revelation or aletheia is a law of the Spirit, the new way which leads to 
life and peace by the same Spirit which raised Christ from the dead, the same Spirit which 
brings freedom.   
 
In addition, it would seem to follow from Christ’s equating himself with aletheia that he 
personally possesses (or even ‘is’) the subjective aspect of aletheia, namely excellence of 
veracious character to speak the facts of reality unencumbered by falsehood or deceit.   This 
observation returns us to the situation earlier in this chapter, that of Christ appearing before 
Pontius Pilate and stating that his purpose is to bear witness to the truth and all who are of the 
                                                            
946 Young, above n 852, 1005. 
947 Romans 3:4. 
948 R Brown, The Gospel According to John (Geoffrey Chapman, 1984) 621, 628-631. 
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truth listen to his voice, and Pilate’s response inquiring as to the definition of truth.949  In 
each instance, the relevant Greek word translated as truth is aletheia.  Jesus declaring himself 
to be ‘of the truth’ and a witness to the truth implies that he alone is the one who reveals the 
divine, who can reliably speak and show the truth that displays the reality of God and his 
interactions with humanity.  As such, he is to be believed and followed.950   
 
However, as we saw, Pilate’s response is not a genuine philosophical query, but represents a 
sceptical refusal to accept Jesus as the truth, and demonstrates that Pilate is not of the truth, 
for he has not listened to Jesus’ voice.  In other words, though Jesus’ witness is true 
according to the rules of the formal state, this attestation to the divine reality (with its focus 
on conforming to the rules) is a merely secular one.  The testimony was certain in the formal 
sense and so excluded trust or belief, and this paradoxically meant the testimony was 
nihilistically uncertain because it lacked the crucial aspect of divine revelation, and it was 
therefore rejected by Pilate – it did not result in faith.  As was seen in the numerous examples 
above, where the truth of the divine reality is revealed, it does produce faith (pistis, or strong 
trust and persuasion by the divine) and trust in the mystery of the divine.   It can be surmised 
that if Jesus’ testimony had been divinely revealed to Pilate, he would have believed, instead 
of ‘delivering [Christ] over to them to be crucified’ because he was motivated by the secular 
or pagan desire for political power.951  Even Christ implicitly acknowledges that such is a 
secular or pagan desire.  It is a secular desire because it is a distortion of Christ’s view of his 
kingdom, a community instantiated through peace; it is a pagan desire because the pagans 
seek to maintain their power through manipulation and dominance in a Machiavellian sense.  
Ultimately, Christ argues that struggle and violence for the purpose of obtaining political 
                                                            
949 John 18:33-38. 
950 Brown, above n 948, 869; John 18:37. 
951 John 19:16. 
268 
 
power is antithetical to his idea of the kingdom: ‘My kingdom is not of this world. If my 
kingdom were of this world, my servants would have been fighting, that I might not be 
delivered over to the Jews. But my kingdom is not from the world’.952 
 
This interaction exemplifies the Christian notion that truth is not merely abstract 
propositional knowledge requiring intellectual assent, but has an indispensable element of 
personal trustworthiness or faith produced through aletheia.  This trust ultimately stems from 
the fact that the relation which is aletheia has its basis and participation in ultimate being: the 
love and peace existing in the divine Trinity.953  Hence, where attestation according to the 
formal rules system of the secular state ultimately leads to an inability to comprehend the 
mystery of the divine, which produces an ontological violence of alienation and suppression, 
divine revelation through Christ disrupts the formalism of the secular and embraces the 
mystery, trusting in the divine.  This arguably results in life and peace – the end of secular 
state violence. 
 
2 Against Christ: The Violent Drive for Decision 
 
In contrast, legal formalism results in violence due to its need for certainty and finality in 
decision-making.  The secular, formalistic desire for certainty according to the rules dictates 
that a decision must always be made, even in the face of mystery – something which does not 
accord with the established canon of rules.  Derrida insightfully exposes this in his contrast 
between justice and law, already discussed in Chapter three.  In particular, he mentions that 
                                                            
952 John 18:36. 
953 Kostenberger, above n 855, 529. 
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‘justice is an experience of the impossible… law is the element of calculation… but justice is 
incalculable, it requires us to calculate with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the 
experiences, as improbable as they are necessary, of justice’.954  Justice is ‘infinite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous and heterotropic’, 
while law is ‘stablizable or statutory, calculable, a system of regulated and coded 
prescriptions’.955  Justice must go through ‘the ordeal of the undecidable’, and therefore 
requires ‘fresh judgment’ which is ‘both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve 
the law and also destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, remystify 
it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its 
principle’.956 
 
In other words, at the moment of justice there is a paradoxical or aporetic place of 
undecidability or mystery where a decision must be made.  In the arrival of this space, there 
appears to be an incalculable spirit of decision, unbound by rules and outside of statutory 
categories, yet also within the letter or regulated system of law itself.  However, in the 
context of the trial of Christ, the mystery is Christ himself, and a decision must be made on 
whether he is truly divine – and since the secular rules cannot comprehend this mystery, the 
decision is made to condemn and crucify. 
 
This violent drive for decision specifically in regard to Christ is effectively portrayed and 
illustrated through Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s celebrated story of the Grand Inquisitor in The 
                                                            
954 Derrida, Force of Law, above n 3, 16. 
955 Ibid 22. 
956 Ibid 23-24. 
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Brothers Karamazov.957  In this fictional account set during the height of the Inquisition, the 
Inquisitor confronts a man who appears to be Christ, and is accepted by the people as such.  
He takes the man in and states: 
“Is it you?  You?”  But receiving no answer, he quickly adds: “Do not answer, be silent.  
After all, what could you say?  I know too well what you would say… I do not know who you 
are, and I do not want to know: whether it is you, or only his likeness; but tomorrow I shall 
condemn you and burn you at the stake as the most evil of heretics…”958 
 
The Inquisitor is so motivated by decision that he ultimately does not care whether it is Christ 
or not, and will not listen.  Instead, he is driven to simply condemn.  What is most fascinating 
about this account is that Alyosha, who is being told the story by Ivan, responds by saying 
‘Your Inquisitor doesn’t believe in God, that’s his whole secret!’ – and this is affirmed by 
Ivan.959  In other words, this violent drive to decision, this enthusiasm to condemn and 
crucify Christ, is fundamentally based in the secular: in the sense of lacking belief in God.  
Pilate may well have believed in the pagan gods of Rome, the Sanhedrin believed in the God 
of Israel, but what they both had in common was their lack of faith in Christ – and it appears 
that it was this lack of divine revelation (which would have enabled faith), in conjunction 
with the secular emphasis on rules and pagan power plays, that led to the violence committed 
against Christ. 
 
B Redeeming the Drive for Decision 
 
How then do we avoid the drive for decision against the undecidable, the pursuit of certainty 
in the face of mystery?  As we have seen with Christ, to simply succumb and decide produces 
                                                            
957 Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (Vintage, 2004) 246-264. 
958 Ibid 250. 
959 Ibid 261. 
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violence.  More importantly, as Milbank argues, the trial and atonement of Christ is not 
unique in the sense that it can be compartmentalised into a singular instance with no purchase 
on contemporary legal ontology.  Any attempt to limit the universality of Christ’s 
condemnation is yet another example of a secular attempt to bound and alienate the divine.  
For through creaturely participation in the divine, the atonement continues.  It cannot be 
categorised, but is forever and again displayed in all human relationships:   
In his death, Jesus entered into absolute solidarity with each and every one of us. He died the 
death which any of us, under sovereign authority, in exceptional circumstances which always 
prove the rule, may possibly die.  He died as three times excluded: by the Jewish law of its 
tribal nation; by the Roman universal law of empire; by the democratic will of the mob. In the 
whole summed-up history of human polity – the tribe, the universal absolute state, the 
democratic consensus – God found no place. He was shuttled back and forwards, with an 
undercurrent of indifference, as though not really dangerous, between their respective 
rules…He died the death of all of us – since he died the death that proves and exemplifies 
sovereignty in its arbitrariness.960 
 
So we cannot simply attempt to legally distinguish issues of (theological) revelation and 
issues of (secular) attestation – having respective parallel courts, for example.  The attempt to 
subsume aletheia into the secular legal institution, to have revelation and attestation co-exist, 
simply will not do – it will reproduce the violence displayed in the trial of Christ and in 
innumerable other situations involving the arbitrary application of sovereign power.  If one 
uses something other than revelation to judge and distinguish revelation, then we have 
already reinscribed the secular as the dominant rule once again. 
 
Instead of the drive for decision and secular categorisation, there is another type of will which 
can redeem the community, producing peace rather than violence.  The need for decision may 
be superseded to redeem in this sense.  Milbank explains: 
Instead there is created will which participates in God, wherein life and Logos (Spirit and 
Son) communicate as one. Such a will is never the presupposed “pure nature” of sovereignty 
                                                            
960 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 96-97. 
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and liberal rights theory. Instead it is already a will to reciprocity and to harmony with others 
according to an ineffable order and measure, which is yet not the measure of law. Such a will 
does not consist sovereignly in itself, and so cannot be betrayed by any executive – instead it 
only is in its always-already othering as execution: always for furtherance and not termination 
of life. Therefore by offering ourselves in and with Christ, we do not really lose ourselves, but 
live the genuine and eternal absolute life that returns as it proceeds outward.961   
 
So ‘the New Testament incarnates a new divine polity’ which abolishes the violence of 
alienation without causing antagonism through conflation, ‘because it reconceives “unity” 
beyond “singularity”’ according to the perfect relationship of the Trinity, revealed in 
Christ.962  By participating in the divine nature through a will of love and peace, an offering 
of ourselves in and with Christ, we may bring into existence a supernatural society – one that 
gives life rather than takes life.   
 
V LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS: THE LAW OF LOVE, FAITH AND 
PARTICIPATION 
 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.  He was 
in the beginning with God… In him was life, and the life was the light of men. The light 
shines in the darkness, and the darkness has not overcome it… The true light, which gives 
light to everyone, was coming into the world.  He was in the world, and the world was made 
through him, yet the world did not know him.  He came to his own, and his own people did not 
receive him. But to all who did receive him, who believed in his name, he gave the right to 
become children of God, who were born, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the 
will of man, but of God.963 
 
It has been argued that a codified, formal, legalistic law instrumentalised through the exercise 
of arbitrary sovereignty can never overcome or comprehend the divine, which includes both 
Christ as the source of the divine nature and us as participants in the divine nature.  Such a 
secular approach will always try to categorise, to exclude, to rule, to decide, and to make 
                                                            
961 Ibid 102. 
962 Ibid 101-102. 
963 John 1: 1, 3-4, 9-13. 
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certain, excluding faith and producing violence.  So perhaps the key to establishing a 
community or law of peace is to allow faith – a law embracing the mystery of Creator and 
created, the enchantment of human relationship based in trust and love and giving of self to 
neighbour, which actually and paradoxically increases subjectivity.  This is not a law which 
leads to death, but a law which gives life. 
 
A A New Law: Mutual Trust as Communal Good 
 
Hence, faith and truth are indissolubly linked in Christian theology as providing an 
alternative legal community.  The new law of the Spirit reveals the truth of the divinely 
revealed Christ and both produces and is apprehended by faith, so that faith supplements 
reason and allows true participation in the divine relations.  Paul promotes a polity governed 
by faith or trust, persuasion by aletheia, or the divine revelation of truth.  He also stresses that 
this rule of trust constitutes a more fundamental mode of eternal law.964  Such trust is a 
‘vertical’ trust that God is just to an eminent and infinite extent that we cannot begin to 
fathom and a trust that this justice will eventually triumph so that a harmony of peace and 
order will embrace humanity.965  It is also a ‘horizontal’ trust and mutual dependence 
between each member of the community.  Milbank reasons that  
It may appear that trust is weak recourse compared to the guarantees provided by law, courts, 
political constitutions, checks and balances, and so forth.  However, since all these processes 
are administered by human beings capable of treachery, a suspension of distrust, along with 
the positive working of tacit bonds of association, is the only real source of reliable solidarity 
for a community.  Hence to trust, to depend on others, is in reality the only reliable way in 
which the individual can extend his or her own power… the legitimate reach of one’s own 
capacities, and also the only reliable way to attain a collective strength.966   
                                                            
964 Milbank, Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651, 49-50. 
965 Ibid 53. 
966 Ibid. 
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So the new law of the Spirit constituted by faith relies on the divine revelation of the glory 
and sacrificial love of Christ, which eventually leads to freedom, an ontology of life and 
peace.  Another important component of this new law of the Spirit that truth is divine 
revelation leading to peace is not that it abolishes the old law of truth as secular rules of 
attestation, but that it transforms and redeems this law.  For example, in Galatians 3:19-25 
Paul explains that the old law cannot ‘give life’, but instead ‘imprisoned everything under 
sin’, leading to death.  However, with the arrival of Christ, the imprisonment of the old law is 
removed so that the promise of faith may be given to those who believe, those who behold his 
glory.  As Paul says elsewhere, ‘now we are released from the law, having died to that which 
held us captive, so that we serve in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way of the 
written code’.967  This new way of the Spirit is ‘love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, 
goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control’.968   
 
Significantly, Paul proceeds to say that against such things there is no law, for the old law of 
sin and death has been removed, and the new law is based on this fruit of the Spirit so that 
there is no law against it.  Indeed, there is no need for a law to be against it.  But as just 
mentioned, this removal of the old law is not its being abolished.  Rather, as stated in 
Matthew’s account which possesses the Jewish emphasis on the enduring nature of the law, 
Christ says he came ‘not to abolish’ the law, but to ‘fulfil’ it, and nothing will pass from the 
law until ‘all is accomplished’.969  Jesus further explains what this means in Matthew 22:37-
40, where he argues that to ‘love God’ and to ‘love your neighbour’ form the basis of the Old 
                                                            
967 Romans 7:6. 
968 Galatians 5:22-23. 
969 Matthew 5:17-18; Kee, above n 804, 19. 
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Testament law.  In other words, the law of love (to love your neighbour as yourself) fulfils 
the law.  Therefore, the old law of the letter is redeemed, transformed and ultimately fulfilled 
by the new law of the Spirit, which promotes the desire for peace, love and harmony.970  
Since the law of love fulfils the old law, it follows that the law of love and the new way of the 
Spirit are equivalent. 
 
Bearing in mind the claim earlier in the chapter that law may refer to both the Jewish Torah 
and the Roman civil law, Paul explicitly adopts the theme of love fulfilling the law in the 
specific context of civil law in Romans 13:1-10, explaining in verses 8-10 that ‘love fulfils 
the law’ because ‘it does no wrong to a neighbour’.  If one loves their neighbour, they will 
not murder them or steal from them and so forth according to the commandments of the old 
law, and therefore love fulfils the law.  Paul both explicitly and implicitly justifies obedience 
to the civil authorities through the law of love, thus redeeming and transforming the old law 
by the new law, and applying this principle to the civil law.  In verses 7 and 8, he explicitly 
provides the foundation for obedience to the civil law by stating that one should render to all 
what is owed to them, particularly taxes, revenue, respect and honour.  This is specifically 
addressing the issue of paying taxes to the civil authorities (who make and enforce the civil 
laws), and so the argument is that since the civil authorities will fulfil the law by ensuring it is 
obeyed, according to verse 8 (owe no one anything except to love one another, for love fulfils 
the law) we should obey the law as a function of love by giving the civil authorities the taxes 
they are owed in order to fulfil the law.  Thus, the fulfilling (which refers to obedience) of the 
law has its basis in the law of love. 
 
                                                            
970 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 121. 
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Secondly, the law of love is implicitly invoked in verse 2, where obedience of the civil law is 
premised on the fact that the civil law is ultimately instituted by God, so that disobeying the 
civil law is equivalent to disobeying God.  Since the law of love includes obeying God as a 
function of that love, Paul is essentially saying that when one is fulfilling or obeying the civil 
law, they are effectively loving God by being obedient to him.  Hence, the law of love fulfils 
and redeems the civil law.  Finally, the law of love is the contextual precondition of 
obedience to the civil authorities in the passage immediately preceding Romans 13:1-10.  In 
Romans 12:17-21, Paul states that one should not repay evil for evil, but overcome evil with 
good, doing good to one’s enemies and loving them.  This is the essence of the law of love, 
and its most extreme application – in the context of the law of love, to love your neighbour as 
yourself, Jesus explains in the Parable of the Good Samaritan that one’s neighbour can be 
even their most bitter enemy, for the Jews and Samaritans were enemies.971  Thus, to avenge 
one’s enemy is contrary to the law of love, and so Paul implies that instead of taking personal 
revenge, one should be subject to the civil authorities.  Since the law of love is Paul’s 
argument for not taking personal revenge, it follows that the law of love is the foundation for 
the fulfilling of the civil law in Romans 13.  Therefore, the new way of the Spirit, the law of 
love, not only transforms and redeems the secularised Old Testament law, but also opens the 
space for a redeemed legal community, and therefore a Christian ontology of peace and truth 
as aletheia – revelation of and participation in the divine. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
971 Luke 10:25-37.  This will be explored more in the final chapter. 
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B The Perpetual Atonement 
 
It could be objected that rather than law itself being secular and leading to violence, it is our 
human failure to properly implement divine truth in the legal system that results in violence.  
Put in somewhat stronger terms, it is the human appropriation of divine truth for nefarious 
purposes that results in violence – not the secular.  One thinks for example of the Crusades, 
the Inquisition, and the like.  It is certainly not disputed that such an appropriation of 
theology produces violence, but the precise point here is that it is a misappropriation; any 
variation of Christian theology which possesses a violent ontology is a distortion, a failure to 
properly participate in the ontological peace of the divine relations.  Sometimes, even when 
law is properly applied, there is violence and death.  In this sense the atonement is inevitable; 
Christ always has to die.  But it is in the paradoxically unique exemplar of Christ’s death in 
law, the law of love divinely revealed through the Incarnation, that we see the possibility for 
peace through the refusal of violence in law. 
 
For Christ’s crucifixion ‘restores the Good’ and ‘restores peace’, enabling the ‘possibility of 
mutual reconciliation’.972  This is because in Christ is displayed the one who ‘endures and 
compensates for evil… suffers violence without violent opposition, and yet at the same time 
positively opposes violence with a counter-violence to violence as such, which positively 
reasserts peace’.973  So for Milbank, the curse demonstrated by the application of secularised 
law and manifested in the violent punishment of Christ does not kill all hope, for the example 
of Christ is paradigmatic for observing the need to and possibility of avoiding punishment 
                                                            
972 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 79. 
973 Ibid.  See also Ibid 26-43.  This also provides a new perspective for considering Cover’s example of 
martyrdom as the foundation for law discussed in Chapter four.  Through the Incarnation, rather than martyrdom 
indicating the establishment of law by dominance, law is established through love, the peaceful resistance 
against violence. 
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and pursuing peace.  Indeed, the trial and punishment of Jesus itself condemns all other trials 
and punishments and forms of alien discipline.974  The only finally tolerable and non-sinful 
punishment for Christians must be the self-punishment inherent in sin.  When a person 
commits an evil act, he cuts himself off from the social peace and this means he is visited 
with social anger.  But the aim should be to reduce this anger to a calm fury against the sin, 
and to offer the sinner nothing but goodwill, so bringing him to the point of realising that his 
isolation is self-imposed.  Thus, this instance of punishment is paradoxically its instance of 
immediate cancellation.975   
 
In other words, rather than encouraging the violence of legal punishment through secularised 
sovereign power, Christianity advocates showing kindness to the sinner with the hope that 
they will see their communal isolation is through their own action, and that forgiveness from 
the community and reconciliation to the community is possible because of Christ.  Indeed, the 
ultimate instance of punishment paradoxically being its immediate cancellation is specifically 
in relation to the crucifixion of Christ, for in Christian theology the violence and punishment 
of the crucifixion cannot be considered in isolation from the peace and reconciliation of the 
resurrection.  It is the resurrection of Christ, presupposing his crucifixion and condemnation 
under the law, which cancels the curse of the secularised law as arbitrary sovereign power 
that leads to violence and death, transforming it, redeeming it, and revealing truth that leads 
to the law of the Spirit, which is life and social peace.  For in Christ’s refusal to respond to 
violence with violence, and in his relinquishing of himself, he is immediately returned 
through resurrection.976 
                                                            
974 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 427. 
975 Ibid 428.  
976 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 100. 
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C Resurrection: Christ our Peace 
 
Paul, in emphasising the unity of Jews and Gentiles in Christ, writes: 
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near by the blood of 
Christ. For he himself is our peace, who has made us both one and has broken down in his 
flesh the dividing wall of hostility by abolishing the law of commandments expressed 
in ordinances, that he might create in himself one new man in place of the two, so making 
peace, and might reconcile us both to God in one body through the cross, thereby killing the 
hostility. And he came and preached peace to you who were far off and peace to those who 
were near. For through him we both have access in one Spirit to the Father.977 
 
In Christ the old law of alienation and antagonism is abolished.  Rather than law as a secular 
series of mandates and prohibitions, which separate and categorise (causing hostility and 
conflict between the divided members of society), the death of Christ unites and harmonises.  
In Christ there is the refusal of violence and the sacrifice of love to all.  Since in Christ all 
Jews and Gentiles have been reconciled to God, all Jews and Gentiles have been reconciled to 
each other.  Importantly, it is not that the differences between peoples have been excluded or 
devalued.  It is not that Jews and Gentiles have their distinctive identity erased.  Rather, for 
those in Christ, the differences that exist no longer alienate them from one another.978  In 
addition, this peace uniquely comes through Christ – ‘in Christ’ you have been ‘brought near 
by the blood of Christ’, and ‘he himself is our peace’.979  It follows from this that it is only 
through the contours of truth, the structure of the Christ-Event displayed through the 
Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection, that we can shape our social existence to promote 
peace and reconciliation, removing the violence of alienation.980   
 
                                                            
977 Ephesians 2:13-18; Victor Paul Furnish, ‘The Letter of Paul to the Ephesians’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The 
Interpreter’s Concise Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abingdon, 1983) 304. 
978 Furnish, Ephesians, above n 977, 319-320. 
979 Ephesians 2:13-14. 
980 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 102-103. 
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In other words, a society of peace through mutual love as self-sacrifice and the removal of 
arbitrary categories is both enabled and modelled by Christ.  This is an intrinsically 
supernatural society, one that cannot be comprehended, constrained or codified by a secular, 
legalistic law.  This is opposed to the natural society or, as Hobbes termed it, the state of 
nature.  The society of secular liberalism or Hobbesian nature is the life which pursues death.  
It is the life which seeks the assertion of oneself over another, a life that is overlaid with 
alienating formal divisions.  However, with the vision of Christ who gives life through 
resurrection, death is no longer authoritative.981  Rather than (for example) the Hobbesian 
need for law to restrict the violent outworking of intrinsic self-interest, in Christ we are no 
longer bounded by law and death, since we have died with Christ, and are also risen with him 
so that we cannot sin and continuously promote peace and the good through our 
(super)natural communal life – and consequently the law is no longer needed.982 
 
But given the suffering and death that has contingently entered this world – ‘Christ on the 
cross suffered death, the ravages of human malice, and the attempt by nomos (Roman and 
Jewish) to control and economise this malice for the sake of the seemingly best achievable 
welfare of the political community’ – we are also called to suffer like Christ.   We can 
because ‘there has been disclosed by the passage through the cross another, more-living, 
actively receptive, and participatory life that knows no death’ – through Christ’s resurrection 
and the spiritual life of mutual community.983  Beyond a secular law and by the law of love, 
through Christ’s death and resurrection we can once more instantiate a legal community of 
flourishing and giving life. 
                                                            
981 Milbank, Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651, 42-43. 
982 Ibid 43. 
983 Ibid 44-45. 
281 
 
VI RESURRECTING THE PEACEFUL LEGAL COMMUNITY 
 
So Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection point to the beyond of the mystery of the 
Trinitarian relations, revealing the glory and love that subsists between Father and Son by the 
Spirit, and allowing participation in that love and glory by faith.  This truth as aletheia, or 
divine revelation, removes the violence and death of the law of sin and secular attestation, 
transforming and redeeming the law by the new way of the Spirit, the law of love.  This law 
comes by the same Spirit that raised Christ from the dead and removes the former hostility 
and enmity of the old secular way of alienation and antagonism, and therefore leads to life 
and peace.  Indeed, as Milbank notes, in traditional modes of violence there is a dualism of 
the included and the excluded, and the old secular law appears to remain trapped by this 
dualism, as alluded to by Paul in the passage above from Ephesians.  Converse to this, the 
Christian idea of law aspires to a law that is at one with life – with Being.984  This law is the 
law of love, which reveals and reproduces the divine Being, producing life and peace.  Hence 
Christ, the logos and aletheia of God, in whom faith and reason unite and truth is revealed, 
redeems and transforms law, uniquely bringing to it a Christian ontology of peace through the 
law of love. 
 
This vision is ideally a blueprint for society, but it also provides the means to live in our 
current society.  It is not advocating theocracy, but a Christian polity within what may be a 
secular state – a Christian approach which may redeem and transform conceptions of the 
state.  The fact one can redeem the other implies there is still a distinction between the two – 
Jesus’ kingdom is not of this world, it is a heavenly peace which may be brought to earth to 
                                                            
984 Milbank, Postmodern Critical Augustinianism, above n 63, 270. 
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the extent that we participate in the divine being.  As such, there is no need to finally alienate 
the secular in articulating the theological.  The material love craved by the secular is not to be 
ignored.  As we shall see in the following chapter, secular materiality may be redeemed 
through this same law of life by the resurrection.  For in the resurrection, paradoxically, true 
materialism may be found in the most spiritual of events, and life is achieved through death.  
Furthermore, it seems possible that as the material practice of the secular is continued (but 
redeemed) through faith, belief itself may come. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE PARADOX OF LAW AND TRUTH IN CHRISTIANITY: 
ON MATERIALISM, THE SUBLIME AND READING THE 
PAULINE LAW OF LOVE 
 
I ŽIŽEK, MATERIALISM AND THE CHRISTIAN LEGACY 
 
A A Paradoxical Position 
 
As argued in the preceding chapters, a secularised law based in secular reason results in 
antagonism and alienation within a community.  However, through the paradigm of the law 
of loving your neighbour as yourself, which is the unity and diversity in the community of the 
Trinity, a model is provided from Christian theology which allows a harmonious relationship 
between the individual and the society; one which avoids violence, and provides for a 
peaceful legal community which privileges one’s neighbour as an individual and therefore 
strengthens the community as a composite of unique individuals.985  With this theological 
approach, law is grounded in truth and is implemented through the law of love, uniting faith 
and reason and consequently creating a harmonious legal community.   
                                                            
985 See e.g. Gunton, The One, The Three and The Many, above n 20, 210-222. 
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So in essence we have proposed the Christian or Pauline law of love as the foundation for a 
redeemed system of peaceful human community.  What is interesting is that even an atheist 
like Slovenian Lacanian-Marxist philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, views this Christian legacy as 
worth fighting for.  Žižek frankly acknowledges his atheistic position as follows: 
For me, there is no transcendent God-Father who discloses himself to us, humans, only in a 
limited way.  The reason God can only appear incognito is that there is nothing to take 
cognisance of here: God is hidden not to hide some transcendent truth, but to hide the fact 
there is nothing to hide.986   
 
Why is the ‘Christian legacy worth fighting for?’987  Žižek apparently sees something in 
Christianity that ought to be recovered, something that Milbank has also identified (though 
their understandings are different) – materialism and the sublime.988  So through Žižek and 
his discussion of Christian material sublimity we can clarify and deepen our understanding of 
the structure of Christian truth in the form of Incarnational Paradox, the resurrection and the 
law of love, for the purpose of articulating the foundation for a human community of peace.  
His direct interactions with Milbank also make Žižek a productive counterpoint, such that we 
can work with Žižek in order to shape the contours of truth.  Through this process we can 
also indicate a way in which those who engage in a secular approach may be equally loved in 
a Christian community of peace, rather than existing in a space of alienation from this 
community or antagonism within this community, which would perpetuate the violence we 
are attempting to avoid. 
                                                            
986 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Dialectical Clarity Versus the Misty Conceit of Paradox’ in C Davis (ed), The Monstrosity of 
Christ: Paradox or Dialectic (MIT Press, 2009) 235-236. 
987 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute: Or, why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? (Verso, 2000) 2.  
It is also worth noting that there appears to be no intrinsic incompatibility between Lacan and Christianity, 
which is perhaps assumed by Žižek.  See for example Jacques Lacan, The Triumph of Religion Preceded by 
Discourse to Catholics (Polity, 2013). 
988 As will be explained in this chapter, materialism generally refers to the physical or immanent sphere, as 
opposed to the spiritual or transcendent.  The sublime refers to that which is beyond limit, in some sense 
unfathomable or deep. 
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Following Milbank then, this chapter proposes that the key to restoring reason to faith and 
providing a sublime Christian materialism which will arguably resolve the problem of 
alienation and antagonism is Incarnational paradox incorporating resurrection as well as 
crucifixion, which assumes and instantiates the Pauline law of love: that one should love their 
neighbours as themselves.  Part I of the chapter introduces the secular position of Slavoj 
Žižek, describing his atheistic Christian materialism and adjusting it through John Milbank in 
order to arrive at a theological Christian materialism which properly incorporates 
resurrection.  In part II, Žižek’s terminology of the ‘Sublime Object’ is adopted and it is 
argued that this may be paradigmatically applied to Christ’s defeat of death through 
resurrection.   
 
Part III contends that we may participate in this sublimity through faith in the paradox of 
Christ’s Incarnation, Crucifixion and Resurrection – that in order to have true and flourishing 
life, we must first die.  This unites reason and faith, reveals the law of love, and enables its 
replication in the community.  According to this reading of Paul, it is the peaceful uniting of 
humanity through the resurrection which institutes the law of love, and makes a legal 
community grounded in the truth of loving the individual possible; it follows that law and 
truth are paradoxical yet symbiotic in Christian theology.  Part IV concludes and notes there 
is one further paradox which can allow final peace in the community, even between the 
secular and the faithful – that just as the practice of love follows faith, so faith follows the 
practice of love. 
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B Structuring the Christian Material 
 
Žižek states that: 
My claim is not merely that I am a materialist through and through, and that the subversive 
kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: 
this kernel is accessible only to a materialist approach – and vice versa: to become a true 
dialectical materialist, one should go through the Christian experience.989   
 
His focus on the material here is central.  It indicates that Žižek is not advocating some sort 
of secular ethic, or embracing some sentimental understanding of Jesus as merely a good 
moral teacher.  The question is not one pertaining to the content of Christianity, but rather its 
structure.  This is because for Žižek, the Christian experience is uniquely associated with 
absence or void through the death of God.990  The idea stems from his understanding of 
materialism itself: it ‘is not the assertion of inert material density in its humid heaviness—
such a “materialism” can always serve as a support for gnostic spiritualist obscurantism. In 
contrast, a true materialism joyously assumes the “disappearance of matter,” the fact that 
there is only void’.991  Materialism is not that which is earthy, but focuses on the nothing, the 
void; true materialism emphasises the contingency and finality of matter which will be no 
more. 
 
In other words,  
The basic axiom of today’s materialism is for me the ontological incompleteness of reality… 
This incompleteness of reality also provides an answer to the question I am often asked by 
materialists: is it even worth spending time on religion, flogging a dead horse? Why this 
eternal replaying of the death of God? Why not simply start from the positive materialist 
premise and develop it? The only appropriate answer to this is the Hegelian one… A truly 
logical materialism accepts the basic insight of religion, its premise that our commonsense 
                                                            
989 Slavoj Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf (MIT, 2003) 6. 
990 Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Fear of Four Words: A Modest Plea for a Hegelian Reading of Christianity’ in Creston 
Davis (ed), The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic (MIT Press, 2009) 92. 
991 Ibid. 
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reality is not the true one; what it rejects is the conclusion that, therefore, there must be 
another, “higher,” suprasensible reality. Commonsense realism, positive religion, and 
materialism thus form a Hegelian triad. How, then, is this reference to God to be taken; how 
do we use this term?  Literally—so that there “effectively is” God, divine history, inclusive of 
God’s death, or “merely metaphorically,” so that God is ultimately a “mythical name” for a 
meta- psychological process? Both versions are to be rejected: it is, of course, not “literally” 
(we are materialists, there is no God), but it is also not “metaphorically” (“God” is not just a 
metaphor, a mystifying expression, of human passions, desires, ideals, etc.). What such a 
“metaphorical” reading misses is the dimension of the Inhuman as internal (“ex- timate”) to 
being- human: “God” (the divine) is a name for that which in man is not human, for the 
inhuman core that sustains being- human.992 
 
So Žižek argues that Christianity is necessary in order to articulate a genuine materialism, 
because it alone points to the void, the ‘ontological incompleteness of reality’, through its 
description of the death of God.  And the term ‘God’ does not literally refer to some personal, 
all-powerful, benevolent being as in the Christian tradition (for such a being does not exist), 
nor to a metaphor for human attitudes, but to that in humanity which is not human yet 
sustains human being.  The emphasis here is on the material practices of Christianity which 
stem from the absence of its God, or as Lacan understands it, the big Other: 
Today, Christianity is alive only in materialist (atheist) practices which negate it (the Pauline 
community of believers, for example, is to be found today in radical political groups, not in 
churches)… a true materialism not only asserts that only material reality “really exists,” but 
has to assume all the consequences of what Lacan called the nonexistence of the big Other, 
and it is only Christianity that opens up the space for thinking this nonexistence, insofar as it 
is the religion of a God who dies.993 
 
Hence why Žižek believes the Christian legacy is worth fighting for: 
The only way to redeem the subversive core of Christianity is therefore to return to death- of- 
God theology… what “dies” on the Cross is not just the false (positive, ontic) envelope of 
Divinity, which was obfuscating its evental core; what dies is God himself, the structuring 
principle of our entire universe, its life- giving force, the guarantee of its meaning… at this 
point of apocalypse, opposites coincide… his death is the death of Evil, so that crucifixion 
and resurrection are one event.994 
 
Žižek fundamentally argues that the Christian legacy allows the subversion of dominating 
material political practices because of its focus on the end of matter through the death of God, 
                                                            
992 Žižek, Dialectical Clarity, above n 986, 240. 
993 Ibid 287. 
994 Ibid 260-261. 
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or the Big Other.  It follows from this materialist perspective that ‘the reality of the Cross is 
the only reality there is’, since the Cross is the material reality of absence manifesting.995  So 
the resurrection and the crucifixion are no longer separate events, but one is subsumed into 
the other –  
 
 
… resurrection is nothing but “the universalization of the crucifixion”… This self- reflexive 
turn is, of course, the passage from “spurious infinity” to true infinity, from relating to others 
(interacting with them) to self- relating: Christ is “actual infinity” because he turns the act of 
violence back upon himself, sacrificing himself (thus breaking the endless vicious cycle of 
reaction and revenge, of the “eye for an eye”). In this way, he already enacts universality: he 
becomes universal in his very singularity, acquiring a distance from his particularity as a 
person among others, interacting with them. In other words, when “each annihilates himself 
for others good,” sacrifice self- cancels itself and we enter universal Love.996 
 
The final act is that as evil dies through Christ sacrificing himself, universal love is enacted – 
or what Žižek might term the law of love.  In other words, Christ’s particular death 
universalises the refusal of violence by sacrifice, and because sacrifice is sacrificed, the 
sacrifice is therefore cancelled, and love becomes the universal enactment or law. 
 
C Sites of the Christian Material: Law, Science, Faith 
 
1 Death and Absence 
 
Let us elucidate these ideas in some more detail.  In regard to its particularly legal aspect, 
according to Lacan and Žižek the Symbolic law (or the ‘big Other’) regulates the public 
narrative symbolic space, but what lies ‘beneath’ the Symbolic Law (the impossible Thing of 
                                                            
995 Ibid 267. 
996 Ibid 267-268. 
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the Real unable to be contained) is actually that which makes the law – it is unconscious 
experience, capricious and arbitrary, leaving no guarantee for the subject.997  In this way, 
lying actually refers to the Big Other, which lies in the guise of truth, or feigns to feign.998  
The authority of law is therefore dependent on its own enunciation, which means that it has 
no intrinsic authority or reason, but simply relies on its own positing.999  This traumatic fact is 
repressed into the unconscious through the imagination that law has its foundation in truth or 
justice.  The law is not to be accepted as true, only as necessary – its authority is without 
truth, and the solution is not to seek truth by reason, but to submit to the regime of the 
Symbolic so that truth can be seen.1000  For Žižek then, the supposition of people in law’s 
authority stems from a faith in law, from a belief or confidence in the truth behind law.  
People only accept that law is authoritative insofar as they already believe in law.  However, 
the belief that truth resides in law is illusory and can be described by the psychoanalytic 
concept of transference – the reasons we believe law is true are only persuasive to those who 
already believe law to be true.1001   
 
Žižek thus articulates the incompleteness of law – that it is never grounded in truth and is 
necessary without being true – there is always something beyond it (the Real), no 
fundamental Other that can ground the law or redeem its founding violence.1002  One could 
see this as an extension of his definition of materialism discussed earlier; materialism 
acknowledges the ontological incompleteness of reality, here it is so in a legal sense.  As 
                                                            
997 E Casey and J Woody, ‘Hegel, Heidegger, Lacan: The Dialectic of Desire’ in S Žižek (ed), Jacques Lacan: 
Critical Evaluations in Cultural Theory (Routledge, 2003) 131-132; F Jameson, ‘Imaginary and Symbolic in 
Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the Subject’ (1977) 55 Yale French Studies 338, 
353.  Here the Big Other refers to that which structures reality – and so for Lacan and Žižek encompasses both 
the Christian God and the Symbolic: language, symbols, signifiers, law and the like. 
998 Casey and Woody, above n 997, 80-81. 
999 We saw this expressed slightly differently by Austin and Derrida in Chapter Four. 
1000 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (Verso, 1989) 37-39. 
1001 J Dean, ‘Žižek on Law’ (2004) 15 Law and Critique 1, 8. 
1002 Ibid 14.  Here one may recall Freud’s parable of law’s origin based on parricide. 
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noted above in relation to Christ’s death, Žižek finds a solution to this problem in a secular 
approach to the notions of loving one’s neighbour and ‘unplugging’ found in St Paul, or 
disengaging oneself from the idleness that constrains the subject to identify with the 
hegemonic social order or Symbolic.  This is not a merely inner contemplative stance, but an 
active work of love which leads to an alternative community.1003 
 
It is in this context that in his typical fashion, Žižek exposes what he claims is the dialectical 
nature of Christianity.  According to Christianity, humans have been created by God, but 
have failed to keep his standard expressed in his moral law.  As a consequence, God as a just 
God must punish this sin, but because of his love for humanity God puts forward his own son 
Jesus Christ, as God in human form, to take the punishment deserved for sin on the cross.  
Whoever repents and trusts in Jesus to take their punishment on the cross receives Jesus’ 
righteousness due to his perfect life, and with this, forgiveness, reconciliation with God and 
eternal life.1004  Žižek, adopting Hegelian ontology with the terminology of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, argues that if the effect of the crucifixion is God existing as the Holy Spirit in 
terms of a mere community of believers bound by love (that is, rather than a translation of 
essence from God the Father and God the Son to God the Holy Spirit, the essence is 
sublated/disintegrated), it follows that the Big Other is no longer required.  As such, if God 
dies in Christ as his earthly embodiment on the cross, not only does God die, but he 
disintegrates as the Big Other.  This is what Hegel termed the ‘monstrosity’ of Christ: that the 
‘insertion of Christ as the Mediator between God and man is strictly equivalent to the fact 
that there is no Big Other’.1005   
                                                            
1003 Ibid 20-21; Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, above n 987, 135. 
1004 C.f. Romans 3:20-26; 2 Corinthians 5:21. 
1005 Slavoj Žižek, ‘Is it Still Possible to be a Hegelian Today?’ in L Bryant et al (eds), The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism (RE Press, 2011) 217-218. 
291 
 
 
Therefore, the corollary of Christian faith for Žižek is that belief in the God who sacrifices 
himself on the cross for sin renders one an atheist, for it is in fact belief in a dead God, a non-
entity, a thing without substance or essence. 
[This is] [t]he ultimate lesson to be learned from the divine Incarnation: the finite existence of 
mortal humans is the only site of the Spirit, the site where Spirit achieves its actuality. What 
this means is that, in spite of all its grounding power, Spirit is a virtual entity in the sense that 
its status is that of a subjective presupposition: it exists only insofar as subjects act as if it 
exists… it is… the divine Substance itself (God as a Thing- in- Itself) which is sublated: 
negated (what dies on the Cross is the substantial figure of the transcendent God), but 
simultaneously maintained in the transubstantiated form of the Holy Spirit, the community of 
believers which exists only as the virtual presupposition of the activity of finite individuals.1006   
 
We mentioned previously that for Žižek the resurrection and the crucifixion are in fact the 
same event.  He explains further:  
This is how we should reread Christ’s resurrection in a materialist way: it is not that there is 
first his dead body and then its resurrection—the two events, death and resurrection, are 
strictly contemporaneous. Christ is resurrected in us, the collective of believers, and his 
tortured dead body remains forever as its material remainder. A materialist does not deny 
miracles, he just reminds us that they live behind disturbing material leftovers.1007 
  
So Christ is resurrected not bodily or literally, but through the spirit of love which binds the 
believers following his crucifixion. 
Is this not Christ’s message of resurrection—what “God is love” means is: “No one has ever 
seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and his love is made complete in us”… 
for Christianity, the true miracle is not the dead Christ walking around, but the love in the 
collective of believers… It is this key dimension of the Holy Spirit as the spirit of the 
community of believers, as something which is here only insofar as we, believers, include 
ourselves in it… Crucifixion is Resurrection—to see this, one has only to include oneself in 
the picture. When the believers gather, mourning Christ’s death, their shared spirit is the 
resurrected Christ.1008 
 
                                                            
1006 Žižek, Fear of Four Words, above n 990, 60-61. 
1007 Žižek, Dialectical Clarity, above n 986, 287. 
1008 Ibid 290-291. 
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In short, Christ is not actually resurrected and the Holy Spirit is not a distinct person of the 
Trinity who comes to dwell within believers.1009  This is not the true miracle or the essence of 
the material.  Rather, according to Žižek, the true miracle is love in the collection of believers 
which constitutes the Holy Spirit and the resurrected Christ, and the material fact of Christ is 
that this ‘resurrection’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ exist against the backdrop of Christ’s dead body. 
 
 
2 Life, Presence, Hope 
 
There is much to appreciate about Žižek’s reading here.  He is insightful in his identification 
that Christ’s death is a sacrifice, in some sense a refusal of violence.  Similarly, it is true that 
at the point of crucifixion, opposites coincide – this is the epitome of paradox, manifested in 
Christ’s Incarnation, and ultimately producing a community of love between the believers.  
However, there are also places where he does not quite hit the mark.  These issues can be 
crudely summarised as a misunderstanding of the resurrection.  For example, Žižek states that 
‘when Christ dies, what dies with him is the secret hope discernible in “Father, why hast thou 
forsaken me?”: the hope that there is a father who has abandoned me.  The “Holy Spirit” is 
the community deprived of its support in the big Other’.1010  Žižek gets this part right in the 
sense that Christ’s death appears to be the death of hope, and his conception of the 
resurrection means that this hope can never be restored.   
 
But the resurrection is the very evidence that God our Father has not abandoned us, and hope 
remains with faith and love.1011  As Jesus says, ‘I will not leave you as orphans… I will ask 
the Father, and he will give you another Helper… the Holy Spirit… to be with you 
                                                            
1009 C.f. Ephesians 1:13-14, 19-20. 
1010 Žižek, Dialectical Clarity, above n 986, 171. 
1011 C.f. 1 Corinthians 13:13. 
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forever’.1012  And after his resurrection, Jesus states that ‘I am with you always, to the end of 
the age’.1013  Žižek should admit that believers are not finally abandoned by God but helped 
by the Holy Spirit, whether or not this is the actual indwelling Spirit of God which comprises 
and unites the spiritual community through the law of the Spirit as Milbank states, or the 
mere existence of the spiritual community itself as Žižek says.  Milbank, following the 
Apostle Paul (as will be contended later), argues that Christ’s resurrection is the basis or 
foundation for the community of faith.  But Žižek appears to be saying that Christ is 
resurrected through the presence of the community of faith.  It follows that Milbank’s and 
Žižek‘s structures appear to be practically identical; the only difference is the orientation.   
So in overviewing the structure of the crucifixion and resurrection, Milbank states: 
This counter-violent violence was disclosed as consisting in utter self-giving which is 
immediately return, as resurrection…  in dying, because he is God, Christ is not truly 
abandoned, but through apparent abandonment is finally and inexorably returned to us.1014  
 
Christ’s refusal of violence and giving of himself resulted in immediate return through the 
resurrection, and paradoxically it is through his apparent (but not real) abandonment that he is 
ultimately returned.  Conversely, on Žižek’s view, Christ’s death signals abandonment by 
God, the final victory of death manifested through the hopeless material remainder of Christ’s 
dead body.  We should therefore accept Milbank’s ontology over Žižek’s, because we only 
gain hope of the final defeat of death, the final act of violence, and final communion with 
God through the actual resurrection itself.   
 
 
Against Žižek’s claim that Christ’s death signals the space for universal love, it is actually his 
death and distinct resurrection that allows this possibility.  As Milbank states, the ‘pre-
Cartesian Catholic metaphysical vision’ of the ‘resurrected body… permits… the universal 
                                                            
1012 John 14:16, 18, 26. 
1013 Matthew 28:20. 
1014 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 100. 
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possibility of love…Here one can claim that the Catholic perspective achieves a materialism 
in a joyful, positive sense… for matter to “matter” there must be a recognition of a mediating 
link between matter and spirit’.1015  Through the quintessential materiality of Christ’s 
resurrection, humanity and divinity (matter and spirit) are mediated and united in one 
glorified body forever, and by faith we analogically participate in this body.  So rather than a 
dreary materialism that finishes with the tortured and dead body of Christ, abandoned with no 
hope, by faith in the resurrection a Christian materialism joyfully embraces the glorified body 
of love provided by Christ. 
 
3 The Place of Faith (and Reason) 
 
I have alluded to this contention that faith is indispensable to a proper Christiam materialism.  
More explicitly, Hebrews 11:1 states that ‘faith is the substance of things hoped for, the 
evidence of things not seen’.1016  In other words, faith is the material fact, the immanent 
substance and evidence for the transcendent, and consequently the foundation for a 
theological Christian materialism which allows immanent and tangible peace from a 
transcendent and immaterial source – the living, triune God.   
 
Žižek too acknowledges this need for faith, though from a very different perspective.  For 
Žižek, the principle of his analysis which reveals the apparent yet strangely paradoxical 
affinity between Christian monotheism and atheism demonstrates not that atheism depends 
upon monotheism, but that ‘monotheism itself prefigures atheism in the field of religion’ – 
                                                            
1015 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 125. 
1016 King James Version. 
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that ‘God is a dead God’, a ‘sublated nothing’.1017  Indeed, the very concept of a God who 
will give himself up for humanity in Christian theism opens the space for atheism to occur as 
a result.  However, it is not simply the case that all paths lead to atheism.  Even Žižek, in a 
series of final comments, makes the radical proposal that atheism is the ‘negation of the 
negation of belief’, and so results in a return to faith, but without God – a belief in belief 
without reference to a particular object, such as God.1018  
 
The implication of a lack of necessity through the death of God which follows from Žižek’s 
critique intersects with Milbank’s statements regarding contingency, for Milbank argues that 
on this view all that exists is contingency, or the contingent remainder – the contingent is 
absolutised.1019  In other words, the only possibly universal truth that secular reason can 
entertain is the rule of contingency.1020  Thus, paradoxically, the death of necessity 
absolutises contingency.  In addition to this, the death of God as the ‘necessary being’ 
precludes ‘metaphysical mediation’, for ‘there is no longer any metaphysical to mediate’.1021  
Milbank observes that this has ‘led to a vacuum’, and without metaphysical mediation, 
‘various modes of fideistic religion have emerged and rushed to fill this void’.1022  In short, 
the establishment of necessary contingence inevitably leads to faith without reason.  This 
observation parallels Žižek’s earlier critique that since law is not grounded in truth, it is 
believed by faith without reason.  Thus, the specific issue identified by Milbank is that 
                                                            
1017 Žižek, Hegelian Today, above n 1005, 96. 
1018 Ibid 101. 
1019 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 114-115. 
1020 Ibid 259. 
1021 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 328. 
1022 Ibid. 
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‘merely fideistic faith mimics rationalistic reason without faith’, and he seeks an alternative 
structure that unites reason with faith.1023   
 
This alternative structure in particular is faith in the resurrection.  The true miracle is not the 
disturbing material leftover of Christ’s tortured, dead body, but that this body is itself 
gloriously resurrected and redeemed, as the prototype for our own resurrection.  ‘But in 
fact Christ has been raised from the dead, the first fruits of those who have fallen asleep. For 
as by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam 
all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive’.1024  As we shall see during this chapter, this 
resurrection empowers faith, and by faith we are able to joyfully participate in this bodily 
resurrection through Christ.   
 
Moreover, Žižek’s faith in a non-entity, the dead God, a sublated nothing – this appears to 
fundamentally lack the requisite materiality sought in Christian theology, and also seems to at 
odds with the accounts of the disciples recording the resurrection.  Despite Žižek’s claims to 
the contrary, with faith in Jesus bodily resurrected rather than faith in nothingness, there 
exists a genuine materiality which can become the basis for a Christian theological 
materialism.  The law too is redeemed through the resurrection.  It is no longer a lie, but the 
truth; it is the revelation of Christ’s divinity which can be believed through a faith united with 
reason, rather than a fideistic or blind faith.  This is further confirmed by the disciples 
themselves testifying about this resurrected body through eyewitness accounts, as well as 
empirically observing it.     
                                                            
1023 Ibid 333. 
1024 1 Corinthians 15:20-22. 
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The earliest written account of the resurrection is probably that of the Apostle Paul in 1 
Corinthians 15:3-8, where he describes an early oral tradition of Jesus’ appearances to the 
twelve disciples and others, before alluding to his own experience of seeing the risen 
Christ.1025  Matthew records the disciples seeing the risen Jesus and worshiping him 
(Matthew 28:16-17); the accounts of Luke (Luke 24:36-43) and John (John 20:19-21:14) 
record the risen Jesus appearing before the disciples, inviting them to see and touch his hands 
and feet, and eating with them.  Mark’s account records an angel at the tomb informing the 
women that Jesus had risen (Mark 16:1-8), though verses 9-20 are most likely not original to 
the gospel of Mark.1026  Nevertheless, Matthew and John were both original disciples and 
eyewitnesses, Mark was probably recording his account informed by an original disciple and 
eyewitness (Peter), and Luke interviewed the original disciples and eyewitnesses for his 
account.1027 
 
Therefore, the accounts of the resurrection in the Gospels and by the Apostle Paul are given 
as original evidence through individual eyewitness testimony, not as unreliable and 
inadmissible hearsay, and so from a purely legal perspective are considered to be evidentially 
trustworthy, where trustworthiness is a belief or faith united with reason.1028  From a 
‘scientific’ perspective, to perhaps anachronistically consider the disciple Thomas, he in 
particular was not content to simply believe in Christ as a fideist (in the sense of blind faith 
without any reason), but believed on the basis of the physical evidence provided by touching 
                                                            
1025 James Price, ‘The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s Concise 
Commentary on Acts and Paul’s Letters (Abinbgdon, 1983) 229. 
1026 See Lindsay Pherigo, ‘The Gospel According to Mark’ in Charles Laymon (ed), The Interpreter’s Concise 
Commentary on the Gospels (Abinbgdon, 1983) 174-177. 
1027 See Luke 1:1-4; John 21:24; Gundry, above n 843, 78-79, 83-85, 93-94, 101-103. 
1028 E.g. 1 Corinthians 15:3-8. 
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Christ’s pierced feet and hands.1029  In a fundamentally reasonable way, the disciples 
affirmed that it was the resurrected Christ.  They touched him, ate with him, and conversed 
with him, having faith in the legal and physical evidence before them.1030  It is true that these 
are individual accounts, but they involve eyewitness testimony and physical evidence.  Žižek 
may not admit the resurrection as a life-giving event distinct from the Crucifixion, but it 
would seem that in adopting this approach Žižek’s interpretation of what the accounts record 
about the resurrection is incomplete. 
 
Bearing in mind the testimony about the resurrection, faith in the resurrection is not mere 
fideism that is against reason, nor is it secular rationality which excludes faith by definition, 
or belief in nothing.  Rather, it is a faith in Christ which is compatible with reason, a faith 
based fundamentally in truth affirmed by law, and even a faith in law itself.  In effect then, to 
have faith in the resurrection is to affirm law.  What we therefore see is that from the 
perspective of Christian theology, faith in the resurrection as truth and law produces a 
genuinely Christian materialism.  As shall be argued in subsequent sections, through paradox 
this can allow faith to be united with reason, as well as the implementation of the law of love.  
However, there is one more ingredient required – the sublime. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1029 Interestingly, he did not even believe the (original evidence of) eyewitness testimony by the other disciples, 
but needed the physical evidence.  Although the actual fact of Thomas touching Christ’s hands and feet is not 
recorded, the invitation by Jesus and the subsequent affirmation of his Lordship and Deity by Thomas indicates 
that he did accept Jesus’ invitation and was satisfied that he had in fact been raised from the dead.  See John 
20:24-29.  Furthermore, Jesus affirms that those who believe without the physical evidence (unlike Thomas) 
will be blessed.  Perhaps it is those who believe the eyewitness testimony, those who trust in the law of love 
proclaimed by Christ and Paul, who are blessed in this sense. 
1030 John 20:24-21:14. 
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II THE SUBLIME OBJECT: DEFEATING DEATH 
 
Exploring the idea of the sublime allows further refining of the structure of the Incarnation 
and resurrection as paradoxical, and it is a major theme of Žižek‘s work.  He states that 
‘sublimity excites and agitates… the sentiment of Sublimity is attached to chaotic, terrifying, 
limitless phenomena… the Sublime must follow Beauty as a form of mediation of its 
immediacy… the sublime object [is] “an object raised to the level of the (impossible-real) 
Thing”’.1031  In other words, for Žižek the sublime is that which is terrifyingly monstrous in 
the sense that it is beyond any limit or categorisation; it cannot be adequately represented, 
mediated or apprehended, and yet it is the most real of things.  Žižek also observes the 
paradoxical nature of the sublime: 
The paradox of the Sublime is as follows: in principle, the gap separating phenomenal, 
empirical objects of experience from the Thing-In-Itself is insurmountable – that is, no 
empirical object, no representation of it can adequately represent the Thing… but the Sublime 
is an object in which we can experience this very impossibility… by means of the very failure 
of representation, we can have a presentiment of the true dimension of the Thing.1032   
 
Although expressed in Kantian terms, the paradox of the sublime indicated by Žižek can also 
be seen as Incarnational in regard to Christ.  Specifically, Christ as the God-man cannot be 
apprehended; his full glory cannot be countenanced, categorised, or expressed in terms of 
limits.  Nevertheless, it is through this utter transcendence of Christ being displayed through 
the immanent Incarnational event that we are actually able to grasp the truth of Christ by faith 
– that in his sacrifice and love we may have forgiveness of sins and eternal life with him in 
glory.  As Žižek states, ‘we can now see why it is precisely nature in its most chaotic, 
boundless, terrifying dimension which is best qualified to awaken in us the feeling of the 
                                                            
1031 Žižek, Sublime Object, above n 1000, 202-203. 
1032 Ibid 203. 
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Sublime: here, where the aesthetic imagination is strained to its utmost, where all finite 
determinations dissolve themselves, the failure appears at its purest’.1033  Purely secular or 
human reason, in its desire to categorise, to observe, and even to imagine, is fundamentally 
limited and therefore can never experience the sublime.  It is only nature enlightened by 
grace, taken beyond itself by the revelation of truth, which can really see the glory of Christ 
in his defeat of death. 
 
Ultimately, I claim that this defeat of death is the paradigmatic sublime object.  Death is the 
great equaliser, the perennial limit of human existence.  Žižek, though, contends for 
something different: 
Homologous to Hegel’s determination of the difference between the death of the pagan god 
and the death of Christ (the first being merely the death of the terrestrial embodiment, of the 
terrestrial representation, figure, of God, while with the death of Christ it is God of beyond, 
God as a positive transcendent, unattainable entity, which dies) we could say… the 
experience of the nullity, of the inadequacy of the phenomenal world of representation, which 
befalls us in the sentiment of the Sublime, means at the same time the nullity, the 
nonexistence of the transcendent Thing-In-Itself as a positive entity… the Sublime is… an 
object which occupies the place, replaces, fills out the empty place of the Thing as the void, 
as the pure Nothing of absolute negativity – the Sublime is an object whose positive body is 
just an embodiment of Nothing.1034 
 
We saw above that Žižek argues that sublimity is attached to terrifying, limitless phenomena, 
and here he applies death to this definition in the sense that death means the terrifying, 
endless void of nonexistence.  However, sublimity is more intrinsically found not in death 
and the consequent emptiness or nothing, the lack, but in the eternal presence; through 
Christ’s resurrection, even death is no limit, but there is only endless life.  This, perhaps, is 
the real terror, the magnificent monstrosity, the truly sublime – that even death has no limit 
                                                            
1033 Ibid. 
1034 Ibid 206. 
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on us.  It is not death and its final, finite nothingness that is sublime, but eternal, unlimited, 
unparalleled life by death. 
 
So for a genuinely sublime Christian materialism, the resurrection and the glory (light) of 
Christ is again rendered central, for it is through the resurrection of Christ that death is truly 
defeated: ‘When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and the mortal puts on immortality, 
then shall come to pass the saying that is written: “Death is swallowed up in victory.” “O 
death, where is your victory? O death, where is your sting?”’1035  And so Milbank 
consequently argues that: 
The sublime does not reside in the obscure divine background alone; it is also the manifest, 
sudden and unbearable light.  This light, although intolerable and excessive, is nonetheless 
visible and clarifying… this sublime event has not ceased to belong to the realm of the 
beautiful, precisely because of its ethico-political connotations: that is to say, to be sublime it 
must be universally and politically acceptable and therefore must succeed in blending with 
other established instances of social beauty.1036 
 
The sublime is not merely the obscure background of divine nothingness, but also the 
revelation of a glorious, limitless, terrifying light.  This sublime event is precisely the 
resurrection of Christ, who displays his infinite glory through defeating death in the 
resurrected body.  Milbank further notes that this event can be truly sublime only if it is in 
itself beautiful, and embraced by the community.  In fact, Milbank argues by genealogy that 
the sundering of the sublime from the beautiful (which is assumed by Žižek in the sense that 
he says that the sublime follows beauty) was actually an arbitrary gesture motivated by 
                                                            
1035 1 Corinthians 15:54-55.  William Stringfellow has also written on the powers of death at work in the world, 
and how death may be overcome by the resurrection in Christ.  See William Stringfellow, Instead of Death 
(Wipf and Stock, 1963).  This resonates with seeking an ontology of peace and life through death, thus defeating 
death. 
1036 John Milbank, ‘Sublimity: The Modern Transcendent’ in Regina Schwartz (ed), Transcendence: 
Philosophy, Literature and Theology Approach the Beyond (Routledge, 2004) 215. 
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distorted theology and political economy.1037  The sublime does not follow the beautiful, but 
is the beautiful, and through the universality of Christ’s resurrection by faith we too can 
participate in this sublimity.  The Apostle Paul underscores this point that the resurrected 
body has a unique glory: 
What is sown is perishable; what is raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor; it is raised 
in glory. It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power. It is sown a natural body; it is raised a 
spiritual body. If there is a natural body, there is also a spiritual body. Thus it is written, “The 
first man Adam became a living being”; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.  But it is 
not the spiritual that is first but the natural, and then the spiritual. The first man was from the 
earth, a man of dust; the second man is from heaven. As was the man of dust, so also are 
those who are of the dust, and as is the man of heaven, so also are those who are of 
heaven. Just as we have borne the image of the man of dust, we shall also bear the image of 
the man of heaven.1038 
 
In the final analysis then, the defeat of death through incarnational paradox is the sublime 
object, as it produces infinity, an eternal, glorious life without limits.  It seems that in 
conflating the crucifixion with the resurrection, Žižek denies the sublime element – the 
infinite miracle.   
Since… the incarnation of God involves a paradoxical coincidence of infinite with finite, this 
is not a truth that can “directly” appear in nonparadoxical finite terms… So even if the upshot 
of the Incarnation is that we now see God as fully there in ordinary life, unqualified by law, 
this can first appear to view only through an event which combines the extraordinary with the 
ordinary. This is exactly what Žižek fails to see. Thus… miracles were necessary in order to 
indicate the extraordinary, and… this fits with the way the New Testament fuses the Roman, 
Latinate sense of domestic welcome and respect for childhood (and for women) with the 
Hebrew sense of the sublimely apocalyptic.1039 
 
In other words, it is necessary that Christ died, and then was resurrected by miracle in order 
to provide life.  Apart from the paradox of Christ as the infinite God and finite man, this too 
is the defining paradox of a sublime Christian materialism – that just as Christ died a finite 
                                                            
1037 See Ibid 211-234. 
1038 1 Corinthians 15:42-49. 
1039 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 211. 
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death to defeat death and infinitely rose to live forever, so we must die to defeat death in 
order to truly live. 
 
III THE SUBLIME TRUTH OF FAITH: PARADOXICAL LAW, LOVE AND 
LIFE THROUGH RESURRECTION 
 
A Reconciling Reason and Faith through Incarnational Paradox 
 
 
Prior to a further explanation of this point, paradox may also reveal a way in which faith and 
reason can be reconciled, as discussed in the first part.  Milbank prefigures a solution by 
stating that the only alternative to nihilism and fideism is the return of a metaphysic which is 
able to mediate between faith and reason, a ’reasonable faith’ or theology.1040  The key to this 
metaphysic is Incarnational paradox.  The paradox of the Incarnation is, in essence, the 
paradox of the absolutisation of contingency – for Christ is the interface of absolute and 
contingent as the God-man.  Furthermore, the meeting of the temporal and the eternal in 
Christ leads to the recovery of reason, for reason is recovered in the betweenness or paradox 
of (incarnational) being, where ‘finite belonging to the infinite is the order of things’, where 
time meets eternity, absence meets presence, and immanence meets transcendence.1041   
 
In other words, reason is united to faith at the paradoxical interface of the universal (reason) 
and the particular (faith), which is the event of Christ.  This is why Milbank states that the 
‘absolutisation of contingency’ has a ‘uniquely disclosive relationship to eternal truth’, and is 
                                                            
1040 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 328, 333. 
1041 Davis, Introduction, above n 174, 11, 19, 21. 
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‘absolute truth’ – it is the paradoxical event of Christ which is truth.1042  In this way, the event 
of Christ moderates and instantiates the paradox of a contingent law, or necessary 
contingence, for the event of Christ dying on the cross and rising again was an event both 
contingent and necessary.  It was contingent in the sense that it was unexpected, as evidenced 
by the Apostle Peter’s reaction when first informed by Christ that this is what would occur, 
and it was necessary in the sense that it was predicted by prophecy, foreordained by God, and 
required in order for the sins of humanity to be forgiven and reconciliation with God to 
occur.1043  Thus, since the Event of Christ (which is truth) is simultaneously necessary and 
contingent, it can be seen to restore reason to faith and unites the two.   
 
More precisely, Milbank argues that truth is the ‘stability of the eternal’, and identifies this 
truth with paradox ‘through the recollection backward and repetition forward of temporality’, 
and also identifies reason with ‘negotiation of the paradoxical’.1044  It was not simply faith 
that ‘believed the absurd’, but reason, whose ‘ungrounded presupposition was the paradoxical 
coincidence of eternity and time as the truth’.1045  Therefore, the only serious location of truth 
where reason and faith are united must lie in the ‘coincidence of the eternal and the temporal’ 
in the event of Christ.1046  For paradox is ‘infinitely accentuated in the Incarnation’ since the 
‘eternal God is identified with temporal man’, and in this way we can have truth, the infinite 
(God) giving back to the finite (man).1047   
 
Incarnation also means that participation in the divine relational life is restored.  In this sense, 
truth is recovered by a repairing of the asymmetrical relation to God of the creation by the 
                                                            
1042 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 114-115. 
1043 See Matthew 16:21-23; 1 Peter 1:20; Romans 3:21-26; Acts 2:22-33. 
1044 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 169-70. 
1045 Ibid. 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 Ibid. 
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action of God himself.  Since God is identity and the infinite/finite, he is also the ‘paradox of 
relational reconciliation’.1048  Therefore, truth, which is ‘itself relational’, is ‘relationally 
restored’.1049  Truth is inextricably tied to participation in the life, death and resurrection of 
Christ.  The ‘truth of truth’, ontological truth, can finally be found in ‘transcendent 
metaphysics or theology’: the ‘Trinitarian play’ between the one and the many, the infinite 
and the simple.1050  This ‘truth-as-disclosure is also the bond of being’ – ‘exchange between 
the infinite and the finite’.1051 
 
B Revealing the Law of Love through Incarnation 
 
This paradoxical exchange of infinite and finite, particularly in the context of Christ dying so 
that he may live, reveals the law of love.  As discussed previously, God has not abandoned 
us.  Rather, through the truth of the resurrection, that with Christ we die so that we may live 
at the right hand of the Father, the law of intimacy, love, forgiveness and mercy is 
demonstrated.1052  In this sense that truth is the manifestation of divine being beyond the mere 
mirroring, Milbank argues that it also communicates peace and the Good.  Indeed, ‘love and 
truth are co-equal in God’.1053  So in Christ, the specifically exceptional in time where the 
divine being incorporating love and peace is disclosed, there is the establishment of the law 
of true human life (the law of love) against the old law which is the law of sin.  This is 
paradoxically based upon Christ as the exception to human law, and upon faith in the 
                                                            
1048 John Milbank, The Thomistic Telescope: Truth and Identity (25 February 2013) 
<http://www.scribd.com/doc/19773690/John-Milbank-The-Thomistic-Telescope-Truth-and-Identity> , 61. 
1049 John Milbank, ‘The Return of Mediation’ in J Milbank et al (eds), Paul’s New Moment: Continental 
Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology (Brazos Press, 2010) 225-226. 
1050 Milbank, Thomistic Telescope, above n 1048, 66-67. 
1051 Ibid 75-76. 
1052 Hebrews 12:2. 
1053 Milbank, Thomistic Telescope, above n 1048, 68-69. 
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criminal death of the one who first identified himself as this exception.  At this point, Žižek 
agrees with Milbank.  Žižek also rightly sees that for justice and truth to be possible, it was 
necessary that one man be recognised as God.  However, he should go further and accept that 
‘this necessity in its actuality really is conjoined to the paradox of the infinite’, which is of 
the order of resurrection.1054   
 
In other words, against Žižek, it can be concluded that only in the necessity of the paradoxical 
Incarnation and resurrection can truth and justice which undergird law be possible – that is, 
the law of love, which removes the violence of antagonism and alienation, and loves the 
individual as different while also uniting them to the community.  Ultimately, Milbank 
argues, it is because of the Cross, the ‘event of the judgment of God’, that ‘no return to the 
law of death’, to the ‘antique compromise of inhibition of violence’, remains possible – and 
the Christian outlook of ontological peace now provides an alternative to nihilism, or secular 
reason.1055  ‘Humanity can only be united through the arrival of Christ, the concrete event, 
beyond all laws’ – the ‘arrival of fully restored human truth’.1056  Furthermore, it is contended 
that with faith in this event necessarily comes charity, the advent of the love of God 
manifested in the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, which to receive means to pass on 
as love for the neighbour.  Hence, it is the Pauline law of love, to love your neighbour as 
yourself, which provides the foundation for a loving legal community based in the truth of 
Christ, and unites reason and faith. 
 
                                                            
1054 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 215. 
1055 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 442. 
1056 Ibid 318. 
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To summarise and recapitulate in more precise terms, what has been so far established is this:  
Milbank contends that the only alternative to a secular approach which sunders faith and 
reason is the return of a theology which is able to mediate between faith and reason, and unite 
them.  This theology arrives in the form of Incarnational paradox, where reason is recovered 
through faith in the truth of divine being, and this is revealed in Christ as the interface 
between the finite and the infinite, eternal God and temporal man.  In the disclosure of divine 
being as love and ontological peace through the incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of 
Christ, the law of sin and death is replaced by a new law, the law of love, which can then 
become the theological truth which grounds the community and restores reason to faith, 
allowing peace.1057   
 
For ‘in Christ peace is proleptically given’, because ‘only the perfect saving of one man from 
the absolute destruction of death’ through the resurrection of Christ, the ‘refusal of the loss of 
any difference’, can ‘initially spell perfect and infinite peace’ leading to the institution of 
love.1058  This is the normative dimension of the law of love: love is paradoxically both a 
commandment of the law and obedience to that commandment – love of God and of 
neighbour is commanded as the greatest commandment of the law by Christ, and Christ also 
says that if you love him you will obey his commandments.1059  So divine love both 
presupposes and is the necessary condition for obedience and the law, and is located in 
incarnational paradox.  This paradox of law and love also points the way to how the law of 
love may prove to be a foundation for the legal community: it simultaneously fulfils the law 
by obeying the commandments since love does no wrong to a neighbour, and reflexively 
                                                            
1057 See Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 154. 
1058 John Milbank, ‘A Response’ in R Gill (ed), Theology and Sociology: A Reader (Cassell, 1996) 468; c.f. Acts 
2:22-36. 
1059 Matthew 22:34-39; John 14:15. 
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transcends the law by producing its own obedience.  This descriptive dimension of the law of 
love will be considered in the final chapter. 
 
 
C Empowering the Law of Love: Participation through Faith in the Resurrection 
 
It seems that, at least at the level of preliminary analysis, as well as the paradoxical 
relationship there is a type of symbiotic relationship between law and truth.  For it is the law 
of love that presupposes the truth yielded through Incarnational paradox and the resurrection, 
and this in turn provides the foundation in truth for the loving legal community to be 
instantiated, and in this way law and truth establish and maintain the other.  The resurrection 
in particular gains significance when considered in relation to how Milbank explains it in the 
Pauline context.   
 
The first relevant theme in this regard is that ‘Paul pursued law beyond law’: the law of love, 
which is the ‘basis for natural justice in symbolic law’.1060  Though justice, according to 
Derrida, transcends law and cannot be deconstructed, it still ‘must be given expression in the 
legal’.1061  Paul therefore linked natural justice with the ‘invocation of a supreme divine king’ 
(Christ, the fulfilment of the law) who ‘exceeded the law as embodying a living law’, and he 
did so with particular regard to the resurrection as the display of a living law of love.1062  This 
leads into the second theme, and returns us to the question of the law of love and its 
relationship to the resurrection, previously explained as an event yielding truth.  Justice lies 
‘before the law’ and is ‘attainable through the truth of the resurrected man’, for ‘with death to 
                                                            
1060 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 170. 
1061 Milbank, Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651, 35; c.f. Derrida, Force of Law, above n 3, 14-15. 
1062 Milbank, Paul Against Biopolitics, above n 651, 42-43. 
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the old law comes resurrection to a living law’, the law of the spirit or the law of love which 
‘renews and redistributes the good’.1063  In other words, the determining factor in the 
symbiosis and paradox of law and truth, the reconciliation of reason and faith, and the 
removal of violence is the event of the resurrection itself.  Paul’s own writings appear to 
support this: 
Now if Christ is proclaimed as raised from the dead, how can some of you say that there is no 
resurrection of the dead?  But if there is no resurrection of the dead, then not even Christ has 
been raised.  And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is 
in vain. We are even found to be misrepresenting God, because we testified about God that he 
raised Christ, whom he did not raise if it is true that the dead are not raised.  For if the dead 
are not raised, not even Christ has been raised.  And if Christ has not been raised, your faith is 
futile and you are still in your sins.1064 
 
Paul seems to argue that the basis of the law of sin and death being defeated is Christ himself 
actually being raised from the dead (it alone defeats death and brings life), for if Christ was 
not actually raised, Paul’s preaching is in vain and he is a false witness, faith is futile and sin 
is not dealt with.  Most importantly, as we have already discussed, since Christ has in fact 
been raised, he is the prototype and guarantee for the defeat of death and the general 
resurrection.1065  As such, truth as participation in the divine is only revealed through the 
resurrection, giving the spirit of life rather than death.  In addition, hope is only given through 
Christ in the resurrection, and this itself is the basis for true peace.  Most importantly, since 
loving others requires loving God, and loving God involves trust or faith in God, and faith is 
futile without the resurrection, it follows that the law of love presupposes the truth revealed 
through faith in the entirety of the paradoxical Christ-Event – life, death and resurrection, 
God and man.1066   
 
                                                            
1063 Ibid 56. 
1064 1 Corinthians 15:12-17. 
1065 1 Corinthians 15:20-22. 
1066 1 Corinthians 15:17. 
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IV MANIFESTING THE PEACEFUL COMMUNITY: FAITH AND PRACTICE  
 
It is perhaps this which allows Christianity to be embraced so readily by the counter-intuitive 
postmodern and Lacanian registers.  Truth is finally revealed through the anti-foundationalist 
paradox of the Incarnation, which is the meeting of the eternal and the temporal in Christ, his 
crucifixion, and his resurrection – an identity in difference, a hole made whole – cosmic 
paternal reconciliation.  Since true reason is recovered in this paradoxical revelation of the 
divine being as the law of love, in Christ reason and faith unite to yield truth, and provide a 
foundation for a true legal community.  In this disclosure of the divine being in Christ is 
revealed the love and peace inherent in Trinitarian relations, particularly the law of love 
which is the basis of the divine relationship.  Thus, the law of love in the divine being 
ultimately yields truth in the incarnational paradox. 
 
The uniting and reconciliation of humanity in Christ as the truth also leads to the passing of 
the law of love, which is obtained through the truth of the resurrected man which may now be 
given expression in the legal community with its foundation in truth and justice.  In this way, 
a peaceful legal community requires the law of love which is established by the truth of the 
Incarnational event.  Similarly, the Incarnational event assumes the law of love since love is 
the ultimate foundation for the revelation and function of the mystery of divine Being and 
relationship.  Hence, it appears that law and truth operate symbiotically to establish and 
maintain the other. 
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The proposition that the peaceful legal community is based on the emergence of truth through 
Incarnational paradox, the moment of intersection between faith and reason, raises the 
question of what this may point towards.  It could be that truth is the interstitial space 
simultaneously separating and connecting the fundamental parallel and so-called ‘binaries’ of 
reason and faith, presence and absence, immanence and transcendence, self and other – the 
space where faith and reason become one through the operation of the law of the Trinity, or 
the law of love: the reconciliation of the one and the many, diversity in unity.  This is the 
crucial jurisprudential insight which the crude and popularised formulations of fideism and 
secularism omit, that God is both personal and wholly Other, the moment of simultaneous 
sameness and difference: the moment of truth.  Indeed, it is the paradoxical resurrection of 
the personification of truth, Jesus Christ, which allows this insight.1067  For it is Christ, the 
transcendent and the immanent, the one in whom divinity and humanity is united forever, 
who is the only mediator between God and man, and who dies in order to live.1068  So Christ, 
as the truth that mediates between faith and reason, also provides a new law.  Instead of the 
law of the letter which kills, it is a law of the Spirit, a law of love which gives life.1069   
 
In this sense, it is indeed the Trinitarian relationship and Christ as the revelation of that 
relationship which resolves the problem of the one and the many, or the problem of how to 
love the individual in a community stricken by antagonism and alienation.  When such 
questions are approached from a purely secular perspective, there is no recourse to divine 
love, and the exclusion of God means the exclusion of divine love in the community.  But 
                                                            
1067 John 14:6. 
1068 John 8:58; 1Timothy 2:5. 
1069 2 Corinthians 3:6. 
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Paul’s outlook is more optimistic – we relate to the law through God by divine love, so by the 
spirit the law is uplifting and can instruct us in righteousness.  So the law is rejected in the 
flesh to be redeemed in the spirit.  True community is to be oneself but more than oneself, to 
be needed by the community, assimilated in the spirit.  This happens through love, not 
submission to a higher sovereign authority – according to Christ we love one another and 
believe God loves each member of the community.1070 
 
At this point those who disagree with the arguments of this thesis may be wondering how 
they may be equally loved in this Christian community.  This may occur through one final 
paradox – faith and practice.  Normally, practice follows faith, but there is also the possibility 
of faith following practice.  For example, Blaise Pascal argues that ‘if you perform religious 
rites with enthusiasm… you will come to be devoutly religious.  “Go then and take holy 
water, and have masses said; belief will come and stupefy your scruples”’.1071  Žižek too 
appears to allude to this paradoxical notion of belief following practice.1072  Therefore, we 
should encourage even those who disagree with Christianity to continue discussing it.  It may 
well be the way that the secular is not alienated and antagonised.  By engaging in the 
Christian practice of loving your neighbour (which includes those of differing belief) as 
yourself, the peaceful legal community of harmony and reconciliation will be instantiated, 
and belief may come. 
 
 
                                                            
1070 C.f. Bloechl, above n 24. 
1071 Blaise Pascal, cited  in James Cargile, ‘Pascal’s Wager’ (1966) 41 Philosophy 250, 250. 
1072 Žižek, Dialectical Clarity, above n 986, 287. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
 ‘LOVE YOUR (LEGAL) NEIGHBOUR AS YOURSELF’: 
PRODUCING PEACE THROUGH A THEOLOGICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE OF TRUTH 
 
I A JURISPRUDENCE OF TRUTH: ARTICULATING IDEAS, 
IMPLEMENTATION AND DELIMITATION 
 
Using the work of John Milbank, the thesis to this point has engaged in a theological critique 
of the secular genealogy undergirding the modern system of law, arguing that a division of 
reason and faith leads to antagonism and alienation.  In contrast to this, it is contended that 
the Christian revelation of theological truth (the law of love) through the uniting of reason 
and faith in the Incarnation produces a vision of ontological peace which redeems law and 
removes this violence – in other words, the Christian law of loving one’s neighbour provides 
the foundation for an ontologically peaceful legal community in which difference operates 
harmoniously.  What remains, then, is to provide a more robust articulation of these 
underlying ideas in relation to our modern system of law. 
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More specifically, Chapters one and two were devoted to constructing definitions of faith and 
reason in the context of John Milbank’s framework.  There was discussion of particular 
fundamental aspects of these such as how secular reason is actually no reason at all and leads 
to ‘blind faith’, and how true reason is recovered and united to faith through Incarnational 
paradox.  In part II of this chapter these essential conclusions will be explained and explicitly 
connected to notions of the peaceful community.  The notion of truth, of course, is a major 
tenet of this thesis, and significant time has already been spent in elucidating it.  However, 
although related issues such as revelation, correspondence and rhetoric (persuasion) have 
been canvassed, how these fit together has not been fully explored.  As such, part III will aim 
to produce a more unified explanation of truth incorporating these aspects, in conjunction 
with further exploring the conclusion of the previous chapter that truth and law are symbiotic, 
and produce peace in the context of Christ’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection.  
Finally, and probably most importantly, in part IV the notions of peace and violence 
presented in the Introduction and discussed in the following chapters will be further 
examined, particularly in the context of Milbank’s theology.  The nature of this ontological 
peace resulting from theology and its relationship with violence, in contrast to the specific 
nature of pagan (secular) violence, will be more exactly articulated. 
 
On the consequently stronger foundation of these further developed ideas, this chapter and 
this thesis will conclude by critiquing the application of the law of love to the modern 
(secular) legal system.  In particular, part V considers the relationship between the Christian 
polity of love and the secular legal system, arguing that forgiveness is the key to establishing 
a peaceful legal community.  Part VI specifically applies these notions to a particular system 
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of private law which governs relations between individuals through contrasting theological 
and (secular) legal interpretations of the Parable of the Good Samaritan, arguing that the 
neighbour principle in negligence as derived from the parable lacks and ultimately distorts 
the theological principle.  Finally, part VII proposes that it is only through recovering this 
principle of love in the community that we may redeem and regenerate the legal system, and 
a vision of ontological peace in legal relations may be attained. 
 
II ‘THE END OF REASON’: THE BLIND FAITH OF SECULAR REASON AND 
RECOVERING REASON THROUGH INCARNATIONAL PARADOX 
 
As has been seen in previous chapters, Christian faith is not merely intellectual assent, but a 
trust in or reliance on God.  This faith is not so-called ‘blind faith’, or belief despite lack of 
evidence or in defiance of contrary evidence, but rather is a personal trust in the character of 
God which has been revealed in Christ.  As was discussed in the first and second chapters, 
this trust is in accordance with reason and the faculties of the mind, and indeed without the 
foundation of Christian faith with the divine mind and reason, the faculties of the human 
mind and the power of human reason cannot operate.  It is this premise of reason based in 
faith which secular reason rejects, and consequently sunders faith from reason.  More 
significantly in this context, it is argued that secular reason, by separating faith from reason, 
actually renders itself to be blind faith.  In other words, this secularised reason provides no 
reason to think that it is reasonable – it is mere belief in its own reason without evidence.  
Conversely, Christian faith unites itself with reason and recovers both through Incarnational 
Paradox.  
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A The Blindness and Violence of Secular Reason 
 
As was indicated in chapter two, the use of reason in conjunction with faith was foundational 
to the development of modern science.  However, when reason was isolated from faith (thus 
producing ‘secular reason’) and became the foundation of modern science, its nature as de 
facto blind faith was revealed.  Milbank notes this as emblematic of the fact that ‘once 
secular reason has exposed its own efforts to ground itself in the universal, then its advocacy 
of a polity and an ontology which is confined to the (non)regulation of conflict through 
conflict emerges clearly to view.’1073  In other words, in any discipline governed by a 
universalising secular reason which excludes faith, the ‘regulation’ of the discipline through 
violence surfaces – and indeed, this was what was found in chapter two.  Hence, (secular) 
reason has to add power to its truth, even though power (violence) is absolutely external to 
truth.  Though reason aims to rule through reason, it finds it must supplement itself with a 
rule of force.1074  Consequently, secular reason is revealed as blind faith which cannot sustain 
itself except through violence. 
 
Chapter three discussed the implications of this for the development of thought and reason in 
the context of the postmodern turn.  In particular, it was found that with reason being turned 
                                                            
1073 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 327. 
1074 Ibid 374. 
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against itself and having discovered no universal foundation for reason (i.e. that it is blind 
faith), the question may be asked whether there is anything at all.  As Milbank notes, this type 
of postmodern deconstruction exposes the nihilistic limit of secular reason, and therefore 
represents the most evolved form of it.  In other words, postmodern deconstruction produces 
the perfect form of secular reason: a nihilistic mythos antithetical to reason.1075  Furthermore, 
it sustains its ontology as a mythos through violence, for it has no other means – it cannot use 
persuasion due to its own unreason, so it must use coercion.1076  Therefore, secular reason is 
ultimately unreason, nihilistic mythos, and blind faith, and tends to sustain itself through 
violence. 
 
The orientation of the secular to the nihilistic cannot be opposed by simply redeeming 
enlightenment reason.  Rather, this secular reason can be confronted with the faith of 
Christian theology manifesting in virtue reconciled with difference.1077  This is because a 
Christian perspective saves the human bias toward reason, for reason in the framework of 
virtue and difference is consistent with the infinite through participation in the divine virtue, 
and leaves no residue of chaos by allowing antagonistic difference.  In other words, as we 
have seen, rationalism is linked to the biblical mythos in particular, and to save reason in this 
fashion requires the supplementation of reason by faith, including faith in infinite reason.1078   
 
There are two ways in which this occurs.  As seen in chapters one and two, the first is that 
according to Aquinas, all human rationality is participation in the divine reason, and therefore 
all knowledge requires faith.  The light of revelation strengthens our grasp of natural 
                                                            
1075 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 156. 
1076 See Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 260-263. 
1077 Ibid 320-321. 
1078 Ibid xvi-xvii. 
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principles, and consequently theology mediates knowledge in all other disciplines.1079  
Indeed, Aquinas understood good reason to be an attentive reception, via the mediation of the 
senses and discursive operations, of the divine light of the logos, in fundamental keeping with 
Augustine.  As such, good reason can only be such if it is based in faith.1080  Therefore, to 
reason truly one must be already illumined by God, while revelation itself is just a higher 
measure of illumination, conjoined intrinsically and inextricably with a created event which 
symbolically discloses that transcendent reality, to which all created events to a lesser degree 
point.  This event is the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the God-
man.  In other words, instead of grafting faith onto a base of reason, faith is fundamental in 
seeking to elaborate a Christian logos, or a reason which bears the marks of the 
Incarnation.1081   
 
The nature of the Incarnation and the Trinity itself is the second, and probably more 
fundamental, method of confronting secular reason with faith and reason united in Christian 
theology.  In terms of the nature of the Trinity, thinking an infinite differentiation which is 
also harmony is what grounds the reconciliation of difference with virtue.  For the paganism 
of antiquity, the absolute was chaotic, and Being is infected with this chaos since the only 
discourse which can include both the same and the different is itself a discourse of difference, 
not a discourse of reason.1082  The extreme response of Voluntarist theology as discussed in 
chapters two and four, or the emphasis of the absolute unity and simplicity of God (i.e. 
equating him with Being) are also sources of secular reason since they do not take account of 
difference.  Hence, the only transcendental, self-identical reality is an empty will or force 
                                                            
1079 Ibid 252. 
1080 Milbank, Future of Love, above n 139, 323-324. 
1081 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 383. 
1082 Ibid 434-435. 
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which returns as the arbitrary and chaotic different.  Thus, to save reason, one must derive it 
from an entity which lies beyond Being and beyond mere difference.1083    The Trinitarian 
God of Christian theology fulfils this by being simultaneously Being as the divine and 
difference in the divine persons, peace in unity and diversity, and the reconciliation of virtue 
and difference.  A Christian ontology can therefore provide the foundation for taking account 
of difference and producing a reason compatible with faith and which is ontologically 
peaceful as a function of the Trinitarian relations.  Such cannot be arrived at by the operation 
of secular reason, but is rather revealed through faith and is a result of faith.1084   
 
B Kant on Pure Reason, Or the Need for Faith 
 
As mentioned in chapter one, Immanuel Kant specifically indicates ways in which reason is 
unable to fully comprehend reality, opening the space for a reason combined with faith.  
Milbank proposes that pure (or secular) reason is supposedly able to resolve the four 
fundamental antinomies identified by Kant.1085  In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant 
constructs each of the antinomies by firstly outlining arguments for a thesis, and then 
arguments for an antithesis.1086  The first thesis is that ‘the world has a beginning in time, and 
in space it is also enclosed in boundaries’, and the first antithesis is that ‘the world has no 
beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite with regard to both time and space’.1087  The 
second thesis is that ‘every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and 
nothing exists anywhere except the simple or what is composed of simples’, while the second 
                                                            
1083 Ibid. 
1084 Ibid 437. 
1085 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 152. 
1086 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge, 1998) 470-495. 
1087 Ibid 470, 471. 
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antithesis is ‘No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and nowhere in it does 
there exist anything simple’.1088  The third thesis is ‘Causality in accordance with laws of 
nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived.  It is 
also necessary to assume another causality through freedom in order to explain them’; the 
third antithesis is ‘there is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in 
accordance with the laws of nature’.1089  The final thesis is that ‘to the world there belongs 
something that, either as a part of it or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being’, while 
the final antithesis is ‘there is no absolutely necessary being existing anywhere, either in the 
world or outside the world as its cause’.1090 
 
Kant observes that the arguments for these positions represent the ‘glittering pretensions’ of 
reason, and yet they ‘do not even permit reason to think them’.1091  ‘Unfortunately’, he 
argues,  
… reason sees itself, in the midst of its greatest expectations, so entangled in a crowd of 
arguments and counterarguments that it is not feasible, on account either of its honor or even 
of its security, for reason to withdraw and look upon the quarrel with indifference, as mere 
shadow boxing, still less for it simply to command peace, interested as it is in object of the 
dispute; so nothing is left except to reflect on the origin of disunity of reason itself.1092 
 
So it seems even Kant acknowledges that pure reason produces violence and endless strife, 
lacking the ability to command peace.  It has a fundamental antagonism within itself.  
Milbank argues that since reason fails in this way and the antinomies cannot be 
conceptualised by the understanding, it follows that any transcending of the antinomies 
                                                            
1088 Ibid 476, 477. 
1089 Ibid 484, 485. 
1090 Ibid 490, 491. 
1091 Ibid 496. 
1092 Ibid 497. 
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becomes a pure act of faith, not a necessity of reason.1093  However, through the Trinity and 
Incarnational paradox of Christ (or specifically Christian faith), these antinomies can be 
transcended.1094 
 
For as we have already seen in the Trinity, the second antinomy of difference and sameness, 
or ultimate constituent parts/no such parts, is transcended.  The Trinity is one in the sense of 
the Godhead and so does not consist of simple parts, but simultaneously the Godhead is 
composed of the three divine members, Father, Son and Holy Spirit; so the Trinity does 
consist of simple parts.  In addition, Incarnational paradox transcends the other antinomies.  
For the first antinomy of time and space, Christ as God is the eternal logos, unbounded by 
time and space.  However, as a man he is temporal and spatial.  For the third antinomy of 
freedom and causality, Christ’s incarnation was causally necessary (though not in the sense of 
being in accordance with immutable natural laws) as a matter of fulfilling Scripture and the 
will of God, but was also simultaneously an act of freedom as a voluntary sacrifice in love.   
Finally, for the fourth antinomy of necessary or contingent being, Christ is an (eternal) 
necessary being as God, but as a man is simultaneously a contingent human.  The fact that in 
the Trinity and Incarnation the thesis and antithesis of each of the antinomies are fulfilled 
implies that with Christian faith comes the transcending of the antinomies and the sublating 
of the binaries.  And with that destruction of secular structure comes the recovery of reason – 
for the eternal/becoming distinction in Christ is universal and is what makes reason 
possible.1095   
 
                                                            
1093 Ibid 152. 
1094 For a comparable analysis see e.g. Chris Firestone, ‘Rational Religious Faith and Kant’s Transcendental 
Boundaries’ in Kevin Vanhoozer and Martin Warner (eds), Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and 
Theology: Reason, Meaning and Experience (Ashgate, 2007) 81-85, and the references contained there. 
1095 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 375. 
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As was discussed in chapter six, the meeting of the temporal and the eternal in Christ leads to 
the recovery of reason, for reason is recovered in the betweenness or paradox of 
(incarnational) being, where finite belonging to the infinite is the order of things, where time 
meets eternity, absence meets presence, and immanence meets transcendence.1096  In other 
words, reason is united to faith at the paradoxical interface of the universal (reason) and the 
particular (faith), which is the event of Christ, for this allows the reconciliation of virtue and 
difference.  On this point of elaborating a reason from the Incarnation, it was noted in chapter 
one that only the qualification of reason by myth and poetry ensures that reason will not 
degenerate into pure abstraction.  The Bible, especially the New Testament, resists the 
advance to pure abstraction by reinvoking the poetic, yet in a nonpagan way which seeks a 
positive relationship to the properly vague abstraction of nondogmatic reason (for example, 
the wisdom literature and New Testament engagement with Greek philosophy).1097  The 
balance is proclaimed paradoxically in the idea that reason itself (logos) becomes Incarnate, 
which means the rational is fully and only accessible by the indirectness of a poetic discourse 
concerning this event.  Reason is then more realistically rational as disclosing a rational 
though mysterious universe.1098   
 
Again, this is because the discourse of poetry in Christian theology promotes the recognition 
of difference through subjectivity and particularity, and the creative difference of the Trinity, 
in contrast to the pure, universalising nature of secular reason.  Thus, secular reason is 
ultimately blind faith and leads to violence, while reason united to faith in Christian theology 
                                                            
1096 See Davis, Introduction, above n 174, 11, 19, 21. 
1097 This may be seen in the way the Apostle Paul quotes the Greek poets in his preaching to the Gentiles in Acts 
17, seeking to teach them about the nature of the true God (that in him we live and move and have our being) 
through poetic discourse. 
1098 Milbank, Double Glory, above n 88, 217-218. 
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is unique in allowing true reason to flourish through the reconciliation of virtue and 
difference, producing an ontology of peace. 
 
C Faith, Reason, Peace: A Sacred Polity 
 
The positive combination of faith and reason has a particular distinctive quality when applied 
to the social or political space.  For Milbank, in Enlightenment thinking, political constitution 
must balance the tension between an absolute sovereign centre and the mass of atomistic 
individuals.  Either the political reality is natural, where the individuals compete in an 
agonistic market economy, or it is artificial, where the individuals are subsumed under the 
singular judgment of a sovereign head. 1099  At this point ‘the whole is mystically elevated as 
greater than the parts, in such a fashion that the totality is held to transcend the grasp of 
reason, and must be regarded as the work of an unfathomable nature or providence’.1100  The 
secular approach fails to take proper account of this tension between the particular and the 
universal, atomic individualism and absolute sovereignty.  As we have seen, the secular 
response is simply to extend and expand sovereign power, producing violence; it is an 
‘abstracting, idealising project’.1101  The existence of irreconcilable difference means that 
these must be mediated, and this occurs through increased regulation; people are treated as 
abstract commodities ruled by violence.1102  Rather than acknowledging the theological 
foundations of the society in faith, noting the mystical elevation of the sovereign through 
unfathomable providence, the secular space therefore tends to alienate.   Milbank contrasts 
this secular space with the sacred space: 
                                                            
1099 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 275. 
1100 Ibid. 
1101 Ibid 281. 
1102 Ibid 281-282. 
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In the first case religious authorisation or providential intervention is moved to the margins: 
God commands the absolute sovereign, who then imposes rule according to an a priori 
rational logic of subsumption of parts under wholes… but in the second… every act of 
association, every act of economic exchange, involves a mutual judgment about what is right, 
true and beautiful, about the order we are to have in common.  It is no longer a matter of 
“transparent” principles of reason… instead one must distil order out of an irreducible 
diversity, one must find a measure between diverse things which are… inherently 
incommensurable.  The order so discovered, so assented to, tends to be imbued with a sacred 
character because it cannot be defined, and is always being repeated with a same yet different 
character… the assent which such an order commands must clearly have the character of an 
allegiance of faith rather than that of a rational conviction.1103 
 
The key then appears to be seeking a space in which the individual and the community can be 
harmoniously connected; rather than faith or reason, it is faith and reason.  It is not a matter 
of purely secular categories which divide, but the embrace of transcendent truths of faith 
which unite and allow peace.  As Milbank says, ‘without “community”, without its self-
sustaining affirmation of objective justice, “excellence”, and transcendental truth, goodness 
and beauty, one must remain resigned to capitalism and bureaucracy’.1104  The society here 
envisioned is not an endless series of legal rules which can never hope to properly regulate 
human behaviour (and so only produce violence), but a sacred community.  Importantly, this 
is not a theocratic society based in some kind of legalistic church canon.  Rather, it is both the 
model for an ideal society and a way of living within a given society, characterised by love.  
The aim, ultimately, is to exist harmoniously within a community of difference. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1103 Ibid 279-280. 
1104 Ibid 281-282. 
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III ‘FAITH IN THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY’: CORRESPONDENCE 
THROUGH REVELATION AND RHETORIC 
 
A Correspondence as Analogical Participation in Revelation 
 
This raises the question of how we may arrive at and implement the transcendent truths 
which are said to unite a peaceful community.  The first, fifth and sixth chapters primarily 
have explored truth in Christian theology at length, the first in terms of definition in the 
context of Milbank’s work, the fifth with a Christological focus, and the sixth in terms of 
implications for law using this definition.  What was found is that truth is not merely 
correspondence in the abstruse and atheological sense of propositions corresponding to states 
of affairs in reality, but rather that truth is correspondence in the far richer sense that it is 
aletheia, revealed by God.  In particular, the Trinitarian relationship is that of self-giving 
love, or loving the other as oneself, and it is perfect peace because it is the epitomic display 
of the reconciliation between the One and the Many, or the universal and the particular.  The 
members of the Trinity co-exist in perfect harmony as one God, but three Persons.  This is 
superlative unity in diversity, and comm-unity: unity in common with others.  The Tri-Unity, 
then, is the consummate example for love and ontological peace. 
 
This truth is primarily revealed through the Incarnation of Christ, the second member of the 
Trinity.  The Incarnation, God in flesh or becoming human, perfectly displays the grace of 
God through demonstrating the unmerited favour of Christ loving the created order by 
sacrificing and giving himself for the forgiveness of sins.  It is in this sense that though the 
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law came through Moses and brought punishment and condemnation, grace and truth comes 
through Christ.1105  Therefore, Christ taking on human form and volunteering to die on the 
cross for people is the ultimate display of the self-giving love characteristic of the Trinity.  Its 
concern is for other and not self, and so it reveals a law beyond formal law, a law of grace 
which becomes the law of love – to love your neighbour.  It is this revelation of God’s love in 
Christ which is truth, or aletheia.   
 
In addition, the Incarnation of Christ reveals the peace inherent in the Trinitarian relations by 
reconciling the temporal and the eternal.  For Christ as fully God is eternal, but 
simultaneously as fully man is temporal, and has been argued above, this also recovers the 
reality of reason united with faith.  Consequently, though reason is directed towards truth, it 
is not in the crude sense of secular reason discovering the nature of physical reality and 
systemising it to a set of propositions.  Instead, the process is inverted and theologised, with 
truth revealing itself through the Incarnation of Christ, reconciling reason with faith and 
recovering it.  As we have seen, this revelation is subsequently apprehended and participated 
in by faith. 
 
B Participation through Faith 
 
So although truth-as-correspondence seems to be an appropriate theological definition of 
truth, it is fundamentally different from the typical meaning of the phrase.  One of the more 
important aspects of this difference is the relationship between revelation and rhetoric.  
                                                            
1105 See John 1:17. 
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Historically, Christians have always understood that the beliefs grounding their ethics as 
being matters of faith, or persuasion (rhetoric).1106  In particular, as the glory of Christ is 
revealed to the mind, the mind is persuaded, which is the same as saying the mind 
appropriates this revelation by peaceful persuasion or rhetoric, rather than the violent 
coercion of secular reason.  As the mind is transformed by faith, it participates in the glory of 
Christ by imitating Christ and then loves one’s neighbour as a reflection of the Trinitarian 
relations.  So the truth of Christianity is that the divine mind of the Trinity in its perfect love 
and peace as revealed in Christ recovers reason and corresponds to the created order through 
participation in the Trinitarian relations resulting from faith, the persuasion of the mind by 
the glorious truth of what has been graciously revealed.   
 
In this sense, the concrete virtue of loving one’s neighbour seeks its notion of what it means 
to have truly human character in a place beyond or above what is human, rather than in or 
beneath.1107  Ultimately then, it is this necessary transcendence in human relations which 
challenges the secular and opens the space for faith.  For as Milbank argues, scholars have 
historically found it difficult to simultaneously point to the ‘universally valid and objective 
and to the customary particulars which instantiate it… a solution is only really possible in 
terms of a tradition like Christianity, which starkly links particular to universal by conceiving 
its relationship to transcendence (truth) in a rhetorical fashion (faith)’.1108   
 
 
 
                                                            
1106 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 329. 
1107 Ibid 328. 
1108 Ibid 330. 
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C A Legally Incarnated Truth 
 
The relation of transcendent truth to immanent faith or persuasion is proclaimed most 
forcefully in the Incarnation of Christ, and more specifically his crucifixion and resurrection.  
As Milbank observes,  
Most forms of persuasion (and if we eschew violence, but still want to encourage virtue, only 
persuasion is left) are thoroughly coercive.  We need in consequence to find a language of 
peace, and this is presumably why we point to one drama of sacrifice in particular.  Truth and 
persuasion are circularly related.  We should only be convinced by rhetoric where it persuades 
us of the truth, but on the other hand truth is what is persuasive, namely what attracts and 
does not compel.  And Christians only see this entire attraction in the figure on the cross, a 
specific and compelling refusal to return evil for evil.1109 
 
So truth is most effectively revealed and people most ably persuaded by what attracts, namely 
that Christ’s refusal of violence draws people to Christian peace.  According to the Gospel of 
John, Jesus himself said ‘when I am lifted up from the earth, [I] will draw all people to 
myself’, and he ‘said this to show by what kind of death he was going to die’.1110  Moreover, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, the Christian message is affirmed as a way of revealing 
truth, of indicating the way things really are, through Christ’s resurrection:  
Only resurrection reverses the events of the fall.  In the resurrection, our human historical 
narratives, and attempts to extend this narration to the ultimate “way things are” – the closing 
of the gap between nature and history that we call mythology – come together.  At this point 
myth ceases to be just myth... in the face of the resurrection it becomes finally impossible to 
think of our Christian narrative as only “our point of view”, our perspective on a world that 
really exists in a different, “secular” way… either the entire Christian narrative tells us how 
things truly are, or it does not.  If it does, we have no other access to how things truly are, nor 
any additional means of determining the question.1111 
 
                                                            
1109 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 250. 
1110 John 12:32-33. 
1111 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 250. 
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These notions are central to understanding the symbiosis of truth and law also discussed in 
the previous chapter, and which in a sense is a fundamental contribution of this thesis.  In 
particular, at the end, it puts forward Christian theology as providing a unique post-secular 
legal community.  The symbiosis of law and truth can therefore be recapitulated in this sense.  
Truth is the revelation of the law of love and peace in the Trinity through the Incarnation 
(crucifixion and resurrection), and by persuasion and participation this provides the basis and 
model for peaceful and loving human relations governed by the law of love.  Similarly, the 
truth of correspondence, the way things are between the Trinitarian relations and human 
participation in terms of a loving but diverse community is based on the law of love, to love 
one’s neighbour as oneself.  Thus, truth is achieved by imitating the divine being in love and 
peace as enabled and modelled by Christ, and this institutes the legal community in such a 
way as to remove the prevailing violence characteristic of the secular, and in its place allow 
the possibility for peace. 
 
IV REVEALING AN ONTOLOGY OF PEACE: THE NATURE OF PEACE AND 
VIOLENCE IN CHRISTIANITY 
 
A Back to the Future: Augustinian Peace and Pagan Violence 
 
Augustine describes the incomparable good of this kind of peace: 
For peace is so great a good that even in relation to the affairs of earth and of our mortal state 
no word ever falls more gratefully upon the ear, nothing is desired with greater longing, in 
fact, nothing better can be found… (it) is dear to the heart of all mankind.1112   
                                                            
1112 Augustine, City of God, above n 1, 865-866. 
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For Augustine, this true, heavenly peace may be defined as suffering no attack from within or 
from any foe outside.  It surpasses all understanding (except that of the divine mind) and is 
only appropriated by faith.1113  Hence, as the truth of Christ is revealed, our mind is 
persuaded and we are made partakers of this peace, so we know the perfection of ‘peace in 
ourselves, peace among ourselves, and peace with God’.1114  Reconciling virtue with 
difference also involves the justice of a city where differences exist harmoniously as a 
community, based on Augustine’s model of the City of God, where the individual is loved 
and not alienated, and the universal is reconciled with the particular.  As Milbank notes, ‘the 
justice secured in this city constitutes a more reliable sort of peace: not a mere suspension of 
hostilities, but a peace founded upon agreement and organic harmony, when each person 
sticks to his [sic] allotted task.’1115 In this sense, one is reminded of the Apostle Paul’s 
description of the Christian community in 1 Corinthians 12 as members of a body, each with 
particular functions working in an organic harmony.  The absoluteness of the community (it 
has justice, peace, truth and so forth) presupposes that it reflects an eternal order, and its 
organic harmony allows the particular different members of the community to be individually 
virtuous.1116  Thus, virtue is reconciled with difference, which gives peace. 
 
An eloquent summary of the situation may be given by quoting Milbank at length: 
Christians worship the one true God who originates all finite reality in an act of peaceful 
donation, willing a new fellowship with himself and amongst the beings he has created. In 
“the heavenly city”, beyond the possibility of alteration, the angels and saints abide in such a 
fellowship; their virtue is not the virtue of resistance and domination, but simply of remaining 
in a state of self-forgetting conviviality.  Here there is nothing but “the vision of peace”, a 
                                                            
1113 Ibid 1081, 1088. 
1114 Ibid 1082. 
1115 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 335. 
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331 
 
condition that originally pertained also for the temporal creation, before the sinful assertion of 
pride and domination introduced a pervasive presence of conflict leading to death in both 
society and nature… this salvation takes the form of a different inauguration of a different 
kind of community.  Instead of a peace “achieved” through the abandonment of the losers, the 
subordination of potential rivals and resistance to enemies, the Church provides a genuine 
peace by its memory of all the victims, its equal concern for all its citizens and its self-
exposed offering of reconciliation to enemies. The peace within the city walls opposing the 
“chaos” without, is, in fact, no peace at all compared with a peace coterminous with all Being 
whatsoever.1117 
 
In contrast with Christian theology, the secular is described as neo-paganism by Milbank, 
‘because it is an embracing of those elements of sacred violence in paganism which 
Christianity both exposed and refused, and of which paganism, in its innocence, was only 
half-aware.’1118  In this sense, the secular is a post-Christian paganism, which must be 
negatively defined as a refusal of Christianity and invention of an anti-Christianity.1119  The 
so-called violence of paganism is ‘a certain universal primitive religion of an immanentist 
character, which involves sacrifices, games, and wars, a religion resigned to the “circulation 
of blood”’, such as that described in the fourth chapter regarding Benjamin.1120   
 
Augustine compares pagan religion and practice, incorporating a demonstration of how the 
nihilistic competition of power with power is itself trapped in a mythos, with Christian 
religion and practice which is based in faith and the ontological priority of non-antagonistic 
peace over violence.  He concludes that the former is but a dim and distorted echo of the 
latter.1121  This violent ontology of difference ‘teaches the needlessness of regret, and the 
necessity of resignation to the whole process, where all is equally necessary and equally 
arbitrary; where everything depends on everything else, and this dependence is enacted 
                                                            
1117 Ibid 394. 
1118 Ibid 280.  
1119 Ibid. 
1120 Ibid 285. 
1121 Ibid 392. 
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through constant struggle and counter-resistance’.1122  Against the God of Christian theology, 
in paganism the gods emerge as a response to an alien voice, reinstating a mythical 
consciousness of many gods and heroes.  To exercise freedom then, one must submit 
themselves to the arbitrariness of myth, and find oneself within its uncontrollable power and 
its violent combat.1123 
 
For example, the Roman god Jove’s ‘first words are a fateful “restriction” and binding of his 
own anger, and at the same time a command to feral human begins to “contain” their 
passions… this is a gloss upon Augustine’s view that “pagan virtue” was always limited to 
the mere “restriction of anger” through self-control’ such that for the pagans the ‘primal 
signifiers were weapons, and the basic language was war’.1124  By contrast, ‘the virtue of the 
City of God, being able to root out anger and bad passion altogether, is most profoundly the 
power of charitable donation’.1125  The Trinity  
… as a first “natural law”, condenses the rules for peaceful and equitable social transmission 
and distribution, and in particular it suggests that personhood is only enabled and conserved 
through natural filiation and cultural affiliation.  This principle of sociation surpasses… the 
pagan… where self-preservation is always prior to relation and communication.1126   
 
Indeed, Milbank claims that the Trinitarian perspective actually reveals the true nature of the 
pagan as a theological distortion ‘where the supposed “primary self” conceals the constitution 
of this self through delayed and postponed violence’.1127 
 
                                                            
1122 Ibid 317. 
1123 Ibid 320-321. 
1124 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 108. 
1125 Ibid 109. 
1126 Ibid. 
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Conversely, in Christianity the transcendent is peacefully revealed through faith and 
forgiveness in Christ.  Indeed for Augustine, the pagans were unjust, violent and lacked 
virtue precisely because they did not give priority to peace and forgiveness.1128  Justice that is 
content with less than complete social consensus and harmony is therefore not true justice, 
because one has faith in an infinite justice, that there is a temporally proper (if changing) 
position for everything, without any chaotic reminder.1129   Furthermore, against the pagan 
religion, just as God loses nothing in creating the world, so Christians lose nothing by 
offering love for God.  Instead, the self-giving is a new reception of being fundamentally in 
orientation with the other.1130  Thus, Christian theology in the peaceful gift of self-giving 
provides a unique way of reconciling difference with virtue and producing peace, in contrast 
to the violent antagonism of the pagan and the secular. 
 
B Confronting History and the Present: Peace and Violence in Christianity 
 
However, the teachings of history starkly belie the conclusion that Christianity inherently and 
necessarily possesses an ontology of peace.  The religious wars of the Reformation and 
Counter-Reformation mentioned in the second chapter are just one notable example of the 
myriad and extensive catalogue of violence perpetrated in the name of Christianity.  Others 
include the celebration of violent resistance against idolatry and persecution of unbelievers 
characteristic of early imperial Christianity, where a Christian ruler’s faith was expressed 
through their willingness to pursue and violently punish those who were viewed as 
                                                            
1128 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 415. 
1129 Ibid. 
1130 Ibid 395. 
334 
 
enemies.1131  In particular, this was eventually extended to include holistic persecution and 
forced conversion of non-Christians, manifested through later events such as the Crusades 
and the Inquisition.  The Crusades in particular, despite being ‘holy wars’ allegedly waged on 
behalf of God for the sake of winning converts and defeating ungodly enemies, were marked 
with atrocities, which Riley-Smith claims were not aberrations, but rather constitute the norm 
of violence in Christian history.1132 
 
Milbank acknowledges this, but gives an argument in response.  He contends that there is a 
distinction between the violence of the secular, liberal enlightenment (which has violence as a 
presupposition and universal coercion as an end goal) and the violence allowed by faithful 
Christianity with an ultimately redemptive purpose: to establish genuine peace.  The liberal 
‘peace’ assumes the priority of the individual will through law in the sense of formal 
generality, and so exists in a universalised vision of coercion.  The Christian peace in a sense 
subverts this law in favour of unregulated, self-giving charity; but by doing so, it opens itself 
up to violence.  Therefore, though violence is not unavoidable, it is allowed in order to 
facilitate educational redemption and ultimate, final peace.1133 
 
So it appears that Milbank is ultimately arguing that ‘in some circumstances, passively 
refusing to intervene with physical violence to address violence may be more violent’.1134  
Just as Christ volunteered to suffer (and thus in a sense allow or coordinate) violence for a 
redemptive purpose, to re-establish and re-distribute the Good, so it may be necessary to 
allow or endure violence for the sake of opening the possibility for true peace.  As Milbank 
states, our imperfection intimates that violence may sometimes be necessary to appropriate 
                                                            
1131 T Sizgorich, Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009) 21-24. 
1132 J Riley-Smith, The Crusades, Christianity and Islam (Columbia University Press, 2008) 2, 4, 9. 
1133 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 38. 
1134 Ibid 29-30. 
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and instantiate the Good.1135  Though any good that needs you to fight for it is not an absolute 
good, and the absolute Good is never threatened, our comparatively limited apprehension of 
the absolute good implies participation in the eternal is not ‘cheap and easy’.1136 
 
So given the reality of evil in the world, we must actively seek to oppose it (even to the point 
of violence), and in the very act of opposing evil and violence to pursue and implement some 
semblance of the Good, we remove ourselves from being mere spectators, from a 
disinterested pacifism which is in fact even more violent.  Sometimes violence ought to be 
refused (opposed) by a type of counter-violence.1137   
 
This point can be clarified with reference to the important critique of Milbank by the late 
Gillian Rose.  Milbank acknowledges both that Rose is fundamental to his work, and that she 
has also disagreed with it.1138  Rose’s desire to ‘retrieve and rediscover’ a tradition of law that 
the ‘post-structuralist wave’ has ‘overcome’, particularly through her review of Nietzsche, 
Foucault and Derrida, provides an important foundation for Milbank’s theologically parallel 
work in Theology and Social Theory.1139  Both Milbank and Rose contend that modernism 
has gone awry and that post-structuralist nihilism is no solution.1140  Although Rose is 
initially concerned with law in the context of nihilism and deconstruction, she also 
importantly identifies that there is a tension that exists in law involving the universal and the 
particular, namely that ‘the other, unknowable, law… is precisely… the law of the 
                                                            
1135 Ibid 39-40. 
1136 Ibid 40. 
1137 Ibid 42. 
1138 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory 2nd ed, above n 128, viii, xii. 
1139 Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism: Post-Structuralism and Law (Blackwell, 1984) 1. 
1140 See Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, above n 1139 ; Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46. 
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person’.1141  The formal law is necessary to our self-consciousness and utterly intimate, yet 
we have no acquaintance with it and it is entirely remote.  We obey it only because of its 
‘universal practical validity’.1142  This is particularly manifested through what Rose calls the 
‘antinomy of law’, or the ‘inscrutable encounter with form in general’.1143  Rose expands this 
idea to mean the ‘dual implication of law and ethics’ in The Broken Middle, and states that 
where Dialectic of Nihilism argues that ‘post-structuralist nihilism completes itself as law – 
unreflected but always historically identifiable’ – here ‘post-modern antinomianism 
completes itself as political theology, as new ecclesiology, mending the diremption of law 
and ethics’.1144 
 
It is at this point where Rose and Milbank part ways: their conception of the necessity of 
violence in law.  Rose argues that the notion of love without violence is a ‘sect mentality’ 
which becomes ‘the only refuge for humankind’s invincible enslavement to violence’ – it 
displays a ‘lack of faith in the violence to be found in love, the love to be found in violence – 
the law to be found in both’.1145  Fundamentally, contrary to Milbank, violence is ‘not being 
posited as prior to law: it is presupposed as the call of law’.1146  Rose specifically engages 
Milbank on this point.1147  She argues that Milbank’s conception of a heavenly city of peace 
‘effectively destroys the idea of a city: its task of salvation deprives it of site; while its 
inclusive appeal deprives it of limit or boundary that would mark it off from any other city 
and their different laws’.1148  It is, as Milbank admits, ‘a paradox, a nomad city’.1149  Milbank 
would even see these attributes as virtues; the heavenly city has no alienating and dividing 
                                                            
1141 Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, above n 1139, 23-24. 
1142 Ibid 24. 
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(violent) boundaries, and as an eternal community has no specific site – though it can be 
arguably instantiated on earth so it is situated to some extent.  The disputed issue therefore 
seems to be the ethereality of Milbank’s city, its lack of basis in the reality of socio-legal 
relations due to its salvific escapism and lack of concrete definition. 
 
In particular, Rose claims that we should not embrace either the Athenian tradition of the 
Greeks, which takes the existing law as transcendent and beyond critique, or the Jewish 
tradition which opposes the law of the city to revelation, which then becomes a law which is 
transcendent and beyond critical evaluation.  We should instead take a middle path which 
engages critically with both extremes, and this path is the true realm of law.  For the middle is 
always broken; legal institutions always do some harm, and we should not attempt to either 
accept it or escape it.1150  True faith is to grapple with this difficulty of the broken or violent 
middle.1151  Rose understands faith in this context as being (existing) in the midst of 
uncertainties and mysteries without grasping for facts and reason, in conjunction with the 
enlarging of inhibited practical reason.1152  Faith is not about any object in particular (it is not 
a faith ‘in’ God as Milbank might have it), but rather an inflection or attitude of being and 
action in the world.1153  So the middle is the realm of the necessarily violent law, and to 
simply accept it and mask it without critique (as liberalism does) or escape it without a 
struggling engagement (with Milbank’s heavenly city) is to lack faith and actually reinscribe 
this violence.1154   
 
                                                            
1150 Vincent Lloyd (2007) ‘On the Use of Gillian Rose’ 48(5) The Heythrop Journal 697, 699; c.f. Vincent 
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Rose ultimately contends that ‘mended middles betray their broken middle’, presenting a 
‘holy middle’ which ultimately ‘corrupts’ because it claims to repair the relation between the 
universal and particular, ‘drawing attention away from the reconfiguration of singular, 
individual and state’.1155  The middle is always ‘broken – because these institutions are 
systemically flawed’ – and this implies that ‘this holiness will itself be reconfigured by the 
resource and articulation of modern domination’.1156  In other words, Milbank’s (false) claim 
of a perfectly peaceful city with a holy relation between individual and state will be utilised 
to perpetrate even greater violence.1157  ‘If the broken middle is abandoned instead of thought 
systematically, then the resulting evasive theology, insinuated epistemology, sacralised 
polity, will import the features of the City of Death remorselessly’.1158  In short, the telos of 
their critical projects differ; Milbank concludes with a vision of ontological peace, while 
Rose calls us to be content with the struggle within the world we have.1159   
 
Importantly, Vincent Lloyd argues that for Rose, law can be identified with social norms, and 
since violence is always implicated in law, this implies that social norms never completely 
match with social practice.  This is why Rose is so opposed to any theory which may suggest 
that a (legal) authority is beyond question – it will result in the violence of unwarranted and 
unjustified penalties.1160  That is a formidable objection given Milbank’s emphasis on the 
ultimate or heavenly social peace, which presumably is beyond question because for Milbank 
it represents the culmination of social ontology.  However, it is arguably not an 
insurmountable one in the sense of considering the possibility that social norms could match 
with social practice.  If this occurred, it seems that the broken middle would be repaired, and 
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there would no longer be an inevitable violence of law.  This may exist in the idea of the law 
of love itself.  As mentioned in chapter six, it is a unique norm in the sense that it is a 
command which may govern human society, but one which can also be seen as a practice – 
loving one’s neighbour as yourself.   It therefore appears that in this framework there is scope 
for social norm(s) and social practice to match, repairing the middle and removing the 
invincibility of violence.  With Rose, we can continue evaluating and interrogating the extent 
to which these do in fact coalesce, but this does not exclude the possibility of their doing so. 
 
Even Rose seems to acknowledge this to some extent according to Lloyd, since to love is an 
act of faith, the suspension of usual relational norms; love relationships do not have the usual 
normative quality, and do not have any mechanisms of protection.1161  Rose relays the story 
of Abraham’s (near) sacrifice of Isaac as acknowledging the love in violence and the violence 
in love, with the law being in both.  She goes on to say that it is this ‘free offering’, this 
‘already knowing yet being willing to stake oneself again’ that ‘prevents one… from acting 
with arbitrary violence’.1162  It seems that such an idea culminates in the willing sacrifice of 
Christ, the ultimate act of faith through suffering of violence and the violent refusal of 
violence, which implies that we too can choose in faith not to engage in violence.  Like 
Christ, we may be called upon to suffer violence or violently refuse violence when norms do 
not match practice, but because of his resurrection we can – and we can also consequently 
continue a community of love and peace.1163  So in one sense Rose’s insight is absolutely 
true; violence is inevitable because Christ always has to suffer.  But it is in this very act of 
violent love, or the paradoxically violent resistance of violence, that the law of love is 
instituted, and norms can match practice: the possibility for peace remains. 
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C Future Glory: The Hope of Communal Peace 
 
All this is not to say that violence is ontologically fundamental, nor to justify the inordinate 
arbitrary violence perpetrated during religious wars where Christianity was involved or even 
the perpetrator.  Such acts must be categorically condemned.  The fact that the argument of 
this thesis centres upon the proposition that Christianity is ontologically peaceful, in 
conjunction with the historical observation that it has not produced peace, raises what is both 
an extremely obvious and extremely fundamental issue.  If it is established that Christianity 
has an inherent ontology of peace rather than violence, this implies that those who perpetrate 
capricious or excessive violence in the name of Christianity or as Christians have neglected 
some aspect of Christian theology.   
 
In chapter two, it was proposed that the wars and violence resulting from the Reformation 
and Counter-Reformation stemmed from the violent divorce of reason and faith.  Having 
been contextualised by the rest of the thesis, that claim is qualified here in the sense that it is 
partly correct, but not completely.  Rather, those who perpetrate that sort of violence in the 
name of Christianity ultimately fail to comprehend the implications of Christianity’s 
Trinitarian theology.  As explained above, one of these is the reconciliation of reason and 
faith, but even more fundamentally the nature of the Trinity reveals the reconciliation of 
difference and sameness through the law of love.  In the Trinity, difference exists as one 
harmoniously and peacefully, and this is concretely enabled and modelled in the selfless 
Incarnation and sacrifice of Christ, who died for people rather than committing violence 
against them.  In this way, those whose minds are transformed with the revelation of the 
Trinity will participate in the divine love, reconciling difference and living in harmony.  
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Hence, it follows that the truth (revelation) of the law of love in the Trinity results in 
participation by faith, and this entails peace rather than violence. 
 
But as we have also seen in the previous section, given our human weakness and fallen 
nature, some type of violence seems necessary on the path to ultimate peace, redemption and 
reconciliation.  So there must be a distinction between the unrestrained and evil violence 
described above, which detracts from the Good, and violence which communicates some 
substantive good.  As Milbank observes, violence may be a ‘stay’ or ‘a rebuke or a caress’ – 
not all apparent violence is actually violence, for violence must be judged as to whether ‘a 
substantive good has been impaired’.1164  How then do we determine whether a particular 
type of ‘violence’ is of the former kind, or the latter?  Milbank gives us some clues: 
Every occasion for every good act is always like this – there is always some initial evil, some 
deficiency, some threat, some terror, something to be warded off… hence virtue is 
paradigmatically heroism… to be brave… virtue is always reactive: it always secretly 
celebrates as its occasion a prior evil, lives out of what it opposes… Here, at the beginning of 
every virtue, lies a failure to turn the other cheek… worse still, no… encroachment, no 
seeming violence, is obviously violent in an objective and unquestionable sense.  No, 
violence has always to be judged, since every encroachment, every invasion, including an 
imperial one, may be a gift, an alien strengthening; we have to decide whether it strengthens 
us or weakens us… is there a violent tearing apart of our true self here?  Or to the contrary, 
does our true self only emerge on this journey out of itself?1165 
 
So the delineation seems to be between violence that presupposes a prior evil and/or aims 
toward some ontologically necessary evil, and so leads to an individual heroic virtue, and 
violence in a sense that is gift or strengthening, allowing our true self to emerge which results 
in humility and a fundamental peace with the community.  This is why Milbank continues to 
promote communal peace and the good as an attainable ontological reality, counter-
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intuitively rejecting an atomistic, individual peaceableness or pacifism, which may tend to 
gaze upon violence without refusing it.1166 
 
Though this scenario is ‘apocalyptic’ rather than ‘utopian’ in the sense that we may require 
violence to bring the ultimate good of repentance, redemption and reconciliation, the fact that 
this remains the goal and is an attainable ontological reality retains some utopian 
elements.1167  It implies that consistent Trinitarian Christian theology opens the possibility for 
the final reconciliation of the universal and the particular, through revelation and Incarnation, 
and providing true peace and the good.  Any other differential ontology is non-Christian, 
presupposing transcendental violence and contending for the necessity of reading reality as 
ontologically conflictual – in other words, the failure to take account of difference is 
violence, for in the jostling of difference(es) there is agonistic conflict.1168  However, what is 
sought is not conflict but peace.  As we saw Augustine recognise, peace is the ultimate good, 
and is delightful, and what will be found in heaven – a peace and life everlasting.1169  Real 
peace is a state of harmonious agreement, based on a common love and a realisation of 
justice for all, and it is Christian theology which allows the possibility for this peace through 
the truth of the law of love.  So reconsidering and implementing the law of love in the 
modern legal system offers a way of rethinking and redeeming this system, reducing its 
violence and rendering it ontologically peaceful.1170   
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V CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE MODERN LEGAL COMMUNITY: 
PROPOSING THE LAW OF LOVE 
 
A Christ Against Leviathan 
 
The following sections seek to further indicate the way a Christian ontology of peace offers a 
rethinking of the modern legal system.  Augustine argues that the eternal city, or the Christian 
community, possesses the heavenly peace by faith, and ‘lives a life of righteousness based on 
this faith, having the attainment of that peace in view in every good action it performs in 
relation to God, and in relation to a neighbour, since the life of a city is inevitably a social 
life’.1171  In other words, this ideal heavenly peace is attainable, at least in part, on earth and 
refers to an ordered harmony in the community of the city, where all citizens contribute and 
fulfil their role.1172  In such a community, the individual is not alienated and antagonised, but 
loved by the community comprised of individuals as a function of the law of love, and 
performs their designated role as an act of love towards all other individuals comprising the 
community.   
 
For  
… just as the individual righteous man lives on the basis of faith which is active in love, so 
the association, or people, of righteous men lives on the same basis of faith, active in love, the 
love with which a man loves God as God ought to be loved, and loves his neighbour as 
himself.  But where this justice does not exist… there is no commonwealth.1173   
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So Augustine in fact concludes that without the love based in faith (and consequently based 
on the revelation of God in Christ, the mutual bond of spirit), there is no commonwealth, or 
legal community.  As such, for Augustine, not only is the theological law of love the most 
desirable ontological basis for a legal community of peace, it appears to be the only basis for 
such a community.  The argument is that Augustine’s point also holds true for our modern 
system of law.  That is, without a peaceful ontology – which involves loving your neighbour 
as yourself – it is not possible for the legal system to make peace, and it is rendered 
inherently violent in its attempt to keep violence at bay. 
 
As Milbank observes, this is because ‘the distinctiveness of Christianity, and its point of 
difference with antiquity and modernity, is its reconciliation of virtue with difference’.1174  
The antique (pagan) closure against difference (i.e. antagonism and alienation of individuals) 
meant it really promoted a heroic, exclusive, aristocratic freedom.1175  Pagan ethics are 
therefore not really ethical, because they were not oriented towards a harmonious, relational 
community as an end goal.  Instead, it celebrated control, force and violence over 
members.1176  The division between the whole and the part, as the division between the soul 
and the body, perpetuates a fundamental discontinuity, where subordination of one by the 
other can only be by force.  In contrast, Christian ontology abolishes this division and duality 
which supports the notion of an ineradicable ontological violence.1177  Christianity is 
therefore something like the peaceful transmission of difference, or differences in a 
continuous harmony.1178   
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What Radical Orthodoxy identifies here is the contrast between Hobbesian assumptions of 
primitive atomistic violence controlled by excessive sovereignty, and the loving and peaceful 
Christian community.  The modern state attempts to sovereignly coerce peace as the mere 
absence of conflict between individuals, but the framework of the church as the city or legal 
community has authentic relations of love between God and neighbour by the Holy Spirit 
through the redemption effected by Christ.1179  This is really a contemporary articulation of 
Augustine’s argument just mentioned.  Rather than the state establishing a spurious peace 
based on the suppression of an allegedly prior violence, the church as the state or community 
establishes authentic relations of love through the revelation of truth in Christ and the 
transformation or persuasion of people through faith.  The Church as persuading rather than 
coercing is important, for this allows the proclamation of a new political event: that of the 
cross, which replaces the sovereign power of the secular state with a different type of power 
or strategy of governance.1180   
 
Paradoxically, the power of the cross is in its complete lack of sovereign power – Christ 
refuses to exert the power he possesses, instead resisting violent rule and establishing peace 
through service and the sacrifice of self; this in itself is far more powerful, and through Christ 
we can envisage the possibility of a similarly loving community.  In this community to rule is 
to serve, and people are not merely individual contracting entities regulated by legal violence, 
but redeemed people who are part of a community operating under grace beyond legalism 
and characterised by mutual love, empowered and demonstrated through Christ the King who 
gave himself for us.1181 
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B The Law of Love as the Person and Work of Christ 
 
1 Gift Versus Legality 
 
So we specifically find the law of love as applied in the legal community through considering 
Christ himself as the embodiment and fulfilment of that law.  The previous section introduced 
the terminology of gift, and contrasted it with law – or at least, alluded to the need to go 
beyond the law to truly establish the gift of love as the common good.  The problem is this 
(secularised, enlightenment) law assumes a prior violence which it is trying to prevent 
through the stringent regulation of life, liberty and truth.1182  The danger of such an approach 
is that it really detracts from or prevents the overflowing of divine Good, and so is actually 
evil in the Augustinian sense of privation.  Rather than the fullness of life, freedom and truth 
revealed through the Spirit, the law constrains, alienates and antagonises; as Paul realised, it 
holds out a formal, abstract standard which can never be fulfilled, thereby spelling out 
judicial violence.1183 
 
Conversely, through Christ and his manifold gifts, we can understand our role in the society.  
Where law is said to apply to everyone equally, denying difference and constraining 
intersubjective relationship, the particular nature of divine gift(s) allows difference to be 
harmonised and promoted, producing peace in the body as Paul described in 1 Corinthians 
13.1184  It follows that this giving of ourselves through the receiving of gifts actually increases 
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our subjectivity, such that the sacrifice of the gift is really no sacrifice at all.  ‘A genuine gift 
is excessive since it is not required, and it occasions not a loss but a gain in subjectivity for 
the giver which is reinforced by the counter-gift of gratitude from the recipient.  In this virtue 
is to be found no sacrifice’.1185  Hence the society can continue perpetually in peace, forever 
giving and receiving the gift of love through the law of love, specifically empowered and 
modelled through Christ’s resurrection.  With the vision of the resurrected Christ, the 
presupposition of death is cancelled along with pagan virtue and death-limiting law.  All that 
remains is charity.1186 
 
2 Gift as Forgiveness 
 
The second element of the law of love in the legal community as embodied in Christ is the 
way in which Christ inaugurates and endows the gift of forgiveness.  In other words, the 
person and work of Christ is ‘necessary for the redemption’ because he ‘enacts and enshrines 
the viability of the new, forgiving practice, by virtue of its unique and universal 
“attractiveness”’ – that as we saw, in being put on the cross Christ draws all people to 
himself.1187  Only Christ can end all violence, because his death is not only an example but an 
enabling metaphor for refusing violence and pursuing forgiveness.1188  Furthermore, if Jesus’ 
death is fully effective, it is not limited to ethereal spirituality.  It is also the ‘inauguration of 
the “political” practice of forgiveness; forgiveness as a mode of “government” and social 
                                                            
1185 Ibid 226. 
1186 Ibid 229. 
1187 Ibid 160. 
1188 Ibid. 
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being’.1189   This produces a state of perpetually giving forgiveness or infinite gift-exchange, 
what Milbank calls an ‘atoning practice’, which  
… can arise only once the new community based upon the absolute priority of human 
relationships, so perfectly imaging God, is already in place… it is the radical newness of the 
practice of the gospel, as over against the tolerated violence of all other human practices, 
which suggests the total identification of this practice with himself in its “inauguration”.1190   
 
In other words, Christ as the embodiment of the gift of forgiveness creates the space for a 
community practice of atonement in the law of love through projecting the image of God 
from heaven to earth – the practice of the gospel which is peace rather than violence.  The 
event of the Incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection exceptionally allows this because Jesus 
as the God-man, the omniscient and innocent divine logos, represents the singular suffering 
of all humanity, a maximally sovereign suffering which is capable of instituting forgiveness 
on behalf of all.1191  So through representing universal suffering, Christ also provided the 
possibility for universal forgiveness by participation through faith and the spirit in the law of 
love, leading to reconciliation of human relationships.  Since we participate in the Trinity and 
Incarnation by faith, we also participate in the giving of forgiveness initiated by the divine 
love.  In other words, we receive the divine authority to give and accept forgiveness as part of 
intrahuman reconciliation.1192 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1189 Ibid 161. 
1190 Ibid 162. 
1191 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 61. 
1192 Ibid 62. 
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C Coercion and Love 
 
At this point, a question may be asked regarding the place of punishment and deterrence in 
this kind of community.  As we saw in the previous part, Milbank’s answer is that 
Christianity can still allow coercion, for the goal of coercion is final peace, and the coercive 
action to prevent a person damaging themselves or others can be redeemed through their 
retrospective acceptance of the means taken to reach this final goal of peace.  However, the 
coercion used by the pagan, earthly city does not have the final peace in view, but only the 
peace of compromise between wills, which consequently contains an arbitrary element open 
to the exercise of power.1193  Indeed, secular reason appropriated this arbitrary element and 
pervaded law by engendering a newly rationalistic and formalised approach, one which 
resulted in pure possession and control, and in the regulation and balancing of power.  This in 
turn led to liberal conceptions of property rights, a doctrine of unlimited sovereignty, and 
relationships between legal bodies (both persons and corporations) being conceived on a 
contractualist basis.1194  In particular, Milbank argues that Hobbes  
…traces the origins of human society to individual self-seeking, which eventually gives rise 
to laws which merely protect established power. Against this background, crime is partly 
“rational”, because it protests against an undeveloped notion of right and subjectivity.  And 
punishment at this level is virtually indistinguishable from “revenge”: the reassertion of the 
right of force. Crime and punishment, like revenge, belong to an endless “fatal” process, 
because in the realm of force, which is a realm of sheer quantitative “indifference”, one action 
is only “equivalent” to another, or “compensation” for another, in a purely arbitrary sense. 
No-one is ever satisfied that justice has been done; there is always a balance to be rectified; 
the punishment can never fit the crime.1195   
 
Such is at fundamental odds with the Christian vision of loving one’s neighbour personally, 
seeking communal peace and reconciliation, rather than as an abstract legal entity doomed to 
                                                            
1193 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, above n 46, 424. 
1194 Ibid 441. 
1195 Ibid 170. 
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an endless repetition of violence.  In a specifically judicial context, it is more important to 
investigate than to punish, for once the offence is discovered, the aim is always to restore the 
offender and promote reconciliation and redemption.1196  Here, the practice of forgiveness 
nevertheless involves a practice of restitution, because forgiveness is a gratuitous self-
offering beyond the demands of the secular law.  Christ is the ultimate model for this, since 
he offered himself for forgiveness of sins when he was under no legal obligation to do so.  
Hence, wrongs must be put right by rectification and restoration, or if this is not possible, 
some other means which demonstrates a will to harmony among human beings.1197  ‘The 
practice of forgiveness, as surplus to any system of desert or obligation, is able creatively to 
break out of the blindness induced both by the wrong act of the offender, and by the 
corresponding anger of the victim’.1198 
 
This emphasis on harmony and mutual trust through the Christian practice of forgiveness 
recalls foreshadowing statements made by Benjamin and Cover in chapter four, who saw the 
need to redeem law through non-violent enforcement with the preconditions of (communal) 
peaceableness and trust by virtue of unity within Christian practice.  These preconditions are 
met both at the transcendent level and the immanent level.  At the transcendent level, the 
perfect peace that consists between the Trinitarian relations is revealed in Christ and is 
imparted to the mind by faith, which is a synonym for trust.  The preconditions are 
subsequently met at the immanent level since the persuasion of the mind and participation in 
the law of love by the subject open the possibility for a community of peace between 
individuals, a constantly atoning practice, based on a mutual trust.  With this in mind, the 
                                                            
1196 Ibid 424. 
1197 Ibid 422, 428. 
1198 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 164. 
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thesis finally turns to an example of such a rethinking of law, drawing on the common law’s 
consideration of the neighbour principle. 
 
VI THE LAW OF LOVE, OR LOVE BEYOND LAW: RELEASING THE SPIRIT 
OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN 
 
A Kelsen and the Grundnorm 
 
It is possible to conceive this descriptive dimension of the law of love as providing the 
foundation for civil law and the community found in the Apostle Paul through comparison 
with Hans Kelsen’s Grundnorm, or basic norm.  For Kelsen, the idea of the basic norm is a 
presupposed, fundamental norm that authorises and founds any coherent and valid legal 
system.  It gives meaning to a legal system and bestows the legal power to create such a 
system.1199  At one level, some may note the apparent absurdity of using Kelsen, the high 
positivist and anti-moralist, as a model for how a theological truth such as the law of love 
may found the civil law.  However, Kelsen himself notes that the law of love is an example of 
the basic norm, illustrating that the neighbour principle contains content from which other 
norms can be logically deduced, resulting in the establishment of an entire system of valid 
norms.1200  Given that Kelsen can observe the fact that the law of love is an example of the 
basic norm, it may seem that theology should also be able to begin implementing such a 
process. 
                                                            
1199 M Green, ‘Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems’ (2003) 54 Alabama Law Review 388, 388.  
1200 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 1967) 195-196. 
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The most powerful example of how this may work is found in Romans 13:8-10.  In this 
passage immediately following Paul’s injunction to render obedience to the civil authorities, 
he clarifies this by stating that this should be achieved by loving one another, for love fulfils 
the law.  He proceeds to show that the commandments are all summed up by the law of love: 
to love your neighbour as yourself.  Thus, Paul is arguing that in addition to the reasons given 
in Romans 13:1-7, the civil authorities should be obeyed as a function of the law of love.  
Furthermore, the law of love legitimises and validates the commandment system in 
conjunction with the civil authorities, for Paul uses it to justify his instruction to obey them 
by stating that this law of love fulfils obedience.  It is the law of love that vindicates and 
gives meaning to the civil authorities and the series of commandments by ultimately 
transcending and fulfilling them.  Paul also demonstrates that the law of love provides the 
content from which an entire system of valid norms can be logically deduced.  In Romans 
13:10, he states that love does no wrong to a neighbour.  In this way, all the commandments 
such as not to murder and steal and the like are contained by this principle, since if you love 
your neighbour according to Paul you will not murder them or steal from them.  Therefore, 
the axiom to love your neighbour as yourself can plausibly provide the content of ‘doing no 
wrong to a neighbour’ from which a series of norms can be promulgated and a harmonious 
legal community which loves the individual can be created. 
 
However, given the argument of this thesis, there is great danger in this approach.  We have 
already noted the counter-intuitive nature of considering Kelsen in this context, given his 
positivistic framework.  The effect of having the foundation of law as a norm (even a ‘good’ 
norm such as loving your neighbour as yourself) through which a series of norms can be 
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logically deduced re-introduces the problem of juridification.  In other words, the risk of 
legalising and systematising the law of love in a legal context renders the principle into a 
rigid code which becomes inflexible, secular, formal – the precise issue with the secular 
modern law that we have already identified.  Like the legalism of the Pharisees that Christ 
confronted, or even like the rigid equitable principles of our own time, such a law invites 
transgression by articulating itself in terms of formal boundaries; in other words, such a law 
is intrinsically violent.1201   
 
To pursue the law of love as the foundation for a legal community is the right idea, but to 
approach it through Kelsen’s Grundnorm maintains a secular form or secular logos, which 
will reproduce violence.  What is needed is to go beyond law, to love: the theological logos.  
For in the spiritual bond of love, we are freed from the violent constraints of the law of the 
letter, yet we are able to fulfil the law of the spirit.  This problem of attempting to implement 
the law of love as a legal norm within a secular, formal legal system can be explicitly seen 
through the legal understanding of the Parable of the Good Samaritan in modern negligence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
1201 See Deagon, above n 86, 3-4, 24 where this problem has been identified.  C.f. Slavoj Žižek, ‘The Thrilling 
Romance of Orthodoxy’ in Creston Davis et al (eds), Theology and the Political: The New Debate (Duke 
University Press, 2005) 66, 69; Badiou, above n 114, 79-80. 
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B Understanding the Parable 
 
1 The Legal Interpretation 
 
Although there are examples and illustrations of civil law having a foundation in Christian 
theology and the law of love (the importance of truth in evidence, trust in contract, principles 
of equity, establishing peace through criminal law), these tend to be traces and distortions, a 
residue of an earlier, pre-secular period that is now long gone.  Rather than demonstrating the 
potential to have a secularised civil law based in the theological truth of the law of love, these 
examples tend to be the exceptions which prove the rule that secular law seeks to eliminate 
faith, theology and ultimately, love.  They are part of a mere Christian residue, a malformed 
vestige which limits the radical selfless love modelled by Christ, and puts in its place what 
amounts to little more than altruistic self-interest.1202  Such can arguably be observed in the 
seminal case for modern negligence, Donoghue v Stevenson.1203  Here, Lord Atkin articulated 
the rule which has provided the foundation for much of negligence law over the past eighty 
years.  He stated that: 
The liability for negligence… is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing… the rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law that you must not 
injure your neighbour; and the lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted 
reply… the answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
                                                            
1202 C.f. Harold Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard, 1983). 
1203 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.  Desmond Manderson has meditated on similar themes in the nature 
of tort and the duty of care through engagement with Levinas, arguing that the duty of care is not individualistic 
or communal, but based on responding to difference.  Rather than subsuming particulars under a universal rule, 
or acting out of mere legal obligation founded in the will (contract) or the body (criminal), a genuine duty of 
care will respond by acknowledging and providing what is needed at a deeper soul level within a context of 
asymmetry.  See Desmond Manderson, Proximity, Levinas and the Soul of the Law (McGill-Queens, 2006).  
However, it might also be said that Manderson focuses more on the legal rule itself, and does not sufficiently 
consider the theological basis of the loving neighbour principle which was transformed and distorted into the 
legal rule.  The following sections outline this kind of theological analysis. 
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that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am 
directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called into question.1204 
 
Here Lord Atkin bases his articulation of the (civil) law of negligence on the (theological) 
rule, or truth revealed, that you are to love your neighbour – the law of love to love your 
neighbour as yourself.  In the context of understanding what Lord Atkin precisely intends to 
convey by evoking this principle, it is worth noting the later observation by Lord Diplock that 
it was ‘the Parable of the Good Samaritan evoked by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v 
Stevenson’.1205  The situation of the parable is reproduced in full below: 
And behold, a lawyer stood up to put [Jesus] to the test, saying, ‘Teacher, what shall I do 
to inherit eternal life?’ He said to him, ‘What is written in the Law? How do you read 
it?’ And he answered, ’You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your 
soul and with all your strength and with all your mind, and your neighbour as yourself.’ And 
he said to him, ’You have answered correctly; do this, and you will live.’ But he, desiring to 
justify himself, said to Jesus, ‘And who is my neighbour?’ Jesus replied, ‘A man was going 
down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him 
and departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road, and 
when he saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the 
place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to 
where he was, and when he saw him, he had compassion. He went to him and bound up his 
wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he set him on his own animal and brought him to an 
inn and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the 
innkeeper, saying, ‘Take care of him, and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I 
come back.’ Which of these three, do you think, proved to be a neighbour to the man who fell 
among the robbers?’ He said, ‘The one who showed him mercy.’ And Jesus said to him, ‘You 
go, and do likewise.’1206 
 
So the law of love as the revelation of Christian theology was appropriated by Lord Atkin as 
the foundation for a duty of care in modern negligence.  However, despite its promise, it is a 
mere trace, a distorted, pagan version of the ‘law of love’.  Atkin’s appropriation of the 
theological principle to love one’s neighbour to the legal principle that one should not injure 
their neighbour implies a far more restricted sense of conduct than Christ advocates in the 
                                                            
1204 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, 580 (Lord Atkin). 
1205 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] 2 All ER 294, 326 (Lord Diplock). 
1206 Luke 10:25-37. 
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parable (which Atkin explicitly acknowledges in the above quote).  For example, in the case 
of Hargrave v Goldman, it was found after a brief discussion of Lord Atkin’s neighbour 
principle and its origin in the Parable of the Good Samaritan that: 
The dictates of charity and of compassion do not constitute a duty of care.  The law cast no 
duty upon a man to go to the aid of another who is in peril or distress not caused by him.  The 
call of common humanity may lead him to the rescue.  This the law recognises, for it gives 
the rescuer its protection when he answers that call.  But it does not require that he do so…1207 
 
In other words, Christ’s commandment to love your neighbour as yourself extends to 
showing mercy to people in peril not caused by you (such as the example given in the 
parable, which we are called to imitate), but this is not the case in the legal adaption of this 
theological principle.  Thus, far from the love of neighbour being the ostensible foundation 
for modern negligence, in fact ‘the dictates of charity and compassion’ (love) are explicitly 
distinguished from law, and separated from law.  Though the law acknowledges that ‘the call 
of common humanity’ may compel a rescue and provides protection to this end, it 
nevertheless excludes charity and compassion from the operation of law.  This promotes a 
law or legal system not modelled after Christ in the fashion of selfless love, but rather a cold, 
calculating law, one based on an ultimately selfish desire to avoid helping one who is in need.  
In this sense, the law of love has been twisted and secularised, reified, by modern law.  The 
trace remains, but it is impotent and contains none of its power. 
 
2 The Theological Interpretation 
 
                                                            
1207 (1963) 110 CLR 40, 66 (Windeyer J). 
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In contrast to Lord Atkin’s restrictive and self-interested duty of care which tends to promote 
an attitude of eschewing the boundary of least convenience, or even the pursuit of minimum 
effort just to satisfy some formal goal, we should seek to articulate the neighbour principle in 
a way which is consistent with the Christian theology we have been exploring.  Specifically, 
we need to go beyond mere legal duty and selfish interest, and desire to truly act with love 
and sacrifice in order to promote a peaceful community, just like Christ did.  As Milbank 
exhorts, ‘to act charitably we must break through the existing representation of what is our 
duty towards our neighbour and towards God’, and ‘break through the bounds of duty which 
“technically” pre-defines its prescribed performance’.1208  This initially involves 
understanding the Parable of the Good Samaritan in its theological context. 
 
The superficial content of the parable is straightforward.  A man was travelling from 
Jerusalem to Jericho and was mugged and severely injured, left for dead.  A priest and Levite 
pass by and avoid the man, but a Samaritan comes and has compassion, tending to his 
wounds and paying for him to recover at an inn.  The parable is recorded only in Luke’s 
account, though he is probably drawing from the earlier, truncated account in Mark 12:28-
31.1209  There are some important differences between the accounts.  Mark’s account has only 
the initial conversation where Jesus is asked about the greatest commandment, and Jesus 
responds by saying that the greatest commandment is to love God and love your 
neighbour.1210  Where Mark has the question raised by a scribe, Luke mentions a lawyer; 
Luke’s concern in the context of the account is eternal life while Mark focuses on the greatest 
                                                            
1208 Milbank, Word Made Strange, above n 62, 134. 
1209 Baird, above n 805, 227. 
1210 Mark 12:28-31, paralleled in Luke 10:25-28. 
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commandment.1211  Finally, Mark has Jesus answer the question regarding the greatest 
commandment, while in Luke it is the lawyer who answers the parallel question of what one 
must do to inherit eternal life.1212 
 
These factors indicate Luke’s focus on the inclusivity or universalism of the gospel of Jesus, 
and particularly how Jesus sought to reconcile Jews, Samaritans and Gentiles; some 
commentators also argue that this parable foreshadows the later Gentile mission recorded by 
Luke in Acts.1213  In other words, Luke attempts to demonstrate how discriminating 
categories (such as Jew versus Gentile) are dissolved in Jesus, inaugurating a global 
harmonious community.1214  Luke’s alterations make his account more relevant to his Gentile 
readers, who would have had little concern for scribes and the commandments of the Jewish 
law.1215  Jews and Samaritans especially had an extremely acrimonious relationship, a deeply 
entrenched process of negative stereotyping stemming back even to respective accounts of 
origins of the Samaritans, and a theological dispute over the proper place of worship.1216  It 
therefore seems that Jesus was using this parable as a hyperbole to demonstrate the extent to 
which one should love your neighbour, regardless of different prejudices, races or legal 
categories:  
Normally the Samaritans were considered apostate… universally regarded as objects of 
contempt [by Jews]… by having a Samaritan as the one who helps a man in need, Jesus 
breaks down the boundaries between Jew and Samaritan, to be sure, but most of all he makes 
                                                            
1211 Scribes were originally copyists of Scripture, while lawyers were the experts in Jewish law and legal 
procedure.  The increasing prominence of Scribes in the time of Christ resulted in a merging of the roles, which 
may be why Mark refers to a scribe and Luke refers to a lawyer.  See Blomberg, above n 807, 47. 
1212 Baird, above n 805, 227. 
1213 Blomberg, above n 807, 163-164; also see e.g. T.J. Lane, Luke and the Gentile Mission: Gospel Anticipates 
Acts (Peter Lang, 1996). 
1214 Gundry, above n 843, 94-95. 
1215 Baird, above n 805, 227. 
1216 H Williamson, ‘Samaritans’ in J Douglas (ed), The Illustrated Bible Dictionary Part 3 (Intervarsity Press, 
1980) 1378; Phillip Esler, ‘Jesus and the Reduction of Intergroup Conflict: The Parable of the Good Samaritan 
in Light of Social Identity Theory’ (2000) 8(4) Biblical Interpretation 325, 329-332. 
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the claim that whoever responds to human need is a true child of God and an example of love 
for the neighbour.1217   
 
Furthermore, the term half dead is best understood to mean that he appeared alive, but in a 
severe condition requiring help.  This renders the actions of the priest and Levite inexcusable 
for Jesus, since going to the aid of another is not a matter of legal category, but of the heart 
and compassion (and it was the Samaritan who had compassion).1218  It is also worth 
remembering that the question asked of Jesus, ‘who is my neighbour’, was asked by a lawyer.  
In this context, the lawyer is an ‘expert in the law’, someone ‘trained to interpret and teach 
the law of Jewish tradition’.1219  Jesus does not directly answer the question of who is the 
neighbour, but rather re-directs the focus towards the lawyer (and us as the reader).  He 
effectively changes the question from ‘who is my neighbour’ to ‘who acted like a neighbour’ 
and ‘to whom can I be a neighbour’, implying that we should not try to avoid the divine 
demand through formal legalisation, but should instead show love to all who need it without 
distinction.1220  According to this anthropological reading, Jesus finally emphasises we 
should ‘go, and do likewise’; that is, we should be like the Good Samaritan, loving and 
showing mercy to any who are in need without seeking to restrict the scope of the command 
through legal definition or ethnic prejudice.1221 
 
As such,  
The one who asks, “Who is my neighbour?” thinks of others in the world as classifiable 
commodities.  One can build fences to determine who is in the circle of those to be cared for, 
and who is not.  Then we and all others can “take care of our own”, thinking that our help 
should be directed to those we are related to by ties of family or friendship – things based on 
                                                            
1217 Arland Hultgren, The Parables of Jesus: A Commentary (Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2002) 98. 
1218 Ibid 96. 
1219 Ibid 95. 
1220 Baird, above n 805, 228; Blomberg, above n 807, 338; Gundry, above n 843, 163. 
1221 Luke 10:37. 
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law, rights, bloodlines, culture or tradition.  By means of this parable Jesus calls his hearers 
away from a legalistic or culturally conditioned mind-set to a life of authentic love.  One 
should not seek to define who the neighbour is, but simply be a neighbour to the one in 
need… the example of the Samaritan, who does good to a person in need without any 
apparent regard for religion or ethnicity, illustrates how authentic love pays no attention to 
religious, ethnic, or cultural distinctions.1222 
 
So authentic compassion, a Christian love based on selfless sacrifice, transcends the 
boundaries and limits violently imposed by law, and instead tends to establish a community 
life of selfless sacrifice.  Indeed,  the lawyer’s question could be seen as a ‘typical’ lawyer’s 
question, a ‘boundary question of an exclusionary type’ – and the common answer, in 
accordance with the purview of the Mosaic law, was a fellow Israelite, excluding Samaritans 
and Gentiles and encouraging the engagement of group differentiation and 
stereotypification.1223  However, ‘that a representative of one of the hated outgroups is 
brought along that road challenges the whole structure of group differentiation which the law 
functioned to maintain’, and the fact that it was this representative who exhibited admirable 
conduct further disrupts this legally imposed alienation.1224   
It was, moreover, a compassion with few limits, as shown in the rich and loving detail which 
Jesus… supplies… The force of this case drives one to conclude that compassion which 
transcends legally sanctioned ethnic boundaries and discriminations when faced with real 
human need is a superior form of human behaviour than continuing to live within their 
limits.1225 
 
And as with the atonement, this is not intended to be an isolated incident, but a way of life 
permanently instantiated in human relations: 
Jesus is concerned with this very issue of how a process of decategorization effected through 
a single event of interpersonal contact can be generalized beyond those caught up in its 
dynamics. In part, this is achieved, as already noted, by moving the focus from “neighbour” 
as the passive site of the group categorisation process to “neighbour” as a person who acts 
                                                            
1222 Hultgren, above n 1217, 100. 
1223 Esler, above n 1216, 335, 336-337. 
1224 Ibid 342. 
1225 Ibid 343. 
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properly (and compassionately) to assist someone in need (Luke 10:36). This redefinition of 
the issue away from the group-oriented consideration of whether someone fits, or does not fit, 
within a certain social category to the active need to offer help to whomever needs it, plainly 
promotes a vision of human agency which extends beyond the boundaries of this narrative… 
Whereas Jesus could have broken off the conversation with the lawyer’s answer, the fact that 
he continues with this injunction suggests a concern with doing more to generalize the 
behaviour of the Samaritan beyond the facts of that particular story. As already noted, Jesus 
utilises the story of the Samaritan’s compassion to generate a new principle of moral 
behaviour.1226 
 
It is this sublime vision of truly and universally loving one’s neighbour that indicates its 
theological foundation.  In fact, your neighbour extends to your greatest enemy, and to love 
your neighbour means to show mercy even to your greatest enemy; there are no boundaries to 
the concept.1227  Here the Parable of the Good Samaritan can not only be read 
anthropologically, but also Christologically.  In this light, (that we are the person in need, 
helpless and dead in our sins, rescued by the sacrifice of the Samaritan who represents 
Christ), the logic of the parable ‘raises the possibility that we first need to be shown 
compassion by a neighbour as a condition of becoming neighbours ourselves’ – and ‘only the 
divine persons are capable of showing us this kind of compassion’, particularly by Christ who 
became flesh and gave himself for us – ‘claiming us… as persons sharing his communion 
with the Father and the Spirit’.1228   
 
These observations are important for understanding the source for love of neighbour; we love 
our neighbour because we have first been loved by God – the modelling of sacrificial love 
through Christ, who showed love, mercy and forgiveness to all humanity, his former enemies, 
by willingly dying on the cross in their place, enables us to love one another.1229  So Jesus 
                                                            
1226 Ibid 350. 
1227 See e.g. Matthew 5:43-48. 
1228 Ian McFarland, ‘Who is my Neighbour?  The Good Samaritan as a Source for Theological Anthropology’ 
(2001) 17(1) Modern Theology 57, 62-63. 
1229 See Matthew 5-6. 
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says to love your neighbour means to show similar love, mercy and forgiveness to all 
individuals without bound, and he commands us to do this in a model after himself.  In this 
sense we are liberated from the letter, legalism and limit of the law, but as Paul identifies in 
Galatians 5:13-15, this liberation is for obedience and peace, not selfish striving: 
For you were called to freedom, brothers. Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for 
the flesh, but through love serve one another. For the whole law is fulfilled in one word: “You 
shall love your neighbor as yourself.” But if you bite and devour one another, watch out that 
you are not consumed by one another. 
 
So in Christ, through the law of love, we are liberated from the alienation and antagonism of 
the secularised (formal, codified, limited) law, so that we may have life and freedom.  
Paradoxically, we fulfil the law by going beyond it, and establish a truly sacred community of 
peace. 
 
VII CONSTRUCTING A JURISPRUDENCE OF TRUTH, OR FULFILLING THE 
CHRISTIAN VISION OF ONTOLOGICAL PEACE IN LAW 
 
This thesis has argued that the modern (secular) legal system retains some vestiges of the 
Christian theology, but these have been distorted and limited, with the result that the secular 
system of law produces violence.  The promotion of the liberal legal subject, with their 
autonomy and reason, has ultimately failed, for this alienates the members of the universal 
community in favour of privileging the individual, which leads to violence. However, the 
alternative vision of the socialist collective alienates the individual in favour of privileging 
the community, similarly resulting in violence.  Consequently, what is required is not simply 
a positing of the secularised and impotent ‘law of love’ in the civil legal system, nor merely 
ad hoc adjustments according to the law of the letter (i.e. the passing, amending and repealing 
363 
 
of legislation or the steady progression of the common law) which are already built on the 
foundation of the secular, but a complete restoration; a rebuilding on the new foundation of 
the theological law to love one’s neighbour as yourself to reinvigorate the legal system, a law 
of the spirit which will reconcile the individual and the community, allowing all persons, 
particular and universal, to exist in a legal ontology of harmony and peace.   
 
This ‘new creation’ of the law from its very spirit will arguably lead to a peace beyond 
violence, and a law beyond force, for instead the law of love, of selfless sacrifice and the 
pursuit of peace, will inhere in the interactions of individual persons, constituting a comm-
unity of peace modelled on the relations between the members of the Tri-Unity, graciously 
enabled and revealed in Christ.  In other words, this beautiful relationship of love exchange 
and receipt between members of a legal community is possible because of the revelation of 
the Trinity in Christ and his paradoxical work of dying to live – this, in conjunction with the 
paradoxical need to fulfil law by transcending it in the fashion revealed by Christ, is the 
jurisprudence of truth.1230 
 
However, the aspiration to a fully regenerated legal system in this sense may be too much to 
ask.  After all, there are many questions regarding how we may move from the dominant 
modern, secular system of law to this kind of community, questions that for now remain 
unanswered.  I am not advocating a Christian theocracy or for a polity governed by 
something akin to legalistic canon law.  Rather, in lieu of a radically regenerated legal 
community founded upon the law of love, one could settle for an existence within our current 
legal community which is characterised by the ‘fruit of the Spirit’: ‘love, joy, peace, patience, 
                                                            
1230 Milbank, Being Reconciled, above n 67, 57. 
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kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control’; for ‘against such things there is no 
law’.1231  Perhaps manifesting and displaying this alternative community of love beyond the 
law, meaning the secular can peacefully co-exist, will be enough to persuade people that there 
is another way to true peace and that it is worth seeking.  By revealing this heavenly peace on 
earth beyond the law, it may be possible to move towards an eschatological, final redemption 
of law. 
 
Ultimately, it is this vision which Christianity seeks and makes possible – to bring the 
heavenly peace of community and love to earth in the context of what may effectively 
become a post-secular system of civil law.  This law of love exists in its perfect display 
within the relations of the Trinity, and is revealed as truth through Christ, who reconciles the 
eternal and the temporal, rescuing reason from its secular, violent form, and produces an 
ontology of vertical and horizontal peace between God and humanity respectively.  
Persuaded by this vision, humanity participates in the glorious divine, implementing the law 
of the Spirit to love one’s neighbour, rather than the law of the letter, thus creating a 
harmonious community which reflects the heavenly relations.   
 
Having in this thesis constructed a theoretical foundation for this ontology of peace in law, 
and in this chapter provided a brief description of how this heavenly vision may become 
physical reality, it is hoped that this will indicate that society ought not to yield to an 
allegedly inevitable ontology of alienation and antagonism, but may instead embrace 
ontological peace, which loves all individuals in the community and allows the reconciliation 
of virtue and difference based on the Trinity.  It is further hoped that subsequent work will 
                                                            
1231 Galatians 5:22-23. 
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focus on a detailed articulation of redeeming the current secular system of civil law, imbuing 
it with the law of love as signalled in this chapter.  With these developments, the Christian 
vision of an ontology of peace undergirding human and divine relations can not only be a 
heavenly vision, but an earthly reality as well. 
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